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Judicial corruption and organised crime are the main factors which have undermined the 
democratisation process and the strengthening of the rule of law in the Western Balkans. 
Organised crime and corruption are so entrenched that they have been cited as two key 
obstacles to the admission of Albania to European Union membership in 2011. In Albania, as in 
many Western Balkans countries, the democratic transition of the early 1990s has encountered 
many problems as institutional transformation has been put into practice. While many people 
envisioned a new democratic regime and retrospective justice for the excesses of prior 
community officials, many former members of the politburo retain key positions in the economy 
and politics today. They do so in a context where organised crime and judicial corruption 
flourish. Albania scores poorer than any other country in the Western Balkans on judicial 
corruption. 
Despite the massive consequences of judicial corruption and organised crime for post-
communist societies, research on their nexus is rare. The literature is limited for the most part 
just to describing general patterns and consequences of the phenomenon (Van Dijk 2007; 
Buscaglia and van Dijk 2003). The academic discourse does little to explore the causes of judicial 
corruption and its links to organised crime (Buscaglia and van Dijk 2003; Della Porta 2001; 
Ruggiero 2000; Della Porta and Vannucci 1999; Gambeta 1993; Paoli 2003). There are only a few 
studies on organised crime and corruption in the Western Balkans (Giatzidis 2007; Stojarová 
2007; Transcrime 2004; Holmes 2009; Dobovšek 2006; Arsovska 2008; Trimcev 2002). 
Within this narrow context, this thesis explores the interplay of judicial corruption and organised 
crime in the Western Balkans with the case study of Albania. This research is socio-legal in its 
nature and looks at both social and institutional aspects of the phenomenon. The framework 
adopted combines qualitative and quantitative methods. It included 61 semi-structured 
interviews; the observation of court proceedings in urban and rural courts for 14 days; archival 
research of 31 files and secondary data analysis of judicial corruption during the modern period 
of the Albanian state (1912-2011); as well as the review of several international and local 
reports on corruption and crime in Albania. 
This thesis argues that in post-communist societies there are different categories of judges who 
struggle for power. A high level of judicial corruption favours corrupt judges over honest ones 
and this also influences social disparity among different categories of judges inside the judiciary. 
This class division might create an internal conflict between judges and erode the efficiency of 
the judiciary. It is also argued that if the social status of judges is low, then judges may develop 
their own subculture and claim a higher status in society. This may push judges to deviance. 
The rise of corruption in the judiciary weakens the violent patterns of organised crime to 
influence the judiciary. This strengthens the role of bribes in corrupting judges. As a result, an 
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ongoing ‘clientelist’ relationship between organised crime and judicial corruption is more likely. 
Sophisticated organised crime groups tend to establish permanent relations with judicial 
corruption, whereas less developed organised crime prefers sporadic contacts. Judicial 
corruption opens opportunities for powerful elites and organised crime to gain by influencing 
the judiciary. It helps corrupt judges to get promoted because they have the financial means. 
Contrary to the limited existing literature, customary norms such as ‘Krahinizem’ (regionalism) 
and ‘Kanun’ (codified customary norms) do not play as significant a role in the corruption of 
modern urban courts as previously expected. ‘Clientelistic’ family relationships exert a kind of 
asymmetrical relationship with judicial corruption – sometimes they may promote particularism 
but family honour on the part of judges may also work to prevent it. It is also noted that blood 
feud continues to play a significant role in shaping the incentive of judges for corruption and 
also the motivation of organised crime for recruitment in the hinterland. 
A distinctive finding of this research is that in societies where there is successive disruption of 
the judicial systems through political transition and lack of consolidated democratic legal 
culture, judicial corruption is more likely. 
This study brings some important contributions to the literature of corruption and crime in post-
communist societies. Methodologically, this thesis is the only work that draws on legal history, 
criminology, jurisprudence and public law for the analysis of the links between judicial 
corruption and organised crime. 
And finally, this research is among very few works that attempt to theorise empirically judicial 
corruption in the context of organised crime in post-communist societies. From the 
criminological aspect, this study for the first time draws attention to the subculture of judges 
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ORGANISED CRIME AND JUDICIAL CORRUPTION: 
DEMOCRATIC TRANSFORMATION AND 





Corruption, organised crime and money laundering1 are major obstacles to democratic 
transition and to justice in Albania. Organised crime in the Western Balkans includes but is 
not limited to trafficking of persons, drugs and arms; document forgery and identity fraud; 
and car theft for export rings. Organised crime creates unfavourable conditions for foreign 
investment and growth while constructing havens for terrorism and perpetuating violent 
crime (Buscaglia and Van Dijk 2003; Glenny 2008). Judicial corruption and organised crime 
undermine the centrality of judicial independence to the rule of law and democracy (Van 
Dijk 2007: Della-Porta 2001; Ruggiero 2000). 
One of the biggest concerns regarding the strength of organised crime in the Western 
Balkans is its success in corrupting the judiciary and law enforcement agencies (Giatzidis 
2007; Stojarová 2007). Exploitation of the judiciary by organised crime and consequent 
subversion of the rule of law are critical obstacles in this region’s democratic progression.2 
There is a rise in significance of organised crime in the Western Balkans with an argued 
potential threat to the state.3 This region is considered as a ‘soft’ security threat to the 
European Union (EU) as the result of widespread corruption and crime there (Trauner 
2009). 
                                                          
1 Money Laundering are becoming a world wide concern and a real threat to political stability in 
developing countries. See Alexander K., Dhumale R., and Eatwell J. (2006) Global Governance of 
Financial Systems: The International Regulation of Systemic Risk, Oxford: Oxford University Press, p. 
31.   
2 See the statement on April 7, 2009 by Enlargement Commissioner Olli Rehn on the second round of 
the Presidential Elections in the Former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia emphasising that 
‘Important work remains in order to deliver results on judicial reform, the fight against corruption 
and reform of the civil service’; available at 
http://ec.europa.eu/commission_barroso/rehn/index_en.htm [accessed May 12, 2009]. 
3 See United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime (2008) ‘Crime and its Impact on the Balkans and 
Affected Countries’, March 2008. 
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Political corruption and judicial corruption are comparatively more prevalent in the 
Western Balkans than in any other part of Europe4 and they have also been cited by the EU 
as among the main barriers to Albania’s rejection of the candidate membership status in 
2011.5 Enforcement of state criminal and civil law remains weak and ineffective.6 
Despite these massive problems and wide-ranging implications, detailed research focusing 
on these problems remains scarce. Not until 2007 was the first comprehensive, report 
published that addressed judicial corruption as a worldwide concern (by Transparency 
International – TI). This study focused primarily on developing countries.7 Even this report, 
however, is limited to describing patterns (Rose-Ackerman 2007:15; Buscaglia 2007:67) and 
consequences (Papys 2007:3) of the phenomenon. It does little to explore the causes of 
judicial corruption (Colombo 2007:107; Kurkchiyan 2007:101). 
Subsequent reports by TI show that in the Western Balkans, the judiciary has been ranked 
as the most corrupt of any sector during the last decade.8 Judicial corruption has for this 
reason become a major challenge on the political agenda of almost all governments in the 
Western Balkans. Pressure from the EU has played a key role in highlighting this priority.9 
My research analyses the roots of judicial corruption in Albania and the Western Balkans 
and seeks to explain why reforms are not yielding more concrete results. It also explores 
the generation and dynamics of judicial corruption and its interplay with organised crime. 
What is particularly interesting is that, although criminal gangs have existed in the Western 
Balkans since the period of independence movements in the late 19th and early 20th 
centuries, transnational organised crime is relatively new (Dobovšek 2006). This means that 
                                                          
4 According to a Freedom House report in 2008, the West Balkans Corruption Ratings and Judicial 
Independence were 5.70 and 5.15 on a scale with 1 representing the highest and 7 the lowest; 
available at http://www.freedomhouse.org/template.cfm?page=42&year=2008 [accessed January 
15, 2009]. 
5 See ‘European Commission Opinion on Albania’s Application for Membership of the European 
Union’ (2010), p.11; available at 
http://ec.europa.eu/enlargement/pdf/key_documents/2010/package/al_opinion_2010_en.pdf 
[accessed March 28, 2012]. 
6 See Sherman, J. (2010) ‘Criminal Justice: Security and Justice Thematic Paper’, World Development 
Report 2011, p.4, November 9; available at 
http://www.justpal.org/LinkClick.aspx?fileticket=qt4xBuH6_w%3D&tabid=103&mid=449 [accessed 
June 2, 2012]. 
7 See chapter 7 of Transparency International’s Global Corruption Report 2007: Corruption in Judicial 
Systems (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press). 
8 See Transparency International annual reports: 2004 (p.11), 2005 (pp.14-16), 2006 (pp.19-21) and 
2007 (pp.9, 27, 38), where the corruption score for West Balkan countries remains high and the 
judiciary is one of the most corrupted sectors.  
9 See the EU enlargement strategy plan, whereas key challenging criteria to be fulfilled by Western 
Balkan countries are mostly related to the fight against corruption and crime. European Commission 
(2011) ‘Enlargement Strategy and Main Challenges 2011-2012’, p.4; available at 
http://ec.europa.eu/enlargement/pdf/key_documents/2011/package/strategy_paper_2011_en.pdf 
[accessed May 15, 2012]. 
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the life cycle of organised crime and its relationship with the judiciary can be studied within 
a relatively identifiable and finite period of time. 
The main prevailing arguments suggest that corruption and crime may flourish in the 
judicial system because of the restrained financial conditions of judges and lack of judicial 
independence (Buscaglia and Dacolias 1999: Buscaglia 2001; Voigt 2007; Rose-Ackerman 
2007; Shleiffer and Vishney 1993). The influence of customary norms on the rise of violence 
and crime in post-communist societies is another factor impacting upon judicial corruption 
(Arsovska and Verduyn 2008; Grutzpalk 2002). 
The literature suggests that in transition societies the weakness of state institutions may 
also be a significant condition for organised crime to flourish and strengthen. Judicial 
corruption thus may push people to turn to organised crime and ask for their ‘service’ to 
protect and enforce property rights (Habermas 1998; Gambeta 1993; Paoli 2003; Varese 
2012). 
Within this wider context, I set out to explore the interplay of judicial corruption and 
organised crime. This research is socio-legal in nature as it looks at both social and 
institutional aspects of the phenomenon. The focus of my research is upon the position and 
the discretion of judges in and out of the court structure, including, the constitutional 
framework and institutional arrangements of judicial independence, patterns in the nature 
and causes of judges’ behaviour and, in particular, social factors in their decision-making in 
cases before them. 
In this first chapter, I define judicial corruption and highlight several definitions key for the 
research. This chapter also explores the intricate nature of judicial corruption and its 
complicated interplay with organised crime. In Chapter 2 I explore the literature on the 
causes of judicial corruption and ask why reforms are not yielding success. In light of the 
lack of a substantial theoretical discourse on the causes of judicial corruption in the context 
of organised crime, especially in the Western Balkans, I turn to three theories of corruption 
and organised crime generally: (1) Economic theory, (2) Social control theory and (3) 
Democratic legitimation theory. 
My research design, documented in Chapter 3, details a case study that used primarily 
qualitative methods to create a portrait of judicial corruption and its links with organised 
crime in Albania. It was based largely on interviews with persons uniquely situated to have 
special or ‘expert’ knowledge of the problem. The study also relied on archival research, 
direct observation of courtroom activity and secondary data analysis. 
In Chapters 4 and 5 I describe judicial corruption in Albania and elaborate its landscape. 
The logic of these chapters is interpretive and the method of interpretation is essentially 
comparative. From the literature, a standard model of judicial conduct was specified. Then 
data drawn primarily from fieldwork were used to compare judicial practice in the various 
Albanian courts to this standard model. Where practice varies among courts (e.g. from 
urban to rural areas), systematic comparisons were also made to identify patterns of 
variation among the courts within Albania. In Chapter 4 I elaborate on judicial 
independence as a key factor in judicial corruption, whereas in Chapter 5 I describe the 
influence of social context on the behaviour of judges. 
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Chapter 6 focuses more on organised crime and its consequences for judicial corruption. In 
this chapter I highlight how the typology of Albanian organised crime has changed over the 
20 years during the transition from communism to democracy, 1989-2011. I also highlight 
the interplay between organised crime and judicial corruption and explain its dynamics 
during the transition period. Key aspects of the typology of Albanian organised crime are 
also specified. 
Taking stock from the existing literature and drawing on my data, in Chapter7, I probe new 
factors for judicial corruption and original scenarios of the interplay between judicial 
corruption and organised crime. In light of my findings I then return to my research 
questions and answer them by drawing upon my theoretical framework. My arguments 
here point to different factors in explaining judicial corruption and its relationship with 
organised crime. 
Chapter 8 concludes, draws together the key findings of my research, the implications for 
policy and reform, and points to the need for further research. 
 
 
Defining Judicial Corruption 
 
To better understand the role of judicial corruption and its consequences in post-
communist societies, this section will develop two important notions. It will define judicial 
corruption – with particular reference to post-communist societies.10 The research will then 
compare state exploitation and political corruption (or grand corruption), on one hand, and 
judicial corruption, on the other. 
Judicial corruption will be defined in its broadest terms, including all actors in a court 
process: judges, prosecutors, lawyers, litigants, clerks, as well as court staff and officials 
employed by the Ministry of Justice. 
As mentioned earlier, TI’s definition is based on diverse observations of judicial corruption 
and is presented in its 2007 report. In that report, it defines corruption as ‘the abuse of 
entrusted power for private gain’, extending this concept to cover judicial corruption. It 
provides a working definition of judicial corruption as ‘the inappropriate influence on the 
impartiality of the judicial process by any actor within the court system’ (TI 2007:xxi). 
However, judicial corruption is an activity with many facets. This definition misses the 
interconnection with other webs of crime and fails to distinguish between appropriate and 
‘inappropriate influence’. Papys (2007) explains how complex judicial corruption is and how 
                                                          
10 For a wider picture of the problematic of the judiciary in post-communist courts in Europe and 
Central Asia see James H. Anderson and Cheryl Gray (2007) Transforming Judicial Systems in Europe 
and Central Asia (Washington, DC: World Bank, 2007); available at 
http://siteresources.worldbank.org/INTLAWJUSTINST/Resources/AndersonandGrayABCDEFinal.pdf 
[accessed March 15, 2010]. 
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carefully it should be observed in order to make clear what is judicial corruption and what 
is not. 
The TI study then explores some patterns of judicial corruption. It points, for example, to 
‘police tamper[ing] with evidence that supports a criminal indictment, or prosecutors 
fail[ing] to apply uniform criteria to evidence [facts or proof] generated by the police’. As 
another example, in states where the judiciary is highly politicised and high-level judges are 
appointed on political bases, then a constitutional right such as appeal could be 
undermined. In fact, the politicisation of appointments themselves may be considered as 
judicial corruption. According to TI, ‘Appeals [in such settings may] tend to favour the party 
with the deepest pockets [and with the strongest political connections]… [This means] that 
a party with limited resources, but a legitimate complaint, may not be able to pursue their 
case beyond the first instance’ (TI 2007:xxi). 
Safeguarding judges from threats and bribes is probably not enough in attempting to 
uproot judicial corruption. One of the most controversial definitional issues relates to 
cultural particularities (Colombo 2007:107; Papys 2007:4). Such particularities might 
constrain judges to hand down biased decisions. In illustrating this argument, Colombo 
(2007:107) shows how the decision of an Italian magistrate (judge) was affected by high 
pressure from the Italian public in a case where some key Italian national football players 
were accused of ‘match fixing’. He also implied that the decision of the Italian magistrate 
could have been affected by the Italian team’s win at the 2006 World Football 
Championship during the same period. 
Judicial corruption undermines the primary role of a judge which is to provide parties with 
a fair decision irrespective of their economic status or political background. In fact, one of 
the dangerous consequences to society could be the perception it promotes that breaches 
of the law are unlikely to be punished because there are safe harbours which might 
mitigate the risk of criminal prosecution such as judicial corruption (Papys 2007:3). A good 
law is as good as its enforcement and an efficient enforcement of a court’s decision 
requires that judge’s discretion be safeguarded and be independent from any public or 
private influence. 
On the other hand, too much discretion on the part of the judiciary might open gaps for 
abuse of this power. Therefore, lack of accountability and transparency of the judicial 
processes are also important components of the causes of judicial corruption. According to 
Rose-Ackerman (2007:15) the discretionary power of the judiciary is important and a fair 
balance between the independence and accountability of the judiciary needs to be 
established. Either too much independence or too much control can both risk corrupting 
the courts (Rios-Figueroa 2006). 
Misuse of funds by court administrators and judges is sometimes argued to be a form of 
judicial corruption. Even TI seems to accept the notion that ‘misuse…[of] scarce public 
funds that most governments are willing to allocate to justice’ is judicial corruption. The 
reasoning is that this weakens the judicial process. This is not always the case, however, as 
public officials’ abuse of office for personal profit or enrichment may meet the criteria for 
normal petty corruption. Thus, misuse of funds or the power of the office for personal gain 
need not constitute judicial corruption per se. Under some circumstances where such 
misuse jeopardises judicial functioning, it could also amount to judicial corruption. 
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In contrast with TI, Buscaglia (2001; 2007) provides a broader definition of judicial 
corruption. His framework is wider and it includes political and social factors. (2001:235) 
defines judicial corruption as ‘the use of public authority for the private benefit of court 
personnel when this use undermines the rules and procedures to be applied in the 
provision of court services’. Buscaglia (2001:235) classifies judicial corruption in two main 
types – administrative corruption and operational corruption. The first is when ‘court 
administrative employees violate formal or informal administrative procedures for their 
private benefit’. This ‘administrative corruption’ resembles TI’s definition. The second type 
is mostly regarded as the political influence on the course of court operations. As Buscaglia 
puts it, ‘operational corruption’ is a situation when courts and judges act as proxies of 
politics. Judicial corruption here is ‘usually part of grand corruption schemes where political 
and/or considerable economic interests are at stake’ (Buscaglia 2001:235). 
Based on the above discussion a more valuable definition which may help to better 
understand the pattern of judicial corruption in the Western Balkans is proposed as 
follows: judicial corruption is any form of undue influence that encourages a judge, willingly 
or otherwise, to take a decision which under the same circumstances and in the absence of 
undue influence, a reasonable judge, would not have otherwise taken. This influence can 
be either formally executed (i.e. institutional, social, economic and political) or informally 
implied (i.e. personal political beliefs, friendship relations, kinship, blackmail, coercion and 
bribe). 
What all the existing literature highlights is that many elements of judicial corruption (e.g. 
bribery, extortion, brain drain, political control of the judiciary, low quality judges, lack of 
ethics, poor infrastructure, etc.) are found in the majority of developing countries.11 This 
raises the question of whether it is the stage of development or other factors that give rise 
to this phenomenon. Therefore, one might ask whether judicial corruption is flourishing in 
the Western Balkans because of a relatively undeveloped understanding of democratic 
practice and the rule of law. Alternatively, might it be the abuse of liberal democracy’s 
principles by post-communist political elites that stimulates judicial corruption in the 
Western Balkans? 
By examining the conditions that have made this subversion possible, this thesis hopes to 
specify some of the empirical preconditions for establishing a liberal rule of law. In this 
sense, the implications of my study extend beyond the Western Balkans to other 






                                                          
11 For more see Transparency International (2007) Global Corruption Report 2007: Corruption in 
Judicial Systems (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press), pp.168-171. 
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State Exploitation or Political Corruption 
 
Having explained what judicial corruption means and illustrated some of its dynamics, I 
now contrast it with state exploitation and political corruption in post-communist societies. 
Here I seek to distinguish state exploitation and political corruption, on the one hand, and 
judicial corruption, on the other. 
As described above, judicial corruption means all inappropriate actions and undue 
influences which jeopardise the impartiality of the judiciary. I have shown that it can 
involve judges and prosecutors. It may also, according to many analysts, entail advocates 
and police alike (Buscaglia 2007). Any sort of economic, political or cultural pressure which 
might weaken the independence of the judiciary can be considered as judicial corruption. 
On the other hand, state exploitation involves the manipulation of state institutions, 
resources and/or power by political elites or parties to enhance their collective power 
(Gryzmala-Busse 2007). Privatisation and the politicised distribution of assets is one 
example. It may mean that the structuring of institutions and legal frameworks are shaped 
to serve governing elites’ or parties’ agendas rather than society. Where these ends are 
criminal, this activity is called state crime (Green and Ward 2004). In contrast, political 
corruption is misuse by officials of public power and resources for personal or partisan 
profit. Bribes for state contracts are a classic example. However, it should be emphasised 
that often both concepts overlap and it can be difficult in practice to differentiate them. 
In order to comprehend how these crimes operate in the Western Balkans, we first need to 
examine how the post-communist state works and how political parties govern the state in 
democratic transition. This study, therefore, now briefly develops the relationship between 
two fundamental actors in institution-building there: political parties and government. 
These actors are paramount to both the development of the state and to its exploitation or 
erosion through corruption. Where state exploitation occurs, it can be an important 
contributor to judicial corruption. Political appointments of corrupt judges can provide a 
safe harbour used by corrupt officials to maintain their status quo. 
For the purpose of this research, post-communist societies are recognised as having a long 
tradition of exploitative state relations – perhaps partly due to their utopian constitutional 
formations (Reiman 1987).12 In such a context, state exploitation tends to be a type of 
power resource. Political parties exploit the state to gain power which serves them in 
pursuing their political and personal agendas. In contrast, political corruption entails the 
misuse by the government or political officials of their governing powers and resources for 
illegitimate, usually secret, private gain.13 
In other words, exploiting the state gives parties political power to pursue their agendas, 
and political corruption is misuse of this state power for personal or particularistic non-
                                                          
12 Reiman (1987:3) defines an exploitative society as ‘when its social structure is organised so that 
unpaid labour is systematically forced out by one class and put at the disposal of another… On the 
force-inclusive definition of exploitation, any exploitative society is a form of slavery.’ 
13 See OECD (2007), definition of ‘political corruption’, Glossary of Statistical Terms, OECD; available 
at http://stats.oecd.org/glossary/detail.asp?ID=7290 [accessed February 15, 2009]. 
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party gain. In some cases, this state power may extend to control of the judiciary through 
executive or legislative mechanisms such as budgetary authorisation; Parliamentary 
consent on the nominations of Supreme and Constitutional Court judges; laws regulating 
judicial structure, conduct and accountability, among other things. Thus, judicial corruption 
can sometimes be a consequence of state exploitation or political corruption. This is 
because those who control the state might easily exploit or misuse the judiciary (Karklins 
2005). 
Many analysts argue that in post-communist societies, judicial corruption, state 
exploitation and political corruption have some specific patterns. In part, this is because 
transitions to democracy differ and each state’s trajectory had its own characteristics. The 
shift of the political regime included at the same time changes in politics, economy, and 
cultural behaviour. For instance, Poland and Hungary followed a more institutional and 
law-based path to democracy; others like Romania and Albania experienced massive 
demonstrations and greater upheaval (Ekiert 2003:89-92). Fledgling political parties rushed 
to take advantage of the old regime’s destruction to increase their dominance in the new 
institution-building, sometimes for personal gain (Gryzmala-Busse 2007:2). 
To maintain access to state exploitation, post-communist parties did not rely on the classic 
patterns used by their counterparts in the West like the establishment of clientelist14 
networks or effective political programmes. The concept of ‘clientelism’ in developing 
countries combines the Weberian concept of patrimonialism with the rational-legal form 
otherwise known as ‘neopatrimonialism’ (Eisenstadt 1973) in which a neopatrimonial 
administration makes no distinction between the public and private sphere and disguises 
its patrimonial behaviour behind a legal outfit (Ward and Green 2004:22). 
Thus the capacity for the post-communist elite for corruption arose out of the construction 
of the new state. This included new institutions and legal frameworks. In other words, the 
state was exploited through formation of institutions and laws tailored to further the 
political parties’ interests (Holmes 1997:337). As Anna Gryzmala-Busse (2007:31) states: 
‘Parties politicised the privatisation and distribution of state assets for their own benefit 
and skimmed directly, as part of a larger system of an unregulated and unrestricted party 
funding.’ 
Therefore, state exploitation is a party-state relationship and this relationship is based on 
the use of political power for party interests. It is important to emphasise that the 
interrelation between state and political parties, though grounded in a dialectical process, 
is analytically a bit like that of the chicken and the egg (Holmes 2006:190). It is not always 
clear in such transformative situations whose interests historically congealed first – those 
of the political parties or those of the state. 
The insularity of politics in transitional societies is another factor which has fostered the 
politicisation of institutions. Insularity allows elite control to grow strong. It is quite 
                                                          
14 In the context of this study I have borrowed Green and Ward’s (2004:21) definition of 
‘clientelism’: a ‘pattern of social exchange between patrons, normally the holders of political 
administrative offices, and clients, who may be private citizens, business or more junior officials. The 
patron exercises power or influence in favour of the client, who reciprocates by offering electoral, 
political donations or personal gifts.’ 
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impossible in societies like Albania to gain employment in public administration without 
having a reference from the party elite (Cepiku 2004). The reasons are many but 
traditionally, political employment was outsourced only to individuals attached to political 
parties, both for security reasons and to retain it as a resource for ‘clientelism’ (Vickers and 
Pettifer 2007). In other words to maintain the machinery of corruption, governing elites 
sought to secure control of state functions through allocation of offices by means of rent-
seeking arrangements or exchange of favours between state and non-state actors (business 
or criminal networks) (Kopecký 2006). 
In contrast with Western traditions, political parties in the post-communist Western 
Balkans were not a product of civil society or legitimised interest groups. They were a 
legacy of post-communist elites. The development of political parties was strictly attached 
to an agenda of state exploitation. To that end, the political ruling party recruited ‘people 
who live from politics rather than for politics’ (Kopecký 2006:253). 
On the other hand, despite commonalities, political corruption in the Western Balkans has 
been framed in terms of particular patterns. These patterns are related to the ‘monopoly’ 
power of the state – an attitude inherited from the former regime (Krastev 2002; Prato 
2004). The monopoly was based on decision-making and institutional control. In fact, 
sometimes post-communist corruption is conceptualised as ‘stealing the state’ or ‘state 
capture’ (Karklins 2005). 
Thus, in a way quite similar to state exploitation, political corruption is also about political 
power, state capture and misuse of public discretion – but in this case for personal 
interests (Amundsen 1999). Therefore, it is ‘the state’ involvement factor which has made 
researchers ‘[consider] corruption as a state-society relationship. This is [important] 
because public sector corruption is believed to be a more fundamental problem than 
private sector corruption, and because controlling public sector corruption is a prerequisite 
for controlling private sector corruption’ (Andvig and Fjeldstad 2001). 
It should be mentioned, however, that although state exploitation might appear similar to 
political corruption, they are not identical (Holmes 2006:190). It is argued that there are 
interchangeable elements between them (rent seeking,15 clientelism, bribes16) but there 
are also differences as noted above (Kopecký 2006:259-260). However, when pressed to 
list the differences, many admit that there is ambiguity and it is not always easy to 
distinguish them clearly (Gryzmala-Busse 2007:27). 
 
 
                                                          
15 Khan (2000:21) defines rent seeking as ‘the expenditure of resources and effort in creating, 
maintaining, or transferring rents…[which can] also be illegal, as in the case of bribes, illegal political 
contributions, expenditures on private mafias, and so on.’ 
16 Bribery is defined as the ‘offering, promising, giving, accepting or soliciting of an advantage as an 
inducement for an action which is illegal or a breach of trust’. See TI’s ‘Business Principles for 
Countering Bribery’ (2009) p.5; available at 
http://www.cgu.gov.br/conferenciabrocde/arquivos/English-Business-Principles-for-Countering-
Bribery.pdf [accessed May 20, 2009]. 
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Judicial Corruption in Post-Communist Societies 
 
Judicial corruption is very complex and relates with many aspects of society’s rules and 
institutions. Judicial corruption in post-communist Europe differs by country, region, and 
period of time. To demonstrate its existence and trends I will use both TI’s Corruption 
Perception Indicator and also Freedom House indicators. The differences between their 
surveys are minimal (Holmes 2006:106-120). 
One might imagine that, as the result of political transition, the level of judicial corruption 
in the Western Balkans was high only during the early 1990s. Figures show, however, that, 
even after ten years of transition, the indicator for corruption of the judiciary remains 
critical. Holmes (2006:133-136), in an extensive survey, classified judges in post-communist 
countries as highly corrupt. In his analysis of official and non-official sources, some 
indicators suggested that judicial corruption might play an important part in generating 
corruption as a whole. 
To this end, if the judiciary proves to be corrupted and inefficient in its dealings with 
criminal cases, criminality is likely to increase (Buscaglia and Van Dijk 2003). The public may 
lose confidence in justice; and corrupted officials, confident that the chances of being 
sentenced for their misdeeds would be small, could intensify their corrupt activities. 
Therefore, a strong judiciary is vital in dealing with corruption and crime. In what seems a 
paradox, however, according to Holmes (2006) the most corrupt countries seem to have 
low criminal rates. Countries like Albania which are ranked at the top of the list of most 
perceived corrupted countries have questionable records regarding criminality. Sweden, 
for example, had a reported crime rate 185 times higher than that of Albania (Holmes 
2006:90-91). Thus, criminal statistics in Albania should be regarded with caution as they do 
not often present the reality. They are frequently manipulated and reported by the 
executive in a way that intends to portray anti-corruption reforms and the war against 
crime as successful (Shaw, Van Dijk and Rhomberg 2003). 
This asymmetry of low crime rate versus high level of corruption is explained by Holmes in 
different ways, almost all of which lead to lack of trust in the institutions dealing with 
criminality. One factor is social, as people do not report criminal cases because they find 
self-justice more suitable and more respected in their society. Another factor is 
institutional since a majority of public officials in cases involving criminal activities such as 
bribery, fraud or embezzlement are not convicted. 
According to Holmes’s data, the differential between cases reported to the authorities and 
those convicted is high in countries like Bulgaria and Hungary. Less than 50% of the cases 
involving corruption are convicted by the courts. In Bulgaria during 1997 and 1998, the 
ratio between cases reported/convicted was less than 20% (1997, 95/26 and 1998, 
136/21). However, there was an improvement (reported cases/convicted cases) during 
1999 and 2000 when the percentage increased from approximately 20% to almost 50% 
with 52/25 in 1999 and 59/21 in 2000. In Hungary, figures at first appear more promising 
but what is noticeable is the lack of a positive progression. In a three-year period, roughly 
half of the pending cases received a court verdict (1998, 902/274; 1999, 609/289; and 
2000, 650/274) (Holmes 2006:98-99). 
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Hence, these data suggest another risk indicator of judicial corruption: the ratio between 
reported and sentenced cases. The lower the ratio the higher could be grounds for 
suspicion of judicial corruption (Karklins 2005:34-35). In the context of my study, this may 
also show that not only judges but also state police and prosecutors may play an active part 
in judicial corruption. So cases may be reported by people but they may be closed 
afterwards by corrupt state police or prosecutors and not sent to the courts for further 
proceedings. This pattern could be associated with all post-communist countries in Europe 
including Russia (Holmes 2006:93-95). It should be emphasised that the practice of 
corruption across post-communist countries is very similar (Karklins 2005:19; Kurkchiyan 
2003). 
A new form of state patronage is linked with the inherited communist ideology of 
governance (White 2009). Control of the state by a few (e.g. dictator and his closed circle) 
in the name of all (i.e. the ‘people’) changed gradually during the democratic 
transformation. The new form of governance now consists of few in the name of a few (i.e. 
political elites) (Holmes 2009; Krastev 2002). This is because state institutions, including the 
judiciary, appear to have been captured by political elites. 
Many examples show that the courts have been used politically since democratic transition 
in order to pursue the agenda of these elites (Popova 2010).The double standard of 
decisions rendered by high-level courts in many post-communist countries on political 
elections is one indicator of the links between judges and political elite. For instance, they 
tend to render decisions in favour of the most likely political party to win the elections 
(Trochev 2006). If the new government criticised the court this meant that the judges’ 
predictions were wrong (ibid). Whether to call it a warning signal indicating a lack of judicial 
independence or bad betting on behalf of the judges trying to protect their status quo, 
both could be considered features of judicial corruption. 
One striking pattern of judicial corruption that is especially frequent in post-communist 
Russia is known as ‘telephone justice’ (Ledeneva 2008).17 It is well known by society as an 
element of corruption embodied in the courts. In a survey designed by Professor Alena 
Ledeneva (‘telefonnoye pravo’), only 6.4% of Russian respondents reported that nothing 
but the law influenced judges’ decisions in the courts, while 6.1% voiced this view for 
procurators’ offices (ibid:340). 
Another staggering pattern of judicial corruption appears in complicated laws made 
purposely to confuse the system. A chaotic net of laws can provide space for corrupted 
judges or prosecutors to escape from criminal charges or use them for their interests. As 
Rasma Karklins (2002:29) puts it, ‘Lawyers…[sometimes] become short-term legislators in 
order to come up with complicated laws…[and] then return to private practice where they 
command high fees as the sole experts who can negotiate the same confusing laws.’  
The high levels of perceived judicial corruption in the Balkans and Eastern Europe18 might 
be assumed to be the result of the economic and political transformations of the 1990s. 
                                                          
17 According to Karkins  ‘telephone justice’ is when ‘Communist party  leaders would pick up the 
telephone and call prosecutors and judges and tell them what outcome the party expected in 
specific cases’ (quoted at Ledeneva 2006:25). 
18 See the World Bank, Business Environment & Enterprise Performance Surveys (BEEPS), Albania 
12 
According to a BEEPS report of 2005, figures continue to worsen even after the key 
transitional years in terms of the judiciary and the spread of corruption in the Western 
Balkans. Albania continues to score poorer than any other country in the region on 
corruption and corrupt functioning of the judiciary19 even in the last decade (see Figure 1). 
 
Figure 1 Rule of Law, Comparison Across Western Balkans Countries for 2009 
 
Source: Kaufmann, D., Kraay, A. and Mastruzzi, M. (2009) ‘The Worldwide Governance 







                                                                                                                                                                    
2005; available at 
http://siteresources.worldbank.org/INTECAREGTOPANTCOR/Resources/BAAGREV20060208Albania.
pdf, [accessed December 10,2009].  
19 See IDRA (2006) ‘Corruption in Albania: Perception and Experience Survey 2006’; available at 
http://www.idra-al.org/pdf/en/Findings_Survey2006_Corruption_Perception_IDRA_web.pdf 










Judicial Corruption in Albania 
 
In Albania, as in many Western Balkan countries, the transformation from the communist 
system to democracy was more ideological rather than institutional. Many individuals of 
the former regime are employed and continue to steer new democratic institutions 
(Vickers and Pettifer 2007). Several attempts in early 1995 by the Democratic Party (DP) to 
achieve legal reforms pretended to purge the new democratic system of the remnants of 
the old system. The results were at best partially successful. As Austin and Ellison 
(2009:176) point out: 
 
‘Albania’s post-communist justice is about the selective destruction of the past not 
an attempt to deal with it. At different times between 1991 and 1997, the banner 
of lustration was held aloft by both left and right wing parties in order to justify 
political purges carried out purely to weaken their opponents. … what we have 
seen taken place in Albania is primarily politically-inspired vengeance rather than 
an attempt to deal with the past in a constructive and objective way.’ 
 
Thus, the political transition opened gaps for the governing elites to control and abuse 
independent institutions including the judiciary. Organised crime flourished and corruption 
arose in almost all public institutions.20 Though many anti-corruption reforms have been 
made in different sectors, corruption in the judiciary remains problematic.21 Judicial 
corruption is still endemic. The judiciary is perceived as the most corrupted public 
institution by Albanians, especially in urban areas.22 The national perception that 
corruption prevails within the judiciary increased from 71.7% in 2004 to 74.7% in 2005. In 
urban areas there has been a steady decrease from 82.9% in 2004 to 75.2% in 2006.23 
There is another variation between national and urban perceptions and it relates to 
institutions fighting corruption. Whereas the General Prosecutor’s Office has been 
classified as the most corrupt by the general public, people living in urban areas have 
                                                          
20 The EU Instrument for Pre-Accession Assistance (IPA), programmed to help the West Balkans to 
join the EU, emphasises that ‘The fight against corruption and organized crime is defined as a top 
priority in the EU Communication on Enlargement Strategy and Main Challenges 2007-2008. 
Corruption is widespread in the region and deeply rooted in society, organized crime remains a 
serious concern. … measures taken are not commensurate with the magnitude of the problem.’ For 
more see European Commission (2008), Instrument for Pre-Accession Assistance (IPA); Multi-Annual 
Indicative Planning Document (MIPD) 2008-2010 Multi Beneficiary, European Commission; available 
at http://ec.europa.eu/enlargement/pdf/mipd_multibeneficiary_2008_2010_en.pdf [accessed 
March 20, 2009). 
21 See American Bar Association report (2008) ‘Judicial Reform Index for Albania 2008’, American Bar 
Association, Central and Eastern European Law Initiative (ABA/CEELI).  
22 See IDRA (2006) ‘Corruption in Albania: Perception and Experience Survey 2006’, pp.5-6.  
23 Ibid, pp.6-7. 
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depicted the judiciary as their least corrupt sector.24 However, both nationall and urban 
perceptions are similar in pointing to the judiciary as the least transparent institution.25 
With slight improvements, the general perception of people on the judiciary remained 
critical even during 2008-09. According to the 2010 corruption survey by the Institute for 
Development Research and Alternatives (IDRA) in Albania, only ‘35.9% of the respondents 
declared that they trust the judicial system either “A lot” or to “Some” degree’.26 
As mentioned above, one of the most distinguishing features of corruption in post-
communist societies is the control of independent institutions by political elites. A good 
example of this control is how the Albanian government tried to use the Law of Lustration – 
or, as the Albanian media refers to it, the law of ‘spies’ or ‘files’. According to Jirina Šiklová 
(1999:254), ‘Lustration is the process of screening individuals in positions of political 
economic influence in order to determine whether they once had ties to the former state 
security service. Screening of current and future state officials and employees aims to 
determine the extent of their collaboration with the former secret police.’ 
In Albania, the wording of the lustration law is very broad and ambiguous.27 It gives to the 
executive extensive and highly discretionary power to target anyone they consider to have 
had a key role in notorious ‘political processes’ during the communist regime. This law, 
enacted to foster universalism, has become an instrument of particularistic interests 
(Austin and Ellison 2009:188). 
Though it is estimated that more than 30 prosecutors, let alone judges, could legitimately 
be purged under the Albanian lustration law, officials who tolerated corruption were left 
untouched.28 Some of the prosecutors, who were targeted in 2009, were investigating 
important files where high profile politicians were being accused of corruption. On January 
15, 2009, the leading prosecutor of the most controversial case for the last five years (i.e. 
Gerdeci),29 Zamir Shtylla, asked the General Prosecutor Ina Rama to be released from all his 
                                                          
24 Ibid, p.11. 
25 Ibid, pp.13-14. 
26 See IDRA (2010) ‘Corruption in Albania: Perceptions and Experiences 2010’, p.24. 
27 See the US Department of State, ‘2008 Human Rights Report: Albania’, which notes that ‘On 
December 22, the parliament passed a controversial “lustration” law, which is expected to allow for 
the dismissal from public office of a wide range of officials who participated in “political processes” 
while serving in higher-level government positions under the communist regime, including judges, 
and prosecutors, and law enforcement officers. The vague wording of the law gives the government 
wide discretion in determining what “political processes” means, thereby allowing it considerable 
latitude in determining if an official should be dismissed from duty’. Available at 
http://www.state.gov/g/drl/rls/hrrpt/2008/eur/119064.htm [accessed January 20, 2009]. 
28 See the declaration of the then spokesman of the Democratic Party parliamentarian group (the 
majority) Aldo Bumci asking for an immediate resignation of six members of the Albanian 
Constitutional Court. Shqip Gazette (2009) ‘Bumci: Members of the Constitutional Court subject of 
the lustration law should leave’ (Te ikin anetaret e Kushtetueses qe preken nga dosjet), January 19. 
29 Sokolaj, T. (2009) ‘Head prosecutor of ‘Gerdeci’ case: Withdraw from the undue influences’ 
(Kryehetuesi i Gërdecit: Iki nga presionet). Panorama Gazette, January 15. 
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functions on this case. He based his resignation on ‘numerous political pressures exerted 
on him publicly’. 
The Albanian lustration law has been harshly criticised for its broadness and politicisation 
by international bodies monitoring democracy (OSCE) and human rights (ODHIR). These 
groups highlight that the law needs revision to ‘meet international standards’ and that, as it 
is, it presents ‘serious constitutional and political’ problems.30 The US embassy in Tirana 
was even more straightforward in its statement that: ‘we are deeply concerned. This law 
has raised serious legal, governmental, and constitutional questions among Albania’s 
international partners, including the United States. We call on the Government of Albania 
to take immediate steps in consultation with national and international experts to ensure 
that this law would meet international standards.’31 
Similar incursions have been made by the powerful into judicial actions across the 
spectrum of law. It should also be emphasised that the law was ‘frozen’ by the 
Constitutional Court after being challenged by the opposition party. In a majority vote of 7 
to 2, the court suspended the law and decided to ask the Venice Commission32 for an 
‘amicus curiae’ opinion. Several judges of this court were subject to this law, but according 
to the Opinion of the Venice Commission ‘the lawmaker has failed to meet its obligation to 
provide, through an organic provision, for the ability of the Court to examine the 
constitutionality of the Lustration law even in cases of lustration leading to a conflict of 
interest with some of the judges’.33 In 2010, after receiving this ‘Opinion’, the 
Constitutional Court found the ‘Law of Lustration’ unconstitutional.34 
The decision procedure followed by the court echoes the previous patterns of judicial 
corruption in post-communist societies. First, the high-level courts can fractionate or 
provide double-standard decisions on political grounds. In this case, the Constitutional 
Court used the balance mechanism of the Venice Commission opinion to avoid political 
pressure and to take advantage of the national elections taking place just three months 
later. This decision of the Constitutional Court may also indicate that old system judges 
who are still part of the system probably keep alive informal links to sustain the agenda of 
political elites. Or this decision may have been in the form of gratitude to the Socialist Party 
(SP; now in opposition) which in 1998 intervened in the formulation of the Law of 
                                                          
30 For more see the OSCE press release on December 22, 2008; available at 
http://www.osce.org/item/35778.html [accessed February 5, 2009]. 
31 See statement from the US Embassy, December 23, 2008; available at 
http://tirana.usembassy.gov/08pr_1218.html [accessed February 6, 2009]. 
32 The Venice Commission is the European Commission for Democracy Through Law with the primary 
task of advising its members on constitutional matters. Opinions of the Venice Commission are not 
binding; however they have a great political impact, especially in countries with fragile democracies. 
Usually the expertise provided by this Commission is reflected in laws for which the opinion is 
sought. Available at http://www.venice.coe.int/site/main/Presentation_E.asp [accessed January 20, 
2012]. 
33 See the Amicus Curiae Opinion of the European Commission for Democracy Through Law (Venice 
Commission) (2009) ‘The Law on the Cleanliness of the Figure of the High Functionaries of the Public 
Administration and Elected Persons’, issued October 9-10, p.11. 
34 See the Decision of the Constitutional Court no.9 dated March 23, 2010. 
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Verification (i.e. a former lustration attempt) and excluded judges and prosecutor from any 
inquiry (Austin and Ellison 2009:192). 
It is worth mentioning here that, similarly when the Lustration Commission was operating 
under the auspices of the SP, the first ‘spy’ detected was the head of the Constitutional 
Court – at that time Mr Rustem Gjata. This move was not considered to be part of a well-
intentioned move to purge the system of old remnants of the former regime. Instead, some 
analysts argued that this political step was a calculated move by the SP to secure the 
approval of the new constitution that would be introduced by them just months later 
(Austin and Ellison 2009:193; Baze 2008). 
This is a pessimistic scenario regarding quick and positive transformation of the judiciary as 
many reforms designed to undermine the power of post-communist elites could be barred 
by high court judges. Aldo Bumci, the representative of the DP parliamentarian group in 
2009, evoked this problem by openly asking for the resignation of six Constitutional Court 
judges.35 Second, the lustration law is used to re-populate the judiciary and prosecution 
with partisan judges and prosecutors. Finally, this law is also been used to pressure 
members of parliament, supporters of position and of opposition parties which disagree 
with the ‘progressive’ reforms of the governing elites (Bezhani 2002). In the entire political 
history of Albania after the 1990s no significant attempt or legal reform has been made to 




Organised Crime and Judicial Corruption 
 
Organised crime often plays an important role in relation to judicial corruption. That 
interplay seems, however, to have found little space in the academic analysis of organised 
crime. In the following pages, I begin by defining organised crime and highlight some 
characteristics of Albanian organised crime. Then, in the last part of the chapter, I explore 
how organised crime interrelates with judicial corruption and what some specifics of this 
linkage might generally be. 
Organised crime schemes and networks are diverse and very complicated. They operate 
under deep secrecy and very secure connections. These are some of the reasons which 
explain why most information on the nature of organised crime comes from journalists’ 
articles and the personal experiences of former criminals (Arsovska 2008). Despite that, 
many analysts have offered some interesting depiction of and analyses of mechanisms 
used by organised crime (Williams and Godson 2002). My own research explores one of the 
practices used by criminal groups to undermine the rule of law – namely corruption of the 
judiciary. 
                                                          
35 Shqip Gazette (2009) ‘Bumci: Judges of the Constitutional Court affected by the lustration law 
must leave’ (Bumçi: Të ikin anëtarët e Kushtetueses që preken nga dosjet), January 19. 
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Organised crime has many definitions and each country has given considerable emphasis to 
it in their penal frameworks/codes (Levi 1998; Paoli 2002). The diversity of definitions 
shows the intricate structure of this crime (Levi and Maguire 2004). Albanese (2000:410), 
points out four elements which constitute organised crime: ‘a continuing organization, an 
organization that operates rationally for profit, the use of force or threats, and the use of 
corruption to maintain immunity from law enforcement’. 
 
 
Albanian Organised Crime 
 
According to the literature, organised crime in Albania has a particular structure which is 
based on kinship ties and customary norms. The role of geography and ethnicity are some 
other elements which are considered (Transcrime 2004:39). Albanian criminals usually 
operate in small groups and their membership varies from three to ten members per cell. 
They function differently and independent from other similar ethnic groups in the region. 
Some of their distinguishing patterns are violence, brutality, high secrecy and 
determination (Raufer 2002).  
One of the most highlighted elements of Albanian organised crime is violence (Arsovska 
2008). Many analysts have suggested that Albanian culture and customary laws may be the 
main stimulus for the violence of organised crime in this society (Arsovska and Verduyn 
2008; Stojarová 2007). They have also argued that the archetype of Albanian organised 
crime resembles those in Italy, like the Ndrangheta which bases its strength on close family 
ties and the security of kinship.36 
Albanian gangs are noted to be cautious to preserve the ethnic component intact and do 
not mix with other nationalities.37 It is argued that because of this kinship-based structure, 
Albanian organised crime is very difficult to infiltrate by law enforcement agencies or other 
criminal groups (Xhudo 1996). Due to Albania’s geographic location many criminal routes 
pass through Albanian lands and engage local organised crime networks. As a top Italian 
Prosecutor Cataldo Motta declared, ‘Everything passes via the Albanians. The road for 
drugs and arms and people, meaning illegal immigrants destined for Europe, is in Albanian 
hands.’38 
                                                          
36 See the report of Senator Alberto Maritati (2002) ‘Organised Crime in the Balkans with Reference 
to Albania’, November 16, Rome; available at 
http://www.cespi.it/Rotta/Ascodcriminalit%C3%A0/maritati.PDF [accessed February 20, 2009]. 
37 For more see Europol (2008) ‘European Organised Crime Threat Assessment (OCTA) 2008’; 
available at 
http://www.europol.europa.eu/publications/European_Organised_Crime_Threat_Assessment_(OCT
A)/OCTA2008.pdf [accessed March 10, 2009]. 
38 See BBC News (2000) ‘Albanian Mafia Steps Up People Smuggling’, August 3; available at 
http://news.bbc.co.uk/1/hi/world/europe/863620.stm [accessed May 25, 2009]. 
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According to Europol, today Albanian criminal groups have ties throughout Europe and 
America.39 They often have entered areas as subcontractors of local organised crime 
there.40  
Gradually they have emerged as an independent force (Ruggiero 2000).41 Using this 
approach, they have seized power in some areas from even the fierce Camorra groups in 
Italy42 and have partially subverted what remains of La Cosa Nostra’s leadership of 
organised crime in America (Frieden 2004; Saviano 2007). 
In addition, it is reported that Albanian organised crime invests illicit profit in legitimate 
business and often uses legal enterprises as camouflage. Many corrupt public officials take 
part as members of the unit.43 The level of organised crime in Albania is still critical. To 
illustrate, Turkey with a population of more than 75 million people recorded only 47 
criminal groups in 2000 (i.e. 5% of the Turkey’s population), whereas in Albania, with a far 
smaller population, the number of criminal groups reported was 23 or 50% less than 
Turkey.44 
The situation seems to be deteriorating, as over a period of eight years (2000-08) the 
number of criminal groups in Albania doubled. According to the Albanian state police the 
number of apprehended and captured criminal groups for 2008 amounted to 40.45 At the 
same time, other ethnic Albanian organised crime rings like those from Kosovo controlled 
70% of massage parlours in Soho, London during 2000-03 where prostitution was a 
‘supplementary’ service (Väyrynen 2003). 
                                                          
39 Europol (2011) ‘EU Organised Crime Threat Assessment (OCTA) 2011’, April 28; available at 
https://www.europol.europa.eu/sites/default/files/publications/octa_2011.pdf [accessed December 
6, 2011]. 
40 See the testimony of Grant D. Ashley, Assistant Director, Criminal Investigative Division, FBI 
Before the Subcommittee on European Affairs, Committee on Foreign Relations United States 
Senate, October 30, 2003; available at http://www.fbi.gov/congress/congress03/ashley103003.htm 
[accessed May 15, 2009]. 
41 See Europol (2008) ‘European Organised Crime Threat Assessment (OCTA) 2008’; available at 
http://www.europol.europa.eu/publications/European_Organised_Crime_Threat_Assessment_(OCT
)/OCTA2008.pdf [accessed March 15, 2009]. 
42 According to Europol (2004), ‘Camorra organisations do not allow much room for foreign 
organisations. However, some foreign groups, especially Albanian, Nigerian and Chinese have 
acquired some autonomy in managing [the] drug trafficking, exploitation of prostitution and the 
black market [activities] of their…clandestine compatriots.’ See Europol (2004) ‘European Union 
Organised Crime Report 2004’; available at 
http://www.europol.europa.eu/publications/Organised_Crime_Reportsin_2006_replaced_by_OCTA
/EUOrganisedCrimeSitRep2004.pdf [accessed March 20, 2009]. 
43 Report on the Organised Crime Situation in Council of Europe Member States, Council of Europe, 
Strasbourg, December 2000; available at 
http://www.coe.int/t/dghl/cooperation/economiccrime/organisedcrime/Report2000E.pdf [accessed 
April 25, 2009]. 
44 Ibid. 
45 See Albanian State Police annual report 2008, in Albanian; available at 
http://asp.gov.al/2008/dhjetor/analiza-vjetore-prezantimi.pdf [accessed May 15, 2009]. 
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Having explained some characteristics of Albanian organised crime generated from the 
literature I now turn to techniques that organised crime uses to corrupt the judiciary. As 
stated above, due to its complexity, it is difficult to have a classical definition of organised 
crime. Many organised crime groups have hierarchical structures with solid discipline, and 
control thousands of members and millions in cash (Varese 2010). The presence of 
organised crime extends beyond illegal markets to political and financial domains (Burger 
2009). 
The activity of organised crime is multifarious and requires that many actors be in play or 
be corrupted. Thus, criminal groups have both enemies and allies where one of the most 
important opponents is the state and its institutions. There are two possible ways for 
organised crime to bypass the state: purchasing it or subverting it (Jamieson 2001). In other 
words, bribes, extortion, pressure, blackmail and exchange of favours are some of the 
many weapons used by organised crime to succeed. 
Of all the different strategies, corruption is one of the most frequently used tools to 
penetrate public institutions. Increasingly it is central to definitions of organised crime. 
After almost three decades, various analysts on issues related to organised crime have 
agreed on the main elements that render ordinary criminal activity as an organised crime. 
Across a range of 15 prominent authors researching organised crime, 11 of them 
considered corruption as a fundamental component of organised crime activity. Albanese’s 
definition, mentioned earlier, views corruption as a determinant force of organised crime 
and not as an optional factor. 
In short, organised crime using corruption to manipulate public institutions could gather 
such power that it might be difficult to control even in countries with consolidated 
institutions and modern legal frameworks.46 Hence, the question raised is whether a 
criminal organisation can be successful without having strong ties to public institutions 
such as the judiciary. In this regard, it is important to look more closely at the links between 
organised crime and judicial corruption. In the following section, the research will briefly 
explore some patterns of the interplay between organised crime and judicial corruption. 
 
 
Links of Organised Crime to Judicial Corruption 
 
Organised crime is complex and the borders of its legal and illegal arrangements are often 
difficult to define (Paoli 2002). Significant parts of illicit business are kept in the shadows 
and the working mechanism is not easy to understand. This is because of the sophisticated 
structure of organised crime and the extensive nature of its activity. As cited above, one of 
the main ways used by organised crime to survive is the corruption of public institutions. 
                                                          
46 Council of Europe (2001) ‘Recommendation Rec(2001)11 of the Committee of Ministers to 
Member States Concerning Guiding Principles on the Fight Against Organised Crime’, adopted by the 
Committee of Ministers on September 19, at the 765th meeting of the Ministers’ Deputies; available 
at:https://wcd.coe.int/ViewDoc.jsp?id=224773&Site=COE&BackColorInternet=DBDCF2&BackColorIn
tranet=FDC864&BackColorLogged=FDC864#_ftn6 [accessed May 15, 2012]. 
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Yet, organised crime uses corruption in all its forms either to neutralise the state or to 
circumvent obstacles generated by law enforcement agencies (Rose-Ackerman 1999). 
It is not by chance that the growth of corruption has a positive correlation with 
development of organised crime in a society. In their survey, Buscaglia and Van Dijk (2003) 
concluded that the main factors contributing to the growth of corruption and organised 
crime are political, socio-economic, criminal justice and legal. These factors had different 
relations with organised crime and the use of corruption helped in varied ways. Both 
crimes are supportive of each other and unlikely to conflict at any point (Buscaglia and Van 
Dijk 2003:10). In this respect, organised crime tends to undermine justice by corrupting 
judges, prosecutors and investigative police (Buscaglia 2007). In this way organised crime 
seeks to pave the way for its longevity and to secure its economic and political sphere of 
influence. 
Methods used by organised crime to pervert the judiciary suggested by Buscaglia and Van 
Dijk (2003) can be grouped in two broad categories. First, there is petty corruption where 
the entire chain of criminal justice actors is bribed sporadically for specific cases and no full 
control is exerted on the judiciary. Second, organised crime may control or capture the 
entire criminal justice system. Here organised crime attempts to ‘purchase’ politicians in 
order to infiltrate members of organised crime into public institutions. In countries where 
corruption is endemic, it is argued that there is a trend toward exchange of favours 
between political elites and organised crime. 
To this end, the former offer access to institutions, goods and information, and the latter, 
in exchange, help to blackmail the political or economic opposition or launder illicit profits 
(Della-Porta and Vannuci 1999). According to Shelley (1998), ‘The infiltration of the 
Ukrainian legislature by criminals became a serious problem. More than 20 members of the 
Parliament would be tried on criminal charges…[had they not held] their parliamentary 
immunity, according to Hryhory Omelchenko, a member of the Parliamentary Committee 
on Fighting Organized Crime and Corruption. Forty-four legislators, elected to local political 
bodies, also have criminal backgrounds.’ 
Further, in her later study on Russia, Shelley (2003) underscores that organised crime asks 
for state ‘alliance’ not only as a matter of security but also for strong economic reasons. In 
the early 1990s, organised crime began establishing monopolies in the Russian economy 
where almost 85% of the banking sector was controlled by organised crime (Shelley 1998). 
Therefore, in a situation where the concept of the state can hardly be distinguished from 
that of organised crime, the judiciary, like other independent institutions, might easily be 
tempted to change the ‘boss’ (Shelley 2003). 
On the other hand, if the state is in alliance with organised crime then this makes it 
especially difficult to draft and implement legal instruments that can hamper criminality 
and corruption. As the case of Russia reveals, a strong nexus between organised crime and 
the state is very likely to undermine successful legal initiatives against organised crime and 
corruption (Burgher 2009; Volkov 2002). In fact, the interplay between organised crime and 
public institutions goes beyond immunity to governance itself. It has been shown that in 
remote areas where the power of the state is almost absent and enforcement of law hardly 
exists, it is for organised crime to exert the control and functions of a government. In many 
cases, they adjudicate among parties and their decisions are binding. In the early 1950s, 
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Italian judges in Locri, Calabria claimed that Mafia families were acting as a parallel court 
for agrarian disputes (Paoli 2003:162; Gambetta 1993). 
Legal power emerges from a long tradition of mafia in enforcement of the customary code 
of honour. Many Mafia families today who enjoy great ‘respect’ in the community are 
often invited to resolve honour disputes. As Paoli (2003:163) points out, ‘Even nowadays, 
where mafia is most strongly rooted, the Cosa Nostra and the Ndragheta families still 
represent themselves as fully-fledged alternatives to state power.’ So, the role of organised 
crime with respect to the judiciary or policing could vary from ‘defending’ traditional values 
to ‘business-type’ security defence. They may act as the ‘guardian’ of their customer in case 
of any extortion by rivals. They can also offer their services in blackmailing other 
participants in a publicly tendered project. 
It is interesting to note that the state is not only the enemy of organised crime but also its 
competitor. When the state is strong, people ask for the state institutions to resolve their 
dispute. When the state is weak, the Mafia offers its services at a certain cost. In his 
analysis of the Mafia relationship with business, Gambetta (1993:164) concludes that ‘the 
police are seen as a competing supplier of protection’. The role of corrupt judges is 
important in the mechanism of organised crime – especially in societies where corruption is 
rampant. 
Thus, in post-communist societies where laws are complex and criminal justice is weak, it is 
easy for organised crime to corrupt the judiciary (Karklins 2002). Therefore, the role of the 
judge in the scheme of organised crime commences when organised crime fails to 
circumvent other actors before coming to the court – prosecutors, police or other law 
enforcement agencies (Menénde 2007). After this point, the corrupt judge can still help 
criminals evade prosecution or detention. Therefore, judicial corruption is like an 
‘insurance policy’ for organised crime as even when their members are brought before the 
judge, they, in the worst scenario, will have assurance of receiving at worst the lightest 
punishments (Della-Porta 2001). 
In short, the judiciary serves as the last resort to organised crime to escape prosecution 
and, as a result, this is likely to classify judicial corruption as the most determinant factor in 





In the analysis above, I showed that judicial corruption exists and that it is a concern in 
post-communist societies. I also emphasised that both judicial corruption and organised 
crime are two of the main obstacles for the Western Balkans in terms of economic 
development and consistent democratic political transition. 
It appears from the discussion above that many cultural factors such as legal traditions and 
acceptance of the rule of law are essential for a fair and a strong judiciary. These elements 
are still embryonic in the Western Balkans. My research demonstrates that in post-
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communist societies state exploitation and political corruption appear to be closely 
interrelated with judicial corruption. This research raises many issues regarding judicial 
corruption and its links to organised crime. It suggests this relationship is endemic and 
problematic for democracy in this region. 
Taking stock of our discourse so far, the primary question guiding this project relates to the 
roots of judicial corruption in Albania. To that end I explore the main factors giving rise and 
life to this phenomenon – focusing especially on organised crime, its motivations, dynamics 
and justifications. 
To better understand this complex problem, I begin now by formulating four specific 
questions to guide this project: 
 
1. To what extent does judicial corruption exist on a widespread basis in 
Albania and how can I demonstrate it? 
In this question, I seek to explore in more detail the presence of judicial corruption in 
Albania. It points us to a descriptive task. The research seeks to examine trends and to 
establish how pervasive judicial corruption is. Through this question, I will be guided to 
probe actors and parts of the judicial structure – for example judges of the First, Appeal, 
High (i.e. Supreme) or Constitutional courts – where corruption is most vivid. The research 
focuses on court procedures as well as on the interrelations among judges, 
solicitors/advocates, litigants, prosecutors and court administrative staff. It also guides me 
to develop a qualitative and quantitative assessment of its extent. This question directs the 
project to issues of accountability and transparency as well as practices that distort 
established procedure within the judiciary. 
 
2. What are the causal dynamics which are generating patterns of judicial 
corruption? 
This question directs the study to the socio-economic environment and to reasons why 
actors behave in this way. Among the factors I examine are: economic standards, state 
capture, and legal culture as well as family ties, regionalism (Krahinizem) and gender. I turn 
here to the discussion of possible factors embedded in Albanian society that could 
undermine the integrity and fairness of judges. 
 
3. What are the connections of judicial corruption to organised crime 
locally? 
This question directs me to critically evaluate the interplay between organised crime and 
judicial corruption in Albania more specifically. It focuses on the role of judges in organised 
crime and to the corrupting techniques used by such networks to distort the judiciary. 
 
4. Why are the judicial reforms yielding so few results? 
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This question leads me toward efforts at judicial reform and the obstacles facing them. It 
guides the project to issues of legitimacy, accountability and the power distribution 
between state and non-state actors involved in the reform process. This question directs 
me to reflect on why judicial reforms lagged behind in relation to others such as market 
reforms. Here I focus on critically examining peoples’ perception of the role of courts and 
law-making and see their implications and challenges to judicial reforms. 
To summarise, this chapter outlined the key concerns and questions that have driven this 
thesis and defined the key concepts of judicial corruption, state exploitation, political 
corruption, and organised crime. It then described patterns of judicial corruption and 
hinted at the nature of its interplay with organised crime. Finally, it outlined some specific 
research questions which will help to structure this research. 
The following chapter will review both the empirical literature and theoretical paradigms 
that have either been used or might be adapted to explain judicial corruption and also 
organised crime. These literatures will be used as a springboard for developing competing 





















THEORISING JUDICIAL CORRUPTION: 





While there is a lack of substantial theoretical discourse on the causes of judicial corruption 
in the context of organised crime, there is some valuable empirical work from which this 
thesis draws. There is also a more general theoretical literature on corruption and 
organised crime which is critically discussed. 
This chapter is divided into two main parts aiming to set up a cohesive framework that will 
help illuminate possible reasons for judicial corruption in Albania. In the first section 
quantitative research shows that judicial corruption is widespread and its causes are 
explored in the Western Balkans, particularly in Albania. The second section outlines the 
main features of three theoretical paradigms which might provide the basis for answers to 
my research questions. 
 
 
Organised Crime and Judicial Corruption in the 
Western Balkans 
 
There are many reasons why organised crime in the Western Balkans has found fertile 
ground to flourish. First, the geographic position of the Western Balkans places it on the 
border between East and West. To the east, Turkey is the route to Asia and beyond. To the 
west, the Western Balkans shares the Adriatic coast with Italy and Greece. Inland, it shares 
borders with five EU members – Hungary, Slovenia, Greece, Romania and Bulgaria. 
The Asian routes of South American cocaine to Western Europe go through the Balkans 
(see Figure 2)47 and similarly a majority of Afghan heroin follows the Silk Road from Turkey 
across the Balkans to Europe (Anastasijevic 2006). Second, the prevalence of illegality and 
black market activity makes the Western Balkans an attractive place for many EU-based 
                                                          
47 Figure 2 shows the paths of criminal activities passing through the Western Balkans. Available at 
http://www.seerecon.org/maps/see-map.pdf [accessed January 20, 2009]. 
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organised crime groups to launder their proceeds. Their activity benefits from the 
assistance of indigenous criminal circles which help them to integrate illicit profits into legal 
activities.48 Third, in stark contrast to many Eastern European countries, which experienced 
democratic transformation in the late 1980s, events in the Western Balkans have often 
sparked wars that spread through the region. During recent decades, ethnic wars, poverty, 
political transition and state collapse provided opportunities for organised crime to 
mushroom in the Balkan states (Glenny 2008). 
Figure 2 Smuggling Routes Through the Balkans 
 
Source: International Criminal Threat Assessment. 
 
Organised crime in the Western Balkans has its own characteristics compared to other EU 
and non-EU organised crime. One of the most distinguishing elements is the misuse of 
‘ethnicity’ as a sensitive issue or as camouflage to exploit the state. According to Williams 
and Godson (2002:317-318), ‘War crimes and organized crimes sometimes have the same 
perpetrators’ and ‘competing factions or separatists often resort to criminal behaviour to 
fund their political struggle’. 
In the second war in Kosovo, for example, the Kosovo Liberation Army (KLA) is argued to 
have taken advantage of this conflict for ‘personal enrichment of the members of 15 [of its] 
clans, allegedly controlling…the drug trade’.49 
                                                          
48 See Europol (2008) ‘European Organised Crime Threat Assessment (OCTA) 2008’; available at 
http://www.europol.europa.eu/publications/European_Organised_Crime_Threat_Assessment_(OCT
A)/OCTA2008.pdf [accessed January 24, 2009]. 
49 See Centre for the Study of Democracy (2003) ‘Corruption, Contraband, and Organized Crime in 
Southeast Europe’, Sofia, p.13; available at 
http://unpan1.un.org/intradoc/groups/public/documents/UNTC/UNPAN016997.pdf [accessed 
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This use by organised crime of politics for gain may be due to lack of real democratic 
competitiveness between political parties in a majority of states in the Western Balkans. 
They use nationalism and ethnicity partitions as voting power to win political elections. 
Organised crime, which supports political parties financially, uses ‘ethnicity to mask its 
criminal influence’ (Stojarová 2007). 
What they do, although it might be illegal, is attempt to justify locally while enabling their 
ethnic political wing to win. Electoral victors run the government and thereby control the 
judiciary, prosecutions and police forces. Thus, they can offer protection to organised 
crime. Some scholars argue that the officials also use these institutions against opposing 
ethnic factions as well as against other ethnic-based organised crime groups while 
tolerating crime on the part of their own ethnic partisans (Griffiths 1999). 
So, the political battle is in fact an ethnic battle where the ‘Robin Hoods’ of crime can take 
advantage. The US Department of State in its ‘2008 Human Rights Report: Macedonia’ 
points to ethnic imbalance as a political concern. It observes that: 
‘Ethnic imbalance remain[s]…in the police force. At year’s end, 20.3 percent of the 
force consisted of ethnic minorities, short of the government’s 25 percent 
recruiting quota for minority officers. Ethnic Albanians made up 25 percent of the 
population and constituted approximately 16 percent of the police force. … [Thus,] 
ethnic Albanians remained underrepresented in the military and police, especially 
in the intelligence and counterintelligence agencies, although special efforts were 
made to recruit qualified minority candidates.’50 
The position of organised crime in the Western Balkans has been enhanced by the strife of 
the past 30 years. The UN embargo of the 1990s in the post-Yugoslavian states brought 
proliferation of arms and goods smuggling. Important arteries through Albania, Romania 
and Bulgaria revealed that organised crime operated a transnational structure that enabled 
it to move easily across national borders.51 In almost all states of the region, traces of 
political links with organised crime were clearly evident.52 
In most of the Balkan states, criminal groups, like political parties, are based on ethnicity. 
For example, in Bosnia Herzegovina, organised crime groups are known from the ethnicity 
of their membership. Bosnian gangs seldom mix with Serbians. However, these ethnic 
crime groups sometimes exist at least partly due to politics involving other ethnic factions. 
In fact, the war period from 1990 to 2000 saw a rise of organised crime all over the 
Western Balkans (Giatzidis 2007). 
                                                                                                                                                                    
January 25, 2009]. 
50 See US Department of State (2008) ‘2008 Human Rights Report: Macedonia’; available at 
http://www.state.gov/g/drl/rls/hrrpt/2008/eur/119091.htm [accessed February 25, 2009]. 
51 Centre for the Study of Democracy (2003) ‘Corruption, Contraband, and Organized Crime in 
Southeast Europe’, Sofia; available at 
http://unpan1.un.org/intradoc/groups/public/documents/UNTC/UNPAN016997.pdf [accessed April 
20, 2009]. 
52 Ibid, pp.11-15. 
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In recent decades, almost all countries in the region have begun to reform their criminal 
justice systems – introducing contemporary laws and asking for Western experience. 
However, the process has often been distorted because of elite participation in organised 
crime, which, some argue, enabled capture of state institutions including the judiciary. 
Politicians that tried hard to break the system paid with their life. In 2003, Serbian Prime 
Minister Zoran Djindjic initiated a set of important judicial reforms to curb organised crime 
and corruption. In early January 2003, he ordered that the head of secret police and 
Minister of Defence be removed. Just before parliamentary approval of these electoral 
judicial reforms, Djindjic was assassinated by a post-Serbian War ‘Zemun’ mafia gang on 
March 12, 2003 (Vejvoda 2004).53 
Several organised criminal groups such as the ‘Zemun’, ‘Red Berets’ or ‘Scorpions’ survived 
in Serbia through the Milosevic regime and after. One of the key sources of this power is 
believed to have been their strong ties to old elites which still retained power in the 
Serbian administration (Anastasijevic 2006). This may also explain why a successful 
presiding judge of the Serbian Chamber for War Crimes in the ‘Scorpions’ case, Gordana 
Božilović-Petrović, was removed from the bench right after the decision to convict them in 
2007.54 Though the removal of this judge looks ambiguous what appears crystal clear, in 
the words of Judge Važić, is that this decision was not based on any ‘inadequate efficiency 
of her overall performance’.55 
Similarly, in the Croatian criminal record there is not any significant political or legal move 
against organised crime groups. Though there are noteworthy legal reforms and organised 
crime here is less developed than in Serbia, there is much room for improvement.56 In 
Croatia, like Serbia, criminal justice is undermined by corrupt officials (Daskalovic 2003). In 
2003 the district state attorney of Zagreb was removed from office on charges of accepting 
bribes from criminal groups in exchange for providing evidence that lessened the threat of 
conviction for criminals (ibid). 
One of the most complicated cases in the Balkans is that of Bosnia Herzegovina. Here, due 
partly to the Dayton Accord57 which divided the country based on ethnicities (i.e. Muslim 
Bosnian, Catholic Croats and Orthodox Christian Serbs) and in part due to other social 
issues, organised crime is prospering (Zoglin 2005).  
 
 
                                                          
53 Tran, M. (2007) ‘Killers of Serbian PM given 40 years’ jail’, The Guardian, May 23. 
54 Helsinki Committee for Human Rights in Serbia (2007) ‘Self-Isolation, Reality and the Goal’; 
available at http://www.helsinki.org.yu/doc/Report2007.pdf [accessed May 20, 2009]. 
55 Ibid, p.263.  
56 See Helsinki Committee (2007) ‘Annual Report on the State of Human Rights in Croatia 2006-2007 
by Croatia Helsinki Committee’; available at http://www.hho.hr/izvjestaji-o-stanju-ljudskih-prava 
[accessed February 27, 2009]. 
57 See General Framework Agreement for Peace in Bosnia and Herzegovina and Annexes, UN Doc. 
S/1995/999. 
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The comment made by the International Crisis Group on Bosnia and Herzegovina in 2002 is 
breathtaking: 
‘Unlike for the majority of law-abiding Bosnians, national discrimination and 
“ethnic justice” do not apply to smugglers, racketeers, tax evaders, gunrunners, 
drug dealers, white slavers, and their patrons. These groups rejoice in what 
remains of old Yugoslavia’s “brotherhood and unity”, doing business across internal 
and external borders and national or confessional divides. Their community of 
interest – in getting rich and defying the law – contrasts with the disunity of those 
who want to uphold the law.’58 
A thorough reform of the judiciary was imperative for Bosnia Herzegovina (Transcrime 
Report 2004). Yet, how to do so remained a problem due to poor efficiency and extensive 
influence of political elites and/or organised crime. It was not until 2003-04 when serious 
judicial reform came to life. All places in the judiciary were considered vacant and all 
candidates (i.e. existing and new judges) went through a normal competitive process. As a 
result, the reform managed to purge the system leaving aside more than 30% of the 
existing judges and succeeded in balancing ethnic representation within the system.59 
Similarly, the Macedonian judiciary has suffered delays of reforms and extensive 
corruption. Several cases where judges have abused their positions by mishandling court 
cases, have been reported even in 2008.60 
Organised crime in the Western Balkans has progressed significantly and this is seen in 
their areas of activity which are constantly enlarging, fostering cross-border activities, 
making up very flexible criminal structures, and, more importantly, investing into the 
legitimate economy.61 In other words organised crime in the Western Balkans is becoming 
more professional, sophisticated and difficult to control. As the 2004 Transcrime on the 
Western Balkans concludes: ‘Organised crime groups utilise legal entities as shields and as a 
way to reinvest illicit profits.’62 
The following section takes stock of the existing empirical literature on judicial corruption 
and its causes. 
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Nature of Judicial Corruption 
 
In searching for theoretical literature on the causes of judicial corruption, it becomes clear 
that such studies are extremely rare. Issues of corruption let alone judicial corruption were 
almost exclusively the domain of social and political science until 1980 (Rose-Ackerman 
1999). Since then economic researchers have begun to draw attention to the financial 
consequences of corruption (Abed and Gupta 2002). Recently, theoretical work on 
corruption and public institutions, where its presence is most obvious, are becoming a 
trend in socio-legal studies. 
Empirical findings on corruption are organised in global outlines such as the several global 
corruption reports by Transparency International (TI) (Hodess 2007). Yet, as mentioned 
earlier, the emergence of judicial corruption as an elaborated concept in the worldwide 
academic discourse was not addressed in systematic form until 2007 when TI published 
Global Corruption 2007. 
The 2007 TI report emphasises how crucial judicial corruption is as an obstacle to the rapid 
democratisation of a society. It also identifies various cultural, economic and political facets 
that are very helpful in unfolding the intricate nature of judicial corruption. However, even 
this report, despite its contribution to enriching the literature, appears to have lacked 
deeper theoretical reflection on the issue. 
It is worth underlining that judicial corruption is one form of the broader phenomenon of 
corruption generally (Hossain 2007:xix). All ingredients of general corruption are evident in 
the corrupt behaviour of judges, prosecutors and police forces. By noting that judicial 
corruption is part of general corruption, theories of corruption may be drawn on to better 
elucidate varieties of causes and consequences of corruption in the judiciary. Many 
analysts have framed general corruption as a way to ‘circumvent legal systems’ (Buscaglia 
and Dakolias 1999). Therefore judicial corruption appears to be one particular approach to 
doing so. 
I now explore some corrupting forms used by Albanian organised crime and political elites 
to circumvent and distort the judiciary there. 
 
 
Corrupting Techniques of Albanian Organised Crime and Political Corruption 
 
As mentioned in Chapter 1, techniques used by organised crime in corrupting the judiciary 
tend to rely on classic forms such as those constituting petty corruption and grand 
corruption.63 Bribes and blackmail are common weapons for undermining the judiciary and 
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controlling its decisions. A repented criminal by the name of Ilir Shllaku wrote in his diary 
that, during 1994, the court found him not guilty because he lured judges, the prosecutor 
and his advocate with cash.64 In 2008 another prosecutor was facing charges of accepting 
50,000 euros as a bribe by criminal gangs in order to negotiate with his wife who was the 
presiding judge of the court dealing with the trial of one of their members.65 In the same 
year, the chief prosecutor of the Durrës district withdrew after an inquiry into one of his 
properties valued at 710,000 euros which he had failed to declare as legally required.66 
Organised crime in post-communist societies often draws on the tactics of the old 
communist regimes. These include use of the former secret police, many of whom are now 
in private policing, to evade detection, provide information, and assist in penetrating 
legitimate institutions. New political elites, which use ties to the old communist elite, 
appear especially active in attempting to control the public institutions generally and the 
system of justice specifically (Austin and Ellison 2009:194; Baze 2010; Zogaj 2009). Many 
former secret police, members of the notorious communist intelligence service known as 
‘Sigurimi’, were discharged from their official positions during the democratic wave of 
1990-97 (Vickers and Pettifer 1997). 
However, due to their experience, low cost (as more than two-thirds were jobless) and 
expertise, many of them were quickly absorbed by organised crime.67 Their assistance 
consisted of consultation on technical issues like coordination, secrecy and protection 
against interceptions.68 According to Leman and Janssens (2006:233), research on 41 files 
in human trafficking routes through Albania and Bulgaria shows that ‘it appears that in 
more than 25% of the cases, former intelligence personnel visibly played an important role 
in the activities of the criminal networks’. 
A significant number of former communist prosecutors or judges retain key positions in the 
hierarchy of the Albanian legal system like the Constitutional Court or General Prosecution 
Office (Austin and Ellison 2009:193).69 As a result, under the process of judicial reform, 
which is a prerequisite of EU and NATO accession, the Albanian government has opened a 
frontal war against the General Prosecutor’s Office and is exerting constant pressure upon 
the High Court. 
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There are strong reasons, according to the political opposition, to believe that a new elite 
headed by Prime Minister Berisha’s family control politics and the economy of the country 
(Baze 2010).70 For almost two years, Berisha himself has headed actions against the 
judiciary and prosecution on what appear to be baseless grounds. One result is that former 
General Prosecutor Theodhori Sollaku was dismissed in 2007. The Albanian Prime Minister 
has launched a campaign against the new General Prosecutor Ina Rama suggesting that 
‘the prosecution is not fighting the crime…[and] continues to be strongly politicised’.71 In 
fact, Berisha’s agenda seems to be a weakening of the Prosecutor’s Office and the 
judiciary’s independence. 
The precipitating motivations for the Prime Minister’s attacks seem to lie mainly in three 
files involving political figures with apparent links to organised crime. In each case the 
Prime Minister assailed the prosecutors for alleged politicisation on their part when, in fact, 
the politicisation appears to have rested with their accuser instead. The cases ultimately 
illustrate a seeming tendency of the judiciary to dismiss files on organised crime with no 
action. They have sparked a public outcry for the last several years in Albania. All the files 
contain elements of strong links between organised crime and the political elite.72 
The first file relates to corruption allegations against the former Minister of Transport, Mr 
Lulzim Basha, accused of gross negligence and damaging the state budget with 385 million 
euros.73 Berisha backed Basha by considering the decision as a collective act of government 
rather than of an individual.74 The second file involves the former Minister of Defence, 
Fatmir Mediu, who was accused on almost the same grounds as Basha for giving 
preference to a company to dismantle small arms in a factory located at ‘Gerdeci’ village. 
Their actions produced a catastrophic explosion on March 15, 2008 where 26 people were 
killed and 400 houses destroyed. Similar to the remedies in the Basha case, the calculated 
cost of Mediu’s damage reaches stratospheric figures of up to 30 million euros.75 
In the third case, a known businessman, Damir Fazlic,was pictured by the media and 
political opposition76 as a liaison man for the Serbian mafia who launders their criminal 
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proceeds in Albania.77 According to the media, all legal work for the sale was done by a 
lawyer with close ties with the daughter of the Prime Minister.78 It should be mentioned 
that all these files were closed by Albania courts and only recently the Constitutional Court 
turned down the decision of the High Court on Mediu and the case will be tried again.79 
Not surprisingly, the Prosecution Office for Serious Crime has expressed concern about the 
response of the judiciary to organised crime cases. Extensive organised crime control of the 
judiciary has been alleged. During 2008 the Prosecution Office for Serious Crimes issued ten 
sequester orders requesting that assets of several different criminal groups be frozen. Five 
of them were ruled out by courts of the first districts based on a unified decision of the 
Supreme Court rendered on January 25, 2007.80 
Several legal initiatives also initiated by the government in the name of reform also appear 
questionable. Instead of providing for legal reforms to minimise corruption within the 
judiciary, they have appeared instead to constitute government attempts to limit the 
power of the judiciary and prosecution.81 Therefore the triangle of political elite, organised 
crime and judicial corruption seems vividly clear in Albania. 
Organised crime has become more sophisticated and more cautious. Despite the fact that 
many organised crime groups have recently gone behind bars, there are sceptical voices 
which suggest that, though some dangerous but small groups have been stopped, others 
continue to operate.82 These are alleged to be more dangerous, organised and politically 
connected. The chief of the Prosecution Office for Serious Crimes, Olsian Çela, emphasised 
that: 
‘Although some dangerous criminal groups were destroyed, others continue to 
exist or arise, other groups replace older groups, which may not have the notoriety 
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of old ones, but who, …have new structure of organization and action, are very 
sophisticated and with a diversity of criminal activities.’83 
As explained above, organised crime uses several techniques to distort the judiciary in the 
Western Balkans generally and Albania specifically. Now I turn to the causes of organised 
crime and its effects on the judiciary. At first it appears that cultural norms may be one 




Distortion of Cultural and Customary Norms by 
Albanian Organised Crime 
 
Albanian society has often been portrayed as violent because of its harsh cultural norms 
(Arsovska 2008; Doll 2003). While this may be so, what is more important, is the very clever 
way that organised crime has managed to grip traditional norms of honour and misuse 
them for criminal purposes. It is thus worth briefly analysing some existing medieval ways 
of dispute resolution such as the blood feud and ‘Besa’ (‘given word’) to see how organised 
crime uses them in modern Albania. 
Researchers have shown that blood feud was an institution which in the absence of the 
state has served the family since medieval times as a sort of protection (Rosenthal 1966). It 
is argued by some scholars that the blood feud or vendetta is in antagonism with social 
disorder or chaos. Grutzpalk (2002:115) argues that ‘Blood feud makes a society safer than 
it would be if there was no regulation of violence and its use against others.’ For Weber, 
blood feud as a tradition was extended from protection to the acquisition of new territory. 
In occidental cities, vendetta, according to him, was transformed into policing. 
Theoretically, Weber has drawn parallels between vendetta and public force or political 
violence. For him, political violence is about ‘territory’ and blood feud was formerly used to 
protect or seize new territories (Grutzpalk 2002:121). 
In Albanian society, the potentially positive social factors surrounding blood feud, are 
sometimes argued to have been obstructed by another customary practice of honour – the 
‘Besa’ (given word or sacred promise, and the respect for guests and friends) (Trnavci 2008; 
Mustafa and Young 2008). The purpose of Besa is similar to vendetta – the strengthening of 
family kinship and protection of the society. They differ, however, in that where blood feud 
is used to restore the honour, Besa gives the right to protection to someone pledged under 
one’s honour. When vendetta and breach of Besa are in dispute, the disparity of 
consequences might be huge. This is because Besa implicates many actors such as a host 
and the guest families. For one breach of Besa the number of victims can be endless 
(Grutzpalk 2002:118). 
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The commonly held view regarding these customary cultural elements is that it is the lack 
of a modern state whose laws penetrate the society that persuades its people to produce 
such social regulating norms. What is interesting to explore is how in the case of Albania, 
organised crime has taken these customary norms out of their social context of coexistence 
with a state-based rule of law and has transplanted them into their cells’ or groups’ 
subcultural codes. For instance, if members of the group made a pledge on Besa, the 
consequences of any breach would redound to their families. As Raufer (2002) puts it: 
‘The very pronounced mafia character of the Albanian criminal associations follows 
equally from the behaviour of its members after an arrest. There is never, even in 
confidence, any revealing of the features of the group to which they belong. The 
response is unchanging: my biological family is in danger in Albania.’ 
The extension of crime’s spectre from the criminal unit to the members’ families also 
involves other customary practices like vendetta. As a result, there are more than 800 
children virtually imprisoned in their homes for protection as a result of the ongoing blood 
feuds among families in Albania, especially in the North.84 It can be predicted that blood 
feud might help local criminal groups to recruit this contingent. As mentioned earlier, one 
of the characteristics of Albanian organised crime is violence. It is common that rival 
criminal groups fight and kill each other. Although killing may be clearly for criminal 
purposes (e.g. revenge, seizing of illegal markets) leaders of these groups might cunningly 
expose it in the community as a blood feud. Therefore, family members of the victims, 
being under social pressure, will automatically get involved in vendetta and this can open 
ways for organised crime to recruit and integrate them easily in criminal activities. As Shala 
(2003) concludes: 
‘We reach the conclusion that the greatest part of the murders [by organised 
crime] in 1997 are known and registered as blood feud… [I]n fact they are murders 
caused by revenge [and] hidden under the cover of canon[i.e. Kanun].’ 
Traditionally Besa is given as a sort of protection for reasons constituted in the customary 
codes such as the ‘Kanun of Leke Dukagjini’. 85 According to this code, there are specific 
norms to be applied and institutions (e.g. the council of elders) to decide whether there is 
breach and, if so, whether a penalty is warranted. In other words, what criminals might do 
can be envisioned metaphorically as a cultural ‘money laundering’ scheme in which, using 
‘traditional norms’, what is unacceptable is transformed into something else. 
What starts as outside the community and its traditions (i.e. Albanian tradition does not 
accept the pledge of criminals as valid) is cleverly integrated or portrayed in society as a 
legitimate action on the basis of traditional norms. Criminals take advantage of the erosion 
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of customary institutions to oversee application of these norms, such as absence of a 
council of elders, and reshape customary norms according to their own illicit purposes. 
Thus, it can be said that it is not the nature of customary norms like Besa and blood feud 
which cause the problem but their ‘modern’ interpretation by organised criminal groups for 
their own interests. The literature suggests that for organised crime, reliance on these 
customs helps them to survive. The blending of customary laws with criminal purposes 
makes the groups secretive and difficult to penetrate (Xhudo 1996). Thus, we see how 
organised crime misused customary norms for purposes of consolidation. 
The image of Albanian society, generally, and organised crime, in particular, as violent is 
pervasive. As to why this is so, Arsovska and Verduyn (2008:243) argue that violence on the 
part of Albanian organised crime is due to ‘conflict of conduct norms’ more than any 
inherent ‘culture of violence’ or impact of customary laws themselves. They point to ‘socio-
cultural confusion’ as reflected in views on ideologies and values. Further they suggest that 
‘country, politics, economy, corruption, area of living and sub-cultures played a significant 
role in shaping these attitudes’. 
This argument parallels closely an earlier influential argument made by Cloward and Ohlin 
(1960) that violence is greatest among youth and gangs when older members are removed 
from the scene due to death, injury or prison and younger members coming up vie for 
leadership and turf. In this setting, the authors argue, established norms and agreements 
are rendered inoperative and violence results. 
Another important facet of the power of Albanian organised crime is their division 
according to the subcultural partitions of the country. In almost all academic rhetoric on 
Albania, the regional division between north (Gheg) and south (Tosk) has been very central 
(Doll 2003; Blumi 1998). Of many distinguishing characteristics between these subcultures, 
the Ghegs differ from Tosks mainly because it is said that they are more attached to 
customary norms. 
However, it is worth highlighting that being supportive of or guided by traditional norms is 
different from having proper knowledge of the customary code of laws like Kanun of Leke 
Dukagjini. It is important to differentiate between norms themselves and symbolic 
traditions that give only a flavour of customary laws like the Kanun. This explains the fact 
that many blood feud-related crimes have been justified under the name of the Kanun 
while, in fact, a majority of northern Albanians apparently know little or nothing about the 
modus operandi of this code (Arsovska and Verduyn 2008; Celik and Shkreli 2010). This 
must be further explored. 
In sum, contemporary factors combined with cultural norms seem to be the elements 
which generate violence in Albanian society. The popular wisdom that violence is a 
consequence of an Albanian culture of violence is questionable. This kind of statement can 





Causes of Judicial Corruption 
 
In this section I briefly discuss some of the causes of judicial corruption. As mentioned 
earlier, customary norms appear to be playing a significant role in Albania. Some of the 
most evident influential customary norms suggested by different researchers are ethnicity, 
ties of kinship and localism. The literature also suggests other organisational and 
institutional factors of judicial corruption such as poor financial and infrastructure 
conditions of judges, and low standard of judges’ professionalism. The influence of 




Ethnicity, Ties of Kinship and Localism 
 
Previously some have argued that organised crime in Albania is caused by an inherent 
violence in the culture and society. I have qualified that claim and presented evidence to 
modulate it by pointing to conflict of cultural norms and to cultural appropriation of 
customary elements by organised crime. Now I explore how ethnicity as well as kinship ties 
and localism have been associated with organised criminal activity in Albania. With respect 
to ethnicity, prior research suggests that organised crime uses it as a basis of recruitment 
for criminal activities that may include judicial corruption. It may facilitate the access of 
these criminal groups to the judiciary or other enforcement agencies directly (e.g. bribery, 
extortion) or indirectly (through political ties). As Gatzidis (2007:338) puts it: 
‘Organized crime permeates Albania’s power centres at the political and economic 
levels to such an extent that in 2006 Prime Minister Berisha accused the country’s 
attorney general of being linked to it, while admitting that whole fields of the state 
are still under the influence of organized crime.’ 
In Albania, ethnicity appears to have been used primarily as a bridge to build links between 
criminal networks at home and Albanian ethnic-minority or diaspora (e.g. Albanians with 
Kosovo-Albanians or Macedonian Albanians) populations abroad who might be exploited 
by criminal rings. The FBI has highlighted such links.86 It may be that common cultural 
elements make these groups feel safe in terms of their understanding and relations with 
each other. In contrast with ethnicity, kinship or family ties and localism appear to be 
causes of judicial corruption. 
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Thus family relations are another factor that may play a role in judicial corruption. They 
may contribute to reduced efficiency, weakened impartiality or distorted decisions on the 
part of judges. Relations among actors within the judicial structure can impair its 
impartiality (Alistar 2007). Threats against family members may also be used to coerce 
judges to favour a particular party. Family links may also help corrupt judges or 
solicitors/advocates protect themselves against detection which might otherwise occur 
through leaked information or overt allegations. 
 
 
Structural and Organisational Factors 
 
Judicial corruption can also be caused by lack of human resources, poor infrastructure, 
insufficient number of judges, low budgets, and weak professional standards. It is already 
echoed by many authors that lack of human resources and poor infrastructure are some 
other reasons for judicial corruption (Reiling and Hammergren et al. 2007). Weak 
infrastructure can erode judicial efficiency (Karosanidze and Christensen 2007; Siddiqi 
2007). Poor infrastructure means an insufficient environment and facilities for judges to 
work properly (e.g. lack of court buildings, judicial lockups, prosecution chambers, and 
spaces for witnesses, the computerisation of records, and supply of documents) (Ford and 
Seng 2007). If the judiciary operates in a disorganised infrastructure, opportunities for 
judges to get corrupt will arise. This often happens in poor countries with a large 
population.87 
An insufficient number of judges per capita can be another significant contributor to 
judicial corruption. In a poor region where population is extensively large, like Asia and 
Pacific, the budget allocated to the judiciary is not enough to cover expenditures. As a 
result, the number of judges is short and not in a right proportion with the population. In 
this situation, judges could accept bribes for the time of their case-processing or give 
preference to parties that provide the most lucrative offers. It should be noted that judges 
could still be just in the court decision they hand down.88 
Budget allocation and low remuneration of judges, are argued to be other probable causes 
for judicial corruption. Low salaries, therefore, could deter bright lawyers and qualified 
candidates from the judiciary. According to Yang and Ehrichs (2007:49), ‘severe under-
funding always has an impact on the judiciary as it seeks to supplement its needs from 
other [illegal] sources’. Unpaid judges will be thus more open to other illegal sources like 
bribes, to subsidise their financial needs. 
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It should be mentioned however, that these factors are oversimplified. The level of salary 
can be an open-ended debate and judges might always find excuses on these grounds. On 
the other hand, salary cannot always be the main attraction for bright candidates. There 
are other social factors (e.g. quality of life, infrastructure, career, etc.) that might attract 
intelligent lawyers. Under-financing and low salaries of the judiciary as strong causes for 
judicial corruption seems questionable (Yang and Ehrichs 2007). 
Judicial corruption may also be as a result of weak professional standards and processes for 
selecting the most adequate candidates. Lack of an organised selection procedure for 
assessing candidates before they join the bench, could be a factor in judicial corruption 
(Guarnieri 2007). Lack of substantive training and education for candidate judges also 
might reduce judicial efficiency and increase corruption. According to Yang and Ehrichs 
(2007:53) ‘The importance of the length and quality of judicial training to combating 
corruption lies in the capacity of judges to make good decisions and resist incentives to 
favour particular parties.’ 
Gender bias in recruiting judge candidates is argued to be a significant cause for judicial 
corruption. Nyamu-Musembi (2007) argues that ‘Gender bias sustains systemic inertia in 
responding to corrupt practices whose impact falls exclusively or predominantly on 
women’. She further argues that corrupt networks inside the judiciary could also be based 
on club-like, male gender relation known in the west as the ‘old boy’s club’. In most of the 
developing countries high level judges are mostly males and female judges are mostly 
employed in lower courts or administration.  According to her, this pattern might 
encourage judicial corruption in form of discrimination for those women judges who ask for 
promotion (Nyamu-Musembi 2007:127).  
In countries where political stability is unsettled, the judiciary may be eroded and the 
chances for judicial corruption could be high. This is especially evident in countries like 
Palestine where the peace process is always in question. According to the Palestine 
Coalition for Accountability and Integrity, in 2007, this conflict contributes strongly to 
‘corruption, and increases the scope for political interference with judicial decisions’.89 
Thus, judicial corruption is complex and the arguments as to its causes are diverse. They 
can be social, political, institutional and even personal. This literature is preliminary and 
much further research is needed. Yet, it is hard to set out a comprehensive list of the 
causes of judicial corruption. These factors can be regarded as provisional risk elements. 
What is important here about these potential contributors to corruption, is that they tend 
to be found in almost all later developing countries. Despite this particularity, factors that 
dominate in one country versus another differ. In some countries organisational factors 




                                                          
89 Palestinian Coalition for Accountability and Integrity (2007) ‘War of Attritions Weakens Palestinian 
Judiciary’, in Transparency International, Global Corruption Report: Corruption in Judicial Systems 
(Cambridge: Cambridge University Press), p.249. 
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Impact of Organised Crime on Judicial Corruption 
 
There is a developed literature on judicial independence and its causal link with judicial 
corruption. Judicial independence asks that the court decision be free from any political, 
economic and criminal pressure. It means that judges, in the course of their decision, 
should be influenced only by the law, facts and their rationale (Rios-Figueroa 2006; Rose-
Ackerman 2007). 
Lack of judicial independence has been seen as one of the main ingredients of judicial 
corruption in many developing countries, especially in those with a communist past 
(Ledeneva 2008; Safaralieva 2007; Sticka 2007; Karosanidze and Christensen 2007; Blass 
2007; TI Croatia 2007). However, in the following, this study will tackle judicial 
independence in relation to organised crime. In the Western Balkans, as already explained 
in the first section, the interplay between judicial corruption and organised crime is strong. 
When judicial independence is weak, organised crime tends to spread. One of the most 
important factors in a democracy is judicial independence. Organised crime works 
insidiously to disrupt judicial independence in order to undermine prosecution. 
Thus, the role of judicial independence is crucial in terms of judicial corruption and the fight 
against organised crime. As mentioned in Chapter 1, Buscaglia and Van Dijk (2003) argue 
that if the judiciary sustains an accepted independence, despite the prevalence of 
corruption in other segments of the state, the judiciary retains such a power which is likely 
to limit the corrosive force of organised crime in society. 
Judicial independence is strongly related with the spread of organised crime. Buscaglia and 
Van Dijk (2003:13) point out that ‘independence and integrity of the judiciary was the most 
important predictor of the extent of organised crime’. Similarly, Van Dijk (2007) finds that 
there is a positive correlation between the perception of judicial independence and 
organised crime indices. Countries with weak judicial structures, and in particular those 
perceived to be highly controlled by the executive, tend to be rated as countries where 
organised crime is rampant. 
In addition, some good indicators of the links between judicial corruption and organised 
crime were ‘procedural complexity and abuses of substantive judicial discretion’ (Buscaglia 
and Van Dijk 2003:12-13). Voigt (2007:297) finds out that ‘the higher the complexity of 
judicial system the higher the expected level of judicial corruption’. So, complex (and even 
labyrinthine) laws tend to increase the chances of organised crime to corrupt the judiciary. 
More often in developing countries, complex laws have been used by judges or lawyers as 
ways to elicit illegal profits. A good illustration of how this scheme works in Zambia is 
pointed out by Chikalanga, Lungu and Yezi (2007:289): 
‘poorly trained individuals (some of whom may simply be retired civil servants 
recommended by traditional leaders) are applying complex laws to difficult facts 
and have to rely on the competence of lawyers to guide them. In this way, judges 
are open to manipulation by lawyers seeking the best deal for their clients.’ 
Where judges are corrupt they further facilitate organised crime. Direct implication of 
judges in the criminal scheme has been another crucial factor in the relationship between 
judicial corruption and organised crime. Thus, judges involved in corruption can play a 
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critical role in the strengthening of organised crime through a variety of means, such as 
showing leniency towards prosecuted individuals, applying pressure to judicial colleagues 
or even by becoming a tool in making decisions favourable to one criminal group against 
the other (Della Porta 2001; Menéndez 2007). 
To put it differently, a corrupt judge might turn into a part-time employee working for the 
purposes of organised crime. This makes it hard to differentiate when they start working 
for organised crime and when they stop. As Albanese (2000:411) rightly highlights, it is 
difficult sometimes to distinguish between organised crime and criminal activity: ‘for 
example official misconduct by government officials, obstruction of justice and commercial 
bribery are all types of [illegal]…behaviour [engaged in for different reasons by both types 
of offenders (corrupt judges and criminals)]’. 
As mentioned in Chapter 1, judicial corruption can thus be used by organised crime as an 
‘insurance policy’ in case other means of security fail. This is because the judiciary is the 
last resort for evading punishment, and as a result organised crime will continually attempt 
to corrupt and distort the judiciary. A good example can be drawn from the Italian judicial 
reform of the early 1990s, called ‘the clean hands’. In this period, many otherwise 
successful judicial reforms were obstructed by political elites and the mafia. This 
demonstrates how organised crime in concert with political elites and the mafia can distort 
judicial independence. It shows further how they can break any attempt by reformers to 
hamper the impact of corruption and organised crime in the judiciary (Della Porta 2001). 
Complicated, expensive court procedures and inefficient criminal justice might push people 
to rely on criminals for help in expediting or resolving their disputes (Gambetta 1993). One 
of the most important services by mafia to private enterprise is the collection of delayed 
debts, often made initially at extortionate rates of interest (shark loans). Lengthy 
procedures and inefficiency of law enforcement agencies in collecting overdue liabilities in 
time are other openings for the mafia to become involved in this ‘business’. 
As Gambetta (1993:171) points out, in the words of Judge Giovani Falcone: due to the 
inefficiency of the courts, ‘it is common to turn [rely on]…to the local man of honour’. In 
this respect, the mafia may emerge as a quasi-government in some areas. Organised crime, 
then, has another strong reason to corrupt the judiciary – not only for security but also for 
profit maximisation purposes. A strong judiciary will not only erode organised crime but at 
the same time it can also thwart its relation with private enterprises. 
As explained above, there are several causes which might bring about judicial corruption. 
The complexity of causes shows how intricate this phenomenon is. Now let me turn to the 
theoretical literature to see what help it can offer in understanding the roots of judicial 






Theoretical Analytical Framework 
 
The next step in explaining judicial corruption and its resilience in the face of reforms takes 
us to theory. Having examined the empirical literature to see how different authors have 
tried so far to explain judicial corruption, I now ask what theories have been or might be 
drawn on to look for explanations. 
Though there is a lack of a substantial theoretical discourse on the causes of judicial 
corruption in the context of organised crime, there are various theories explaining 
corruption and organised crime more generally which can be adapted for this project. 
Therefore, three lines of theoretical argument are examined: Economic theory, Social 
control theory, and Democratic legitimation theory. These will be used, together with my 




Economic Theories of Judicial Corruption 
 
There is a connection between theories of economy and theories of law. As Cooter and 
Rubinfeld (1989:1068) put it, ‘the “reasonable man” of the law is not very different from 
the “rational man” of economics’. In both cases, the ‘reasoning person’ is used as a 
heuristic device. 
Some early analyses have portrayed corruption as a ‘lubricant’ to an economy constrained 
by bureaucracy (Lui 1985). Thus, for these analysts, corruption was an extra-legal 
instrument that helps bypass red tape barriers and allows individual or group admission to 
decision-making processes (Leff 1964; Back and Maher 1986; Leite and Weidemann 2002; 
Dreher and Gassebner 2007). Another argument is that bribes consolidate political party 
relationships. In developing societies, according to Leys (1965), a bribe plays the political 
role of money which is to ‘cement’ social network relations within the political party. 
According to Huntington (1968), corruption is part of the modernisation process. Every 
society in its early stages of modernisation, he argues, has seen extensive corruption. 
Huntington depicts this as the result of new emerging (modern) norms that conflict with 
traditional practices. What traditional norms called ‘normal’, modern social norms term 
‘corruption’. Thus corruption for Huntington is a modern phenomenon that results when 
new norms of legal impartiality are applied to old customs rather than something negative 
that arises in the society itself (ibid:254). 
Having shown some positive approaches to the functions of corruption, let us now look at 
some other economic theorists who argue just the opposite. 
In most contemporary economic discourse, corruption has been framed as diabolic in 
terms of its consequences for economic and political development. In general, corruption is 
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argued to: reduce the efficiency of markets and legitimacy of democracy (Tanzi 1998); 
subvert investments and distort income distribution (Tanzi and Davoodi 2001); misallocate 
labour, capital and talent in the economy (Dabla-Norris and Wade 2002); corrode natural 
resources (Leite and Weidemann 2002); impair economic growth (Mauro 1995); increase 
poverty by generating income inequality (Gupta, Davoodi and Alonso-Terme 2002); and 
pave the way for organised crime to infiltrate public institutions and legitimate businesses 
(Rose-Ackerman 1999). 
As to where corruption originates, a variety of analyses have pointed to public institutions 
as key factors in its appearance and its magnitude (Lambsdorff 1999, 2007). Weak public 
institutions open gaps for corruption to entrench itself in society. Schneider and Enste 
(2000) find that poor services and infrastructures of public administration have a positive 
correlation with the rise of a shadow economy. Tanzi (1998) argues that institutional 
behaviour and level of corruption are very sensitive to government interventions into 
markets. These analyses suggest that more regulation risks inflicting corruption on public 
institutions as the bargaining chances to bypass government rules or laws increase to the 
benefit of bureaucrats. Complex bureaucracies also introduce additional procedures and, 
as a result of the time consumed on the process, tend to be very expensive. Therefore, 
people find it cheaper to offset the price of time-consuming proceedings with a bribe. 
All services of public institutions are products generated by public demand and, as such, 
lack of supply may have significant consequences for their value. Yet some of them, like 
court decisions on criminal cases, are unique and there is no other competitive market to 
curb the demand or price. Therefore, it is the bureaucrat, which in the case of judicial 
corruption is the judge, who holds the ownership (or discretionary control) of the service. It 
is he or she who decides the quality, quantity and timing of the service as well as, 
especially, the identity of the beneficiary (Rose-Ackerman 1999). The possibility for officials 
to create scarcity by managing the flow of a product through means such as delaying 
approvals or labyrinthine procedures not only create openings for possible bribes but also 
make it very difficult to prove whether the behaviour is corrupt or not (ibid:14-15). 
Wage policy, according to Van Rijckeghem and Weder (2001), is another significant factor 
in the interrelations between corruption and public institutions. Public officials with 
reasonable remuneration will be less inclined, they suggest, to accept bribes as this can 
result in losing a lucrative job and other future privileges such as a pension or a good 
position in the private sector. In the case of judges, the cost of a bad reputation might be 
even higher than the loss of a job. The authors also emphasise that the wage policy has 
another immediate impact on the bureaucracy and the rule of law (ibid:74). 
From an economic standpoint, judicial corruption has been perceived among other types of 
corruption to hamper economic growth. Corruption of the judiciary prevents economic 
development and risks market stability by increasing the cost of interpretation and 
enforcement of laws (Buscaglia 2001). As a healthy economy is primarily based on a free 
market, private business, foreign investments and efficient public institutions, a fair 
judiciary in economic terms promotes market stability. It also precludes exploitation by 
undue pressures (e.g. politics, criminal rings and monopolies). 
In a comprehensive approach, Buscaglia (2001) incorporates most of the above economic 
arguments under what he terms the ‘market-power’ economic approach to the judiciary. 
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He argues that: concentration of power in the hands of a few; complex procedures and lack 
of transparency; uncertainty regarding legal doctrine; lack of alternative dispute resolution; 
and collusive behaviour among parties looking for legal or illegal services from a public 
agency are all components of a weakly performing institution (ibid:4). 
Analysis of this interrelation of institutional performance with judicial corruption has been 
extended by Voigt (2007) through an economic lens. The marginal profits of judges’ corrupt 
behaviour depend, he argues, on the balance between the utility of this behaviour and the 
cost of being detected or sentenced (ibid:296). This is a basic deterrence approach. Then 
Voigt introduces the same institutional elements, with only minor differences, as Buscaglia 
and Dakolias (1999) do above in the form of variables. Voigt highlights, however, that ‘this 
result is influenced by other factors’ too (2007:299). 
Voigt finds that economic standards (i.e. measured as per capita income) and the openness 
of the economy could account for up to 46% of the judicial corruption in a society. In an 
interesting counterpoint to Buscaglia and Dakolias (1999), and Buscaglia (2001) which place 
procedural complexity and transparency at the top of their lists of institutional conditions 
that are strong indicators for judicial corruption, Voigt (2007) argues that good governance 
practices that may add some complexity do not have a corruption enhancing effect. He 
states: ‘neither the obligation to publish court decisions, nor the level of checks and 
balances nor the existence of anti-corruption commissions has a significant impact on the 
level of corruption within the judiciary’ (2007:296). 
The findings of Voigt (2007) are in line with an earlier analytical model by Leite and 
Weidemann (2002) which shows that the developmental stage of the economy in a society 
is crucial to the effectiveness of anti-corruption policies such as institution-building and law 
enforcement. They contend that institution-building (e.g. improvements in monitoring 
technology) ‘tend[s] to be more effective in less developed countries while stricter 
enforcement (e.g. increase of penalties) tends to be more effective in more developed 
countries’ (2002:192). 
It is argued that there are many other factors, under such circumstances, which may 
determine whether someone engages in criminal activity and these could also be ethical or 
moral. However, qualitative research has shown quite persuasively that financial earnings 
are a strong impetus for criminal behaviour in cases where the profit of crime is higher than 
the cost of conviction and punishment (Becker 1993:390). 
If we turn for a moment from primary causes of judicial corruption to secondary ones, 
there is a literature that applies cost-benefit analysis techniques to the issue of level of 
enforcement. This work starts from the assumption that the quality of a court decision 
often depends on efficient enforcement. Becker and Stigler (1974) point to four variables 
which could determine the quality of law enforcement behaviour. 
According to Becker and Stigler (1974), the first is the ‘investigation cost’ to assure the 
optimum level of law enforcement integrity. The better the record of the enforcer, the 
higher the costs of corrupt behaviour expectation. Second, the balance between the profits 
generated by law enforcers in enforcing laws compared with incomes produced by 
criminals in violating the laws exerts an impact. To the extent that legal returns are 
exceeded by proceeds of crime, corruption will be more likely. Third, the ‘temporal pattern 
of violations increases the costs as it is difficult to bribe or even intimidate the enforcers 
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who would be involved in a non-repetitive violation’ (ibid:4). This is a difficult variable to 
measure since it is hard to establish a bench mark for costs unless the officials have a crime 
history. Fourth, if the outcome of a law violation includes a victim, the quality of 
enforcement is higher because ‘victims have a stake in apprehending violators’ and this 
may reduce the cost of enforcement (ibid:5). 
All the above-mentioned variables might be applicable in anticipating the cost of any 
attempts to bribe a judge. This requires, however, precise approximations of costs 
regarding the judge’s integrity; the balance between profits resulting from a fair court 
decision and those from the violation of laws; and, the number of victims related to the 
consequence of the court decision. 
Usually, before going to the court, litigated parties attempt to solve their dispute in a 
private manner if the cost of the private settlement is lower than that of the trial. This can 
be an alternative to attempts to corrupt the judge. The main factor distinguished by Cooter 
and Rubinfeld (1989) to favour private settlement over trial is the uncertainty of the trial 
process. Judicial corruption may be attractive to some litigants in that it can help to reverse 
this costly factor (i.e. uncertainty). It may create a greater sense of security but it may also 
push parties to other extra-legal means (e.g. the council of elders which operate under 
Kanun of Leke Dukagjini) which might prove inexpensive relative to trial or court. 
What judicial corruption does is to create a ‘private market’ for dispute resolution. One 
result, if the consequences are not popularly accepted, may be to encourage people to 
return to customary norm enforcement. If so, this could hinder advancement of the rule of 
law (Cooter and Rubinfeld 1989:1093). While the quality of law may be good in many cases 
before the court, corruption in some cases can exert a strong effect. An inefficient or 
distorted law, fails to distribute legal entitlements rightly. Thus, as result, ‘the more 
someone values a contested legal entitlement, the more that party will be prepared to 
spend on litigation [or other costs such as bribes] to obtain it’ (ibid:1092). 
In many post-communist European countries judges promulgate complex laws and 
proceedings, as do the legislatures, with an eye to the idea that in the future, when sitting 
as judges or working as private advocates, they will sustain a monopoly over legal 
knowledge. This gives them effective ownership of society’s entitlement-distribution 
function through being those who alone can wield these laws (Karklins 2005). 
Thus, the economic theories above outline a number of factors which could explain the 
causes of judicial corruption such as the economic level of the society (Leite and 
Weidemann; Voigt 2007); efficiency of law (Cooter and Rubinfeld 1989; Karklins 2005). 
organisational structures and behavioural patterns (Buscaglia and Dakolias 1999; 
Lambsdorff 1999); concentration of power and unbalanced supply of public decisions 
(Buscaglia 2001; Rose-Ackerman 1999); standards of service and infrastructure of public 
institutions (Shneider and Enste 2000); complex procedures (Tanzi 1998); quality of law and 
quality of law enforcement agencies’ behaviour (Becker and Stigler 1974); and the level of 




Social Control Theories 
 
Social control theory contrasts with economic theory (described above) in terms of the 
explanation it offers for the causes of delinquency and crime. In general, economic theories 
rely on profit-loss analysis of the criminal, economic standards of the society and 
institutional performance as core factors for corruption. Social control theory, however, 
focuses on other elements such as the power of social networks and their norms to control 
the behaviour of individuals or groups. Thus, social control theory focuses on both the 
institutional and individual factors that make people succumb to criminal behaviour. 
Under social control theory, we are all envisioned as having the capacity for crime. What is 
interesting is why we do not all do it. One answer is that there are certain cultural norms 
ingrained in us by society that are absorbed as we develop. However, the proponents of 
the theory challenge the concept of ‘natural conformity’ explaining that there are other 
factors, namely institutions and networks of social control, which have strong influences on 
this social adaptation like teachers, parents, priests or similar sorts of social influencers. 
Because conformity cannot be taken for granted, nonconformity such as crime and 
delinquency is to be expected when social control is less than completely effective (Lilly, 
Cullen and Ball 1995). Key questions could be raised under the auspices of social control 
theory which might be applicable to judicial corruption, such as what forces constrain most 
judges, prosecutors or other law enforcement officials to conform to the law? What goes 
wrong that enables corruption? 
In the following, I will explore different kinds of social controls. Prior to that, it is important 
to emphasise, however, that the Western Balkans has gone through a difficult period of 
wars and political changes in the last 20 years. Thus, the modernisation wave that affected 
Europe and America during the 19th century is now influencing the 21st century Western 
Balkans. Similar social and economic factors in the Western Balkans – like rapid change of 
the political system, fast urbanisation and massive transformation of demography, 
influence of technology and new cultural approaches – are taking place as social 
consequences produced by industrial revolution as occurred earlier in the West. For these 
reasons, it seems appropriate to start our look at control theory from Durkheim’s 
(1897/1951) analysis. 
Social control theory has roots in Durkheim’s (1951) pioneering work which argued that 
lack of social solidarity is a main source of crime. According to Durkheim, who was affected 
by social distortion during the 19th century European industrialisation process, traditional 
family-type coexistence was replaced by greater individualism. Social solidarity based on 
similarity of people’s viewpoints and life experiences was disrupted as market activity 
made them more specialised and, thus, unique. Though people are still linked by 
interdependence, the strong religiously inspired social cohesion of earlier times faded. 
Thus, Durkheim points to an historical weakening of the power of control exerted by 
society’s institutions. 
Social control theory argues that most restraint on our behaviour is exerted by norms and 
constraints embodied in a web of relationships including those of family and everyday life. 
If these social networks are disrupted and weakened, social disorganisation tends to arise. 
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As a result, institutions tend to break down. Durkheim refers to the resulting normlessness, 
which weakens society’s regulatory capacity, as ‘anomie’.90 Conversely, if solidarity of 
society or a subgroup becomes too strong, it can apply very intense control and potentially 
could even overwhelm the individual’s capacity for choice. 
For Durkheim solidarity has two functions: integration and regulation. Integration creates 
attachment to the group and inculcates the cognitive orientation and beliefs of the group 
through a process of socialisation. This empowers the society to shape the actions of its 
members through regulation. Their combined effect is to effectively guide individual 
behaviour by collective social norms (Durkheim 1951:209-214). Thus, delinquent behaviour 
can erupt when external governing social norms are not internalised by members of the 
society and also when institutions or social groups are incapable or otherwise fail to 
enforce these norms and related rules effectively (Reiss 1949). 
The Chicago School (1920) drew on Durkheim to articulate possible causes of social control 
disruption. Modernisation according to Wirth (1938), a prominent representative of 
Chicago School, affected even the family which is prime among the social control groups. In 
general, people’s lives differentiated though they still need to rely on one another. This 
greater autonomy may produce an internal cognitive confusion for individuals and an 
external social disorganisation for society, thus corroding social control (Lilly, Cullen and 
Ball 1995:80). 
Social control may be exerted personally (Reiss 1949), by family or other public and private 
institutions (Nye 1958). Some theorists maintain that it is the individuals themselves who 
have the key role in controlling their behaviour. Reckless (1967) argued that containment 
processes are at work. They depend on ‘pushes and pulls’. ‘Pushes’ are personal factors like 
negative reactions to family problems, dislike of one’s work place, poverty, lack of life 
chances and so forth. On the other hand, ‘pulls’ are more social factors which pull the 
person to criminal action like illegitimate opportunities and delinquent subcultures 
(Reckless 1967:467). Both pushes and pulls can overcome an individual’s internalised 
norms and self-control. 
Continuing on the theme that the issue is not why some commit crime but rather why most 
other members of the same society with the same subcultural components do not, Sykes 
and Matza explore the techniques people use to quiet conscience, which is the internalised 
voice of social control, to allow them to commit crime? Sykes and Matza’s answer to this 
question is those who commit crime develop ‘techniques of neutralisation’ that let them 
convince themselves what they are doing is not really wrong (1957:664). 
For Sykes and Matza (1957) neutralisation does not constitute a permanent rejection of 
social norms but only a temporary abatement (Lilly, Cullen and Ball 1995:90). They 
emphasise an important assumption which might be helpful in understanding judges’ 
neutralising techniques. Sykes and Matza explain that these techniques, or justifications of 
deviance, will be ‘more readily seized by segments of society for whom a discrepancy 
between common social ideals and social practice is most apparent’ (1957:669). 
                                                          
90 Durkheim argued that the rise of markets and industrialisation in the West had historically created 
an ongoing anomic condition. 
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In emerging democracies like those in the Western Balkans, where many political ideals are 
transplanted from the West, citizens, including judges, may see the norms as non-
indigenous and foreign. This could be a basis for convincing oneself that the norms are not 
justifiable. Alternately, organised crime groups could try to persuade a judge that the 
modern laws are an affront to regional and ethnic customs. 
Thus, ‘neutralisation techniques’ could come into play to produce deviance. However, both 
authors admit that this approach (i.e. neutralising techniques) has its weaknesses, as the 
argument made relies more on juvenile age rather than on the mentality of the mature 
person as would characterise most of the judges active in the courts. In addition, there is 
lack of good data on the distribution of neutralisation techniques ‘as operative patterns by 
age, sex, social class, ethnic group, etc’ (Sykes and Matza 1957:669). 
Matza (1964) expands the neutralisation techniques in what he calls ‘drift theory’. This 
rationale of ‘drifting’ is not so different from the ‘pulls’ and ‘pushes’ of Reckless (1967). As 
Matza states, ‘Drifting stands midway between freedom and control’; ‘drifting is a motion 
guided gently by underlying influences’; ‘drift is a gradual process unperceived by the 
actor’; ‘[drifting] is loosening of social controls’ (1964:28-29). Drifting happens where 
personal neutralisation techniques are facilitated by the neutralising activity of authorities 
which ‘represent moral order’ (Lilly, Cullen and Ball 1995:90). 
Unlike the majority of control theories which point to lack of internalised social norms, 
Hirschi (1969) developed two other mechanisms of social control: social bonds and the 
constructive rationale of the delinquent to decide on his engagement in criminal behaviour. 
For Hirschi, social control entailed not the ability to internalise social norms but the 
strength to bond with social groups which, according to him, were family, education, 
marriage, peers, gangs, church, social network and the like. These groups then exert an 
influence of control over the individual that restrains her or him from crime. Hirschi states 
that ‘deviant behaviour occurs when the bond of the individual to society is weak or 
broken’ (2001:xviii). 
In a different prospect Cohen argues that social groups, which lack the possibility to 
integrate into the higher levels of society because this is deprived by the upper class, may 
form their own subculture to generate the necessary power to make integration possible 
(Jones 2006:179). Cohen’s approach of ‘status deprivation’ can be helpful to explore the 
subculture of judges and how this leads to judicial corruption. 
In applying social control theory to the historical experience of state formation in Albania, 
one must recognise that foreign norms were repeatedly introduced by overseas powers 
who were governing in the country. From the Ottoman Empire, to a monarchy using French 
law, then the invading fascist occupiers, followed by a communist regime and now 
democratic structures of governance, ideas of law changed constantly. Thus, the rapidly 
changing governing systems may have come and gone too quickly to mesh with the 
solidarity of traditional social groups. 
Each new government produced its own social networks of control and attacked ones 
associated with those formerly in power. The norms they attempted to introduce through 
public institutions seem at best to have taken partial hold. Conflicting social networks 
destabilised social control and produced social disorganisation (Sutherland 1934). 
Normlessness or ‘anomie’ may have resulted. This appears to have thrown most citizens 
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back repeatedly on traditional social groups for solidarity and regulation (Doll 2003). Thus, 
family and kinship ties as well as customary norms have retained exceptional strength 
despite modernisation – a situation that appears to have created opportunities for 
corruption, generally, and judicial corruption, in particular. 
The pre-eminence of traditional familial solidarity appears to have given kinship and 
village/regional ties special importance in politics. It may generate clientelism or 
politicisation of subcultural divisions. In Albania this appears to have taken the form of 
‘Krahinizem’ (or ‘localism’). Under this system, policymakers tend to appoint and favour 
candidates for positions who are from their own family, locality and region in order to 
assure certainty of rapport and loyalty (Wahler 2004). Voters also favour candidates from 
their own locality.91 Appointment of judges, not on merit but on Krahinizem, might subvert 
court integrity and raise conflicts of interest for judges. Pressure may be exerted to base 
decisions on Krahinizem and not on criteria stipulated in law. Thus, unusually strong local 
solidarity and breakdown of national civic cohesion may both have contributed to problems 
of social control. 
Social control theories appear to have been influenced by several historical and 
technological developments in Western society and their impact on social solidarity 
(Durkheim 1957). It can be argued, as mentioned above, that similar factors are affecting 
the Western Balkans today. However, it should be underlined that there are different 
ideological and cultural ingredients involved at different times and in different societies 
(e.g. industrialising West v. post-communist Western Balkans today). Because of these 
factors, social control theories might need to be adapted for application to non-Western 
societies. Therefore the factors contributing to weakened social control in Albania might 
differ slightly from the classic formulation. In addition, these theories are strongly focused 
on the individual’s perception of crime rather than that of social groups. 
 
 
The Theory of Democratic Legitimisation 
 
The theory of democratic legitimation argues that to achieve valid law in modern society 
the law-making process must unfold democratically. Jurgen Habermas refers to these 
democratic conditions as those of the ideal speech situation. He contends that law must be 
created through discussion between all parties rationally and without respect to power or 
elite advantage: non-coercively and with commitment to resolution (Habermas 1998b). 
Rights are key because they establish the conditions of free discourse vital to such 
democratic politics. Deliberative democratic politics unfold, according to this model, with 
                                                          
91 The political mainstream in Albania is controlled by two major political parties which usually divide 
their votes according to the subcultural divisions. Thus the Socialist Party is more successful in the 
southern part of Albania (Tosk) and the Democratic Party in the northern region (Gheg). Therefore 
the so-called ‘Krahinizem’, a kind of clan based on family or local relations, is an important factor in 
the appointment of public officials. In this context the selection of judges based on ‘Krahinizem’ and 
not on merits could open gaps for judicial corruption. 
49 
an eye to the good of society as a whole (Shapiro 2003). Social norms will tend to be 
reflected in law. Law, thus made, will tend to be accepted as legitimate. 
In Albania, while the forms of democracy are embraced, there remains nonetheless a 
democratic deficit. The Constitution was largely adapted from those of European civil law 
states, especially France and Italy (Toro 2001). The initial document was accepted by 
participatory public referendum. Subsequent amendments were approved, however, by 
just a legislative majority without popular participation so that local norms appear to have 
been less than fully reflected in those laws. Implementation may introduce further 
discrepancy, as shown in chapter 1 with the example of the politicisation of the law of 
lustration. Some conventional laws are also adapted from those of the EU as a precondition 
for membership. This transplantation of law may have produced a situation where the 
relation of enacted law to local norms is tenuous. Habermas (1998b) argues that any or all 
of these conditions that create a gap between laws and norms may contribute to produce a 
crisis of legitimisation. 
Conflicting networks may also struggle for control – thus disrupting equal access to law-
making and institutions. This can give rise to organised crime which can compete with the 
system of justice and turn people to claim protection of their property rights from the 
Mafia (Gambetta 1993; Varese 2010). Albanian elites also have tended in recent decades to 
attempt to monopolise power (Vickers and Pettifer 2007). Powerful groups in Albania also 
use law-making to attack and weaken their adversaries (Austin and Ellison 2008). Many 
laws relating to the independence of the judiciary and to the impartiality of prosecution 
and law enforcement can in this way be politicised. Equally, access to justice may be 
undermined. Law-making may also be distorted by powerful factions to disadvantage 
political opponents. Democratic accountability and transparency can be weakened and 
separation of powers to provide checks and balances disrupted. The extent of politicisation 
in Albania is evidenced by a 2008 survey which concluded that recent violence may be at 
least partially a reaction to perceived social injustice (Arsovska and Verduyn 2008). 
If laws are being imported and law-making is politicised, democratic transition from the 
communist regime has also occurred at such a rapid pace of change that initiatives to 
establish a more democratic process and to build bridges between laws and local social 
norms appear to have occurred only partially at best. Thus, institutions may have lost 
popular acceptance and, thus, legitimation. Laws may be seen as existing for the elites and 
subject to ‘rent seeking’ rather than as democratically accountable.92 Habermas argues 
that, under these conditions, the state may tend to begin to govern through surveillance, 
control and policing rather than through participatory democratic dialogue and 
accountability (Rasmussen 1996). This emphasis on control can create openings for misuse 
of discretion which leads to corruption. It may produce differences in treatment between 
the powerful and others or between rural and urban peoples. Weakened deliberative 
politics may enable capture of the judiciary by powerful elites, corrode the confidence of 
the masses and weaken their ability to resist organised crime (Waldman 2001). 
                                                          
92 See the criticism of the process of recent constitutional amendments by former Albanian judge in 
the Court of Strasburg, Judge Kristaq Traja, in Panorama Gazette, (2008) ‘Kristaq Traja: Was 
referendum required for the election code’ (Kristaq Traja: Duhej Referendum per Kodin Zgjedhor), 
November 24. 
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Amidst rapid change, new norms may also conflict with old. Culture conflict theory argues 
that differences in norms between social groups may lead the less powerful to be depicted 
as deviant and may generate conflict (Sellin 1938; Sutherland, Cressey and Luckenbill 1992; 
Miller, Grødeland and Koshechkina 2001). In Albania, the legacy of successive occupying 
regimes and Western influence has introduced procedures for dispute resolution that are 
very different from the traditional schemes of everyday life (Arsovska 2008). 
Understanding of formal law on the Western state model as well as its acceptance by much 
of the public is limited. People do not automatically grasp the laws and institutions 
transplanted from overseas and they may feel more comfortable with indigenous 
customary law such as the Kanun of Leke Dukagjini (Durham 1994). The Kanun is used as a 
basis for justifying, sometime falsely, extra-legal modes of dispute resolution such as blood 
feud and enforcement. This may produce a dichotomy in the approach to law between 
urban and rural areas, between generations and between those educated and those not 
(Mustafa and Young 2008). 
The circumstances we have been describing may create a situation of ‘power-distance’ 
between public institutions and the citizenry. Power distance refers to ‘the extent to which 
the less powerful members of institutions and organizations within a country expect and 
accept that power is distributed unequally’ (Hofstede 2003:156). To the extent that Albania 
is a high power-distance country, it may suggest elite control, though not necessarily for 
deviant purposes, and unequal access to ‘justice’. This too could strengthen organised 
crime. 
To conclude, economic theories approach corruption in the light of financial pragmatism, 
whether as an individualistic choice in the case of petty corruption (e.g. bribing of judges or 
prosecutors) or in terms of organisational behaviour (e.g. lack of transparency and 
accountability of courts). It underlines that it is financial stimulus and the conditions that 
allow it to be illicitly acted upon that leads a judge or judiciary to corruption. This theory is 
helpful in considering poor infrastructure and financial constrains as conditions for judicial 
corruption. This theory can also be helpful in understanding why judicial corruption has 
kept increasing in the last decade. It may also help to consider the influence of competition 
for bribes among different levels of court (i.e. first instance, Appeal and High Court). 
Economic theories may also help to explain whether the increase of judicial corruption 
makes organised crime more or less competitive in the informal market of property rights’ 
protection and distribution. 
We have also seen that crime and deviance can arise when social control is either too 
strong or too weak. Rapid historical changes of governing laws and institutions in Albania 
have made the understanding and acceptance of successive legal systems a challenge. 
Some argue that institutional breakdown has resulted.  
Therefore social control theory helps to consider that rapid succession or disruption of 
regimes, breakdown of legal institutions and a lack of consolidated democratic legal culture 
might make judicial corruption more likely. I also showed that Albanian society is socially 
based on family ties and protection of kinship. As a result, kinship links or regional 
networks are seen as safer institutions to be trusted for conflict resolution than public 
ones. 
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Extremely high levels of customary solidarity along with kinship, regional and local loyalties 
provide an alternative to the formal mechanisms of the modern state. Judges may give 
preference to someone from their region or people turn to customary mechanisms to work 
out their differences. Judges may be appointed on the basis of their regional background 
rather than merit, with an understanding of reciprocity for this clientelism to follow. Shared 
loyalties between a judge and one or more parties to litigation may also distort the 
decision-making process. Social control theories could also help to find out the subculture 
of judges and probe its patterns. It may also help to understand judges’ justifications for 
submitting to subculture. 
In my analysis of Albania through the lens of Democratic legitimation, several ‘democratic 
deficits’ have been highlighted. Many important laws are transplanted from overseas in a 
vacuum of public discourse. This theory would argue that for this reason a public sphere 
and political discourse from civil society is weak or absent. Many scholars argue that if laws 
do not democratically unfold in society their legitimacy may be undermined and society’s 
trust in public institutions eroded.  
So this theory may help to explain the implication of legitimacy of laws and judicial reforms 
to the public’s trust of courts. In addition to problems of legitimation, this may enhance the 
perceived distance between the powerful and the weak members of society. 
Thus this theory may also help to understand the inertia of society toward judicial 
corruption and the decrease of social pressure toward corruption. It may also shed light on 
the interplay of the judiciary with the political elite with respect to government control. 
Today many attempts for an independent judiciary are propounded on the basis of more 
freedom of the courts from politics.  
This raises the thorny question of how democratic accountability of the judiciary is possible 
without succumbing to its politicisation (Rose-Ackerman 2007). Therefore judges in 
Albania, like those elsewhere in the Western Balkans, are organised in their own 
organisation – producing their own codes of conduct and urging more self-administration 
of the courts. Is this attempt to enhance the independence of Albanian judges a step 
towards democratising the Albanian system of justice, or is it a backward step to lack of 
transparency and accountability of the judiciary and the prosecution?  
And finally, all of the above-mentioned theories provide interesting and conflicting 
conditions on which this study can focus in finding answers for research questions. Seeking 
in this section to carve out some ideas about the reasons for judicial corruption in the 
context of organised crime in Albania, my project moves next to specify the methodology 








Researching judicial corruption in the context of organised crime in Albania involved 
several challenges which I had to consider before going on to do the fieldwork. Albania is a 
post-communist country, yet still in the process of political struggle.93 Corruption is 
widespread in public institutions and people are reluctant to be interviewed about 
sensitive issues such as corruption or organised crime. There exist serious concerns that 
any disclosure may bring dangers to life or career. In a relatively closed society with a small 
population personal ties are strong and information is easily shared. Interviewees may be 
quickly identifiable or exposed as sources of information. In Albania the role of friendship 
ties and family relations are very important so respondents may avoid talking about issues 
which may reveal facts that could put their friends or colleagues at risk (Arsovska 2008; Doll 
2003; Schwandner-Sievers 2008; de Waal 2005). 
Previous research on corruption and organised crime conducted in developing countries 
has suggested that often public officials like judges, prosecutors, police or politicians are 
reluctant to cooperate (Arsovska 2008; Ghana Integrity Initiative Report on Judicial 
Corruption 2007). The procedures for accessing public institutions and documents are also 
very complex. Although it appears that laws which allow public access to official documents 
exist, gaining access is very complicated and time-consuming. Often documents are not 
kept in order or have simply disappeared. Typically, studies of post-communist corruption 
show that prior and current political parties tend to pursue particularistic policies and 
strategies to control and manage public documents (Gryzmala-Busse 2007; Karklins 2005). 
Some analysts say that the concealment, loss or destruction of official documents in many 
post-communist governments has been instrumental for the political elite in disguising the 
traces of their public official involvement in corruption or other criminal activities (Karklins 
2005:19; Lawson and Saltmarshe 2000). 
In addition, the lack of previous research on judicial corruption in Albania, at both national 
and international levels, which could have served as a good source for document location, 
was also an obstacle. The subject matter under study for this thesis is both highly sensitive 
and involves certain risks. It was not easy to ask judges, politicians or criminals for 
something that may affect them directly or indirectly. It was also quite difficult to generate 
information from people in a society where ‘taking the law into your own hands’ (i.e. blood 
feud) is the norm.94 
                                                          
93 Since 1990 Albania has made several amendments to the constitution and changed the election 
system. The last changes were made in 2008. 
94 See Bilefsky, D. (2008) ‘In Albanian feuds, isolations engulfs families’, The New York Times,August 10. 
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Albanian newspapers routinely provide anecdotal evidence on the failure of courts to fight 
organised crime or on their links with the political elite. In a statement in 2009, Kreshnik 
Spahiu, then Vice Chairman of the High Council of Justice, sparked harsh criticism from the 
judiciary when he declared that ‘criminal groups should not dictate courts’ decisions’.95 For 
the above reasons it was of paramount importance for this project to craft an adequate 
methodology of research which would not threaten the life and career of either 
respondents or researcher. At the same time, the methodology had to be as systematic as 
possible as well as robust and rigorous ensuring progress of the investigation and validation 





There are different strategies of enquiry and this is highly dependent on the subject of the 
research (Creswell 2009). This project was characterised by complexity, political and 
professional sensitivities, ambiguity and lack of prior data. The case study96 is the most 
suitable strategy of enquiry suggested by the literature for studies of this type. Its 
exploratory nature and in-depth analytical approach to a specified phenomenon in a 
particular country, bound by a specified historical frame, lent itself to the particularities of 
the study of Albanian judicial corruption (Creswell 2009:176; Yin 1994:12). Let us compare 
it to the alternatives. 
Yin (1994:13) points out that an experiment ‘deliberately divorces a phenomenon from its 
context’. In case study research, knowledge of the context is of crucial importance because 
the ‘knowing subject is never disengaged from the body or from the world, which form the 
background and condition of every cognitive act’ (Tamanaha 1997:4). As I have shown in 
Chapter 2, the role of customary norms is still prevalent in Albania and plays a significant 
role in shaping the attitudes of people toward corruption, crime and law generally. One of 
the central concerns of this study was to look at the influence of social context on the 
behaviour of judges toward corruption. 
While one aspect of this study was the analysis of the historical dynamics of the judicial 
structure and its role in judicial corruption, this was not the only objective of this research. 
Yin (1994:13) argues critically that such an historical approach usually lacks a contemporary 
factor.  
He contrasts that with ‘a history…[that] does deal with the entangled situation between 
phenomenon and context, but usually…[in relation to] non-contemporary events’. This 
                                                          
95 Shekulli Gazette, (2009) ‘Spahiu criticises judges: Criminal groups should not dictate the court’s 
decisions’ (Spahiu kritikon gjyqtaret: Bandat s’mund te diktojne proceset gjyqsore), November 6. 
96 A case study is defined as an ‘empirical inquiry that investigates a contemporary phenomenon 
within its real-life context, especially when the boundaries between phenomenon and context are 
not clearly evident’ (Yin 1994:13). 
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study, in contrast, avoided that pitfall by applying history to explore the origins and 
practice of judicial corruption today. 
The survey also is a limited tool to fully rely upon. It does not help to generate enough 
analysis of contextual factors and it does not provide in-depth information. For instance, a 
survey can show the perception of experts (e.g. judges, prosecutors, advocates, academics 
and journalists) but it is unlikely to produce enough substance to analyse these factors. Yin 
(1994:13) argues that the survey as a method does not provide an in-depth insight of the 
context. 
 He points out that ‘surveys can try to deal with phenomenon and context, but their ability 
to investigate the context is extremely limited’. Some other advantages of the case study as 
a strategy of enquiry highlighted by Yin (1994:13) and relevant to this research are: 
• It ‘copes with the technically distinctive situation in which there will be many more 
variables of interest than [number of respondents]’. 
• It ‘relies on multiple sources of evidence, with data needing to converge in a 
triangulating fashion’. 
• It ‘benefits from the prior development of theoretical propositions to guide data 





Once the strategy of enquiry is determined, the next step is the research design. As 
mentioned above, methodologies usually speak of five main types of research design: (a) 
experiment, (b) participant observation and ethnography, (c) survey, focus groups or semi-
structure interviews, (d) archival research, and (e) evaluation. This study combined archival 
research with semi-structure interviews to produce a historically informed case study on 
judicial corruption in Albania. A historically informed approach taken here was primarily 
based on the archival research and a review of the literature. 
In terms of periodisation, the span of time studied included the transition period of Albania 
from communism to democracy (1990-2011) but also considered the legacy of earlier 
historical sequences of disruption of judicial structures in the post-Ottoman years of, first, 
independence (1912 onward) and, then, communist dictatorship (1912-89). The historical 
approach helped to highlight the contextual role of legal culture as a potential factor of 
judicial corruption (Kurkchiyan 2007). Interviews were undertaken with persons who had 
expertise and experience with the phenomenon. Only those with direct (judges, 
prosecutors, advocates) or indirect (journalists, academics, analysts, retired judges and 
prosecutors) interest/knowledge in relation to judicial corruption were selected. 
There are five components which Yin (1994) suggests a researcher should consider when 
preparing for the fieldwork. These suggestions should serve as guiding points for designing 
the research. The first component is the study or research questions, which have been 
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largely explained in the first chapter. The second component is the set of propositions 
which according to Yin (1994:21) ‘direct attention to something that should be examined 
within the scope of the study… [They] also begin to tell you where to look for relevant 
evidence.’ In this project my propositions were suggestions provided by the theoretical 
framework that have been explored in the second chapter. 
The third component to be considered is ‘unit analysis’. Yin (1994:22) explains that the unit 
of analysis is ‘related to the way your initial research questions have been defined’. It 
indicates what you are analysing (e.g. persons, organisations, cities, etc.) to inform your 
study. In my case study the ‘unit analysis’ is primarily the individuals (e.g. judges, 
prosecutors and advocates) though occasionally also organisations (e.g. all level courts, 
High Council of Justice ( HCJ) and National Judicial Conference (NJC) and informal 
institutions such as organised crime groups and customary norms. This duality helped to 
broaden the spectrum of the research because, as Maxfield and Babbie (2001:91) argue, 
each unit of analysis provides a somewhat different perspective on the same phenomenon. 
The fourth and fifth components, according to Yin (1994), are related to the matching of 
the data with the suggestions of the theoretical framework and establishing criteria for 
interpreting the findings. For instance, data collected from judges, prosecutors and 
advocates regarding the accuracy of a court procedure were considered more reliable. But 
information regarding the outcome of a case involving corruption was cross-checked with 




Specifying the Outcome 
 
The empirical focus of my research was on: constitutional arrangements and the 
institutional framework of judges’ work; the patterns of judicial decisions; the nature and 
causes of judges’ behaviour; and, in particular, factors in their decision-making in cases 
before them.97 Though my study explored the Western Balkans as a whole conceptually, 
my empirical analysis focused selectively, for reasons of practicality, on judicial corruption 
in the context of organised crime in Albania. 
Initially, in thinking about interviews, I was guided by risk factors from prior reports. To 
determine whether judicial corruption may be occurring in courts I probed legal and 
                                                          
97 The EU Commission’s 2008 progress report on Albania indicated the prevalence of corruption in 
public institutions and more specifically in the judiciary. It points out that ‘in 2007, 224 officials were 
identified as involved in corruption and conflict of interest, 53 of them were arrested and 
prosecuted. Regarding high level corruption, one former deputy minister has served a one-year jail 
sentence. However, a more systematic approach is needed to tackle corruption overall, particularly 
widespread bribery in the judiciary, police, health and customs sectors’. Available at 
http://www.delalb.ec.europa.eu/files/albania_progress_report_2008.pdf [accessed November 9, 
2010]. 
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institutional risk indicators:98 the independence, accountability and transparency of judges’ 
work (e.g. recruitment; tenure and salary; discretion of the courts; access or lack thereof to 
the courts; the number of times judges have been removed from office; inertia in reacting 
to corruption; conflict of interest and court infrastructure) (Clark 1975; Buscaglia, Dakolias 
and Ratiff 1995; Buscaglia 2001; Larkins 1996). 
In addition, I explored sentencing indicators: unusual patterns and irregularities in 
sentencing; differential treatment of otherwise similar cases by type, family, city, region 
and social status; and reports of frequent socialising by judges with particular members of 
the legal profession, high profile criminals or the political elite (Schwarz 1977; Sarrica and 
Stolpe 2007). 
To explore the relationship between judicial corruption and organised crime I explored the 
role of judges, prosecutors and advocates on criminal cases. I looked at the potential 
construction of each in the mechanism of corruption during the trial; behaviour with the 
witnesses, the contradictory pieces of circumstantial evidence introduced or ignored by the 
prosecutor or judges within the material supporting a criminal indictment; prosecutors 
issuing criminal indictments with an insufficient number of crime-specific elements 
required by the procedural codes; absence of participants in the proceedings (e.g. 
defendants and their solicitor/advocate, witnesses) and difficulties securing the presence 
of the principal participants; postponement of trials by judges and advocates; and the trend 
of returned cases by higher courts to lower courts (Buscaglia and Van Dijk 2003; Buscaglia 
2007; Macedonian coalition ‘All for Fair Trials’ 2008). 
These risk factors were used to generate ideas about the kind of pressure judges brought 
to bear and what documents to look at in both the interviews and observational phase of 
my study. Access to existing reports on such indicators from Transparency International, 
the International Commission of Jurists and the European Union Commission was obtained. 
This enabled me to explore the indicators they use and to draw on them in shaping my 
study.  
The final report from a study on the links between organised crime and corruption in EU 
prepared by the Center for the Study of Democracy (CSD) in 2010 was also reviewed. 
Reports prepared by American Bar Association’s Central and Eastern European Law 
Initiative (ABA/CEELI) on the Albanian judiciary for the period 2001-08 were thoroughly 
consulted and their indicators were considered as well. Finally, I discussed my initial risk 
indicators with a local experienced solicitor/advocate who had assisted several 
international organisations in preparing reports on Albanian judicial independence. 
To understand judicial corruption I needed a way of determining the extent to which it 
exists. I also needed a way of characterising it and detecting variations in the landscape of 
corruption by region, urban/rural life and ethnic concentrations, among other things. As 
one cannot measure corruption directly, I opted to measure in terms of deviation from 
judicial independence and integrity. It is a standard against to which to assess judicial 
                                                          
98 It is suggested that many of the indicators may not explicitly lead to corruption as they could, for 
example, be the result of the court’s inefficiency; however, these elements can help in elucidating 
where chances of corruption may exist. 
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behaviour. I chose the widely applauded Bangalore Principles of Judicial Conduct (BPJC)99 
and the model of an exemplary judicial behaviour that they advanced. 
It is customary to use a ‘standard model’ (see Weber 2007, 2011) in assessing empirical 
data as a helpful methodological device. Weber highlights that such a model is not a 
hypothesis but it helps to structure the phenomenon that is the object of research. It is not 
descriptive in nature but it is meant to enlighten the ambiguous part of what is described. 
Weber leaves it up to the discretion of the researcher to select or devise their own 
‘applicable model’, making sure that certain ‘ethical’ boundaries are maintained and 
respected throughout the process of enquiry. 
The BPJC (2002) suggested themselves as an ideal standard model for this study. They were 
prepared and reviewed under the auspices of the United Nations by a large and culturally 
diverse community of judges from all legal cultures (civil law, common law, Sharia law), and 
from developing and developed countries, including those from post-communist societies.  
I explain the reasons for selecting this model in Appendix I. In the process of determining 
the BPJC I have reviewed two categories: principles of judicial independence and principles 
of judicial conduct (Appendix II). It has also helped to decide what evidence to collect 
(Appendix III). 
It should be emphasised, however, that any model must be used with sensitivity to the 
social political context (Buscaglia 2001). As Hammergren (1999:3) puts it, ‘I doubt that 
anyone is in a position to produce the perfect checklist, first because our knowledge of the 
factors shaping judicial performance is too imperfect; second because, on a global level, 
both judicial operations and the standards for evaluating them vary widely; and third, 
because in the best of worlds, we are talking in terms of probabilities, not absolute laws.’ 
The BPJC provided a base against which to pit archival and interview data to create a 
portrait of the landscape of judicial corruption in Albania. In this context, I have used the 
BPJC and my set of indicators with a critical eye on their limitations and also have probed 
for new signs of judicial corruption that emerged throughout the collection of data and 
incorporated them into my enquiry. 
 
 
Selection of Sites and Respondents 
 
The sampling of my respondents and sites was crucial in order to generate reliable and 
useful data which could then be analysed and to provide answers to my research questions. 
My research plan was to interview judges, prosecutors and advocates from all levels of 
court and also from all regions of the country. To select them a process called ‘snowballing’ 
                                                          
99 The Bangalore Principles of Judicial Conduct (2002) are ‘Judicial Independence’, ‘Impartiality’, ‘Integrity’, 
‘Propriety’, ‘Equality’ and ‘Competence and Diligence’. See them in full at 
http://www.unodc.org/pdf/crime/corruption/judicial_group/Bangalore_principles.pdf [accessed November 25, 
2009]. 
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was used where initial contacts are asked for further referrals and those for still another 
wave of referrals, and so on. Respondents were selected as randomly as possible from 
those pools of referrals. 
The next challenge was to select the places where interviews would be done and what kind 
of people should be selected. This involved site selection and a plan for choosing 
respondents. The territory of Albania is divided into 12 regions (qarqe) and 36 districts 
(rrethe). It has a three-tier court system composed of 29 Courts of First Instance (including 
a special court on Serious Organised Crime in Tirana); six Appeal courts (including a special 
appeal court on Serious Organised Crime in Tirana) located in the main districts of the 
country (Durrës, Gjirokastra, Korca, Shkoder, Tirana, and Vlora); the High Court (i.e. 
Supreme Court) as well as the Constitutional Court, both located in Tirana. 
It should be mentioned that because of extensive commercial activity in the capital city of 
Tirana and the city of Durrës (Albania’s main port), the Courts of First Instance of Tirana 
and Durrës are called ‘career courts’ (see Chapter 4). Other important constitutional 
institutions relevant to this research are the High Council of Justice (HCJ) and the National 
Judicial Conference (NJC), which are in charge of the nomination and promotion of judges 
of the first instance and appeal courts (Albanian Constitution art.147). 
For the sake of the analysis I divided my respondents into two main categories – rural and 
urban. Due to the fact that the District of Tirana is the most urbanised and commercialised 
area and the majority of the main courts are there (First Instance and Appeal Courts of 
Tirana, Serious Crime courts, the High Court, and the Constitutional Court), I clustered all 
respondents from courts located in the District of Tirana under the ‘urban’ category and all 
courts located in other districts, which are proportionally less urbanised and far smaller 
than the District of Tirana, under the ‘rural’ category.100 It is not by chance that the first 
instance court of Tirana is known by the HCJ as the ‘court of career’. Thus I managed to 
interview judges, prosecutors and advocates from all levels of court. In order to have a 
diversity of opinions and to probe customary norms and assess variations I conducted 
interviews in the Midlands (Tirana), South (Fier, Gjirokaster, Vlora), Southeast (Korca, 





Judicial corruption and its interplay with organised crime, by their nature involve many 
factors which make the topic very complex and diverse. In this context the researcher 
should find a research strategy that is open and flexible, and that leaves room for 
interpretation and collection of data from multiple data sources (Maxfield and Babbie 
                                                          
100 According to the last census, the population of the District of Tirana in both urban and rural areas 
was 990,270, whereas the population of the second largest district, Fier, was 496,625. See Albanian 
Institute of Statistics (INSTAT) (2011) ‘Population and Housing Census in Albania’, December, pp.17-
18. 
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2001:23). For this reason I have triangulated qualitative and quantitative methods.101 
Triangulation of methods is defined as the ‘use of different methods to study the same 
phenomena or the observation of the same issue from at least two different points’ (Devis 
2011:173). 
Some positive aspects of triangulation are that it allows the researcher to collect a rich set 
of data from different sources; it minimises bias which often happens with the application 
of one method of research and it strengthens the validity and reliability of findings because 
it entails the cross-checking of a combination of sources (Anderson et al. 2011:11). 
The use of quantitative research involved reviews of: the World Bank’s interactive database 
of Worldwide Governance Indicators, Transparency International’s reports on Albania, 
surveys conducted by Gallup Balkan Monitor on the Western Balkans (2008-10), and 
surveys specifically focusing on the perception of corruption in Albania conducted by the 
Institute for Development Research and Alternatives (IDRA) in 2005, 2006, 2008, 2009 and 
2010. The qualitative research included: semi-structured interviews, archival records, direct 
observation and secondary data analysis. I speak in more depth about the qualitative 
methods of data collection below. 
 
 
Preliminary Challenges of the Fieldwork 
 
Initially, I conducted a preliminary field trip for two weeks at the end of November 2009. 
During that visit, contacts with main mediators were sought. As a result of preliminary 
conversations with a small number of academics, journalists and lawyers a more refined 
thesis question was formulated and insight was gained into potential challenges relating to 
access. This early visit was intended to facilitate the next phase of the fieldwork which was 
conducted for five months between April and August 2010. 
The first challenge was how to approach judges and prosecutors and get them to agree to 
give an interview. I learned that a few foreign NGOs had succeeded in accessing judges and 
prosecutors to interview them on issues related to judicial independence and corruption. 
One of the main reasons for their success, I learned,102 was because these NGOs were 
                                                          
101 According to Creswell (2009:232) qualitative research is a ‘means for exploring and understanding 
the meaning individuals or groups ascribe to a social or human problem. The process of research 
involves emerging questions and procedures; collecting data in the participant’s settings; analysing 
the data inductively, building from particulars to general themes; and making interpretations of the 
meaning of the data. The final written report has a flexible writing structure.’ On the other hand 
Creswell (2009:233) defines quantitative research as a ‘means for testing objective theories by 
examining the relationship among variables. These variables can be measured, typically on 
instruments, so that numbered data can be analysed using statistical procedures. The final written 
report has a set structure consisting of introduction, literature, and theory, methods, results, and 
discussion.’ According to Maxfield and Babbie (2001:23) the difference between qualitative and 
quantitative methods ‘simply…is the distinction between numerical and nonnumerical data’. 
102 Interview with urban advocate no.1, 2010. 
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funded by their powerful governments and this fact made judges, prosecutors and even 
other public officials more willing to participate. I did not have international back-up. 
Second, many of my potential respondents (i.e. judges, prosecutors and advocates) proved 
to be problematic respondents. Widespread involvement by the legal profession in 
corruption103 meant that some of those I wished to interview might themselves be tainted, 
with the result that they would either be reluctant to speak or might provide inaccurate 
information to protect themselves. 
Third, as part of the ethics approval process I was required to seek signed consent from my 
respondents before commencing the interview and I was told by an advocate, during the 
preliminary visit, that this could be another hurdle during data collection. This formalised 
procedure could deter many of the judges or prosecutors from participating in the 
interview. This awareness was, I learned afterwards, reminiscent of the communist past 
when law enforcement agencies used to ask for ‘consent’ from their victims before 
interrogating or torturing them. Some of my respondents could have been part of this 
notorious interrogation or victims of it. As I show in Chapter 4, many judges in the system 
today worked during the communist regime. On the other hand, some of them also come 
from families who were politically persecuted during that period. 
Fourth, I was also made aware by my preliminary contacts that judges or prosecutors might 
be suspicious of my true identity as an academic researcher. It was possible that they might 
see me as either an undercover investigative journalist or someone working for the secret 
service. This proved to be a valid concern because one of my interviewed judges asked me 
before the interview whether I had been sent by SHISH (the Albanian Secret Service) to 
investigate judicial corruption. 
Being aware of all the concerns mentioned above I prepared my strategies to access the 
fieldwork. I show below how I succeeded in overcoming these various difficulties. 
 
 
Arranging for Access for the Fieldwork 
 
I embarked on my fieldwork in early April 2010 and started to arrange meetings 
immediately. I did some research about each of the courts and rural and urban areas I 
planned to visit for my interviews and observations. I also asked my mediators about any 
characteristic in terms of institutional behaviour of any court, such as discretionary process, 
that I should have been aware of. The response was ‘nothing special’. Although I am from 
Albania and know the language’s dialects and also customs of the country in general, I did, 
however, research through my mediators and friends from areas I planned to visit, for any 
custom and attitude to observe during my interviews. My interviews and observations 
were conducted between April and July 2010. My archival research was accomplished 
during August 2010. 
                                                          
103 European Commission Analytical Report (2010) ‘Commission Opinion on Albania’s Application for 
Membership of European Union’, November 9, SEC1335, p.22. 
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Arrangements for access relied on four mediators or what Maxfield and Babbie (2001:285) 
call ‘sponsors’. I had personal relations with them because of my previous legal 
professional experience in Albania. Due to the fact that Albanian society is a closed society 
and strongly based on personal relations I learned that my respondents were more likely to 
participate and be more open for discussion if I was introduced to them via friendship ties 
or through someone they could trust. The four mediators selected – one journalist, one 
academic, one advocate and one judge – were all very reliable and well known in their 
professional circles for their integrity and credibility. My ‘mediators’ helped me to establish 
initial contacts and sources and also helped me to line up the background for the 
interviews. They were not aware which, if any, of those contacts were eventually 
interviewed. 
It should be noted that due to their professional experience their opinions could have 
brought some bias to this study. So one way of mitigating this problem was by cross-
checking the evidence and views among all my respondents including those of my 
‘mediators’. My professional experience as an in-house lawyer in banking in Albania was 
not something that was likely to have influenced my views because my contacts with the 
courts and prosecutors were very occasional, and only in banking and telecommunication 
cases. I had no previous knowledge of my respondents before the interviews. 
Several contacts with the ‘mediators’ were made two months before embarking on 
fieldwork, and their preliminary consent to participate in the project was sought. The list of 
the interviewees was planned to begin initially with my mediators. Starting with them, I 
planned to snowball from five or six independent initial respondents based on samples 
drawn from each court (i.e. civil and criminal courts; low and higher courts), the 
prosecution office, chamber of advocates, and other important relevant institutions for my 
study such as the HCJ and the NJC. Practically it proved very difficult to arrange meetings 
with judges and prosecutors and for this reason I used different ways to contact them 
either via private phone calls or use of personal contacts. 
 
 






Semi-structured interviews were selected as a source of data because they allow flexibility 
and enabled me to raise other questions than those previously prepared in the schedule, 
and to explore new facts or themes emerging from the discussion (Wengraf 2001). A total 
of 61 face-to-face semi-structured interviews were conducted all over the country 
(Appendix IV). As a basis for construction of these interviews, informal short background 
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conversations were held with the mediators about their perceptions of judicial corruption 
in the context of organised crime during the preliminary visit in November 2009. These 
conversations were used to construct the field protocol to guide the interviews. The 
interview guide included only issues, topics and questions related to the project. The 
structure of the questions was crafted in such a way to include questions for all of the 
respondents, to cross-check views, and also some specific questions for judges (Appendix 
V). 
For consistency of response, the range of actors and institutions under study were asked 
similar questions and this helped me to minimise the risk of having biased data which could 
have happened if I had focused only on the perceptions of one category of actors (e.g. 
judges). This helped me to cross-check the opinions of judges and prosecutors, and avoid 
the first challenge of receiving biased data mentioned above. The selection of different 
categories of participants with direct (i.e. judges, advocates, prosecutors) and indirect (i.e. 
investigative journalists, NGOs and academics) contacts with the judicial system helped me 
to discover information that I could not have obtained from just one category of 
participants. 
Judges were more reluctant to speak about the role of judges in judicial corruption but 
were more open in speaking about the role of advocates and prosecutors. On the other 
hand, prosecutors were more willing to speak about the role of advocates and judges and 
so forth. The length of interviews varied from 45 minutes to 120 minutes. All semi-
structured interviews were recorded and notes were taken during the conversation. 
While with judges and prosecutors the interviews were formal, with advocates, journalists 
and academics I started with a warming-up conversation and gradually went to the main 
points. I made sure with all my respondents to intervene politely to keep the discussion 
focused. I tried to guide the discussion to the relevant issues and to probe new areas 
emerging during the interview. After each interview a short summary was prepared and 
reviewed together with my notes. Those points that needed further exploration were 
highlighted and included in the next interview guide. 
I used the interview summary model suggested by Dawson (2002:113) as it was 
comprehensive and included all the main details of the interview in a short format 
(Appendix VI). Before each interview I initially asked the respondents to sign a consent 
form but realised that this was very awkward for them. I then changed my technique and 
simply introduced myself, summarised my research and its goals and asked the 
respondents for their oral approval and recorded that. This helped me to overcome the 
third challenge (i.e. the reminiscence of communist interrogations) mentioned above. 
I started the recording only after I had asked the respondent’s permission and pressed 
‘pause’ when they required me to do so but continued to write and put everything in my 
notes. A field note diary was kept throughout the research. I also kept notes of my informal 
meetings with non-participants (e.g. friends, colleagues, students) and explored some of 




Accessing the Respondents 
 
My initial assumption was that judges would be the most difficult respondents to access. I 
started my interviews with the largest court of the country, the court of Tirana. I could not 
use email as judges do not possess official email accounts. I therefore tried to arrange the 
meetings by visiting them at their offices, informing the judges or their secretaries directly 
by showing my information sheet with the logo of the university which showed what my 
project was and a short profile about me. I then asked the judges if we could arrange a 
meeting for an interview. Most of them refused on the spot without any explanation, while 
others used more polite justifications the most common of which was ‘I am busy’. 
I then learned that judges were wary of journalists so I got in touch with my journalist 
mediator and we went together to meet some other judges, in their offices again. The 
journalist would introduce both me and my project in a few words and I would immediately 
follow up and hand the judge the information sheet which was printed in both Albanian 
and English. This method worked. I conducted my first interviews which then snowballed to 
others suggested by the first-interviewed judge. Judges were more relaxed when I was 
referred by a colleague and when they learned that their colleague had also given me a 
similar interview. For them, this meant that what I was doing was not risky. This helped me 
to overcome the first challenge (i.e. accessing judges) and the fourth challenge (i.e. their 
not being suspicious), mentioned above. 
Judges in the rural courts were more relaxed, welcoming and more open to questions. They 
would also offer me a coffee at the end of the interview and these moments were 
sometimes better occasions to collect information than during the interview. So I kept 
notes throughout. I realised that, in contrast, judges in the urban courts were more 
nervous and more aware of the time as well as more careful with their answers. With some 
judges I realised after the first set of questions that I would not be able to trigger much 
information. Their answers were very short, constantly referring back to the law, and with 
the judge frequently checking his watch. 
To my surprise, prosecutors were the most difficult respondents to access; this was 
probably because the ones I targeted were those dealing with serious organised crime and 
corruption. To access them I was helped by an international observer who referred me to a 
high profile prosecutor who in turn introduced me to other prosecutors and from then on 
the process snowballed. Prosecutors in rural courts were friendlier, less formal and more 
flexible than those working in the urban courts. Almost all of the interviews with judges and 
prosecutors were conducted in their offices. The length of the interviews was 45-60 
minutes. 
I did not have any particular difficulty accessing advocates, NGOs (local and international 
observers), investigative journalists and intellectuals. Most of the interviews with these 
categories of respondents were conducted in coffee shops. The interviews with them were 





Archival Research and Secondary Data 
 
Archival research is another useful source of data for in-depth analysis and looking for 
other facts of a phenomenon in a selected historical time frame. This helped me to obtain a 
clear perception of the context and to draw the strongest conclusions (Dantzker and 
Hunter 2012). As mentioned earlier, one of my interests was related to the historical 
context of the judiciary (1912-89) so archival research was conducted to supplement my 
interviews on this theme. 
Having obtained approval from the Albanian National Archive, archival research was 
conducted for three weeks during August 2010. Around 31 files selected from the 
Foundation (Fondi) of the Ministry of Justice were reviewed. Official documents relating to 
the courts such as the correspondence of presiding judges at different levels of court in the 
Ministry of Justice were a valuable source of data as they expressed judicial opinion on 
problems facing the courts. I also reviewed other documents such as policy papers and 
governmental projects related to the judicial structure and laws, criminal statistics, judicial 
inspection acts (i.e. included information about judicial professionalism and corruption) 
and reports on the situation of the courts’ infrastructure. 
I probed decisions by the High Court and Constitutional Court on political corruption and 
serious organised crime, retrieving them from the official websites. For the period 2008-12 
relevant official documents relating to the nomination, promotion and inspection of judges 
were also accessed from the official websites of the President of the Republic, Ministry of 
Justice and the High Council of Justice. In addition, hearings held by the Parliamentary 
Commission of Candidate Judges to review those proposed by the President of the Republic 
to be nominated to the High Court and Constitutional Court were also accessed from the 
official websites of the Albanian Parliament. To complement my archival and online 
research of official documents (Corti and Bishop 2005), I also reviewed daily newspapers 





Court proceedings in criminal and civil matters were directly observed for 14 days in 
different urban and rural courts. Cases were profiled in terms of risk factors regarding 
access to the courts and issues of due process. Special attention was given to the behaviour 
of judges, advocates, and court administration staff during the trial; technology and other 
arrangements for recording proceedings, and procedural transparency. Short summaries 
were taken after each observation. The selection of courts was organised in order to cover 
all regions of Albania. Similarly to my interviews, the observed courts were in the Midlands 
(Tirana), North (Lezhe and Shkoder), South (Vlora and Gjirokaster) and Southeast (Korca 
and Pogradec). I also observed court cases at the High Court, Constitutional Courts and 
Serious Crime Courts. Two court sessions of one of the most sensitive corruption cases of 
the last five years, ‘Gerdec’, were also followed. 
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The behaviour of judges outside the courtroom was also observed throughout my 
fieldwork. I not only focused on institutional and administrative factors but also on 
potential social factors as possible causes of judicial corruption. I conducted ethnographic 
observations and sought to probe how customary networks of communication were 
constructed among the community of lawyers and the public as mechanisms to access 
judges (e.g. greetings, informal invitations, retreats to the coffee bar, informal language). I 
selected coffee bars for observation because they are the social settings most frequented 
by Albanians but they also are the places where, I learned, most often a corruption deal 
takes place.104 
There are no special clubs for judges or prosecutors in Albania. I therefore observed which 
coffee shops the judges and advocates in both urban and rural areas most frequented, the 
quality of the establishment, the position (city centre or periphery; hidden or public) and 
finally with whom the judges or advocates were frequently sitting during short breaks (i.e. 
each other, family members, litigants). These observations were important to help me gain 
a better idea of the influence of social environment on judicial independence and also to 





At the beginning of the interview respondents were made aware of anonymised recording 
practices and respect for confidentiality. The questions were also crafted so as not to 
influence participants to generate confidential data. As mentioned earlier, all participants 
were informed in advance about the study and the potential risks/benefits that may derive 
from the project.105 Data were held anonymously throughout the project; names of the 
participants were coded and referenced through these codes in the final thesis, so that 
nothing could be attributed to an identifiable individual participant (Maxfield and Babbie 
2001:58).106 
Each interview was recorded with a digital recorder and the interview was immediately 
transferred from the recorder to my personal computer on special hard drives which were 
both secured with a password known only by me and locked all the time in a safe security 
box inside my house during the fieldwork. At the end of the fieldwork the data were erased 
                                                          
104 In 2011, a public official of the Ministry of Finance was imprisoned for passive corruption based 
on the transcription of his telephone conversations where it is shown how he arranged the amount 
of the bribe from the briber and the place of meeting where the money was to be handed over. The 
place chosen was a coffee shop near to his work. See Panorama Gazette (2011) ‘Official of the 
Ministry of Finance is charged with corruption’ (Denohet zyrtari i Ministrise se Financave), July 10. 
105 See Ethical Approval Guidelines of King’s College, University of London; available at 
http://www.kcl.ac.uk/content/1/c6/04/02/82/WhydoIneedethicalapproval2008.pdf [accessed 
October 20, 2009]. 
106 See British Society of Criminology Code of Ethics for Researchers in the Field of Criminology; 
available at http://www.britsoccrim.org/ethical.htm [accessed October 20, 2009]. 
66 
from the recorder. I personally transcribed all interviews to protect anonymity and 




Data Analysis and Validation 
 
Data analysis is a progressive and very dynamic process. The researcher is engaged 
permanently in reflecting upon data, raising analytical questions and writing memos 
(Creswell 2009:184). There are various analytical strategies and this depends on the type of 
research (e.g. case study, ethnographic, phenomenological, narrative, etc.) (ibid). Given the 
amount of data and the specific context of my study I applied Creswell’s suggestion of a 
‘linear, hierarchical approach building from the bottom up’ (2009:185). This analytical 
approach allows researchers to give more emphasis to the context and information 
provided by their respondents. 
All transcribed interviews, the field notes and archival materials were assembled together. 
After the collection, a general reading was made to get an overall idea about the 
information and reflect on the experience and opinions gained during this phase (ibid). 
Some important factors were identified that needed more investigation, so a new set of 
questions only focusing on the underlined areas were sent to some former respondents via 
email in October-November 2011. The answers were collected and attached to the other 
data. 
All the data were then coded and reviewed systematically. I used Envivo 9 for the coding 
process but did not use its analytical tools. After coding, the data were sorted according to 
key categories, printed out and then assessed manually. New ideas which emerged during 
the review were listed (Merriam 1998). Relevant information was ‘identified, isolated, 
grouped and regrouped according to the themes’ (Creswell 2009:199). Then, based on 
these themes, the data were finally interpreted in order to respond to the research 
questions. It should be mentioned that all the data were in Albanian and the quotes used in 
the text were translated personally. 
To ensure reliability and validity of the findings, the data were triangulated from multiple 
sources (ibid). A short summary of the empirical chapters was sent back to three different 
core participants to review the accuracy of the findings (Yin 1994:127; Creswell 2009:191). 
Thus a summary of the findings of Chapters 4 and 5 was sent to one international observer 
and to a judge. A summary of the findings of Chapter 6 was sent to a high profile 
prosecutor of Serious Organised Crime. When there was any contradiction in the data I 
returned to a number of relevant respondents to verify the accuracy. 
In sum, my research design included a range of data collection methods. The outcomes of 
the study such as the complexity of the phenomenon and contextual considerations were 
taken into account. Ethical considerations and multiple strategies for validating the findings 
and reliability of procedures were also employed. 
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In previous chapters I have explained several patterns of judicial corruption and its 
interplay with organised crime. The literature suggests that apart from contemporary 
political and economic factors other social aspects should be considered as playing a 
significant role. To probe them we need, in the first place, to understand the landscape of 
Albanian judicial corruption and the penetration of organised crime there. 
In this section, I will focus on demonstrating empirically the extent and the contours of 
judicial corruption in Albania. The logic of this part is interpretive and its method is 
essentially comparative. From the literature, a ‘standard model’ of judicial conduct was 
developed and shown in Chapter 3. Now data drawn primarily from fieldwork will be used 
to compare judicial practice in the various Albanian courts to this ‘standard model’, namely 
the Bangalore Principles of Judicial Conduct (BPJC). Where practice varies between courts 
(e.g. from urban to rural areas), systematic comparisons will be made to identify patterns 
of variation between the courts within Albania. 
I have divided this data section into two chapters (i.e. 4 and 5): in this chapter I focus on 
judicial independence, and in the following chapter I look at other ‘values’ of the BPJC. My 
data suggest that lack of judicial independence is one of the main factors in forming judicial 
corruption, and hence is afforded analytical prominence in my thesis. Furthermore, where 
in this chapter I describe the institutional patterns of judicial corruption, in the following 
chapter I focus more on the patterns of conduct of individual judges. In these settings, this 
method of analysis will help the reader to better grasp the difference and see both factors 
and the degree of judicial corruption in the Albanian judicial system. 
Before describing empirically patterns of judicial corruption in the context of judicial 
independence, I first show the judicial structure and the main institutions which are directly 
and indirectly involved in the nomination, promotion and inspection of judges. As 
mentioned in the methodology chapter, Albania has a three tier courts system composed 
of first instance courts which deal with all types of cases (civil, criminal and administrative) 
at the first level; appeal courts which deal with all types of cases appealed from the first 
instance courts; a first instance court and an Appeal Court of Serious Crimes dealing 
specifically with organised crime; and the High Court which is the highest court in the 
hierarchy of the judicial system. 
The High Court is divided into the criminal college and the civil college, each of which deals 
with civil and criminal cases appealed from appeal courts. The jurisdiction of the High Court 
includes charges for corruption and crimes of the President, members of government, 
members of parliament, and judges of the High Court and Constitutional Court. It consists 
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of 17 judges who are appointed by the President of the Republic with the consent of the 
Parliament (Albanian Constitution article 141). 
The Constitutional Court is considered to be outside of the judicial system and its sole duty 
is to protect and guarantee respect for the Constitution. It is composed of nine judges who 
are appointed by the same procedure as the High Court judges (Albanian Constitution 
art.124). The main duties of the Constitutional Courts, among others, are reviewing 
compatibility of the Constitution with international agreements, dealing with national law, 
and normative acts at local and governmental level. It also deals with issues related to 
exercising powers of the President of the Republic and of the deputies (Albanian 
Constitution art.131). 
Other important constitutional institutions in the judicial system,  are the High Council of 
Justice (HCJ) which is otherwise known as the ‘executive of the judiciary’. This institution is 
in charge of inspection and promotion of first instance and appeal court judges. The HCJ is 
composed of the President of the Republic, the Chairman of the High Court, the Minister of 
Justice, three members elected by the Assembly, and nine judges of all levels who are 
elected by the National Judicial Conference (NJC), which is otherwise known as the 
‘parliament’ of judges exactly because of this role (Albanian Constitution art.147). 
 
 
Applying the Standard Model to the Fieldwork 
Findings 
 
As explained in Chapter 3, I have selected the BPJC as a standard model against which to 
assess judicial corruption. In the following section the BPJC model will be applied to the 
Albanian judiciary. To do that I will assess each of the BPJC principles against direct 
evidence such as international and local reports, semi-structured interviews, relevant 
newspaper articles and court observations. First I will begin by examining various 
international and local commentaries on Albania to provide an overview of the situation in 
the last decade. 
Second, I will focus on my semi-structured interviews and observations for a more detailed 
picture of Albanian judicial corruption to date. As the analysis of the data will show, several 
patterns of judicial corruption such as exchange of favours, gift-giving, ‘baksheesh’, 
customary norms and the influence of family and friendship ties, have a particular influence 
on judicial independence, integrity or propriety. For instance ex parte communication 
influences the propriety of the judge and also his integrity. 
I will highlight and contextualise these patterns when assessing my data against each of the 
Principles, trying to avoid overlaps. Judicial corruption is multifaceted and there may be 
patterns of corruption that apply similarly to several Principles. This chapter begins with a 
discussion of the patterns of judicial corruption during the political transition period (i.e. 
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1989-2011). The intention is to give a background of the phenomena in the last two 
decades. The analysis then moves on to focus on judicial independence. 
The background also should be seen as a context for the next chapter. I have blended the 
background and judicial independence in the same chapter as many of the factors of 
judicial corruption today can be better understood if we assess patterns of political 






Judicial corruption has been a persistent concern throughout the transition from 
communism to democracy (1989-2012). Several international reports stress that although 
some progress is being made, the judiciary remains vulnerable to undue influence exerted 
by the political elite and organised crime in Albania.107 The Council of Europe, in assessing 
the commitments of the Albanian government in 2004 to honour its obligations as a 
member state, noted that ‘The judicial system is very weak, with poorly paid and poorly 
trained personnel. It is plagued by corruption, exposed to political pressures and 
unprotected against intimidation from crime syndicates.’108 In a similar vein, in 2004, the 
Organisation for Security and Co-operation in Europe (OSCE) evidenced ‘instances of undue 
pressure from other branches of the government to make particular decisions, especially in 
cases when the State was a party’.109 Albania has the poorest indicators regarding the rule 
of law in the Western Balkans.110 
                                                          
107 See Freedom House report on Albania (2010) ‘Nation in Transit 2010’; available at 
http://www.freedomhouse.org/images/File/nit/2010/NIT2010Albaniafinal.pdf [accessed June 6, 
2011]. 
108 Council of Europe: Parliamentary Assembly, Honouring of Obligations and Commitments by 
Albania, Report by the Committee on the Honouring of Obligations and Commitments by Member 
States of the Council of Europe, Co-Rapporteurs: Jerzy Smorawinski, Poland, Group of the European 
People’s Party and Soeren Soendergaard, Denmark, Group of the Unified European Left, March 23, 
2004, p.16; available at http://www.unhcr.org/refworld/docid/4162a57c4.html [accessed June 8, 
2011]. 
109 Organisation for Security and Co-operation in Europe (OSCE), ‘Legal Sector Report for Albania 
2004’, OSCE, Presence in Albania, p.23; available at http://www.osce.org/albania/23963 [accessed 
June 8, 2011]. 
110 In the 2011 report by Freedom House, ‘Nation in Transit’, Albanian Judicial Framework and 
Independence scored poorer than Montenegro and Macedonia, equal with Croatia and Bosnia with 
4.25 and better than Serbia 4.50 and Kosovo 5.75. The score was based on a scale where 1 
represents the highest democratic progress and 7 the lowest. For more see Freedom House (2011) 
‘Nation in Transit 2011’, 2011 tables; available at 
http://www.freedomhouse.org/images/File/nit/2011/NIT-2011-Tables.pdf [accessed June 28, 2011]. 
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The primary cause of judicial corruption in Albania seems to be the undue influence 
exercised by the political elite on the judiciary. Since the early stages of institution-building 
between 1992 and 1998, the executive has attempted to control the judiciary by way of 
formal and informal mechanisms. The newly-emerging Democratic Party (DP) commenced 
a number of reforms to purge the system of former communist judges but apparently 
failed. Many of these judges remained and some are still present in the system.111 To 
replace them, the DP, then in power, followed a politically-driven reform, infusing the 
system with its political supporters and weakening the role of professional judges.112 The 
phases of the politicisation of judges will be developed more in the ‘structural 
interdependence’ section later in this chapter. 
During 1997, Albania experienced considerable civil unrest, because of the collapse of a 
series of pyramid schemes. At least 25% of Albanian families lost their savings and 2,000 
people were killed. The state was weakened and public institutions were paralysed (Jarvis 
2000:1; Zogaj 2009:236; Hoxha 2008:133). Many courts were burned down in civil riots and 
most of the courts’ documents disappeared. Courts ‘were targeted by local criminal rings to 
destroy facts and files related to criminals’.113 The judiciary was ‘at its weakest point and 
state control almost absent’.114 I speak in more detail about the 1997 civil unrest and its 
consequences to judicial corruption and organised crime in Chapter 6. 
In the period 1998-2001, the independence of the judiciary was constituted in the 1998 
Constitution on the grounds of the separation of powers. However, in practice, judicial 
independence still remained a concern as ‘remnants of the old totalitarian mentality 
persisted, and the executive branch often imposed upon the country’s courts’ (ABA/CEELI 
2001:1).115 The main patterns of undue influence came externally from the executive and 
legislature, and internally from senior judges to junior ones.116 It should be noted that for 
the period 1998-2005 Albania was governed by the Socialist Party (SP), a party supposedly 
                                                          
111 Interview with urban judge no.2, 2010. 
112 Interview with rural advocate no.1, 2010. 
113‘In 1997 the state broke down, it was almost burned a lot of dirty money was accumulated by 
criminal rings, and there was a clash  between them and the state. Gradually organised crime groups 
penetrated local institutions... initially they exerted influence only in their local area by corrupting 
local the chief police, judges or prosecutors... Mostly courts were targeted by criminal rings to 
destroy facts and files related to criminals. The judiciary was at its weakest point and state control 
almost absent.’ (Interview with investigative journalist no.2, 2010). Another judicial inspector who 
worked as a judge at that time pointed out that ‘During 97, the state fell into anarchy, courts were 
burned, documents were forged, and people put their hands all over, someone got a property by 
falsifying documents at the mortgage archives..... this period generated a lot of chaos and discontent 
in society ...’Interview with judicial inspector no.2, 2010. 
114 Interview with urban court advocate no.4, 2010. 
115 See reports by the American Bar Association’s Central and Eastern European Law Initiative on the 
Judicial Reform Index for Albania (hereafter referred to as ABA/CEELI); available at 
http://apps.americanbar.org/rol/europe_and_eurasia/albania.html [accessed May 5, 2011].  
116 According to ABA/CEELI 2001:22, interviewed judges highlighted that the influence of senior 
judges to junior judges in 2001 was ‘less likely than in the past’, suggesting that during 1992-97 this 
influence was prominent. 
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committed to change the situation. The process of lustration was ‘widespread inside the 
judicial system throughout the first decade’.117 
Both the DP and SP used various strategies to attack judges who were known to have been 
affiliated to one party (Baze 2008). Assistant judges formerly part of the trial hearings, were 
removed and cases were tried whether by one judge or a panel of three. Thus this new 
arrangement of judicial structure was considered part of the detachment from the past and 
a move toward the democratic style court systems.118 As a result of the political clash 
between the DP and SP, ‘many experienced professional assistant judges were left out of 
the system for political reasons’.119 
During 2001-08 the Law on Judicial Power120 improved (Pregja 2008) and several laws were 
enacted against corruption.121 All these reforms started to have some positive impact and 
began to strengthen the independence of the judiciary by reconstructing the relationship 
between the judiciary and executive. Interference from politics was not as direct as before; 
it was more of a business-like relationship (ABA/CEELI 2001:22). 
                                                          
117‘One problem of the lustration policies for the democrats was the problem of judges linked with 
the communist past... the dilemma was,  were these judges to be allowed to continue again, should 
they still be judges? This problem was very quickly politicised and turned into a political battle 
among the main political forces (Democratic Party and Socialist Party). Thus lustrations became 
widespread inside the judicial system throughout the first decade. There was fierce opposition from 
the socialists and civil society against 6-month judges,  because soon it became clear that the 
lustration reform was a manoeuvre for power rather than a political will to free the judiciary from 
the communist remnant…there are people who say that those files which were kept by the 
communist secret service “Sigurimi” have never been opened…some say that 60% of the first 
Democrat parliament (after the 90s) were former collaborators of the “Sigurimi”…In the 90s, it is 
true, many of the files of the “Sigurimi” were destroyed…the destruction of these files continued 
even during the time of Sali Berisha in 1993-1997…something interesting also happened, it is said 
that a register of communist spies and collaborators exists, but, from a very confidential source, this 
register has been tampered with and names deleted…this is unprecedented in Eastern Europe…not 
only files disappearing but even the names of those who worked for  the “Sigurimi”…the continuing 
of old crime and the inclusiveness of a new political class has made the lustration 
impossible.’Interview with academic no.3, 2010.  
118 Interview with urban court judge no.1, 2010. 
119 ‘At that time people were trained on short courses (6 to 9 months) to become judges or 
prosecutors. A good quantity of professional judges were removed and replaced by 6-month 
judges… the real selection criteria for 6-month judges was political…. many experienced professional 
assistant judges were left out of the system for political reasons ...those individuals who formerly 
worked in the communist nomenclature were purged from the judiciary…individuals recruited as 6-
month judges were those who had a university degree (not in law) and who had worked in public 
administration. …some of them were registered part time in the School of Law and completed the 4-
year degree in just two years. Some of these judges are still in the system today and some are even 
at the High Court.’Interview with academic no.1, 2010. 
120 Law no.9978, dated February 18, 2008, ‘On Organisation of Judicial Power in the Republic of 
Albania’, here and after referred to as the Law on Judicial Power.  
121 See the assessment of the judicial system prepared by the European Commission in ‘Commission 
Staff Working Paper: Albania, Stabilisation and Association Report 2003’ at p.5. 
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This trend towards independence was however distorted by another, almost equally 
influential, ‘private’ influence: friendship and family relations coupled with exchange of 
favours and bribes. According to interviews conducted by ABA/CEELI in 2001, two patterns 
of influence became especially evident in this period. First, the moral obligations towards 
individuals helping judges be appointed or promoted, and second the influence of friends, 
family and colleagues (ABA/CEELI 2001:21). These patterns were confirmed by the majority 
of my interviewees in 2010-11. The ‘private’ influence is grounded on customary norms 
applicable by society in general. I speak about the influence of customary norms and social 
context in more depth in Chapter 5. 
We see that in 2005-11, although the Code of Judicial Ethics adopted by the NJC had been 
in force since 2000,122 monetary influence increased and ex parte communication became 
more dominant.123 After 2005, while ex parte undue influence by means of bribes and 
friendship continued to be a concern,124 political influence on the other hand, became 
more sophisticated and hidden behind complex or ambiguous laws, tailored to control the 
judiciary from within, through its own institutions such as the HCJ and NJC, or using other 
mechanisms of the executive such as the Ministry of Justice (MOJ).125 
My interviews also suggest that in the period 2005-11 ‘judges and politicians began to 
establish a “particular relationship” on the premise that neither party would “punish” the 
other’.126 This strange relationship was also highlighted by the 2004 Council of Europe 
assessment report, which noted that although in 2002 ‘12 prosecutors and five judges were 
dismissed…, it is striking that no prosecutors or judges have been criminally prosecuted for 
corruption or improper professional behaviour. Such a lenient approach is difficult to 
understand given the pervasive character of corruption in Albania and especially within the 
judicial system’ (Council of Europe 2004:16). 
On the other hand, the High Court also maintained good relations with the executive. 
Cases of two ministers (Lulzim Basha Mayer of Tirana, then former Minister of Transport 
and Fatmir Mediu, Minister of Environment then former Minister of Defence)127 accused of 
corruption were dismissed by this Court ‘for procedural reasons without even considering 
the facts’128 (Bushati et al. 2008:26-30). As recently as January 2012 Ilir Meta, then Vice 
                                                          
122 The Code of Judicial Ethics covers almost all types of undue influences, conflict of interests and ex 
parte communications and improper political activity. For more see ABA/CEELI 2001 and 2004. 
123 ABA/CEELI 2004:26 emphasised that ‘the existence of bribery…is far more common than other 
forms of undue influence’. 
124 See ABA/CEELI 2006:1. 
125 See Council of Europe Resolution no.1538 (2007) ‘Honouring of Obligations and Commitments by 
Albania’; available at 
http://assembly.coe.int/Mainf.asp?link=/Documents/AdoptedText/ta07/ERES1538.htm [accessed 
June 10, 2011]. 
126 Interview with academic no.3, 2011. 
127 On May 9, 2012 the Constitutional Court turned down the decision of the High Court which 
stopped the criminal proceedings against Fatmir Mediu, then Minister of Defence, accused of 
committing crime in the case known to the public as the case of ‘Gerdec’. See decision of the 
Constitutional Court no.27, May 9, 2012.  
128 Interview with urban prosecutor no.4, 2010. 
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Minister, also accused of corruption, was also acquitted by the High Court, with a 
unanimous decision where the case for another minister (Dritan Prifti) is still in process.129 
Because of the outcome of Meta’s case, the Freedom House report on ‘Freedom in the 
World 2012’ scored freedom in Albania as declining in 2012 because of the ‘failure of the 
courts to impartially adjudicate a corruption case against a senior government politician’.130 
It should be noted that the Albanian legal framework on corruption and organised crime 
has improved (see Figure 3),131 and several key conventions were ratified such as the 
United Nations Convention against Corruption and the Council of Europe Convention on 
Laundering, Search, Seizure, and Confiscation of Proceeds of Crime.132 Several institutions 
have strengthened their power in monitoring corruption such as the High Inspectorate for 
Declaration and Audit of Assets (HIDAA).133 In addition, six Joint Investigative Units (JIUs) 
have been set up to fight economic crime and corruption.134 A few of my interviewees, 
however, note that the JIUs are ‘not having the expected efficiency gains because of their 
mixed composition’.135 The JIU is headed by a prosecutor and its structure includes other 
professionals who are employees and primarily responsible to other institutions such as the 
                                                          
129 In 2011 the General Prosecutor’s Office accused Ilir Meta, then Vice Prime Minister and Minister 
of Foreign Affairs, of active corruption based on a recorded video showing Meta asking Dritan Prifti, 
then Minister of Economy, Business and Energy, to favour a company in a tender for a profit of 
£700,000. Prifti denounced the deal in the press and provided the video to the General Prosecutor’s 
Office which had been recorded by him. The video was checked by a US and UK expert and found 
not to have been tampered with. The High Court dismissed this evidence for breach of the 
procedures and called some other Albanian experts who in stark contrast found that the video had 
been tampered with. In 2012 Meta was found not guilty. See Decision of High Court no.8, January 
16, 2012. In Prifti’s recording device the foreign experts regenerated a deleted video showing Prifti 
receiving a bribe of £70,000 and similarly the General Prosecutor’s Office accused Prifti of passive 
corruption. Prifti’s advocate based on the Decision of Meta’s case above, asked that the video be 
refused as evidence, asking the court to not start the trial for lack of evidence but the High Court, 
unlike Meta’s case, turned down Prifti’s request as recently as May 10, 2012 and allowed the trial to 
begin. See Mapo Gazette (2012) ‘The High Court, turns down Prifti: The trial against former minister 
should continue’ (Gjykata e Larte rrezon Priftin: Te vazhdoje gjykimi ndaj ish-ministrit), May 10. 
130 Freedom House (2012) ‘Freedom in the World 2012’, p.24; available at 
http://www.freedomhouse.org/sites/default/files/inline_images/FIW%202012%20Booklet--
Final.pdf [accessed May 22, 2012]. 
131 See the 2008 Progress Report of the Albanian Government, ‘National Strategy for Development 
and Integration’ (Strategjia Kombetare per Zhvillim dhe Integrim), p.21; available at 
http://www.km.gov.al/skedaret/raport_progresi_2008.pdf [accessed September 22, 2011]. 
132 See the 2007 report of the Centre for Legal Civic Initiatives, ‘The Justice Organs Combating 
Corruption: Monitoring the activity of three first instance courts such as Tirana, Vlora and Durrës for 
the period 2004-2006’, Tirana, Albania, pp.8-9. 
133 See Law no.9049, dated April 10, 2003, amended by Law no.9367, dated April 7, 2005 and Law 
9475 dated February 9, 2006, ‘On the Declaration and Audit of Assets, Financial Obligations of the 
Elected and Certain Public Officials’, art.3. 
134 See the speech/report of the General Prosecutor made before the Albanian Parliament, ‘Criminal 
Situation in Albania 2008’ (Raportimin e Prokurorit te Pergjithshem te Republikes ne Kuvendin e 
Shqiperise ‘Mbi Gjendjen e Kriminalitetit ne Shqiperi 2008), pp.164-168; available at 
http://www.pp.gov.al/ [accessed September 20, 2011]. 
135 Interview with rural prosecutor no.5, 2010. 
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state police and both customs and tax police.136 This makes it ‘very difficult for a JIU to 
coordinate and maintain discretion’.137 
In summarising the review of international and local reports on judicial corruption in the 
last decade, it is worth recalling the 2010 report by the European Commission assessing the 
progress of Albania in its application to become a member of the European Union. It 
reported that ‘Overall, Albania lacks a tradition of judicial independence. It needs to 
continue the process of reforming the judiciary, including the adoption of a comprehensive 
judicial reform strategy and key pending laws and the establishment of a sustained track 
record of implementation demonstrating the independence and efficiency of the judiciary’ 
(emphasis added).138 Local and international reports highlight that judicial independence is 
the main factor in judicial corruption but they say little about other social or cultural 
factors. My findings suggest that judicial dependence in Albania is multilayered and 
involves many institutional and organisational factors. It is to these factors that the thesis 
now turns. 
 
Figure 3 Rule of Law v. Control of Corruption in Albania 
 
Source: Kaufmann, D., Kraay, A. and Mastruzzi, M. (2009) ‘The Worldwide Governance 
Indicators: Methodology and Analytical Issues’, World Bank. 
 
 
                                                          
136 European Commission Analytical Report (2010) ‘Commission Opinion on Albania’s Application for 
Membership of European Union’, November 9, SEC1335, p.22. 
137 Interview with urban prosecutor no.5, 2010. 
138 European Commission Analytical Report (2010) ‘Commission Opinion on Albania’s Application for 
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Judicial Independence: Fieldwork Findings 
 
In the above section I examined different aspects of how the judiciary is undermined by the 
political elite and illustrated its dynamics during the period of political and economic 
transition from communism. I relied on international and local reports as well as on some 
interviews undertaken during fieldwork. In the current section I turn to my data and 
explore the contours of Albanian judicial corruption against BPJC standards. I will begin 
with judicial independence. 
Judicial independence is the hallmark of the BPJC.139 The independence of judges is here 
perceived in very broad terms, from the individual and institutional perspective to social 
and political independence. Judicial independence, according to the BPJC, refers to ‘both a 
state of mind and a set of institutional and operational arrangements. The former is 
concerned with the judge’s independence in fact; the latter with defining the relationships 
between the judiciary and others’.140 
Judges should also be free from any social pressure in the course of their work, including 
interpersonal connections with colleagues and parties in the litigation (Application 2). 141 
Politically, judges should avoid any inappropriate connection with other branches of 
government, executive and legislature (Applications 1 and 2). As it is pointed out in the 
Commentary (2007:40), ‘Judges should not be beholden to the government of the day’ 
(Applications 1 and 3). Judges should also play an active role in maintaining the institutional 
and operational independence of the judiciary by being ‘vigilant…to any attempts to 
undermine [their] institutional and operational independence’.142 Judges can even 
stimulate public awareness on judicial independence by helping the public ‘understand the 
fundamental importance’ of this principle.143 
In short, according to the BPJC, independence is multidimensional. It includes 
independence from personal views; from society; from the executive and legislature; from 
colleagues and court staff. Judges are also required to uphold institutional integrity and 
promote trust and high standards of the judiciary to the public. 
                                                          
139 According to the Bangalore Principles, ‘judicial independence is a pre-requisite to the rule of law 
and a guarantee of a fair trial’. See Value 1 ‘Independence’ in the Bangalore Principles of Judicial 
Conduct 2002, p.3; available at 
http://www.unodc.org/pdf/crime/corruption/judicial_group/Bangalore_principles.pdf [accessed 
November 10, 2011]. 
140 See United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime (2007) ‘Commentary on Bangalore Principles of 
Judicial Conduct’, p.39. Hereafter referred to as ‘Commentary’. 
141 ‘Aplications are explonations offered by BPJC which elucidate further the meaning of the ‘Value’ 
or the principle. It helps to understand the meaning of the ‘value’ and how this can be apply in 
practice by judges.  
142 Commentary 2007:52. 
143 Ibid. 
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My interviews also suggest that judicial independence is multifaceted, but that it is 





The majority of my interviewees pointed out that judicial institutional independence 
remains a great concern.144 Institutionally, the judiciary is undermined by the executive 
externally through defective laws, an insufficient budget and the weakening of institutions 
that protect the rights of the judiciary, such as the HCJ. This is usually exercised through the 
influence of the executive and legislative representatives in the HCJ and is reflected in both 
legal and institutional terms. I will now show how these patterns of judicial control work. 
Lack of institutional independence means an inability of the judiciary to operate freely from 
the control of other branches of government such as the legislature and executive. The 
legal structure of the judiciary ‘gives the impression that the judiciary in Albania is 
independent, but in reality this is far from true’.145 
De jure, the Albanian Constitution guarantees the independence of the judiciary, 
administratively, functionally and financially (Albanian Constitution arts.135-147). In terms 
of administrative functions, the Albanian Constitution provides that the entire process of 
selection, nomination and promotion of judges is governed by independent institutions 
such as the HCJ, NJC and the School of Magistrates (SOM). Judges are recruited from the 
law students who graduate from the SOM.146 This School is an independent institution and 
                                                          
144 ‘Although the judiciary should be one of the independent powers, in reality it is not…it is 
independent only on non-political matters, but even on those it is dependent on the street 
(criminals), thus when a judge is not protected by the state, he is dependent on criminals and 
others…in cases influenced by politics, while not necessarily directly, indirectly as a judge you are 
persuaded to decide according to the political will of the political party of the day..’ Interview with 
urban judge no.4, 2010. 
145 ‘The legal structure of the judiciary gives the impression that the judiciary in Albania is 
independent, but in reality this is far from true... the way the separation of powers is enforced in 
Albania shows that there are interfering elements of other powers (legislative and executive) in the 
judiciary, which makes it impossible for an ideal application of this principle (separation of powers). 
There are also other aspects which make judicial independence a fragile concept or surreal ...aspects 
linked with the guaranteeing of the promotion of judges or the disciplinary system of judges, which 
means that, in practice, the exercising of judicial powers makes judicial independence less 
guaranteed...there is a perception among the public that judges are more protected compared with 
other public officials but this perception is based on the constitutional and legal guarantees which 
stipulate how the judiciary should function...in practice though, judicial independence 
suffers.Interview with urban judge no.2, 2010. 
146 The School of Magistrates is the only institution in charge of training future judges and 
prosecutors in Albania. To become a judge or prosecutor in Albania, a student of law should possess 
an LLB with distinction and pass a legal test organised by the School. After acceptance to the School 
he/she has to follow a full-time, intensive theoretical and practical education, for three years. 
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governed by a body of more than 15 representatives from the legal community, of which 
only two are appointed by the MOJ.147 The HCJ can recruit 10% of the total number of 
judges from former judges who were not graduates of the SOM, if they fulfil the legal 
conditions.148 Two-thirds of the HCJ are judges proposed by the NJC and only one-third are 
ex officio members – representatives of the executive and legislature. In addition, judges 
cannot be criminally prosecuted without approval from the HCJ. Neither can they be sent 
before a trial without the consent of the HCJ (Albanian Constitution art.137). These 
safeguards are otherwise known as ‘framing the “immunity of judges”’.149 
Interviewed judges acknowledged that their immunity status is solid, whereas other 
interviewees such as advocates, international observers and especially prosecutors saw 
judges’ immunity as a barrier to prosecuting judicial corruption. Corrupt judges ‘often take 
advantage of this legal shield to get immunity from prosecution’.150 In 2011, General 
Prosecutor Ina Rama raised the issue of immunity of high profile public officials, including 
judges, as a serious concern in fighting corruption and proposed that the law in this respect 
be amended. She also mentioned that in the previous five years the General Prosecutor’s 
Office ‘despite difficulties has requested the removal of immunity for four deputies and 
Ministers in the Parliament and for six judges in the High Council of Justice’.151 
On one hand judges are immune from political attack, but on the other they seem immune 
from investigations for corruption. My interviews suggest that ‘judges are in fact immune 
from removal but not from other undue institutional pressures’.152 However, de facto, the 
function of the judiciary is hampered by legal and institutional interference from both the 
executive and legislature. As one judge put it, ‘the application of the separation of powers 
in practice here seems to have some interfering elements of other branches of government 
which makes it very difficult to achieve the ideal application of the separation of power’.153 





                                                          
147 See Law no.8136, dated July 31, 1996, (amended with Law no.9414, dated May 20, 2005), ‘On the 
Magistrate School of the Republic of Albania’, art.6.  
148 See Law no.9978, dated February 18, 2008, ‘On the Organisation of Judicial Power in the Republic 
of Albania’, art.11. 
149 Interview with rural judge no.10, 2010. 
150 Interview with the urban prosecutor no.2, 2010. 
151 See the Discussion of the General Prosecutor Ina Rama presented at the Conference on the 
Proposal Projects of PACA and EURALIUS, April, 14, 2011; available at http://www.pp.gov.al/ 
[accessed July 25, 2011]. 
152 Interview with urban judge no.7, 2010. 
153 Interview with urban judge no.2, 2010. 
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Legal and Institutional Obstacles 
 
Some of the judges interviewed, highlighted that, ‘legally speaking, the current Law on 
Judicial Power extended the power of the executive nominees such as court chancellors 
and limited that of the chief judges’.154 In a similar vein, the new law on the organisation of 
the NJC was found unconstitutional by the Constitutional Court in 2008.155 Lack of a law 
regulating the NJC has paralysed the functioning of the so-called ‘parliament of judges’. 
Other key pieces of legislation which are related to the organisation of the judiciary, such 
as the law for the Administrative Court, remain ‘“stalled” because of the political 
discontent between political forces from 2009 to 2011’.156 
The blockage of the NJC to gather formally and function according to a law is made for the 
purpose of closed interests. According to one interviewed judge, ‘the underground 
pressure for the NJC to not gather is openly for economic, political and clan interests’.157 
Almost all my interviewees agreed that where the NJC has been legally paralysed, the HCJ is 
politically controlled. As mentioned earlier the NJC selects around 70% of the members of 
the HCJ and if this selection is blocked the HCJ risks lacking full membership and as a result 
its legitimacy will be questioned. It was only as recently as April 8, 2011 that the NJC was 
able to gather and replace the members of the HCJ, the mandate of which was terminated 
more than a year ago.158 Even this meeting was made under huge political pressure and in 
violation of law. 
Another structural problem with the NJC is the procedure and criteria used for judges who 
get elected by the NJC as members of the HCJ. My interviewees said that for ‘a judge to put 
forward his candidacy and lobby is very difficult financially and is time consuming’.159 There 
is no law that regulates the lobbying procedure there. Everything is made underground and 
through private connections. Political support is also a big bonus.160 According to my 
interviewees, the most influential criteria in getting appointed by the NJC into the HCJ are 
strong friendship connections with fellow judges and political support. As one judge put it, 
‘one experienced judge who works in the court of Tirana may have friendships with at least 
70 members of parliament’. 
                                                          
154 Interview with rural judge no.7, 2010. 
155 See Decision of the Constitutional Court no.25, dated December 5, 2008. 
156 Interview with urban judge no.10, 2011. 
157 ‘A lack of legislation from the National Judicial Conference (NJC) (up to 2012) indicates that the 
High Council of Justice (HCJ) is at the limit of its legitimation. The underground pressure for the NJC 
to not meet is clearly for economic, political and clan interests…which has affected the 
independence of the judiciary.  What I would see as a lack of morality from the members of the HCJ 
combined with a lack of regulation on their self promotion, again in my opinion, is openly an attack 
on judicial independence.’ Interview with urban judge no.1,2012. 
158 See point 1 of the Decision of the HCJ no.276, dated May 6, 2011. 
159 Interview with rural judge no.1, 2010. 
160 Interview with rural judge no.2, 2010. 
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So judges appointed to the HCJ need to have both political support and support from their 
colleagues because as mentioned earlier the HCJ is the institution which inspects, promotes 
and evaluates judges of the first instance and appeal courts. The political elite want to have 
some control over the judiciary but on the other hand corrupt judges also want to have 
their own people selected at the HCJ to be protected from inspection and be promoted. I 
will explain this struggle for power among judges later in this chapter. 
 
 
How the High Council of Justice (HCJ) Is Controlled 
 
It is at the discretion of the HCJ to decide the criteria to be used for evaluating judges. The 
HCJ ‘does not publish the names of those who apply for the vacancies, nor does it publish 
the reasons and decisions for its selections or promotion of judges’.161 According to my 
interviewees there are two main factors that have weakened the role of the HCJ. These are 
structural and procedural issues. 
Structural and procedural issues of the HCJ are mostly related to the operational structure 
of the HCJ, its power and composition. As mentioned above, the HCJ is composed of 15 
members, of whom only ten are judges (such as the Chief Justice of the High Court) with 
nine other judges coming from courts of all levels and proposed by the community of 
judges through the NJC. The remaining five (i.e. ex officio) are a mixture of representatives 
of the legislature and executive such as the President of the Republic who is head of the 
HCJ, the Minister of Justice and three individuals appointed by the Albanian parliament.162 
Apart from the Vice Chairman of the HCJ, the criteria for representatives of both executive 
and legislature are not to be a judge but the broadly framed requirement is ‘an 
experienced lawyer of not less than 15 years working experience’.163 The HCJ promotes and 
                                                          
161 ‘The lack of transparency is evident in the way the HCJ has promoted judges recently (2010)... the 
community of  judges has been kept in the dark, we do not know the procedure and the selection 
criteria used for  the candidates. The HCJ does not publish the names of those who apply for the 
vacancies, nor does it publish the reasons and decisions for its selections or promotion of judges... 
they simply declare the names but do not give  reasons why they have selected some and not 
others…and it is difficult to know whether it was a good selection..’ Interview with rural judge no.1, 
2010. Another interviewed advocate on this issue pointed out, ‘...the fact that meetings of the HCJ 
regarding the promotion of 40 judges in the court of Tiranë and Durrës in 2010 lasted only 30 
minutes shows that everything was a result of lobbying outside the official meetings of the HCJ.. 
whereas in fact the criteria of selection should be debated inside HCJ offices and be official...this 
reflects the lack of transparency on the part of the HCJ...’Interview withurban advocate no.5, 2010. 
Interview with urban judge no.1, 2010. According to the law, the HCJ keeps and updates each six 
months a ranking list of judges according to criteria stipulated by its decision. See Law no.9978, 
dated February 18, 2008, ‘On the Organisation of Judicial Power in the Republic of Albania’, art.14. 
162 See Law no.8811, dated May 17, 2001, (amended with Law no.9448, dated December 5, 2005), 
‘On the Organisation and Functioning of the High Council of Justice’, art.3. 
163 Ibid, arts.4, 11, 12. 
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transfers judges of all instance courts, except those of the Constitutional and the High 
Court. Although the number of ex officio members is limited to only one-third and the 
decisions of the HCJ are taken by a simple majority,164 powers given to ex officio members 
by law, especially to the executive’s representatives such as the President of the Republic 
and the Minister of Justice, are critical to control not only the HCJ but also the judicial 
system as a whole. So the ex officio members are a minority which rules the majority in the 
HCJ and I explain how. 
 
 
Role of the President of the Republic 
 
The first obvious pattern of the executive’s control over the HCJ is the extensive role of the 
President of the Republic. Apparently, the power of the President in chairing the HCJ is 
based on the principle of primus inter pares (i.e. equal among equals) (Zaganjori and 
Anastasi et al. 2011:186) but there are certain legal mechanisms who makes him 
significantly influential. The active role of the President begins with his power to convene 
and chair meetings of the HCJ.165 More direct control by the President imposed on the HCJ 
and on the judiciary in large is, first, through his vote as a member of HCJ, and second, the 
right to decree (or not) judges proposed by the HCJ.166 Concern over this dual role of the 
President has been raised by the international community (ABA/CEELI 2004:8). 
Moreover, the President can refuse proposals made by the HCJ. During his term President 
Moisiu refused around 20 candidates proposed by the HCJ (Moisiu 2009:72). In addition to 
these powers, the President has the right to nominate and propose to the parliament the 
names of chief justices and judges of both the High Court and Constitutional Court.167 The 
Chief Judge of the High Court is also an ex officio member of the HCJ and can ‘easily be 
counted as a political vote for quid pro quo favour in certain promotions’.168 
Indirect control by the President over the HCJ is made through his discretion to nominate 
the Vice Chairman of the HCJ who has an important role in managing and controlling this 
institution. According to law, one of the members of the HCJ has to be selected as the Vice 
Chairman, and it is for the President of the Republic to propose his or her name.169 This 
                                                          
164 Ibid, art.25. 
165 Ibid, art.11. It should be mentioned that even when a meeting of the HCJ is called by a verbatim 
request of at least five members it is for the President to formally chair it. Ibid, art.19. 
166 See Albanian Constitution art.136, para.4. 
167 Ibid, art.147, paras.2, 3. 
168 Interview with urban advocate no.5, 2010. 
169 See Law no.8811, dated May 17, 2001, (amended with Law no.9448, dated December 5, 2005), 
‘On the Organisation and Functioning of the High Council of Justice’, art.12.  
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‘gives enormous power to the President to control the nomination and promotion of 
judges as well as their inspections’.170 
Since 1998, there has been a power struggle between the executive and the institution of 
President of the Republic regarding the control of judicial appointments of the High Court 
and the Constitutional Court judges.171 Constitutionally, the President of the Republic is 
designed to strike a balance between the legislature and executive in appointing judges of 
both High Court and Constitutional Court. According to the Constitution, nomination of 
these judges requires parliament’s consent (Albanian Constitution arts.125, 136). In 
addition, the Constitution before its amendments in 2008 stipulated that both political 
position and opposition need to agree with the proposals of the President, something that 
will strengthen the trust of other powers in the judiciary.172 
As the appointment of both High Court and Constitutional Court judges was crucial for 
political forces, two former presidents, Rexhep Meidani (1997-2002) and especially 
Alexander Moisiu (2002-07), had an informal pre-clearing procedure with political parties 
for the suggested candidates before sending their names to parliament for consent. This 
procedure ‘aimed to protect the reputation of the judiciary in front of the public’.173 But a 
breakthrough in this practice occurred when a judge proposed by President Moisiu for the 
High Court was voted down by the majority in parliament although the consensus of both 
political camps was taken beforehand by him. The majority, then socialists, argued that the 
proposed judge was refused by them because she was one of the judges in the trial that 
condemned their socialist leader Fatos Nano in the early 1990s on political grounds (Moisiu 
2009:173). 
The current President Bamir Topi, formerly vice president of the DP, the actual governing 
political force, has followed a different route for proposing judges of the High Court and 
Constitutional Court. In contrast to two former presidents, President Topi avoided the pre-
clearing practice which ‘appeared to be a failure’.174 In 2008, parliament voted down five 
candidates proposed by the President without even checking their files and this was a ‘very 
extreme case at this point’.175 
                                                          
170 ‘...prior to 2007, the President of the Republic decreed the proposals made by the HCJ with 
regard to nomination and promotion of judges. This time (2010) we did not receive any information 
as to why almost all the judges voted for by the HCJ were decreed by the President. He has the right 
to refuse them....he also has the right not to provide reasons for his decisions and this happened in 
the time of Moisiu....this mechanism (decree) gives enormous power to the President to control the 
nomination and promotion of judges as well as their inspections by the HCJ...’ Interview with urban 
judge no.1, 2010. 
 
171 Interviews with urban judge no.5, 2010. 
172 Interview with urban judge no.5, 2010. 
173 Interview with international observer no.1, 2010. 
174 Interview with international observer no.1, 2010. 
175 ‘The appointments of the High Court and Constitutional Court judges have essentially been left to 
the President of Republic with a pretty free hand. In the time of Meidani and Moisiu, they had a 
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It should be made clear that there have been on-going crises between President Topi and 
the executive during his term and this political discontent is mainly evidenced in the 
appointment of the High Court and Constitutional Court judges.176 For the period 2008-11, 
there were around twelve candidate judges177 proposed by President Topi who were either 
voted down by parliament or barred at the hearing procedure of the special commission of 
parliament.178 
In addition, my interviewed judges reported that the role of the President as the Chairman 
of the HCJ in controlling the promotion right of first and appeal court judges is ‘very 
influential and that this becomes more obvious in the period 2007-11’.179 The Vice 
Chairman of the HCJ is in control of all the executive powers of the HCJ, where, among 
other functions, he is in charge of managing the activity of the Judicial Inspectorate of the 
HCJ, which is the main body authorised with inspecting judges of first instance and appeal 
courts.180 In addition, the Vice Chairman heads the special commission set out by the HCJ 
to nominate, transfer and promote applicant judges where vacancies arise.181 He is also in 
charge of signing all decisions by the HCJ.182 
                                                                                                                                                                    
practice of informally discussing things with parliament beforehand, perhaps the leader of the 
majority, whatever, to ensure, since the nomination process is subject to parliamentary consent, 
some guarantee that things would be accepted. As you know, what really happened was that Alfred 
Moisiu appointed the judge from the Court of Appeals, in 2005. He had spoken with all the 
parliamentary parties and they were all essentially in favour of his candidacy and so he went ahead 
with the nomination, but then his candidate judge decided a case which was not well received by 
socialists ...and so the socialists who had the majority in Parliament in 2005 didn’t vote for that 
nomination. President Moisiu was furious and stopped doing this pre-clearing procedure, and 
President Topi did not do it when he appointed six people in 2008, a mechanism which appeared to 
be a failure. That is a very extreme case, .... the six nominees were voted down by Parliament 
without even checking their files...’Interview with international observer no.1, 2010. 
176 See European Commission Analytical Report (2010) ‘Commission Opinion on Albania’s Application 
for Membership of the European Union’, November 9, SEC1335, p.6. 
177 The list of candidates refused: in 2008, five candidates for the High Court (Kristaq Traja, former 
judge at the European Court of Human Rights, Zamir Poda, Artan Zeneli, Mehdi Bici and Altina 
Xhoxhaj); in 2010, six candidates in total, four proposed for the Constitutional Court (Vangjel Kosta, 
Edlira Jorgaqi, Ardian Leka and Artan Hoxha) and two for the High Court (Sokol Çomo and Vexhi 
Muçmata); in 2011, one refused for the High Court (Manjola Bejleri). For more see decrees for each 
of the above names at the official website of the President of Republic; available at 
http://www.president.al/english/pub/dekretime.asp. 
178 Mapo Gazette, (2011) ‘Judges decreed by Topi: The parliament passes only half of them’ 
(Gjyqtarët e dekretuar nga Topi, Kuvendi kalon vetëm gjysmat), June 15. 
179 ‘...the role of Chairman and Vice Chairman of the HCJ is very influential in promotion of judges 
and this becomes more obvious in the period 2007-11. In terms of nomination of judges in this 
period I can’t really say who had the most integrity but I’m afraid the judges who were appointed by 
the current President (Bamir Topi) have a particularly poor track record and that’s also true of the 
courts....’ Interview with international observer no.3, 2010. 
180 See Law no.8811, dated May 17, 2001, (amended with Law no.9448, dated December 5, 2005), 
art.13. 
181 Ibid, art.29. 
182 Ibid, art.36. 
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Role of the Minister of Justice 
 
My interviews highlight that another powerful mechanism of influence by the executive 
over the HCJ and the judiciary in general, is the role of the Minister of Justice (MJ). Similar 
to the President of the Republic, the MJ has a voting right as a member of the HCJ but he 
does not vote on decisions related to the disciplinary proceedings of judges initiated by 
him.183 Only three subjects may ask to propose issues to be considered in the agenda of the 
HCJ’s meetings: the Vice Chairman, the MJ, and five other members together.184 Only those 
issues raised by the MJ should be reviewed in the earliest meeting of the HCJ.185 The 
majority of my interviewees saw ‘the power of the Ministry of Justice to initiate the 
disciplinary proceedings of judges as a clear interference of the executive to the judicial 
independence’.186 
The MOJ, based on the evidence gathered from its inspection or that of the HCJ, has the 
right to initiate a disciplinary proceeding for first and appeal court judges. Judges of both 
High and Constitutional Courts are immune from these inspections. The MOJ also has the 
discretion to propose to the HCJ what kind of disciplinary penalty should be given.187 The 
MOJ thus ‘takes prosecutorial roles against judges; it investigates them, gathers proof, 
brings the accusation before the HCJ, and defends them as well as proposes the disciplinary 
penalties to the HCJ’.188 It may come as a surprise but the Constitutional Court, in a 
decision of 5 to 4, found it a breach of the separation of powers when the penalty charge 




How Ex Officio Members Control the HCJ 
 
Apart from the above legal powers given to representatives of the executive in the HCJ, it is 
still very difficult to understand how ex officio members, constituting only one-third of the 
HCJ, influence the votes of representatives of the judiciary that makes up two-thirds of the 
                                                          
183 Ibid, art.25 point 3. 
184 Ibid, art.22 point 2. 
185 Ibid, art.31 point 1. 
186 Interview with urban judge no.7, 2010. 
187 Law no.8811, dated May 17, 2001, (amended with Law no.9448, dated December 5, 2005), art.31 
point 3. 
188 ‘...the Minister of Justice (MOJ) has the power to discipline judges...he can also decide to close 
the file or not trigger the proceedings at all...so the MOJ takes prosecutorial roles against judges; he 
investigates them, gathers evidence, brings the accusation before the HCJ, and defends them as well 
as proposing the disciplinary penalties to the HCJ. Today, the Minister of Justice proceeds whoever 
he wants. And this is not only with the current Minister but with the MOJ as an institution…’ 
Interview with urban judge no.1, 2010. 
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HCJ. I asked judges how this was possible. According to those interviewed the 
representatives of the judiciary in the HCJ have ‘not shown the integrity and strength of 
independence to be the ones who lead the HCJ’.189 This weakness has given ‘more space to 
the representatives of the executive and legislature and has limited the power of judges 
there’.190 Several interviewed judges confirmed that during recent years, one particular 
phenomenon has occurred. Members of the HCJ, ‘in an open conflict of interest, have been 
promoted during the time they were members of the HCJ.’191 
Their promotion has been triggered either by the Chairman of the HCJ (i.e. President of the 
Republic), the Minister of Justice or the Vice Chairman of the HCJ. This has led 
representatives of the judiciary, who are judges, to not differentiate from the rest of the 
HCJ (i.e. ex officio). According to one judge I interviewed, ‘their policies comply with the 
closed interest of ex officio members and for this reason member judges are reluctant to 
oppose the government’s initiatives on judicial reforms which undermine the interest of 
judges’.192 
The majority of interviewed judges highlighted that many of their rank see membership of 
the HCJ as ‘a means for promotion and as an exchange of favour between the 
representatives of the executive and representatives of judges’.193 As of August 2011, six 
out of 17 judges (one place is still vacant) of the High Court, including Chief Judge Shpresa 
                                                          
189 Interview with urban judge no.2, 2010. 
190 Interview with urban judge no.4, 2010. 
191 Interview with rural judge no.10, 2010. 
192 ‘...first of all the HCJ lacks the legitimisation of the decision-making or of judicial reform, because 
the HCJ, at the moment (2010), has four questionable votes. The mandates of three members 
terminated and the HCJ extended their mandate artificially, while two other members selected by 
the NJC were moved, one to the Constitutional Court and the other to be a Member of Parliament. 
So although the HCJ has 9 members who represent the judiciary, 4 of them do not have 
legitimisation and this makes the decision-making of this institution questionable and subjective, it 
deflates the power of representatives of the judiciary.... And this is in violation of the spirit of the 
autonomy of the judiciary which requires that the decision-making of the judicial councils be 
influenced strongly by judges.... representatives of judges in the HCJ have not shown integrity and 
the power to be independent and to be those who lead the HCJ. This has meant that the 
representatives of the executive and legislative have more power and eclipse the power of the 
judges in the HCJ.  In 2010, a phenomenon occurred whereby the members of the HCJ were 
promoted while they were members of the HCJ, in an open conflict of interest. Their promotion was 
triggered by the Chairman of the HCJ (i.e. President of Republic), who has the right to select and 
propose the names of judges of the High Court and Constitutional Court, or with the proposals of the 
Minister of Justice or the Deputy Chairman of the HCJ. This led representatives of the judiciary, who 
are judges, to not differentiate from the rest of the HCJ (i.e. ex officio). Their policies comply with 
the closed interests of ex officio members and for this reason member judges are reluctant to 
oppose the government’s initiatives on judicial reforms which undermine the interests of judges...’ 
Interview with urban judge no.2, 2010. 
193 Interview with rural judge no.6, 2010. 
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Beçaj, have been promoted while being members of the HCJ;194 and similarly, four out of 
nine judges of the Constitutional Court have been members of the HCJ before their 
promotion there.195 
The HCJ has not only been used by its member judges as a springboard to the High Court 
and Constitutional Court with the support of the executive’s representatives, but also as a 
promotion tool for those working in rural first or appeal courts to advance their careers in 
more urban and ‘lucrative’ courts.196 Almost ‘all member judges of the HCJ have been 
promoted in appeal courts or higher courts’.197 
According to two experts appointed by the European Council to review anti-corruption 
policies in Albania in 2010: ‘with regard to the appointments of judges to the appeal courts, 
the selection procedure was carried out in a completely non-transparent manner, in 
violation of law, and partly even in violation of rules recently set by the HCJ itself, and 
undoubtedly far from compliance with European standards for the judiciary’.198 This 
pattern of exchange of favours among the community of judges is becoming increasingly 
evident.199 It is not by chance that the number of disciplinary proceedings followed by the 
HCJ is decreasing. 
This can explain the argument mentioned earlier that corrupt judges support their loyal 
friends to be appointed at the HCJ in order to be protected from inspections for corruption 
                                                          
194 See Judge Besnik Imeraj, Judge Guxim Zenelaj, Judge Ardian Nuni, Judge Aleksander Muskaj and 
recently Judge Edmond Islamaj. For more details see their CVs at the website of the Albanian High 
Court; available at http://www.gjykataelarte.gov.al/ [accessed July 12, 2011].  
195 See biographies of Judge Vladimir Kristo, Judge Petrit Plloçi, Judge Admir Thanza and Judge Altina 
Xhoxhaj on the website of the Albanian Constitutional Court; available at http://www.gjk.gov.al/ 
[accessed July 12, 2011]. 
196 See e.g. the CV of the recent member of the HCJ, Hysen Saliko who worked as a judge in a rural 
first instance court of Kolonje 1994-2007 (this court was closed in 2007 because of judicial reforms) 
and who then was an HCJ inspector from December 2007 to May 2010, and then upgraded in May 
2010 as judge of the Appeal Court of Vlora and also became a member of the HCJ in April 2011. For 
more see the CV of Hysen Saliko at the HCJ website; available at http://kld.al/saliko_hysen [accessed 
July 12, 2011]. 
197 Interview with a member of the National Association of Judges, 2010. 
198 See the Expert Report prepared by Francis Desterbeck and Thierry Loquet for the European 
Commission, titled ‘Rule of Law Mission: The Fight Against Corruption’, June 7-11, 2010 
(unpublished). This report is mentioned in several media articles, see also Neza, A. (2011) ‘Why so 
much fear from lifting of immunity’ (Pse gjithe kjo frike nga heqia e imunitetit), Panorama Gazette, 
September 22. 
199 Interview with rural judge no.1, 2010. 
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or other irregularities as a result.200 In 2008 there were eleven disciplinary proceedings, 
where seven cases were discharged and four were postponed to the next year.201 
In 2009 the number of disciplinary proceedings increased to 14, where only three judges 
were penalised, five discharged, four cases postponed to the next year and two 
dismissed/closed.202 In 2010 the number of disciplinary proceedings plummeted to three 
cases only, where two disciplinary proceedings’ requests were withdrawn by the Ministry 
of Justice and one was discharged by the HCJ.203 
 
 
How the HCJ Controls the Judiciary 
 
Promotion and evaluation process of judges: My interviews suggest that the promotion 
system is also a mechanism for judicial corruption. Up until 2010, the evaluation system 
was very simple and based on only three indicators: two quantitative indicators (the 
number of court decisions per year and the time spent processing a file) and a qualitative 
indicator (the percentage of decisions returned by the appellate courts).204 
Deficiencies in the evaluation process: The qualitative indicator of the HCJ, such as the 
percentage rate of returned cases from the appeal courts, seems unrealistic for the 
Albanian context. According to the HCJ, a first instance court judge should have not more 
than 30% of his total cases returned to score the qualitative indicator.205 Practically, this 
indicator does not help professional judges to be promoted. My interviews suggest that 
                                                          
200 Judges may by disciplined by the HCJ for several violations mainly related to ethical misbehaviour, 
violation of law while managing a case, and extortion. See art.32 on disciplinary proceedings of the 
Law no.9877, dated February 18, 2008 on the ‘Organisation of Judicial Power in the Republic of 
Albania’. 
201 See the HCJ report ‘Summary Information of Some Activities of the High Council of Justice during 
2008’ (Informacion Permbledhes per Disa Aktivitete te Keshillit te Larte te Drejtesise); available at 
http://www.kld.al/aktivitete_2008 [accessed September 21, 2011]. 
202 See the HCJ report, ‘Summary Information of Some Activities of the High Council of Justice during 
2009’ (Informacion Permbledhes per Disa Aktivitete te Keshillit te Larte te Drejtesise); available at 
http://www.kld.al/aktivitete_2009 [accessed September 21, 2011]. 
203 See the HCJ report, ‘Summery Information of Some Activities of the High Council of Justice during 
2010’ (Informacion Permbledhes per Disa Aktivitete te Keshillit te Larte te Drejtesise); available at 
http://www.kld.al/aktivitete_2010 [accessed September 21, 2011]. 
204 See the HCJ’s Decision no.199, dated September 15, 2006, ‘On the Evaluation Criteria of the 
Judicial Performance’, (amended with Decision no.238, dated December 24, 2008); available at 
http://www.kld.al/vendime [accessed July 4, 2011]. 
205 See the HCJ’s Decision no.199, dated September 15, 2006, ‘On the Evaluation Criteria of the 
Judicial Performance’, point 4; available at http://www.kld.al/vendim_kriteret_matese [accessed 
July 4, 2011]. 
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‘the professional level of High Court and appeal court judges is lower than that of first 
instance court judges’.206 
There are around 641 judges and prosecutors working in Albania today and only 208 of 
them have come via the professional education of the SOM.207 The remainder is composed 
of ‘judges and prosecutors educated during the communist period and of those qualified 
from short intensive courses in 1993-94, the so-called “six-months judges”’.208 
Whereas the majority of graduates from the School of Magistrates ‘work in first instance 
courts, the remaining contingent operates in appeal courts, the High Court and the 
Constitutional Court’.209 My interviewees noted that the number of cases returned by the 
appeal courts increased and this has undermined the institution of due process and judicial 
review, a problem still persistent in post-communist judicial systems (Herron and Randazzo 
2003; Sadurski 2005).The high level of returned cases by appeal courts and the High Court 
has raised concerns in the community of judges. As one first instance court judge put it: 
‘The trend [of returned cases from appeal to first instance court] is sharply 
increasing in an illogical and illegal way. They return cases to us and we decide the 
same, then cases are appealed and they return back to us again. The system of 
judicial control is not working at all.’210 
So the unreasonable ‘high level of returned cases’ seems to be a pattern of judicial 
corruption used by the corrupt judges in the appeal courts or the High Court. A few 
interviewees highlighted another pattern used by corrupt judges to undermine honest 
judges who work in the first instance courts. This is applicable in cases tried by three 
judges. Here, ‘the corrupt judges try to oppose the decision of the honest judge and leave 
the opinion of the latter in minority, in legal terms known as “a dissent judgement”. A large 
number of dissenting opinions would make the honest judge look unprofessional and will 
be counted as an indicator of poor performance in his evaluation. Sooner or later the 
                                                          
206 ‘...I can say that the quality of the decisions of first instance courts is very good in the appeal 
courts but very poor in the High Court, where in fact it should be the contrary...so the professional 
level of the High Court judges and appeal court judges is lower than that of first instance court 
judges. This shows, I believe, the extent of the phenomenon. I probably would not call it judicial 
corruption, but incorrect exercise of duty by the High Court...’ Interview with former Minister of 
Justice, Enkelejd Alibeaj.  Another high profile judge pointed out: ‘...I am totally dissatisfied with the 
way the High Court works today.... we see the way decisions are taken by the High Court...they take 
contradictory positions on similar cases.. I, have sometimes seen far better decisions given by judges 
of the first instance and appeal courts...’ Interview with urban judge no.5, 2010.  
207 See the official website of the School of Magistrates, at ‘General Introduction’; available at 
http://www.magjistratura.edu.al/#185 [accessed July 18, 2011].  
208 Interview with urban prosecutor no.4, 2010. 
209 Interview with urban judge no.2, 2010. 
210 Interview with rural judge no.2, 2010. 
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honest judge has to either conform to the corrupt environment or to accept the fact that 
he or she will never be promoted.’211 
In 2010, there were three decisions issued by the HCJ tackling issues of the evaluation 
process but in none of them was it made clear what suggestions were to be accepted and 
what were not.212 According to the former Minister of Justice Enkelejd Alibeaj, promotion 
‘was based on two criteria: static, such as publishing research papers; and dynamic, such as 
evaluation of the day-to-day work of judges’.213  
Since April 2010 the HCJ has changed almost the entire process of evaluation for first 
instance courts and, according to some judges I interviewed, ‘has made it more 
complicated’.214 It should be emphasised that the remarks made by the interviewed judges 
above were based on the old system of evaluation. The majority of my interviews were 
conducted between March and September 2010. The interviewed judges were not familiar 
with the new system. During 2009, the HCJ asked judges for their comments regarding the 
old system of evaluation (i.e. the system in practice before April 2010) and many of them 
sent their suggestions.215  
So, in 2011, I asked a number of them whether their suggestions had been included in the 
new system of evaluation.  
 
 
                                                          
211 ‘...the corrupt judges try to oppose the decisions of the honest judge and leave the opinion of the 
latter in the minority, in legal terms known as “a dissent judgement”. A large number of dissenting 
opinions would make the honest judge look unprofessional and would be counted as an indicator of 
poor performance in his evaluation. Sooner or later the honest judge has to either conform to the 
corrupt environment or to accept the fact that he or she will never be promoted. This is one of the 
ways an honest judge can be undermined and made to fit with the corrupt system. Otherwise he will 
get out of the system...’(Interview with urban advocate no.7, 2010). 
212 See the HCJ’s Decision no.261, dated April 14, 2010, Decision no.268, dated September 15, 2010, 
and Decision no.269, dated September 27, 2010. For more see ‘The Summery of Activities of the 
High Council of Justice for 2010’; available at http://www.kld.al/aktivitete_2010 [accessed July 4, 
2011]. 
213 ‘...the promotion was based on two criteria: static (academic experience), such as teaching and 
publishing research papers; and dynamic, such as evaluation of the day-to-day work of judges. The 
HCJ should have prepared a regulation which would have determined the order and classification of 
judges according to their work performance. But this was not done. The static criterion was not 
applied. ….. according to my information even in recent promotions  (2010) made mainly in the 
courts of  Durrës and Tirana, which are the most preferred courts in the country, judges were not 
evaluated according to these criteria, and this fact is also mentioned in the minutes of the HCJ’s 
meetings...’Interview with former Minister of Justice, Enkelejd Alibeaj,2010. 
214 The new evaluation system is based on three broad category groups: (a) general professional, 
organisational and implementation skills; (b) legal and technical skills; and (c) human resources and 
professional commitment. For more see the HCJ’s Decision no.261/2, dated April 14, 2010, 
‘Evaluation System of Judges’. 
215 Interview with rural judge no.7, 2010. 
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One judge pointed out: 
‘Not only is there no transparency by the HCJ on our suggestions, but even their 
decisions on the evaluation procedures have not been enforced. We still do not 
know the reasons why the evaluation of judges has not been completed, or rather, 
while many judges have been evaluated by the inspectors of the HCJ, why the 
latter fails to decide and publish the results.’216 
The new evaluation system for the appeal and serious crime courts has raised concerns 
among the community of judges. Awarding more points for work experience and fewer for 
qualifications disfavours judges graduating from the SOM, who score high in qualifications 
but low in work experience. According to an interviewed judge, ‘this evaluation system is 
made on purpose by the HCJ to leave out all this generation of judges. This makes it very 
difficult for them to be upgraded in higher and urban courts.’217 
In a similar vein, a few interviewed judges noted that the ‘proposal of recruiting 10% from 
the community of judges, introduced in the current Law on Judicial Power, came from the 
HCJ and not from the government’.218 This is because every judge who enters the system 
should have graduated from the SOM and the only way for the HCJ to retain some control 
over the judiciary has been to allow itself the power to recruit people out of the judicial 
system such as advocates and lawyers.219 
This ambiguity and confused procedure in the evaluation has led to almost all current 
promotions being perceived by the public as corrupt. The majority of interviewees noted 
that the promotions of 2008-10 were very doubtful. According to a chief judge of a first 
instance court, ‘The promoted judges in 2010 were not the best ones, especially those 
promoted in the appeal courts.’220 For the last six years the HCJ has failed to conduct a 
general evaluation of judges, and this, according to former Minister of Justice Enkelejd 
Alibeaj, is a ‘dramatic circumvention of the law by the HCJ’.221 
 
 
‘Career Courts’ – Another Pattern of Corruption 
 
Another equally biased and illegal promotion scheme employed by the HCJ, in the view of 
the majority of the interviewed judges, is the promotion to the so-called ‘Career courts’ – 
i.e. courts of Tirana (Albania’s capital) and Durrës (the country’s main port). Thus, a simple 
move from a rural court to an urban court, although they are both first instance courts, is 
                                                          
216 Interview with rural judge no.9, 2011. 
217 Interview with urban judge no.2, 2010. 
218 Interview with rural judge no.10, 2010. 
219 Interview with rural judge no.7, 2010. 
220 Interview with rural judge no.6, 2010. 
221 Interview with the former Minister of Justice Enkelejd Alibeaj, 2010. 
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considered promotion, where ‘often, promotion means an upgrade from one level court to 
another (i.e. from first instance to Appeal court)’.222 These courts were not considered for 
the initial phase of the appointment for the new graduates of the School of Magistrates. 
And, according to several interviewed judges, this was another corrupt manoeuvre 
‘orchestrated by the HCJ together with the MOJ to avoid judges graduated from this school 
to get in appeal and first instance urban courts and promote those who would be able to 
purchase the position’.223 
It is not by chance that ‘Career courts’ are the most ‘lucrative courts’ or where the size of 
business transactions is higher than in other courts. According to the majority of 
interviewed judges this current promotion scheme was viewed as a pattern of judicial 
corruption. Considering the transfer of a first instance judge to first instance courts of 
Tirana or Durrës as a promotion is regarded by the community of lawyers as ‘a tool of the 
HCJ to generate bribes’.224 
I had the opportunity to interview judges who had applied to the HCJ for promotion, and I 
asked them whether they were approached by any of the HCJ’s officials or its members to 
pay something, but none of them admitted personally to having had such an experience. 
However, almost all of them accepted that there were rumours that applicant judges ‘were 
asked to pay up to 50,000 euros for a transfer from a rural first instance court to Durrës 
first instance court and up to 70,000 euros for a transfer to the first instance court of 
Tirana. Prices for transfer to the appeal courts of Durrës and Tirana almost doubled to 
150,000-200,000 euros.’225 
For the High Court, alleged sums paid for promotion reach at least 250,000 euros.226 In 
contrast, the level of bribe paid to be promoted to the Constitutional Court is lower than 
that to the appeals or the High Court, as ‘the Constitutional Court is not considered very 
“lucrative” as the flow of commercial cases is very low’.227 There are rumours that ‘one 
current candidate proposed by the President for the High Court paid 250,000 euros but he 
was refused by parliament. The same judge was subsequently appointed by the HCJ as 
                                                          
222 According to the former Minister of Justice Enkelejd Alibeaj career is not ‘only the upgrade from 
one level of court to a higher level but also a transfer from a rural to an urban court’. Interview with 
former Minister of Justice Enkelejd Alibeaj, 2010. 
223 Interview with rural judge no.7, 2010. 
224 ‘... the notion of “career courts” is the notion of judicial corruption. …it is a tool of the HCJ to 
generate bribes...the issue is very simple, the problem is economic, there (in the career courts) is the 
money, and there is the market…if you are promoted there you can take the “investment” back… So 
I think...that the goal of making the Court of Durrës and Tirana “career courts”,  is like putting a price 
on the courts...’ Interview with rural judge no.2. 
225 ‘...I have heard about amounts of up to 20,000 Euros being offered in order to be accepted at the 
Magistrate School,... and I’ve also heard that judges were asked to pay up to 50,000 Euros for a 
transfer from a rural first instance court to Durrës first instance court and up to 70,000 Euros for a 
transfer to the first instance court of Tirana. Prices for transfer to the appeal courts of Durrës and 
Tirana almost doubled to 150,000-200,000 Euros...and 250,000 Euros were required to become a 
High Court judge...’ Interview with international observer no.2. 
226 Interview with international observer no.3, 2010. 
227 Interview with local observer no.1, 2010. 
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chief judge of an urban court. But as the “price” for this position was 50% cheaper, he was 
reimbursed the difference.’228 The ‘price list’ of bribes shown by my interviewees is 
confirmed even by the Global Integrity Report on Albania 2010.229 
 
 
Misuse of Judicial Inspectorates 
 
Another mechanism used by both the HCJ and MOJ is the misuse of judicial inspectorates. 
On rare occasions, inspections of judges, especially those by the inspectorate of the MOJ, 
have been politically motivated.230 As shown above, the duties of each of the judicial 
inspectorates are often conflicting and confused. The perception by judges is that although 
slight progress has been made there have been cases where inspections are selective and 
based on double standards.231 
Inspection can be used as a tool to ‘mute’ those judges who actively oppose defective laws 
and judicial policies. A member judge of the National Association of Judges (NAJ), who 
helped to challenge the new law of Judicial Power and that of the NJC before the 
Constitutional Court, reported that ‘immediately after the decision was issued by the 
Constitutional Court in their favour, suddenly, he was visited by the inspectors of the 
MOJ’.232 There have been eight cases where inspections of the HCJ have been conducted 
while courts’ cases were still in process. And decisions by the HCJ to initiate these 
inspections were found by the Constitutional Court to be in violation of the Constitution.233 
Judges also pointed out that the inspection procedure is ambiguous and opens up gaps for 
political pressure. A former Chief Judge of a first instance court pointed out that: 
‘Although the procedure requires that the result of the inspection cannot be 
declared until the court’s decision becomes final,234 the decision of the HCJ or 
Ministry of Justice to inspect a judge while the case is still in process in the first 
instance court, is a pressure and a signal sent to the appeal courts’ judges to 
understand the political motive, if the case were appealed there.’235 
                                                          
228 Interview with international observer no.3, 2010. 
229 See Global Integrity Report (2010) ‘Global Integrity Report: Albania, 2010’, Washington DC; 
available at http://www.globalintegrity.org/report/Albania/2010/ [accessed July 11, 2011]. 
230 Interview with HCJ inspector no.2, 2010. 
231 Interview with investigative journalist no.1, 2010. 
232 Interview with a member of the NAJ, 2010. 
233 Interview with urban judge no.2, 2010. 
234 The decisions of court become final in two situations, when the case has not been appealed and 
when the time for appeal has lapsed. And if the case is appealed, the decision of the appeal court 
then becomes final. 
235 Interview with urban judge no.1, 2010. 
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Since 2004, the Constitutional Court has highlighted that a decision of court can only be 
reviewed by a higher court and not by any other institution outside the court system, as 
this can otherwise be considered as an infringement of judicial independence.236 In 
addition, while interviewed judges agreed that inspection is an important mechanism to 
hold judges accountable, they insist that ‘this power should be given only to the HCJ as its 
inspectors are judges and not allowed to the MOJ, whose inspectors are not judges but 
simply individuals holding a law degree and without experience in the courts and whose 
selection often is politicised’.237 
There were some differences among the interviewed judges regarding the role of the 
inspectorates. Those who were concerned about the selective use of inspection by the HCJ 
and MOJ were either former chief judges of urban first instance courts or simple judges in 
rural first instance courts. Those who were more relaxed were urban first instance court 
judges or chief judges of rural first instance courts. 
When asked about the role of inspection, one chief judge of a first instance rural court said, 
‘inspection is a good thing; chief judges should be checked about their administrative role 
in the court’.238 Another judge, of a first instance court from Tirana, was asked whether 
inspection was being used as a form of pressure, and her answer was that ‘there are no 
double standards used by the inspectors, their focus is on the file and not on the judge’.239 
In fact, the majority of judges have been disciplined by the HCJ on the grounds of wrongful 
application of law (Zaganjori and Anastasi et al. 2011:178). This diversity of opinion among 
the community of judges shows that somehow the use of the judicial inspectorates for 
political reasons is more evident in urban courts where size of commercial cases is higher. 
To sum up, institutional independence is still a concern and political influence continues to 
be a problem. 
I close this section with a quote from a chief judge of a rural court: 
‘In Albania it is very difficult to separate politics from other institutions. The 
parliament is political, executive is political, and then we talk about [the 
independence] of the judiciary… but chances are limited. I do not know whether 
the day will come [when the judiciary will be fully independent]… my hopes are 
zero.’240 
 
Another form of dependency which is closely linked with institutional independence is 
operational dependence. The following section looks at how judicial independence is 
operationally obstructed. 
 
                                                          
236 See Decision of Constitutional Court no.11, dated May 27, 2004, p.3. 
237 Interview with the HCJ inspector no.1, 2010. 
238 Interview with rural judge no.3, 2010 
239 Interview with urban judge no.4, 2010. 
240 Interview with rural judge no.6, 2010. 
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Operational Patterns of Control 
 
In this section I focus on the tight budget allocated by the executive to the courts, poor 
salaries, lack of infrastructure and human resources, lack of a special budget for expert 
witnesses. I show the concerns of my interviewed judges and also point out how all these 
factors influence the performance of the judiciary. Operational dependency entails reliance 
by the judiciary on external resources because the budget allocated by the state to cover 





Operational dependency, as mentioned above, is about the dependence of the judiciary on 
external private resources. Budgets provided for the judiciary over the last decade are very 
low and insufficient to cover its needs. Almost all the judges I interviewed admit that this is 
having a ‘significant influence on their work in terms of performance and efficiency’.242 
From 2001 to 2010, (exept 2005), the average percentage of the state budget allocated to 
the judiciary was less than 1% of the total state budget (see Table 1 on budget trends for 
2001-10). According to the 2010 European Commission Report on Albania (2010:19), the 
‘budgetary appropriations for the judiciary overall remain insufficient’. In 2011 
Transparency International stated that ‘In Europe, Albania has the lowest share of 
government spending dedicated to the judiciary, and judges’ salaries are fifty per cent 
lower than those in neighbouring Kosovo.’243 
 
 
Table 1 Trends in the Courts’ Budget, 2001-10 
Year  Budget of courts in 
Albanian Lek 
Courts’ budget as % of 
state budget 
2001 998,139,000 0.60% 
2003 1,102,413,000 0.77% 
2004 2,100,552,000 0.89% 
                                                          
241 Interview with urban judge no.8, 2010. 
242 Interview with urban judge no.7, 2010. 
243 Transparency International (2011) ‘EU Anti-Corruption Requirements: Measuring Progress in 
Albania, Kosovo, FYR Macedonia and Turkey’, p.6. 
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2005 2,771,000,000 1.74% 
2006 2,531,000,000 1.63% 
2007 1,347,000,000 0.64% 
2008 1,411,500,000 0.56% 
2009 1,737,110,000 0.67% 
2010 1,759,160,000 0.76% 
Source: ABA/CEELI reports on Albania, 2004, 2006, 2008 and data from Albanian Ministry of 
Finance for 2010 state budget (data compiled by author). 
In all international reports, and my interviews, judges claimed that the level of salaries is 
very low. According to a study by EURALIUS in 2006,244 salary increases in Latvia had a very 
positive impact on the ranking of that country in Transparency International’s corruption 
index – in stark contrast to Albania, which dropped down one place because of its lack of a 
long term strategy to increase salaries.245 Judges claimed that because of poor salaries they 
‘could not afford to fulfil even their normal life expectations and that this has influenced 
their working standards’.246 
The budget shortfall pressures judges to rely on external sources to assist the judicial 
process. Chief judges of courts use their private connections, which inevitably influences 
the independence of their courts. As one first instance rural court chief judge put it: 
‘Normally when I, as a chief judge, use my private connections to solve financial 
and administrative problems of the court, then it is normal to expect that I will 
serve these people when they ask for my help. This makes the judiciary dependent 
                                                          
244 See the European Assistant Mission to the Albanian Justice System (EURALIUS) (2006) ‘Increase of 
Judicial Budget Aiming to Reduce Corruption Degree based on European Countries’ Experience’. The 
material is not published and not made public.  
245 Interview with local observer no.3, 2010. 
246‘...take the economic factor, I think that the salaries of judges, when compared with their 
colleagues in Europe, are low, they cannot justify the workload and high responsibility...with these 
salaries judges could not even afford to fulfil their normal life expectations and this has influenced 
their working standards...’Interview with urban judge no.1. According to a rural advocate ‘poor 
salaries of judges are a factor of judicial corruption, although they have the highest salaries of all the 
public officials in Albania. The low salaries of judges do not motivate them, they do not enjoy certain 
privileges or advantages related to their profession, for instance their security and social status is 
poor…so, lacking these elements, a judge will depend on favours made to him by others. If a doctor 
does a favour for him or a family member, the judge feels somehow obliged to pay it back. A judge 
cannot be independent from other segments of society. In this context we should provide judges 
with some more privileges, not only to protect them but also to protect us…unfortunately we do not 
have this concept of judicial independence.’ Interview with rural advocate no.1. 
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and in a way to serve to the private donors regardless of our will. We are obliged to 
do that, simply for the sake of our work and not for our personal interests.’247 
In addition, another rural chief judge said that they have to ask international donors such 
as USAID for assistance, and that this requires chief judges to ‘spend much time and energy 





Lack of infrastructure is another factor that obstructs the work of judges and drives them to 
find external ways to perform their duties. In general, judges highlighted that there has 
been a significant improvement in infrastructure of mainly the rural courts,249 whereas in 
big courts such as the court of Tirana, there is not enough space and almost all courts’ 
proceedings are held in the judges’ offices.250 In this court, only in the civil sector, there are 
44 judges and only seven courtrooms to be shared and ‘only 2% of scheduled Tirana civil 
sessions are held in courtrooms…. and for criminal cases, almost 93% are tried in offices’.251 
Many cases tried by a panel of three judges will be postponed because ‘there is a lack of 
courtrooms and this makes it very difficult to allocate a suitable time for trials with a panel 
of judges’.252 
Job conditions are another problem that influences judges’ work. As mentioned above, the 
majority of cases are held in the judges’ offices and this gives them very little time to work 
in privacy and comfort.253 Most judges take ‘files and work home and this leaves them 
limited time for private life or outside activity’.254 Recently, there has been an increase in 
the incidence of judges suffering from mental health issues, and this has been attributed 
‘to the lack of comfort and the stressful work’.255 
Lack of sufficient supporting staff such as secretaries or judges’ assistants is another factor 
that impedes the performance of judges and increases the backlog.256 In contrast to the 
                                                          
247 Interview with rural judge no.6, 2010. 
248 Interview with rural judge no.3, 2010. 
249 Interview with rural judge no.5, 2010. 
250 Interview with urban judge no.7, 2010. 
251 Lombard, P. and Stienstra, D. (2011) ‘The Use of Courtrooms at the Tirana and Durres District 
Courts: Final Study Report’, USAID Albania, p.1. 
252 Interview with rural judge no.3, 2010. 
253 Interview with urban judge no.9, 2010. 
254 Interview with rural judge no.7, 2010. 
255 Interview with urban advocate no.2, 2010. 
256 Interview with rural judge no.1, 2010. 
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High Court, Constitutional Court and serious crime courts (i.e. first and appeal court), 
where the situation generally seems to have improved, in many urban courts there is still a 
need for more supporting staff.257 Rural courts (appeal and first instance) seem more 
organised in this respect, whereas courts in urban areas such as the courts of Tirana and 
Durrës lack supporting staff and do not have enough space.258 ABA/CEELI (2006:51) states 
that in the court of Tirana ‘two to three judges share[d] one secretary’. 
It should be mentioned that Albania has the lowest ratio of judges per capita in Europe.259 
For over four years the Inspectorate of the HCJ suggested that the number of judges in 
urban courts, especially appeal courts in Vlora, Durrës and Tirana, be increased but this was 
not possible, at least formally, to be arranged until 2009.260 To avoid the backlog, ‘many 
judges use their secretaries to write “simple” court decisions which do not require lengthy 
reasoning such as divorce cases’.261 
Similarly, there are occasions when corrupt judges, after the case has been decided, ‘leave 
it to the advocate of the winning party, if they trust him, to write the court’s decision’.262 In 
addition, there are judges who ‘employ private lawyers to help them prepare cases 
because their time is so tight. This usually happens in urban courts where the workload is 
higher’.263 In 2010, this concern was raised by the Minister of Justice when he asked that all 
decisions be written by judges alone and further asked that procedures be devised that 
would make this process verifiable.264 
Another significant problem is the lack of a special budget for experts in civil cases where 
parties in the process have low incomes and could not afford such experts (i.e. those 
individuals exempted from the court’s tax because of their low income). In this situation, 
‘there is currently no solution provided and on many occasions the process goes into 
deadlock’.265 
There is no travel subsidy for judges who live in a different city from where they work. 
Travelling by low cost public transport makes judges vulnerable to crime and social 
                                                          
257 Interview with urban advocate no.8, 2010. 
258 See the report by the European Assistance Mission to the Albanian Justice System (EURALIUS), 
‘Backlog Analysis of Albanian Courts 2002-2005’, sent to the Ministry of Justice, January 15, 2007, 
pp.11-12. 
259 Transparency International (2011) ‘EU Anti-Corruption Requirements: Measuring Progress in 
Albania, Kosovo, FYR Macedonia and Turkey’, p.6. 
260 Interview with HCJ inspector no.2, 2010. 
261 Interview with urban advocate no.2, 2010. 
262 Interview with urban advocate no.2, 2010. 
263 Interview with rural judge no.7, 2010. 
264 Interview with urban advocate no.2, 2010. 
265 Interview with urban judge no.8, 2010. 
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pressure,266 and could even endanger their lives. One judge of the Serious Crime Court 
pointed out that: 
‘I travel to Tirana every day using public transport. Many times I have seen family 
members of accused criminals travelling in the same bus with me. How safe does 
that make me feel? And I link this with the lowest budgets for courts. As a judge I 
feel totally unprotected on the street.’267 
This section has examined both institutional and operational dependence and has shown 
how they serve to influence the independence of the judiciary. But there is another form of 
judicial dependence, one that has not yet been explored by either international or local 
reports, or indeed the literature in general. This is the structural interdependence of judges 
within the judiciary. 
The following section will demonstrate that the Albanian interdependence of judges is 
multilayered. The most influential category of judges manages the distribution rights of 
promotions in the first instance and appeal courts by advancing the careers of members of 
its network and stalling others. Let us see how this mechanism works. 
 
 
Inner Structural Interdependence 
 
My interviews suggest that there is an inner structural interdependence among judges. In 
the context of this study, structural interdependence of the judiciary means a parallel 
hierarchy within the judiciary where certain categories of judge control others informally. 
According to the BPJC, judicial independence ‘requires not only the dependence of the 
judiciary as an institution from the other branches of government; it also requires judges 
being independent from each other’ (Commentary 2007:50). 
There are four main categories of judge that are active in the judicial system today. First, 
judges who have worked during the communist period, known by the public as ‘former 
communist judges’ (gjyqtaret e komunizmit); second, judges who completed their studies 
in the late 1980s (during the communist period) but were employed during the early phase 
of the political transition to democracy in 1990-2000268 (hereafter referred to as ‘judges of 
transition’); third, graduates from non law backgrounds who became judges after 
completing short intensive courses (i.e. six to nine months) during 1992-93, commonly 
known as ‘six-months judges’; and fourth, judges who graduated from the School of 
Magistrates and began practising in 2000 (hereafter referred to as ‘Magistrates’). 
                                                          
266 Interview with rural judge no.7, 2010. 
267 Interview with urban judge no.4, 2010. 
268 Many of them were working as professional judges’ assistants when in the late 1990s this 
institution lapsed and judicial structure reformed and they all became judges. 
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My analysis will focus only on the corrupt fraction of these categories but who are yet very 
influential. When I mention one category I do not wish to imply that all judges within the 
category are corrupt. There are many honest judges in all the described categories, but my 
interviews suggest that their role is insignificant in influencing the HCJ and NJC. 
There were two main waves of political influence during the post-communist period which 
helped the first three categories of judge to establish and strengthen their positions within 
the judicial system. 
 
 
First Wave (1992-96) 
 
The first wave occurred in 1992-96 (ABA/CEELI 2004:3) when the country was governed by 
right-wing political forces represented by the Democratic Party (DP). In the early phase of 
transition in 1990-93, Albania was in need of judges with a new perspective regarding the 
application of the rule of law. The judiciary, in theoretical terms, was applying democratic 
principles but in practice these new legal concepts were enforced by judges educated by 
and who worked in the communist system (Prato 2004:79).269 
Due to this emergent need the DP began a judicial reform based mainly on two premises. 
First, to remove ‘former communist judges’, especially those having a criminal past, and 
second to replace them with lawyers educated in the late 1980s but who began practising 
law in the early 1990s (‘judges of transition’), as they were not involved in judicial 
processes during the communist period.270 As many ‘former communist judges’ were 
moved, the number of vacancies in the judiciary increased. To fill this gap, in addition to 
‘judges of transition’, the DP organised short and intensive courses for judgeship. Some of 
the new judges were individuals supposedly recruited from families persecuted for political 
reasons during the communist regime.271 
The conditions for becoming a judge were unprecedented: ‘every candidate with a 
university degree usually other than law (a few had finished high school only) went for an 
intensive six-month course and immediately became a judge’.272 A degree in law was not a 
prerequisite and even people holding degrees in ‘agriculture, medicine or engineering were 
allowed to enrol on these courses’.273 The true criterion was political affiliation to the DP. It 
                                                          
269 Interview with rural prosecutor no.4, 2010. 
270 Interview with urban advocate no.1, 2010. 
271 Interview with urban judge no.1, 2010. 
272 Interview with urban judge no.6, 2010. 
273 Interview with urban advocate no.6, 2010. 
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sufficed that an applicant be a strong supporter or worked in the administration or in the 
Party’s structures.274 
Candidates selected by the executive were scrutinised and ‘sometimes even suggested by 
the Albanian secret service of that time, the so-called “SHIK” (i.e. the National Information 
Service)’.275 In addition, the DP approved a specific law in 1995, commonly known as ‘the 
law of lustration’. This law was another political tool used by democrats to clear the 
judiciary of former communist remnants (Austin and Ellison 2009). Many former 
communist judges were not allowed even to practise law as advocates.276 The law of 
lustration further increased the power of ‘six-months judges’ because their number 
increased in the system. The latter advanced and ‘replaced professional but politically-
attacked judges’.277 
The judicial reform weakened the category of ‘former communist judges’. In the period 
1990-93, of eleven judges in the High Court (then the Court of Cassation) only three were 
re-elected.278 Almost all ‘former communist judges’ were purged from the system, starting 
with the High Court and later the first and appeal courts. It should be noted that many of 
them remained active and went on to practise as either advocates or public notaries.279 The 
aim of both political camps, however, was to keep some ‘former communist judges’ in the 
system as it was very easy to control them through ‘the use of their past files assembled by 
the former secret service, the “Sigurimi”’.280 
In the first wave of judicial reforms in 1992-96, ‘six-months judges’ was the dominant 
category in the system. The majority of my interviewees confirmed that ‘six-months judges’ 
were highly politicised and in full control of the executive at that time. There were two 
reasons for that. First, these judges were proposed by the political elite which possessed 
files for each of them, files that were used to blackmail them when necessary. Second, their 
professional background was poor and this made them easier targets for the inspectorates 
of both the HCJ and the Ministry of Justice.281 
                                                          
274 ‘… it was a criterion that candidates should have a university degree... a law university degree 
was not a condition... there were candidates holding degrees in agriculture, medicine, engineering 
who were allowed to enrol on these courses...so all these people who had the right connections 
with DP and became jobless during the transition were very quickly absorbed and recruited for six-
month courses. It was the political criterion which was the most important factor for joining these 
courses...’ Interview with rural advocate no.1,2010. 
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279 Interview with urban judge no.10, 2010. 
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The political elite have always tried to promote themselves to key positions in the judicial 
system.282 Today a few of them can even be found in the HCJ and in the High Court.283 They 
have become a great obstacle for the ‘Magistrates’ to advance in the system.284 This new 
wave of judiciary has triggered a form of competition between ‘former communist judges’, 
‘judges of transition’ and the ‘six-months judges’.285 However, the role of ‘six-months 
judges’ was to weaken in the second wave of judicial reform. 
 
 
Second Wave (1998-2000) 
 
This second wave began in 1998 when the Socialist Party came to power amid a near civil 
war during 1997 (Jarvis 2000). In stark contrast to democrats, the socialists used another 
political tool to lustrate the judiciary from the supporters of their political adversaries. In 
1999, they organised a professional test targeting the ‘six-months judges’.286 Around 30 
judges refused to take the test and of those who participated only four failed, one repeated 
the test and passed.287 
Almost all of those who refused to take the exam were from the ‘six-months judges’ 
category. As a consequence, only a few ‘six-months judges’ remained in the system.288 In 
addition to that, socialists attacked the lustration law and argued that this law was in 
violation of the Constitution. With this move, the socialists allowed those ‘former 
communist judges’ who were still part of the system to retain their positions in the 
judiciary and those outside to practise law as advocates or public notaries.289 
‘By the end of 1998, both these categories of judge were highly politically polarised. The 
“former communist judges” were supported by the socialists and the “six-months judges” 
were backed by democrats.’290 However, judges from both categories were not 
                                                          
282 Interview with investigative journalist no.1, 2010. 
283 Interview with investigative journalist no.2, 2010. 
284 Interview with urban judge no.2, 2010. 
285 Interview with urban prosecutor no.4, 2010. 
286 Interview with urban advocate no.6, 2010. 
287 Organisation for Security and Co-operation in Europe Presence in Albania (2004) ‘Legal Sector 
Report for Albania’, p.17. 
288 Interview with rural advocate no.1, 2010. 
289 Interview with academic no.1, 2010. 
290 ‘ By the end of 1998, both these categories of judge were highly politically polarised. The “former 
communist judges” were supported by the socialists and the “six-month judges” were backed by 
democrats…. Each of the political forces supported their respective groups during their time in 
government. These two categories of judges continue to hamper the power of the judiciary to self-
govern and become  independent from political powers. These groups of judges obstruct judicial 
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quantitatively the dominant groups in the system. Another category that emerged during 
1990-2000, ‘judges of transition’, was growing and becoming stronger. This category has 
never been attacked directly by political parties. The ‘judges of transition’ were used 
interchangeably by both political spectrums.291 A good part of this category advanced in 
the system and gradually influenced the promotions of judges after 2000.292 The ‘judges of 
transition’ was an amalgam of judges poured into the system by both democrats and 
socialists, so ‘they were very flexible, opportunist and financially powerful’.293 
Until the current Law of Judicial Power entered into force in 2008, there were three ways 
to recruit judges other than from those who had graduated from the SOM and these 
possibilities were all exploited by the political elite.294 All these channels were suitable for 
those candidates falling into the category of ‘judges in transition’.295 It should be 
mentioned however, that priority was given to those who had graduated from the SOM 
(ABA/CELLI 2001:2). Several judges I interviewed pointed out that ‘“Magistrates” were 
expected to be the most qualified judges and their professional impact was felt 
immediately in the system’.296 
Before the first class of ‘Magistrates’ entered the judicial system in 2000, former categories 
of judges had already consolidated their positions.297 After a decade of democracy, the 
borderlines between ‘former communist judges’, ‘judges of transition’ and ‘six-months 
judges’ gradually started to fade away. A culture of political control over the judiciary was 
formed.298 All three categories were used interchangeably by both the executive and 
legislature. A few of the judges I interviewed highlighted that all first three categories, and 
especially ‘judges of transition’, felt somehow threatened by the ‘Magistrates’. 
With support ‘from the political elite, some networks from the “judges of transition” have 
exploited the judiciary using legal tools’.299 A significant tool was the ten years work 
experience requirement stipulated in the law for a ‘Magistrate’ judge to become a member 
of the HCJ. And this ‘legal obstacle barred all “Magistrates” from having any influence in 
the HCJ’.300 The distribution of promotion rights in the first and appeal courts was therefore 
                                                                                                                                                                    
independence because of the connections they have with those political groups from which they are 
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291 Interview with urban advocate no.4, 2010. 
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managed by the ‘judges of transition’ through their dominant control over both the HCJ 
and the NJC.301 
 
 
Inner Structural Patterns of Control 
 
Initially, when the number of ‘Magistrates’ was insignificant in 2001, powerful networks 
from the category of the ‘judges of transition’ seem to have used the power of the majority 
vote in the NJC to nominate representatives from this category as members of the HCJ.302 
Numerically they were dominating the NJC. A pattern of ‘clientelism’ informed influential 
and less influential judges in the system. From 2001, various international reports 
evidenced that ‘judges appointed or advanced through the system are sometimes said to 
feel a moral obligation to provide preferential treatment in court matters to those who 
were behind their appointment’ (ABA/CEELI 2001:17). 
Later on, prior to enactment of the new NJC’s Law in 2005, each judge was a member of 
the NJC, bearing the right to vote on every decision, including proposals for membership of 
the HCJ. Because of this voting arrangement in the NJC, ‘the strengthening of networks 
based on friendship ties among judges became significant’.303 Judges who wanted to 
become members of the HCJ ‘started to lobby their colleagues and ask for their support. 
Political support was an important bonus too.’304 
The search for votes among fellow judges therefore gradually changed the layers within the 
judiciary and judges became divided into two big categories, ‘Magistrate’ and ‘non-
Magistrate’.305 And the emergence of the ‘Magistrate’ served as a kind of social bond 
between the other three categories. ‘“Magistrates” were perceived as a threat to all former 
categories because they were less politicised; they were more professional and numerically 
speaking they had a future’.306 According to the Law on Judicial Power, 90% of the recruited 
judges should have graduated from the SOM.307 
                                                          
301 Interview with rural judge no.7, 2010. 
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As the number of the ‘Magistrates’ rose and their voting power in the NJC increased, 
another sudden move occurred. A new law prepared during socialist rule in 2004 but 
approved in parliament while democrats were in power in 2005, is believed to have been 
proposed by high ranking ‘non-Magistrate’ judges.308 The new law of the NJC was copied 
from the Law on the Judicial Conference in the United States (ABA/CEELI 2006:42), 
although Albania has a different court structure and legal system. This law created a 
structure of control within the NJC where one-third was composed of ex officio members 
such as judges of the High Court and chief judges of first and appeal courts. The latter 
mostly belonged to the category of ‘non-Magistrate’ judges.309 The other two-thirds was 
selected based on a representative format where each regional court had to select its 
representatives.310 
So in stark contrast to the previous law of the NJC where each judge automatically became 
a member of the NJC and had a right to vote, the new law removed the possibility for the 
‘Magistrates’, who were increasing in number, to influence the NJC. This law also 
formalised a parallel hierarchy of judicial control within the judiciary by giving the ex officio 
members of the NJC, such as the Chief Judge of the High Court and chief judges of courts of 
appeal, a significant power over their colleagues.311 
The NJC operated in this way for three years from 2005, until the new NJC law was found 
unconstitutional by the Constitutional Court in 2008. As mentioned above, in addition to 
friendship ties and political support, the new organisational structure of the NJC triggered 
by the 2005 law involved other informal criteria for judges to support each other such as 
regionalism/‘Krahinizem’ which is where judges support those candidates which they share 
the same region/jurisdiction. 
Usually, judges coming from bigger regions such as Vlora, Tirana or Durrës had more 
chances.312 No judge from the courts of Korca city for instance, has been a member of the 
HCJ since its creation.313 However, the majority of interviewed judges mentioned that this 
is not about Krahinizem but is more about friendship ties because many judges work in a 
different city from where they live.314 So judges are more willing to help the candidate they 
share the same court with rather than the one with whom they share the same origin and 
‘this is the reason why the majority of member judges in the HCJ come from big courts such 
as Tirana’.315 
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Also as mentioned above, a culture of ‘clientelism’ formed among judges. Those having 
strong networks within the NJC arranged to become members of the HCJ with the support 
of politicians.316 In exchange, those elected on the HCJ would promote their supporters and 
establish a deal with representatives of the executive to get promoted later on, either in 
the ‘Career courts’ and appeal courts of Tirana and Durrës or in the High Court or 
Constitutional Court.317 
Where political support remained significant, the purchasing of positions flourished.318 In 
the period 2005-10 the support and power of the structures within the system became 
highly commercialised. This was another factor in explaining how the three former 
categories became united.319 They had more time in the system and exploited it to greater 
extent. They had ‘the right connections with business and the underworld, political 
support, and were financially capable of “purchasing” or “trading” the influence’.320 Not 
only were ‘non-Magistrate’ judges who controlled the HCJ exploiting the system but they 
were also exploiting their colleagues. They not only influenced the disbursement of 
promotion rights generally but they also received favours from judges they had ‘helped’ to 
get promoted in a form of gratitude or exchange of favours.321 
My interviews suggest that an important role in the commercialisation of promotions was 
played by both the current Chairman of the HCJ (i.e. President of the Republic) and its Vice 
Chairman until 2012.322 Judges promoted during 2007-10 were not the most qualified. As 
one international observer highlighted, ‘I’m afraid the judges who have been appointed by 
the current president have a particularly poor track record.’323 
The following example illustrates this point. An advocate practising law was proposed by 
the HCJ for appointment in a rural court and the President gave his approval in 2010.324 
Almost six months later the prosecution office accused this judge of corruption while he 
was practising law in private as an advocate. The HCJ was asked by prosecutors to remove 
the immunity of this judge in order to pursue the criminal proceedings according to the 
law. The request was accepted and the immunity was removed by the HCJ,325 but this case 
                                                          
316 Interview with rural judge no.2, 2010. 
317 Interview with investigative journalist no.2, 2010. 
318 Interview with investigative journalist no.1, 2010. 
319 Interview with investigative journalist no.2, 2010. 
320 Interview with rural advocate no.1, 2010. 
321 Interview with urban judge no.7, 2010. 
322 Interview with urban advocate no.2, 2010. 
323 Interview with international observer no.1, 2010. 
324 See point 4 of HCJ Decision no.271, dated December 16, 2010; available at 
http://www.kld.al/vendim271 [accessed September 21, 2011]. See also the President’s Decree 
no.6811, dated December 21, 2010, approving the proposal of the HCJ; available at 
http://www.president.al/shqip/info.asp?id=6326 [accessed September 21, 2011]. 
325 See HCJ Press Conference June 22, 2011; available at http://www.kld.al/node/342 [accessed 
September 21, 2011]. 
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again raised serious doubts about the selection procedures followed by the HCJ and the 
institution of President. 
The judiciary today is influenced by ‘non-Magistrate’ judges and mostly from those judges 
pertaining to the category of ‘judges of transition’. They are present in urban appeal courts, 
the High Court and the Constitutional Court.326 In the High Court, of 17 (one place is still 
vacant) only two are ‘former communist judges’, and the remainder including the Chief 
Judge, come from the category of ‘judges of transition’.327 In the Constitutional Court the 
balance changes, where out of nine judges (one place is still vacant) four come from those 
educated during the communist period and who formerly worked in different positions 
such as prosecutors, investigators or academics; and the remainder are judges educated 
during the transition period and who formerly practised law whether as judges or legal 
experts during 1993 and after.328 
It should be noted that while there remain legal barriers (15 years of work experience)329 
for ‘Magistrates’ to become judges of the Constitutional Court, they do not have the same 
problem when being appointed in High Court. The requirement for the latter is ten years 
and this allows ‘Magistrates’ from the first generation to be eligible.330 All chief judges of 
the appeal courts, High Court and Constitutional Court come from ‘non-Magistrate’ judges. 
In contrast, the majority of ‘Magistrates’ work in first instance courts, only a few of them 
are in the appeal courts and only three serve as chief judges in first instance courts.331 For 
example, up to 2011 there was no ‘Magistrate’ employed in the career court of Durrës.332 
Although ‘Magistrates’ make up 50% of the total number of judges their influence is weak. 
At least 80% of them work in the first rural courts.333 As one ‘Magistrate’ pointed out, 
‘“non-Magistrates” have always tried to keep us in the lower courts and this is shown even 
in the latest promotion [2010] where out of 17 vacancies opened in the appeal courts only 
one magistrate was promoted’.334 
However, while only one ‘Magistrate’ became a member of the HCJ in 2011 another one 
proposed by the President of the Republic, Judge Manjola Bejleri, was refused in the same 
                                                          
326 Interview with urban judge no.10, 2010. 
327 See CVs for High Court judges at its official website; available at http://www.gjykataelarte.gov.al/ 
[accessed July 20, 2011]. 
328 See bios of each judge of the Constitutional Court on its official website; available at 
http://www.gjk.gov.al/ [accessed July 20, 2011]. 
329 See Law no.8577, dated February 10, 2000, ‘For the Organisation and Function of the 
Constitutional Court of the Republic of Albania’, art.7. 
330 See Law no.8588, dated March 15, 2000, ‘For the Organisation and Function of the High Court of 
the Republic of Albania’, art.3. 
331 Interview with rural judge no.7, 2010. 
332 Interview with rural judge no.7, 2010. 
333 Interview with urban judge no.2, 2010. 
334 Interview with urban judge no.2, 2010. 
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year by the hearing commission of parliament. It should be emphasised that she is the head 
of the NAJ, which brought several laws before the Constitutional Court in 2009.335 
On the other hand, my interviews suggest that the quality of the ‘Magistrates’ has 
worsened and that many of them have ‘quickly adapted to the system and its patterns of 
judicial corruption’.336 There is growing concern from the community of judges and lawyers 
regarding the quality of ‘Magistrates’ too. The first three generations of ‘Magistrates’ 
(2000-03) are highlighted as being better in terms of quality and expertise compared to 
later ones.337 Their politicisation was also emphasised by some interviewees as being of 
concern. There are individuals or even networks among the category of ‘Magistrates’ who 
have political support and are promoted in first instance urban courts either as judges or 
prosecutors.338 ‘Magistrates’ tend to be very ambitious and some of them have quickly 
grasped the patterns of judicial corruption, so they engage in politics in order to advance 
their careers.339 
A few interviewed judges noted however that although there is a tension between 
different categories of judges in the system they tend to support each other (e.g. by hiding 
their material mistakes in a court case) on possible charges of corruption. This includes 
prosecutors as well. One judge recalled that once he was trying a case where his colleague 
was accused of tampering with the evidence. The prosecutor of the case came and said to 
him ‘try to protect him…he is your colleague’.340 
Therefore, all laws related to the Judicial Organisation, HCJ, the SOM and especially the 
Constitution, improved the independence of the judiciary from the executive and 
legislature but did not avoid the structural interdependence from parallel structures within. 
In 2005, the role of politics became more external and its influence was more focused on 
the appointment of the High Court and Constitutional Court judges. Promotions to urban 
first and appeal courts were more controlled by judges who were members of the HCJ.341 
Patterns of inner judicial control became more commercialised. Currently, ‘judges of 
transition’ are the most powerful category of judges dominating the system. It is certainly 
premature to consider all ‘judges in transition’ corrupt or unprofessional (see Figure 4 
below). There is a general perception that honest judges coming from this category can 
mostly be found in first instance rural courts. 
                                                          
335 Shqip Gazette (2011) ‘Bejleri: The Report filed against me is based on nonexistent facts’ (Bejleri: 
Relacioni kunder meje eshte ngritur mbi fakte te paqena), June 16. 
336 Interview with rural advocate no.1, 2010. 
337 Interview with rural judge no.1, 2010. 
338 ‘Even “Magistrates” have their political preferences, and they too are at certain times  promoted 
based on their political views...those who have more political support from the political party in 
power have higher chances to upgrade, but I cannot say that this is a phenomenon...’ Interview with 
rural advocate no.1, 2010. 
339 Interview with local observer no.1, 2010. 
340 Interview with rural judge no.7, 2010. 
341 Interview with urban judge no.1, 2010. 
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On the other hand, there is an increasing trend for ‘Magistrates’ to conform to the system 
and become politicised and corrupt. My interviews underline that the quality of 
‘Magistrates’ is decreasing and they too are becoming prone to corruption. Judicial 
independence therefore suffers from an inner control and parallel hierarchy mostly 
dominated by ‘judges of transition’. A tension between different categories of judges is 
formed who compete for power and this appears to be weakening the judiciary. 
 
Figure 4 Layers of Judges’ Categories within the Judiciary 
 
 
To summarise, my data in this chapter demonstrated that obstruction of judicial 
independence in Albania should be examined from a range of different perspectives. 
Judicial independence is anchored to institutional, operational and structural structures. 
Institutionally, there are constitutional safeguards that provide immunity for judges from 
political pressure. However, specific laws which regulate the functioning of the judiciary 
still leave space for the executive to influence the judiciary externally via shortage of 
budget and from within by undermining the HCJ and NJC. The weakening of the latter 
institutions has created a tension between different categories of judges which struggle for 
power and control of both the HCJ and NJC, and thus the judiciary is gripped from within by 
more powerful ranking judges. Having explained patterns of judicial corruption in the 
context of judicial independence, I will now turn to other values embodied in the BPJC and 
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In Chapter 4, my data showed the institutional patterns of judicial corruption in the context 
of judicial independence. The focus was on the organisational factors (i.e. political 
influence, defective judicial laws and inner structure obstacles) and the ways in which they 
influence the efficiency of the judiciary (Buscaglia 2001:235). These factors are related and 
known in the literature as institutional aspects of judicial corruption.342 The current chapter 
is also part of the data section of the thesis and should be read in that context. While the 
data in this chapter explains the landscape of judicial corruption from the perspective of 
the individual behaviour of judges, it also indicates other institutional factors which are 
evidenced in other aspects of the judges’ conduct, such as factors which influence their 
impartiality, integrity and propriety. I also explore the Albanian-specific conditions and 
structures which challenge what the Bangalore Principles of Judicial Conduct (BPJC) do not 





Impartiality is an important value in the BPJC. It might seem difficult to distinguish this 
value from ‘independence’, but in practice they are different. According to the 
Commentary (2007:57), ‘a judge could be independent but not impartial…but a judge who 
is not independent cannot, by definition, be impartial (on an institutional basis)’. 
Impartiality requires an absence of subjective elements (i.e. personal views, prejudice and 
bias) and the presence of objective elements (i.e. it must offer sufficient guarantees to 
exclude any legitimate doubt in this respect) (ibid:58). Impartiality should not only be 
apprehended but also be demonstrated (ibid:59). Informal communication (i.e. ex parte) 
with parties is considered a violation of impartiality (ibid:62). In this respect judges should 
avoid any direct or indirect relation with the subject or object of the case which may 
influence his impartiality. This is otherwise known as conflict of interest.343 
                                                          
342 For a discussion of definitions and judicial corruption, see for instance ‘Evaluation of Judicial 
Corruption in Central America and Panama and the Mechanisms to Combat it” (Due Process of Law 
Foundation, 2007); available at http://www.dplf.org/uploads/1196091774.pdf [accessed September 
15, 2011]. 
343 Law on Judicial Power 2008 arts.22, 23. 
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Impartiality in the court process in Albania remains a great concern and is perceived as 
problematic even by the community of judges.344 As in many countries, judges in Albania 
are required by law to withdraw from a case when a conflict of interest arises. This includes 
economic, business, administrative, familial, or any ‘other situation where serious bias is 
proved’ (Civil Procedure Code arts.72-75; Criminal Procedure Code arts.15-17). But judges 
cannot recuse for reasons other than those stipulated in the law as this may obstruct the 
judicial process.345 For instance, judges cannot withdraw from a case because of the heavy 
workload (ABA/CEELI 2008:42). 
In terms of family ties, the legal term used for the conflict of interest extends up to fourth 
cousins and in-laws of parties or their advocate with a judge or his spouse (Civil Procedure 
Code art.72; Criminal Procedure Code art.16). Whereas similar conditions for conflicts of 
interest apply to prosecutors (Criminal Procedure Code art.26) and court staff (Criminal 
Procedure Code art.23), they do not apply to judicial police. There is also no specific law 
that covers conflict of interest where the same advocate represents several co-
defendants.346 In addition, even the wording used in the Albanian Code of Judicial Ethics is 
very broad and not specific.347 
Conflicts of interest arise even in the procedural terms where a judge has previously been 
involved in the case whether as witness, prosecutor, or even as a judge in another instance 
of the court (Criminal Procedure Code art.15). In practice, the latter requirement has 
caused an anomaly in the serious crime courts, especially in cases appealed on pre-trial 
judgment. Such cases are judged by a panel of three judges (Criminal Procedure Code 
art.14.3). According to ABA/CEELI (2008:42), ‘If the defendant goes to trial, all the judges 
who presided over the pre-trial hearing in the first instance and on appeal are disqualified. 
The court simply does not have enough judges to staff a panel, and will often call on the 
criminal division of the nearby Tirana District Court to loan judges for the case.’ 
Each party in the case has the right to ask the judge to withdraw if there are grounds for 
conflict of interest (Civil Procedure Code arts.74-75; Criminal Procedure Code arts.18-230). 
But if the request is not made according to the procedures and found as unjustifiable by 
the court, it will be disqualified and a maximum fine of 20,000 Albanian Lek (around £150) 
will apply (Civil Procedure Code art.76). The legal conditions for both forms of recusals 
either when it is triggered by the judge himself or when the recusal is required by litigants 
are the same, the procedures however differ.348 In the recusal process, with his own 
                                                          
344 IDRA 2009 shows that from those surveyed only 16% of the general public and 20% of public 
sector employees agreed with the general statement that ‘judges in Albania are impartial in 
conducting trials’. In addition, the judges’ perception in this respect was staggering: 82% of judges 
surveyed agreed with the above statement. IDRA (2009) ‘Corruption in Albania: Perception and 
Experience, Survey 2009, Summary of findings’, pp.5, 24. 
345 Interview with urban advocate no.1, 2010. 
346 Organisation for Security and Co-operation in Europe Presence in Albania (OSCE) (2006) ‘Analysis 
of the Criminal Justice System of Albania: Report by the Fair Trial Development Project’, p.73. 
347 According to the Rule 3 of the Code of Judicial Ethics, ‘a judge should not allow that any of his 
family members, relatives or other persons to influence his work and decisions’ (emphasis added). 
348 Interview with urban advocate no.2, 2010. 
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initiative, the judge summons a request to the chief judge of the court and the latter 
decides whether to honour the request or not. By contrast, when a request for the judge’s 
withdrawal is made by either party in a civil process, it is for the judge of the case in hand 
to accept it or not (Civil Procedure Code arts.73-75). 
In the second scenario, one conflict of interest is replaced by another.349 This is because 
every judge, before examining the case, makes sure that no conflict of interest arises by 
checking whether he has any connection with the case at hand which according to the law 
can disqualify him. And this large discretion makes it very difficult or almost impossible that 
the judge will accept the request of the parties to recuse.350 One advocate I interviewed 
added that ‘if parties ask a judge to withdraw, they have to bring evidence, so the burden 
of proof shifts to the parties. And again this makes it very difficult to generate evidence as 
this may require dealing with the privacy and Data Protection Act 2008.’351 
However, figures show that the general public is well informed about the procedure on 
how to file a claim if they have doubts on the administration of the process or the fairness 
of the court’s decision. According to ABA/CEELI (2008:48): ‘In 2006, the HCJ registered 776 
complaints, in 2007 – 787 complaints, and in 2008 – 2,101 complaints.’ There is no specific 
or clear law on occasions of friendship between parties and judges or on the links between 
the judge’s family members and any party in the process. In addition, the law does not 
cover the friendship ties between parties and court secretaries, prosecutors and judicial 
police.352 The law is also unclear on situations where there is a family relation or friendship 
tie between the shareholders of a law office and the judge.353 However, my interviews 
suggest that in the last five years the number of cases where judges withdraw for conflict 
of interest is increasing, as according to a prosecutor, ‘judges know that they can be very 
easy attacked on the grounds of the conflict of interest’.354 This fact implies that judges are 
trying to hide obvious patterns of corruption and sophisticate them more using third 
parties or law offices to negotiate with litigants. I speak below about this pattern. It should 
be noted that advocates can abuse requests for withdrawal and often they use this to delay 





                                                          
349 Interview with urban advocate no.2, 2010. 
350 Interview with urban advocate no.8, 2010. 
351 Interview with urban advocate no.2, 2010. 
352 See Civil Procedure Code arts.72-75; Criminal Procedure Code arts.15-17. 
353 Interview with the urban prosecutor no.2, 2010. 
354 Interview with urban prosecutor no.1, 2010. 
355 Interview with urban judge no.11, 2010. 
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Patterns of Friendship Influence 
 
My interviews suggest that impartiality can be obstructed by two forms of friendship – 
professional and local. 
Professional friendships often come through education. There are only three public law 
schools in Albania and the majority of magistrates come from the same school of law, the 
University of Tirana, Faculty of Law.356 There have been occasions when judges have had 
cases where one of the parties in process has been one of the judge’s university fellows.357 
Albania is small and, an international observer noted, ‘everybody knows each other. I have 
seen that occasionally judges and prosecutor will meet normally before and after the 
process and it was obvious that they were friends.’358 Following 2000, all prosecutors and 
judges now graduate from the same school, the School of Magistrates (SOM).359 
I confirmed this pattern personally. In several of my court observations, especially in rural 
courts, I noted that judges communicated with prosecutors in a very friendly way, giving 
the perception that they were close friends. Prosecutors entered the court using the same 
entrance as judges. It should be mentioned, though, that in small cities the community of 
lawyers is very small and it is normal to expect them to have established professional 
friendships.360 
Several judges admitted that undue influence exerted by friendship ties is sometimes more 
significant than other institutional pressures. According to a chief judge of a first instance 
rural court, ‘you would occasionally hear judges whispering over the dilemma of finding a 
suitable solution for their friend but one that is also within the limits of the law’.361 Local 
friendship can equally influence impartiality. This attitude comes from the idea of loyalty to 
friends. One international observer noted that ‘if somebody comes to a judge and has a 
                                                          
356 Around 96% of judges surveyed by IDRA in 2010 were graduated from the University of Tirana 
Faculty of Law. See IDRA (2010) ‘Corruption in Albania Perception and Experience: Judges Survey 
2010’. 
357 Interview with rural judge no.7, 2010. 
358 Interview with international observer no.3, 2010. 
359 Interview with urban prosecutor no.5, 2010. 
360 Interview with rural judge no.5, 2010. 
361 ‘In my opinion the worst corruption is the other form of corruption, non-monetary corruption, 
obligation to do a favour, the social obligation, a form of pressure, something that existed even 
before (during communism), so if I do you this favour you should do me that...this is a bit culturally 
engrained here. Albanians consider their neighbours as part of their family. So you have to be very 
strong to resist friendship influences with dignity and obey the law when deciding a court case... It is 
very difficult... you occasionally hear judges whispering about the dilemma of finding a suitable 
solution for their friend but one that is also “within the limits of the law”... it is something else 
though to do a favour “within the limits of the law”. For example, if the law says that someone can 
receive a sentence of 5 to 10 years and you sentence him to 5 years this is within the boundaries of 
the law. But if he has to be sentenced to 5 or 10 years and you say that he is innocent then this is 
inexcusable...’Interview with urban judge no.3, 2010. 
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close friendship with him, the judge will find it hard to say no to the person even if it is right 
to do so. Friendship ties certainly are very problematic.’362 
Close connection with society or moral norms also has caused judges to be partial. This is 
more evident in rural courts with local judges, especially with those who have worked for 
many years in the same district. For instance, in the early period of transition, 1992-97, 
there were occasions in cases involving a blood feud, when family members of the victim 
would gather outside the court and ask the judges to free the accused as they wanted to 
exact revenge according to the ‘Kanun’. This traditional Albanian code would allow the 
victim’s family to restore justice with ‘its own hand’ and maintain its honour in public. In 
this situation, if judges do not respect that commitment they will be seen as obstructers of 
customary norms and feel under social pressure.363 
There have been rare occasions where judges or prosecutors have even ‘been blackmailed 
under the Kanun’,364 but a few of my interviewed judges noted that the situation is 
improving. In these situations, one might ask: What should judges do to maintain the 
confidence of the public which the BPJC promote? And this could be followed with another 
question: What are the standards that a judge should take into account when assessing the 
public confidence – customary or institutional? This puts judges in a very uncomfortable 
position, because whichever side they take they can be seen as biased either by the public 
or law. In addition, judges will be reluctant to ‘take any bribe on cases of blood feud as 
family members of the victim may then chase the judge and his family under the blood 
feud regime’.365 However, the majority of my interviewee judges noted that this is not such 
an issue (i.e. blackmailing judges under blood feud) in the Albanian courts in the North as it 
used to be. There are only sporadic cases when similar situations can happen and hence ‘it 
is hard even to call it a phenomenon there’.366 
In addition, judges in rural courts find it difficult to socialise because this can be 
misunderstood by society and impact negatively on judges’ reputation there.367 In rural 
courts, there is a different perception of judges who come from a different region – non-
local judges. Albania is a small country and many judges live in a different city from where 
they work. Advocates think that local judges are more honest because of social pressure 
                                                          
362 Interview with international observer no.1, 2010. 
363 Interview with urban judge no.11, 2010. 
364 Interview with rural prosecutor no.3, 2010. 
365 ‘…in the cases of blood feud, there is no way that a judge would go down that path, as he or she 
would endanger himself and his family because of the Kanun ...so judges will not take any bribes in 
cases of blood feud as family members of the victim might then chase the judge and his family under 
the blood feud regime....this is an issue related to Kanun, and if the other party saw the judge sitting 
with their adversary they would not like it.. A judge should be aware of protecting himself and stay 
away from the parties, from both social and financial influences…judges should behave very 
carefully in public especially in small towns, because here society finds it difficult to stomach. Here 
people know everybody, they know all your family and even your tribe…particularly in the city of 
Shkodra (North) where blood feuds are a big concern...’ Interview with rural judge no.6, 2010. 
366 Interview with rural advocate no.2, 2010. 
367 Interview with rural judge no.3, 2010. 
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from the locals. Judges coming from a respectable family (‘Dere e Madhe’) in the area, in 
particular, are less likely to be corrupt because this will give their family a bad name in that 
area.368 
The contrary happens with rural non-local judges, who mix and socialise very quickly with 
people. The lack of ‘both a reputable family origin and knowledge of customary norms is a 
disadvantage for non-local judges, and sometimes this leads them to engage with criminals 
or people with a bad public reputation’.369 As one rural advocate put it, ‘when they come 
here in the first two weeks you see them sitting with all sorts of people, which local judges 
do not’.370 Judges in this category are perceived by the community of lawyers as more 
easily corrupted.371 
In contrast, in urban courts the role of family is more limited but the role of friendship ties 
and private connections is very strong.372 Friendship ties are used either as a form of access 
to judges or as an exchange of favours among friends if the judge and advocate knew each 
other before.373 Several interviewed judges admitted that they do favours within the ‘limits 
of the law’. I explain this pattern below, in the ‘Propriety’ section. 
However, other interviewees saw the mobility of judges or prosecutors (non-local 
judges/prosecutors) as something positive in terms of social pressure. Non-local judges are 
more protected from family ties and the social influence of the area.374 Several interviewed 
judges highlighted that, especially in rural courts, judges who ‘work for more than 15 years 
in one area become familiar with the people there and this can lead to social influence or 
obstruction of the judges’ independence because of the friendship networks’.375 
My interviews suggest that the influence of family ties in rural courts is decreasing. 
Patterns of social influence here ‘are gradually mirroring the patterns of urban courts in 
terms of friendship ties and exchange of favours’.376 In addition it seems that a violent 
                                                          
368 Interview with rural advocate no.2, 2010. 
369 Interview with rural advocate no.1, 2010. 
370 ‘…Non-local judges, when they come here (city of Shkodra in the North), in the first two weeks 
you see them sitting with all sorts of people, which local judges do not…judges from Shkodra know 
the views of the people here and want to act correctly. You do not see them in coffee shops.... non-
locals do not even have a house here where they can stay, so you only find them in 
clubs….’Interview with rural advocate no.2, 2010. 
371 Interview with rural judge no.2, 2010. 
372 Interview with urban judge no.3, 2010. 
373 Interview with urban advocate no.7, 2010. 
374 Interview with rural prosecutor no.2, 2010. 
375 Interview with rural judge no.6, 2010. 
376 ‘People are departing from the customary norms because society is becoming more urbanised, 
everything is changing, and everything is market-oriented…there are no values like there used to 
be…Before, we had the family, honour, friendship; now... we are gradually mirroring the patterns of 
urban courts in terms of friendship ties and exchange of favours...it’s going in the direction of the 
money...’Interview with rural judge no.1, 2010. 
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custom such as blood feud and another non-violent custom ‘good name of family’ play a 
positive role in inhibiting judges from corruption. In contrast, friendship ties seem to play a 
negative role in judicial corruption. This is evidenced even in the ex parte communication, 
to which I now turn. 
 
 
Ex Parte Communication 
 
Ex parte communication between judges and parties remains a concern in Albania. In rural 
courts, judges will meet openly and sometimes on the premises of their client.377 One 
advocate I interviewed took me to one of the most expensive hotels in the vicinity of a rural 
court and pointed out that its owner is a powerful individual who has won several cases in 
the court.378 Some judges in that city used to have frequent informal meetings there. 
The contacts in rural courts are more personal. By contrast, as mentioned above, in urban 
courts such contacts tend to be more sophisticated and judges might ‘meet on the outskirts 
of the city or in particular restaurants’.379 In urban courts, parties usually use their 
advocates to contact judges.380 My interviews suggest that in rural courts in the North, 
judges are very cautious about socialising openly with litigants in cases dealing with blood 
feud, because ‘family members of the victim will immediately perceive these meetings as a 
breach of customary norms’.381 This could endanger the life of a judge because family 
members of the victim may call for a vendetta according to the Kanun. 
It should be mentioned that there are legal improvements which encourage judges to 
recuse on their own initiative in cases of conflict of interest. Since 2000 there has been a 
Code of Judicial Ethics in Albania which covers almost all aspects of conflicts of interest 
(ABA/CEELI 2001:22). The Ethics Commission set up by the National Judicial Conference 
(NJC) has been in operation since 2002 and provides advice to both judges and the High 
Council of Justice (HCJ) on ethical issues and judges’ conduct (ABA/CEELI 2008:46). Training 
in ethics is provided for judges as part of their continuing legal education. In addition, the 
HCJ’s inspectors are instructed to also assess a judge’s case on the grounds of conflict of 
interest. If they find out that there are reasons to believe that judges were in conflict of 
interest and did not recuse, ‘the inspectors will immediately initiate a disciplinary 
proceeding and propose it to the HCJ’.382 
                                                          
377 Interview with urban advocate no.7, 2011. 
378 Interview with rural advocate no.1, 2010. 
379 Interview with investigative journalist no.1, 2010. 
380 Interview with urban advocate no.6, 2010. 
381 Interview with rural judge no.6, 2010. 
382 Interview with HCJ inspector no.1, 2010. 
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However, enforcement of this Code remains a concern (ABA/CEELI 2008:47). My interviews 
show that judges were not very familiar with the Code and a few of them did not yet 





Judges can be partial by abusing their active role in the process. Judges in these situations 
will prioritise one party using their discretion. Several of my interviewed prosecutors 
reported that, when looking at judges’ behaviour in the courtroom, they can easily identify 
when judges are assisting a party or not. For instance the way they question/persuade the 
witness or the way they react to the advocate or prosecutor.384 In addition, another explicit 
indicator is when the court ‘refuses to let other parties ask questions in a particular 
direction which looked like a direction that would be very favourable to the other party’.385 
Economic or political status of the parties is also a significant factor for judges to be biased 
in a court process. It is very difficult for a ‘normal’ individual to win a case against powerful 
individuals or businesses. This is true of both urban and rural courts.386 The social status of 
the parties, however, is not always the main cause for bias. In criminal cases particularly, 
judges often give priority to prosecutors. As one international observer put it, ‘On more 
than one occasion I’ve seen unprepared prosecutors treated with considerable patience by 
the judges.’387 According to an OSCE report on Albanian criminal justice, ‘Courts also seem 
to have a tendency to listen more to the prosecution than to the defence, thus creating a 
disadvantaged position for defence counsel and creating imbalances in the principle of 
equality of arms.’388 
However, impartiality is often harmed unintentionally. In the Albanian judicial system the 
role of the judge in the process is active,389 so he is allowed to raise questions to all parties 
                                                          
383 According to IDRA (2010), 22% of surveyed judges required a better training on ethical behaviour. 
IDRA (2010) ‘Corruption in Albania Perception and Experience: Judges Survey 2010’. 
384 Interview with urban prosecutor no.1, 2010. 
385 Interview with international observer no.2, 2010. 
386 Interview with rural advocate no.1, 2010. 
387 Interview with international observer no.3, 2010. 
388 Organisation for Security and Co-operation in Europe (OSCE) (2006) ‘Analysis of the Criminal 
Justice System of Albania: Report by the Fair Trial Development Project’, p.93. 
389 This active role of judges in the court process is a pattern of the accusatorial legal system in civil 
law countries in Europe such as Spain and Italy. There are two main features of the accusatorial 
process: first, the separation of the prosecutor’s functions from the courts, and second, the 
separation between pre-trial and trial proceedings. According to Amodio (2004:490), ‘The clear-cut 
separation between the body responsible for investigating and prosecuting a crime and the body 
responsible for adjudicating the case was introduced with a view to securing the trial judge’s 
impartiality and suggested that the judge’s own initiative in collecting evidence not offered by the 
parties should be made an exception even at trial.’ 
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in the process and interfere when he thinks it appropriate. The role of judge is more than 
that of sole arbiter; he or she plays an active role and on many occasions judges cross the 
line without any malicious intent.390 In addition, the active role of judges in the process is 
often misunderstood and this has led judges to act as prosecutors in the process. As one 
urban prosecutor put it, ‘sometimes you see judges take the role of the prosecutors 





Judges should possess integrity in the discharge of their duty. Integrity includes personal 
and institutional behaviour. According to the BPJC, the main ingredients of integrity are 
‘honesty and judicial morality’ (Commentary 2007:79). Although there is no definition of 
integrity, the guidance provided by the BPJC is that the test should be left to the 
community’s standards (ibid:79). Overall the behaviour of a judge should be on the highest 
level in both private and public life (ibid:80). In addition, it is essential that the behaviour or 
conduct of the judge assures the community of the integrity of the judiciary – justice must 
be seen to be done (ibid:83). 
Integrity entails good behaviour, a professional conduct in the court and ‘scrupulous 
respect for the law’ (ibid:82). The situation becomes obscured when the BPJC imply that 
the integrity of judges should be above that of a reasonable observer (ibid:80). The 
perception of an observer is contextualised with the community standards of ethics, 
especially in rural courts, and he/she will test the judge’s acts accordingly. Moreover, there 
may be a disparity between different communities’ standards for certain conducts and this 
may influence the perception of a non-local judge by a local observer. Take, for example, 
the case of a judge originating from the South but working in the North. His behaviour may 
be in accordance with the customary norms in the South, but this may not be perceived as 
proper by a ‘reasonable observer’ in the North. 
As mentioned above, there are two types of judge who work in Albanian courts: local and 
non-local. I have shown that the community of advocates in rural courts such as Shkoder 
(North) saw the behaviour of non-local judges, such as their being quick to socialise with 
certain individuals, as not correct. It was not about integrity but about the lack of 
knowledge of customs.392 
In addition, the test of integrity suggested by the BPJC is ambiguous. On the one hand it 
recommends that the community criteria be taken as a standard for applications by judges, 
and on the other it highlights that religious or ethical beliefs, whether accepted or not by 
the community, should not be taken into account when judging an act as immoral, but 
                                                          
390 Interview with urban prosecutor no.2, 2010. 
391 Interview with urban prosecutor no.2, 2010. 
392 Interview with rural advocate no.2, 2010. 
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rather it recommends an assessment of ‘how the act reflects upon the urban components 
of the judge’s ability to do the job’ (Commentary 2007:81). It seems that the BPJC attempt 
to differentiate between the community’s perception and the influence of its ethical and 
religious standards on the judges’ behaviour and conduct. And this may often be confusing. 
To illustrate, one of my interviewees, a judge with extensive experience in rural courts in 
the North, felt content with the fact that he did not approve a request for divorce made by 
a woman on the grounds of the use of violence by her husband. The judge said, ‘I did not 
approve the divorce because the husband was just biting his wife393 – you cannot allow a 
divorce simply for this reason here.’394 He implied that in his locality, a different decision 
could have been perceived by society as unreasonable, too lenient, or as partial. 
Therefore the definition of ‘reasonable observer’ provided by the BPJC throughout the 
Commentary needs to be taken with caution because, in the hinterland, criteria such as 
‘informed person’ or ‘capability of the person to decide fairly’ can have a negative influence 
on the decisions of judges, as illustrated above. Particularly in post-communist societies, 
where law is ‘treated as a tedious formality’, the situation becomes more complicated 
(Kurkchiyan 2003:36). 
In addition, an ‘informed person’ in a rural area may be defined as someone who knows 
customary norms but not the modern principles of law. Therefore his perception of a 
judge’s behaviour will be based primarily on these presumptions and not on formal legal 
procedures. So a judge who, in his mind, applies law and analyses facts of a case according 
to the rule of law principles, may be perceived by the rural ‘reasonable observer’ as not 
acting sufficiently to sustain justice in the community and this can push judges to apply 
customary norms in a formal court. The interviewed judge, mentioned above, argued that 
in several cases he grounded his decisions on the contextual understanding of the local 
community of justice.395 He thus gave consideration to the customary norms within the 
limits of the formal law.396 His experience included knowledge of customary norms 
applicable in the North (Kanun), civil law and even knowledge of laws in the communist 
period. 
Having identified the difficulty of a comprehensive application of the BPJC notions in the 
Albanian context, I now turn to integrity and the factors that undermine it. 
Integrity is conceptualised by the BPJC in very broad terms. Accordingly, ‘Integrity is the 
attribute of rectitude and righteousness. The components of integrity are honesty and 
judicial morality…. there are no degrees of integrity as so defined…. integrity is more than a 
                                                          
393 When the judge was asked why he arrived at this conclusion he said that he did not believe what 
the woman was saying. She failed to provide strong evidence showing that she was bitten regularly. 
Her husband was very old and most probably there were other reasons why she wanted the divorce. 
The judge thought that the woman was looking for an excuse. 
394 Interview with rural judge no.5, 2010. 
395 Interview with rural judge no.5, 2010. 
396 It should be mentioned that the Albanian legal system recognises customary norms as the source 
of law. In the absence of law, judges may take reference to ‘acceptable customs’ (zakonet e mira) to 
solve disputes. (Civil Code arts.159 and 608.) 
118 
virtue; it is a necessity’ (Commentary 2007:59). Integrity is also ‘a relative term, as certain 
judges apply different standards of integrity to different categories of case and subject’.397 
In order to provide a general picture of the issues of judges’ integrity I will try to give some 
nuances which should not been taken as mere facts or as a basis for stigma. But rather they 
should be seen as indicators of which categories of judge or level of court that integrity is 
more problematic. 
My interviews suggest that lack of integrity is a serious concern in the Albanian judiciary. 
The majority of interviewees pointed out that this lack of integrity398 is one of the main 
factors why trust in the courts is poor. This has also been evidenced by local399 and regional 
surveys400 on Albanian judicial corruption in recent years. Even compared to other 
countries in the Western Balkans, Albanians were among those nationalities who perceive 
the judiciary as the least trustworthy institution.401 
In 2001, a respondent in the ABA/CEELI report defined a judge with integrity or a ‘good 
judge’, as someone ‘who never asks for bribes, but who might accept money or a gift if 
offered. A “bad” judge is one who approaches litigants to ask them for bribes or who is 
extravagant in the amount of money gained through corrupt practices’ (ABA/CEELI 
2001:21). In 2011, my findings suggest that this statement is still valid. When I asked an 
urban judge whether a fair judge constitutes one who does not ask for money before the 
trial nor one who accepts cash as a gift after the decision has been given – the answer was 
that ‘In the community of lawyers, this type of judge is known as a crazy judge.’402 To 
another respondent, ‘crazy’ judges are ‘endangered species’.403 This finding implies that 
                                                          
397 Interview with international observer no.1, 2010. 
398 IDRA (2010) shows that 72% of surveyed judges scored fairness as the second worst aspects of 
the courts. IDRA (2010) ‘Corruption in Albania, Perception and Experience: Judges Survey 2010’. 
399 According to IDRA (2010), the percentage of respondents who trust the judiciary ‘A little’ or ‘Not 
at all’ remains high, at 64.1%. IDRA (2010) ‘Corruption in Albania: Perception and Experience, Survey 
2010, Summary of findings’, p.13. 
400 Balkan Monitor points out that ‘The judicial system was the only body where the people’s level of 
confidence had dropped by 13 percentage points between 2009 and 2010.’ See Gallup Balkan 
Monitor: Insights and Perceptions, Voices of the Balkans ‘2010 Summery of Findings’, Gallup Balkan 
Monitor in Partnership with the European Fund for the Balkans, p.28; available at 
http://www.balkan-monitor.eu/files/BalkanMonitor-2010_Summary_of_Findings.pdf [accessed 
September 21, 2011]. 
401 Kosovo Albanians, Macedonia Macedonians and Montenegro. For more see Gallup Balkan 
Monitor: Insights and Perceptions, Voices of the Balkans ‘2010 Summery of Findings’, Gallup Balkan 
Monitor in Partnership with the European Fund for the Balkans, pp.29-31; available at 
http://www.balkan-monitor.eu/files/BalkanMonitor-2010_Summary_of_Findings.pdf [accessed 
September 21, 2011]. 
402 ‘...the worst type of judge is one who asks you for money before the case starts, a good judge is 
one who does not ask you for money beforehand but accepts something after the decision is 
given....an honest judge is one who neither asks for money beforehand nor accepts it afterwards... 
In the community of lawyers, this type of judge is known as a crazy judge...’Interview with urban 
advocate no.7, 2011. 
403 Interview with urban prosecutor no.4, 2010. 
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judicial corruption is widespread in all court levels and the number of corrupt judges is 
high. It also suggests that judicial corruption seems deeply entrenched in the institutional 
behaviour of judges and so has become institutionalised. 
While the BPJC are not clear on the role of professionalism404 in judges’ integrity 
(Commentary 2007:82) my findings suggest that judges who lack professionalism are more 
likely to be prone to corruption.405 One argument is that they make more mistakes in their 
work and can easily be subject to blackmail either by their superiors, litigants or organised 
crime.406 Unfortunately, more professional judges are found in first instance courts than in 
appeal courts or the High Court.407 Judges originating from the hinterland are easy targets 
for people of influence such as businessmen and politicians. They are perceived by the 
community of lawyers as judges with less integrity than others.408 In rural courts, as 
mentioned above, non-local judges socialise more openly with parties and this is perceived 
by the community as lack of integrity. Such socialising is sometimes unavoidable, 
particularly if non-local judges travel using public transport as they often meet the parties 
there.409 
My interviews suggest that the dynamic of judges’ integrity has changed. Before 2005, the 
public perception was that judges with less integrity tended to be in the first instance of 
urban courts such as in Durrës or Tirana.410 But in 2011 this perception seems to have 
changed. The public now think that judges of appeal courts, and especially of the High 
Court, suffer more from lack of integrity than the lower level court judges.411 The majority 
                                                          
404 In the community of lawyers in Albania professionalism refers more to competence and 
education. Interview with urban judge no.5. In other jurisdictions the term is broader. For instance 
the community of judges in Maryland defined judicial professionalism as a ‘combination of the core 
values of personal integrity, competency, civility, independence, and public service that distinguish 
lawyers as the caretakers of the rule of law’. See the Maryland Commission on Professionalism, May 
30, 2007; available at http://www.courts.state.md.us/professionalism/pdfs/finalreportrevised.pdf 
[accessed May 23, 2012]. 
405 Interview with urban judge no.1, 2010. 
406 Interview with investigative journalist no.2, 2010. 
407 Interview with urban judge no.5, 2010. 
408 Interview with rural advocate no.2, 2010. 
409 Interview with rural judge no.7, 2010. 
410 Interview with urban advocate no.2, 2010. 
411 ‘… we lack a High Court with integrity which can unify the judicial practice, the so called “unified 
decisions”. If this country is not able to find 15 judges who put the interests of the law first and 
appoint them in the High Court what should the public’s expectation be? The High Court is a judicial 
mechanism which corrects the judicial system.  Because through its decisions the High Court guides 
lower courts... according to our law “unified decisions” are binding for all courts (a kind of 
precedent)..in addition, with a “unified decision”  the High Court can put some order into the judicial 
system. And if the court system can be regulated in this way, it is very difficult for a judge in a lower 
court, to circumvent a “unified decision”, because in this case he will be easily identifiable and there 
will be disciplinary proceedings for violating the law. I say that a High Court with integrity is very 
important. It is a very good self-correcting mechanism which we are lacking...’ Interview with urban 
prosecutor no.3,2010. 
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of my interviewees highlighted that among judges, prosecutors and advocates, the latter 
were considered to be the worst in terms of integrity. In addition, the interviews suggest 
that corruption is more widespread in civil and administrative cases which deal with 
property rights where the level of bribes is higher.412 Less corruption is perceived in cases 
dealing with family issues.413 
Poor recruitment and politicisation of promotions remain concerns in terms of integrity. 
The contingents of judges recruited from the community of advocates are perceived as 
having more problems with integrity than others.414 The ‘six-months judges’ are 
comparably viewed by my interviewees as having less integrity, followed by (in rising order 
of integrity) ‘post-communist judges’, ‘judges of transition’, and ‘Magistrates’. In general, 
‘Magistrates’ are perceived to behave more professionally in the courtroom and in public. 
But my interviewees suggest that the trend is negative.415 As one judge said, ‘it is very hard 
to say what category of judges has more integrity but it can be said that “Magistrates” are 
better in terms of ethics and professionalism. Unfortunately it is evident that even from the 
category of “Magistrates” there are individuals who have spoiled the role of judge in 
society, something that makes it very difficult for us to introduce ourselves in the public as 
judges.’416 Among all categories of judges, in general to the public eye, the behaviour of 
‘Magistrates’ is perceived to be better than that of ‘non-Magistrates’ because of their 
young age and short period in the system. So they appear to the public as less 





It is essential that justice not only be made but also be demonstrated (Commentary 
2007:85). Demonstration of justice requires that the appearance of judges’ conduct be at a 
high standard in the public view (ibid:85). The test of propriety according to the BPJC, rests 
on the ability of the judge to not only perform his judicial duties duly but also to form in the 
mind of the reasonable observer that his conducts are proper (ibid:85). The BPJC highlight 
that judges should be aware of certain restrictions on their public life (ibid:87). While 
recognising that gathering with members of the legal professional can be beneficial, the 
Principles state that extensive socialisation with advocates and litigants harms impartiality 
(ibid:87). 
                                                          
412 Interview with urban judge no.2, 2010. 
413 Interview with rural judge no.8, 2010. 
414 Interview with rural judge no.7, 2010. 
415 Interview with rural advocate no.1, 2010. 
416 Interview with rural judge no.4, 2010. 
417 Interview with rural judge no.1, 2010. 
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The BPJC consider the application of the rule of the conflict of interest as playing a 
significant part in the appearance of a judge’s activity before the public (ibid:92). The 
Principles suggest that, to maintain a proper appearance, judges should resist undue 
influence from colleagues, family members, friends and court staff (ibid:99). Judges should 
also be aware of the financial interests of their family members (ibid:98). In addition, a 
judge, his family members and also his staff should not ‘ask for, or accept, any gift, bequest, 
loan or favour’ that is related to his function (ibid:117). Propriety is also linked with 
protection of confidential information and private data of the litigated parties (ibid:104). 
The BPJC highlight that extrajudicial activities (e.g. academic activities) should not harm the 
impartiality of judges and appearance of judicial activity (ibid:111). It is also not considered 
improper if judges associate and speak out in public while being cautious in preserving ‘the 
dignity of the judicial office’ (ibid:95). The above elements are also covered by the Albanian 
Code of Judicial Ethics.418 
The BPJC, as mentioned above, address ‘propriety’ and elaborate only on the personal 
aspects of the judges’ behaviour and speak little about institutional factors which have a 
significant impact on the appearance of the judiciary to the public. For instance, issues of 
infrastructure, delays in decisions and solemnity of the process are not tackled. There is 
only one aspect where the BPJC seem to introduce an institutional element connected to 
‘propriety’ – the suggestion that judges should avoid the misuse of judicial prestige for 
private benefits where it includes, among other things, even the use of judicial stationery 
(Commentary 2007:100). Focusing only on the individual aspects of ‘propriety’ will not be 
helpful in providing a clear dynamic of the issues of judicial appearance in Albania. 
Therefore, I will be looking even at the institutional appearance of judicial conduct. 
The majority of interviewed advocates suggested that there are two main factors 
influencing the public’s perception of the propriety of judges in Albania. 
First, the institutional behaviour of judges in managing the court process, which is mostly 
associated with transparency, managing files, wearing a judge’s uniform (i.e. a special 
robe), and patterns of communication with parties and court staff. All these essentials 
constitute the solemnity of the judicial process. According to the HCJ decision no.238, 
dated December 24, 2008, the elements of the solemnity of the judicial process are: that 
the process be heard in the courtroom, judges wear their uniform, dates and time of the 
process be followed rigorously, ethics be respected during the process, and court decisions 
be issued without delay and according to the law.419 
Second, the individual behaviour of judges outside the courtroom is another important 
aspect of propriety.420 This is related to ex parte meetings or impropriate contacts of judges 
with litigants, socialisation with individual lawyers, or suspicious individuals; gift-taking or 
‘baksheesh’; and expensive lifestyles off the bench.421 
                                                          
418 See Rules 3, 4, 10, 15, 19, 22 and 23.  
419 See the Monitoring Report of Albanian Helsinki Committee on the Due Process during 2010, p.13; 
available at http://www.ahc.org.al/doc/Raport_rregullshmeria.pdf [accessed August 12, 2011]. 
420 Interview with rural judge no.8, 2010. 
421 Interview with urban prosecutor no.5, 2010. 
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My findings are in line with the Institute for Development Research and Alternatives (IDRA) 
survey of 2010 which shows that the opinion of both the general public and public 
employees on the transparency of courts was very low and that courts were perceived as 
the second least transparent institutions in Albania.422 In both IDRA surveys of 2005 and 
2006, courts and the General Prosecutor’s Office were perceived as the least transparent 
institutions.423 It should be noted that courts, however, are amongst those institutions that 
have made some progress in the period 2005-10.424 
The approach of Albanian judges on the test of propriety was very similar to the BPJC 
framework. According to one interviewed judge, ‘If the decision of the court is not in 
accordance with the moral standard of parties in process or the public opinion in broad, 





Infrastructure: Although I elaborated on the role of infrastructure in Chapter 4 as a factor 
to judicial corruption I turn to this issue again and look at it from a different angle. So here 
in this section I indicate how poor infrastructure influences the behaviour of judges and the 
public’s perception of prestige of the judicial office. Almost all the judges I interviewed 
underlined that ‘lack of solemnity in the process is one of the main factors that harms 
judges’ reputation in the public sphere’.426 Lack of courtrooms means that in many courts, 
cases must be tried in the judges’ offices.427 This opens opportunities for improper contact 
with litigants, advocates or prosecutors during the process.428 
Lack of space even in the judges’ offices brings chaos to the court’s process because there 
are no sitting places for parties, public observers or advocates.429 Courts with an improved 
infrastructure do not have problems with solemnity but there are other courts still, such as 
                                                          
422 IDRA (2010) ‘Corruption in Albania: Perception and Experience, Survey 2010, Summary of 
findings’, p.15. 
423 IDRA (2006) ‘Corruption in Albania: Perception and Experience, Survey 2006, Summary of 
findings’, p.13. 
424 IDRA (2010) ‘Corruption in Albania: Perception and Experience, Survey 2010, Summary of 
findings’, p.15. 
425 Interview with the urban judge no.2, 2010. 
426 Interview with urban judge no.9, 2010. 
427 In 2006, for 30 first instance courts there were only ‘81 courtrooms for 286 judges, while the 
eight appellate-level courts share[d] 19 courtrooms for 65 judges’ (i.e. an average of less than three 
courtrooms per court) (ABA/CEELI 2006:32). 
428 Interview with urban judge no.7, 2010. 
429 Interview with rural judge no.1, 2010. 
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the court of Elbasan for instance, where 18 judges share only two courtrooms.430 Since 
2001 there has been a steady improvement in infrastructure, especially in the courts of 
serious crime in Tirana and several rural appeal courts.431 
Solemnity: Lack of solemnity not only influences the public’s perceptions but can also have 
legal consequences. According to article 25 of the Law on Judicial Power, the solemnity of 
the court’s process should be guaranteed, and according to one interviewed judge, ‘the 
majority of the courts’ decisions today risk being challenged in the Constitutional Court on 
the grounds of the breach of solemnity which is part of the due process’.432 
The judges I interviewed shared different views on whether cases should be heard in their 
offices. Whereas judges working in the civil division were against, those working in the 
criminal division were not quite so unanimous. One interviewed judge, working with 
criminal cases, said that ‘sometimes it is better to hear cases in the office, as the design of 
the courtrooms where criminal cases are tried has a negative psychological effect on 
people with certain characteristics, such as elders or youngsters’. According to him, ‘certain 
categories of case, such as small fraud, are better to be tried in the judge’s office’.433 
In contrast, several interviewed advocates claimed that the lack of courtrooms is not the 
main concern regarding judges’ propriety; rather, there are other aspects which should be 
taken into consideration, such as the life of judges outside the courtroom. According to 
interviewed advocates, these are the more influential factors in the public’s perception.434 
Almost all the interviewees admitted that there are many judges whose expensive lifestyle 
is not justifiable, and the majority of interviewed advocates as well as some prosecutors 
admitted that this number is increasing and becoming a problem even among the new 
judges, or ‘Magistrates’. 
A few interviewees noted that another concern for judges’ propriety is around the wearing 
of a robe. In Albania all judges, advocates and prosecutors are required to wear a special 
robe.435 As recently as 2010, local reports such as that of the Helsinki Committee note that 
many judges still do not respect the wearing of uniform while in the court process.436 
However, my observations and interviews with advocates and judges evidenced that the 
situation is improving and probably this aspect was one of the most progressive indicators 
of judges’ propriety.437 
                                                          
430 Interview with HCJ inspector no.2, 2010. 
431 Interview with urban judge no.2, 2010. 
432 Interview with rural judge no.7 2010. 
433 Interview with urban judge no.1, 2010. 
434 Interview with urban advocate no.2 and no.4, 2010. 
435 See Law no.9978, dated February 18, 2008, ‘On Organisation of Judicial Power in the Republic of 
Albania’, art.25. 
436 See the Monitoring Report of Albanian Helsinki Committee on the Due Process during 2010, p.8; 
available at http://www.ahc.org.al/doc/Raport_rregullshmeria.pdf [accessed August 12, 2011]. 
437 Interview with urban advocate no.1 and urban judge no.3, 2010. 
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Transparency: Several interviewed advocates pointed out that mismanagement of the 
process is another aspect that makes Albanian judges appear non-professional to the public 
(Miklau 2009). Operational issues such as file storing, writing of minutes of the process, and 
accuracy in the meeting are of great concern.438 Files are kept in judges’ offices until the 
case is finished and there have been occasions where proofs have been damaged or 
minutes of the process had pages lost. This may also be related with the lack of 
professionalism of the courts’ administrative staff.439 Since 2004 the situation has been 
improving and it seems that files are better organised and kept in safer places.440 
Interviewed advocates claimed that another operational problem influencing ‘propriety’ is 
the lack of special typing machines (like a stenograph) that help secretaries to transcribe 
the minutes of the court processes.441 They are not even recorded or transcribed to give 
the parties an opportunity to check them later in the process.442 This influences the 
credibility of the process.443 Both judge and litigants rely on the notes taken by secretary 
via computers or hand.444 Sometimes minutes are hard to read and include only the main 
elements of the process.445 
However, a rural chief judge said that all minutes of the process are taken by a secretary on 
a computer and when the process finishes parties are each provided with a copy.446 In my 
observations I realised that both claims stand and there is no uniform standard applied in 
this context. In the first instance court of Tirana, for example, there were judges who did 
not allow their secretaries to keep minutes on a computer but only in handwriting, arguing 
that this method protected the documents from tampering.447 
What I observed in most of the cases tried by one judge, the secretary waited for the 
judge’s instruction on how to formulate the sentences and then wrote it. Several 
interviewed judges argued that this was done to include only the main facts of the case and 
in this way the process was made more time efficient.448 That said, the situation is 
                                                          
438 Interview with urban advocate no.2, 2010. 
439 Around 72% of surveyed judges by IDRA in 2010 ranked the administrative staff’s competence the 
last component of the judiciary out of five. See IDRA (2010) ‘Corruption in Albania, Perception and 
Experience: Judges Survey 2010’. 
440 Interview with HCJ inspector no.1, 2010. 
441 This finding also corresponds with that of IDRA. See IDRA (2010) ‘Corruption in Albania 
Perception and Experience: Judges Survey 2010’. 
442 Interview with urban advocate no.1, 2010. 
443 Interview with rural advocate no.1, 2010. 
444 Interview with urban judge no.7, 2010. 
445 Interview with urban advocate no.2, 2010. 
446 Interview with rural judge no.3, 2010. 
447 See also USAID Albania (2011) ‘Albanian Courts Need Assessment in Support of Audio Recording: 
Assessment report of courtroom equipment and court IT infrastructure, court security, status of 
computerized trial records, and court public relations’, USAID Albania, Tirana.  
448 Interview with urban judge no.1, 2010. 
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changing, especially in rural courts. In many courts, there are screens in the courtrooms 
where everything recorded by the secretary during the hearings is made visible to the 
public in real time. Litigants have the opportunity to agree or disagree if something is not 
correct and ask for the minute of the process to be amended accordingly.449 
Another aspect of ‘impropriety’ noted by interviewed advocates was the publication of the 
court decisions online. My research shows that only a few courts have websites where they 
publish their decisions but most of them do not work well. Only the Constitutional Court 
and the High Court have better accessible websites but they are not updated regularly.450 
Lack of online resources impairs transparency and influences the public’s perception of the 
efficiency of the justice system. 
An additional ‘improper’ conduct noted by interviewees was the inconsistency in how 
judges respect the trial procedures, such as allowing parties sufficient time for collection of 
proofs between court sessions, and ambiguous procedures for late notifications.451 My 
interviews suggest that poor service in the courts is also influencing public perception.452 
According to IDRA 2010, the service is deteriorating. Between 2009 and 2010, there was an 
11.3% increase in the number of respondents saying they were treated ‘Poorly’ or ‘Very 
poorly’.453 
Postponement of trial for ambiguous reasons was also a negative demonstration of justice 
in the public evidenced by interviewed judges and prosecutors. As mentioned earlier, in 
urban courts such as the courts of Tirana and Durrës, the backlog is a great concern. In 
Tirana, a case to be completed may take around eight months in the first instance, around 
twelve months in the Court of Appeal and a minimum of 18 months in the High Court – in 
total it takes around three years and three months to complete.454 The situation is better in 
rural courts; for instance in the courts of Gjirokastra or Korca a case takes one or two 
months maximum.455 There was a positive move undertaken by the President of the 
Republic recently to increase the number of judges in certain courts, but the effects of this 
policy will only be visible in the next five years.456 
It should be mentioned that many procedural issues depend on a country’s infrastructure 
or pertain to other institutions and are not dependent on judges and a court’s 
                                                          
449 Interview with rural judge no.3, 2010. 
450 Interview with urban advocate no.1, 2010. 
451 Interview with urban advocate no.2, 2010. 
452 Interview with urban advocate no.1, 2010. 
453 IDRA (2010) ‘Corruption in Albania: Perception and Experience, Survey 2010, Summary of 
findings’, p.23. 
454 Interview with HCJ inspector no.2, 2010.  
455 Interview with rural advocate no.1, 2010. 
456 Interview with HCJ inspector no.2, 2010. 
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infrastructure.457 For instance, almost all the judges I interviewed said that the Court 
Notification Attendance (CNA) process is not effective. This is because ‘the postal 
infrastructure and the address system are old and in many cities do not reflect the new 
constructions of the transition period’458 (ABA/CEELI 2008:27). Litigants and advocates 
often abuse this weakness by not signing their receipt of the CNA, and this is ‘used as a 
“legal” excuse for not coming to the process’.459 This is one of the main factors that 





Several of my interviewees noted that cessation of the courts also influenced the public’s 
trust in the judicial system. In 2009 there was a reorganisation of the courts’ structure. At 
least eight first instance courts were closed in order to minimise expenses and respond 
better to public demand. The rationale behind this policy was the rapid demographic 
transformation during the transition to democracy whereby many people moved from rural 
to urban areas.461 All closed courts were in the hinterland, mostly in the South.462 
The opinion of interviewed judges differed on this matter. Some of those in urban courts 
saw the reform as helpful in terms of cutting the court’s expenses and distributing the case 
log better. On the other hand, several other judges, especially those from the hinterland, 
noted that the closures are having consequences on the public’s perception in rural areas 
as it is obstructing their access to justice.463 In addition, several interviewees highlighted 
that the process was not duly managed by the HCJ.464 
Some interviewed judges and advocates suggested that the nomination of judges at a very 
young age is also influencing public trust in the judiciary. As one rural advocate put it, ‘It is 
not about intelligence or professionalism but they do not have family [here], no 
                                                          
457 See the report on access to Albanian courts prepared by the Institute for Policy and Legal Studies 
(2007), ‘Due Process and Human Rights in the Judicial Process’ (Gjykimi i Drejte dhe te Drejtat e 
Njeriut ne Procesin Gjyqesor), Botimet Dudaj, p.120. 
458 Interview with rural judge no.8, 2010. 
459 Interview with urban judge no.1, 2010. 
460 Interview with rural judge no.7, 2010. 
461 See the opening speech by President Topi on the ‘Annual Analysis of the High Council of Justice 
on the Judicial System’, March 8, 2010; available at http://www.president.al/shqip/info.asp?id=5685 
[accessed August 10, 2011]. 
462 See Presidential Decree, dated June 8, 2009, ‘On Assignment of the Jurisdictional Power and 
Activity of the District Courts’; available at http://www.president.al/shqip/info.asp?id=5189 
[accessed August 10, 2011]. 
463 Interview with rural judge no.5, 2010. 
464 Interview with international observer no.2, 2010. 
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experience, no one knows their income… it is enough to graduate from the School of 
Magistrates and you become a judge… These judges do not give you the impression that 
they are aware of the importance of their profession and could easily be prone to political 
pressure or criminals.’465 This is in line with a 1996 survey by Goldschmidt and Shaman on 
American judges, which found that age played a significant role in the importance accorded 
by judges to the recusal process and its appearance in the public. The older judges were 
more willing to withdraw from the process if any indicator of the conflict of interest rose. 
The authors pointed out that ‘as the ages of judges increase, they have a greater tendency 
toward disqualification [i.e. recusal]’ (1996:71). 
As mentioned above, not all judges live near their workplace. There is no subsidy for them 
to use private transport and so many of them use low cost public transport. This influences 





Unjustified socialisation among judges, advocates and prosecutors is also a concern 
evidenced by my interviews. In urban courts there are known to be unprofessional 
advocates, known as ‘middlemen’ (Sekser), who have easy access to judges.467 Besides 
advocates, there are also third parties known for their strong contacts with public officials 
including judges.468 
Access to urban courts is becoming more organised and sophisticated. Since 2005, the role 
of advocates, who are initially used to liaise with judges, is gradually being replaced by law 
offices. There are law offices now which have formed ‘clientelist’ relationships with 
particular judges. Political parties and organised crime know which law office is connected 
with particular judges and will therefore hire them.469 The number of judges coming from 
practising law in private (i.e. as advocates or legal consultants) constituted around 40% of 
the total number of the judges at High Court in 2011.470 
As mentioned earlier, in contrast in rural courts the litigants generally do not use advocates 
to access judges but tend to use family connections.471 Judges are less exposed than 
                                                          
465 Interview with rural advocate no.2, 2010. 
466 Interview with rural judge no.2, 2010. 
467 Interview with rural advocate no.1; urban advocate no.3; investigative journalist no.3, 2010. 
468 Interview with investigative journalist no.1; rural advocate no.1; investigative journalist no.2, 
2010. 
469 Interview with international observer no.3, 2010. 
470 See bios for each judge of the High Court on its official website; available at 
http://gjl.altirana.com/ [accessed August 2, 2011]. 
471 Interview with prosecutor no.1, 2010. 
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prosecutors to ex parte meetings with criminals, and this is justified by prosecutors as being 
part of their profession.472 Opinions vary when it comes to the public friendship of judges 
with prosecutors or advocates. My interviews show that in urban courts judges had slightly 
better relations with prosecutors and advocates,473 whereas in rural courts especially in the 
South, prosecutors said that judges do not treat them and advocates with respect.474 One 
explanation can be that in urban areas the social status of judges is not as evident as in 
rural areas where the number of high profile bureaucrats such as judges is small. So judges 
prefer to keep a distance from prosecutors and advocates. This is to make it more evident 
that judges have supposedly a privileged status in the court system grounded on the 
assumption that judges have the final say in a trial.475 
The majority of my interviewees noted that the behaviour of advocates influences the 
appearance of judges to the public. Advocates often abuse their position and ‘ask litigants 
to pay extensive fees arguing that supposedly part of it goes to the judges in the form of 
bribe, where in practice this is not true’.476 In addition, IDRA 2010 shows that judges are 
frequently approached by advocates outside the courts in an attempt to influence their 
decisions. Almost 50% of respondent judges confirmed that fact. And the trend is 
worsening, with reported incidences rising by 11.6% between 2009 and 2010.477 In stark 
                                                          
472 Interview with investigative journalist no.2, 2010. 
473‘...personally I have good relations with prosecutors ... It is not in any of the Codes (Criminal or 
Civil Code),  but in Albania it has become the practice that we do not charge more than the 
prosecutor has asked in terms of the penalty. This tradition derives from the communist past where 
the prosecution office was part of the judiciary and the prosecutor sided with the judge against the 
defendant. But today the prosecutor is one of the parties in the process and should provide 
evidence to support his charge…then his evidence is challenged by the advocate…however,  in a 
theoretical sense the prosecutor represents the state and so cannot be equal to the offenders...’ 
Interview with urban judge no.3, 2010. An international observer pointed out:   ‘...I’ve seen on more 
than one occasion that prosecutors who have been unprepared have been treated with considerable 
patience by the judges. “No, take your time; take your time finding the particular Act that you want 
to refer to.” And then, when the defendant is given a chance to make final statements, the 
defendant might be warned, for example, not to waste the court’s time and not to repeat anything 
that’s been said before and so keep his statements as brief as possible and so on. Other things that I 
have seen are prosecutors bringing absolutely no evidence that has any value or at least not 
undisputed value before the court and the court simply ignoring the fact that the value has been 
challenged...’ Interview with international observer no.3, 2010. 
474 Interview with rural prosecutor no.4, 2010. 
475 Interview with urban advocate no.7, 2011. 
476 ‘...to talk about and define judicial corruption is not easy…people often consider even the high 
fee of the advocate/solicitor as corruption. Many advocates or some of them abuse the system, 
claiming that the high fees they are asking for are intended not only for their work but also to lure 
the judge or the prosecutor, and this is harming the reputation of judges among the public...’ 
Interview with urban judge no.1, 2010. 
477 IDRA (2010) ‘Corruption in Albania: Perception and Experience, Survey 2010, Summary of 
findings’, p.25. 
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contrast, ‘the percentage of judges [24% in 2010] being approached by the litigants with 
bribes has not changed from 2009 [23.3%] and is significantly lower than in 2008 [41%]’.478 
Many interviewed advocates noted that the expensive lifestyle of judges off the bench 
remains a concern. There are judges who have properties that they cannot justify in terms 
of salaries or family wealth – however, according to an interviewed judge, this does not 
mean that they are corrupt, because according to him there are judges who come from rich 
families or who have their family members working overseas who can support them 
financially.479 Corrupt judges or advocates are known for their lavish expenditure on cars 
and clothes.480 I personally observed with the advice of an advocate the car parks of some 
of the urban courts and evidenced myself that the majority of cars parked there were 
expensive. 
According to my observations, judges in both urban and rural courts frequented more 
prestigious coffee shops than did advocates. In general, judges were more discreet in public 
and preferred quieter coffee shops during their breaks. In stark contrast, advocates visited 
less expensive and more crowded coffee areas. In general, judges would sit in groups of 
three or four whereas advocates will usually be sitting with litigants. In urban courts there 
were special places where judges would strike deals, but in rural courts ex parte meetings 
were more exposed in public areas.481 
My data suggest that gift-giving or baksheesh is widespread in Albanian courts. As a local 
observer put it: 
‘Albanian society in general accepts gifts and there is a social justification for the 
gift-giving. Today even the concept of corruption is transformed and in many 
aspects even the concept of gift-giving has changed. If an individual is happy with 
the work of a public official he will give him a gift even when he is not asked to do 
so by the official.’482 
Interviewed judges in both rural and urban courts held a confused perception of the 
acceptance of baksheesh. They all admitted that, ethically, baksheesh is wrong and is a 
form of corruption. But in practice, taking into account the social structure of Albania, a 
few of them noted that baksheesh should not be considered as corruption. As one urban 
court judge put it, ‘if in a complex case the party is happy and considers me as a good 
friend would, and offers me a gift I would not consider it wrong’.483 Another rural court 
judge answered, ‘Even the King accepted souvenirs – the problem is to avoid doing 
business with parties.’484 In its 2010 survey, IDRA highlights that ‘24% of the surveyed 
                                                          
478 Ibid, p.25. 
479 Interview with urban judge no.1, 2010. 
480 Interview with rural advocate no.1, 2010. 
481 Interview with investigative journalist no.1, 2010. 
482 Interview with local observer no.1, 2010. 
483 Interview with urban judge no.3, 2010. 
484 Interview with rural judge no.3, 2010. 
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judges said that they had been approached by litigants with bribe offers in order to 
influence court decision’.485 
It should be noted that the equivalent of ‘bribe’ in the Albanian jargon is ‘Rryshfet’ and this 
differs from ‘baksheesh’. The latter is often far smaller in amount and is always provided at 
the end of the court process. However, the term ‘baksheesh’ is used by both corrupt judges 
and advocates even in the cases when it is ‘Rryshfet’. They use this language to soften the 
term and make it more acceptable to the litigant or each other. As one of my international 
observers explained, ‘I think that for the most part what the judges receive would be quite 
directly referred to as bribe “Rryshfet”; baksheesh sounds just a bit too nice. And I suppose 
that judges who receive something that they might consider baksheesh would not consider 
it a problem simply because it’s such a minor gift compared to “Rryshfet”.’486 
A few interviewed judges confirmed that, in general, judges do not consider the receipt of 
baksheesh as wrong.487 The value of baksheesh offered in rural courts is smaller and 
especially in the North, where criminal cases are mostly related to blood feud, the amount 
of baksheesh can be considered symbolic compared to that offered in urban courts.488 
However, judges claim that the law that regulates gift-giving is ambiguous and judges often 
find the subject difficult to deal with in legal terms because according to the law a public 
official can accept gifts with a value of less than 10,000 Albanian Lek (£70).489 
In addition, several interviewed advocates noted that in rural courts prosecutors usually do 
not take bribes for obvious cases but only for doubtful ones. According to one rural court 
advocate, ‘prosecutors know that judges can play around in ambiguous cases and so they 
abuse this fact’.490 
There is a tendency for courts to formalise ‘gift-giving’ or the money given after the court’s 
decision. This is in cases when judges do not ask the winning party in advance.491 This 
usually happens when one of the litigants uses family or friendship ties to access the judge. 
It should be noted that favour in this setting means that the offender is found guilty but the 
sentence delivered is at the lowest level of the tariff for that offence. 
Many interviewed judges agreed that even taking money after the decision is given is 
corruption, but few of them perceived that as normal.492 One prosecutor highlighted that ‘I 
                                                          
485 IDRA (2010) ‘Corruption in Albania: Perception and Experience, Judges Survey 2010’. 
486 Interview with international observer no.2, 2010. 
487 ‘...in my opinion baksheesh is a pure form of corruption, it is a bribe and it is one of the prevalent 
forms of judicial corruption today in Albania. Unfortunately, judges (especially those who deal with 
civil cases, administrative issues, job claims, or trade issues), consider baksheesh as something 
normal and acceptable...however, legally and morally,   this is clearly corruption…’Interview with 
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488 Interview with rural judge no.3, 2010. 
489 Interview with rural judge no.7, 2010. 
490 Interview with rural advocate no.2, 2010. 
491 Interview with local observer no.1, 2010. 
492 Interview with urban judge no.3, 2010. 
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helped some businessmen by imprisoning some criminals for racketeering and I know that 
when I go and visit them in their city they will not let me pay for dinner, and I do not see 





I asked judges for their opinion on why the public has such a negative perception of judicial 
conduct. The majority of interviewed judges claimed that impropriety is boosted artificially 
by litigating parties as the public has little understanding of how the judicial process 
operates. According to them, in a process one party will always lose and the common view 
is that the loss will generally be the result of judicial corruption. As one urban court judge 
said, ‘In Albania the losing party makes two claims, one in the appeal and one to HCJ for 
inspection on the grounds of corruption. And this is becoming a paradoxical 
phenomenon.’493 
In addition, a few interviewed judges claimed that the media too plays a role in artificially 
amplifying the poor public image of judges. Often the media focuses on judges’ expensive 
cars or wristwatches, but according to one judge this is misguided: ‘a judge may have 
friends who can offer these gifts and this should not be the main concern of the media but 
instead they should focus on judges owning restaurants, three houses and hotels’.494 As 
mentioned in Chapter 3, according to my observations, judges were very anxious about 
journalists. And this may relate to the huge power that media has today in Albania and 
which can easily be misused to attack or blackmail judges for close interests. I explain this 
relationship in Chapter 7. 
Interviewed judges also highlighted that impropriety is often influenced by unprofessional 
advocates.495 Usually, an advocate hides his or her incompetence in defending a case under 
an untrue claim that the judge was corrupt.496 Judges also claimed that the public 
disciplining of judges has a negative effect on the reputation of judges in general. According 
to an urban court judge, public disciplinary proceedings ‘have an immediate effect on the 
parties’ perception of the impartiality of the judge and automatically the judge is 
prejudiced by them as being corrupt’.497 Judges’ awareness of ethical behaviour is 
                                                          
493 Interview with urban judge no.9, 2010. 
494 Interview with urban judge no.3, 2010. 
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lawyers do approach them outside the court in order to influence decisions. This percentage is 11.2 
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particularly high. Although judges are trained and have periodic workshops on the issue of 
ethics their professional behaviour off the bench is often improper.498 
Interviewed advocates and judges noted a common pattern of deviance inherited from the 
communist period. At that time judges had limited chances to favour their friends or 
relatives and the only way was to give a lenient sentence within the margins of the law. For 
instance, if the law says that someone can be charged with between five and ten years’ 
imprisonment, the judge would give the minimum sentence and this was considered a 
‘favour within the limits of the law’.499 
My interviews suggest that this pattern had become a subculture in the community of 
judges. The majority of interviewed judges regarded this pattern as not being a significant 
problem when used for friends and not for commercial benefits.500 However, some 
admitted that many judges exploit their discretion to ‘sell’ years by discounting the 






The BPJC regard ‘equality’ as among the most important values in terms of judicial 
decision-making. Equality requires that judges have legal expertise in key conventions 
against discrimination and civil and political rights (Commentary 2007:121). Equality is 
about the inner conscience of a judge and his outward performance in the court. 
Preserving equality is not only fundamental for justice but is also important for upholding 
the prestige of the judiciary (ibid:121). When assessing a case, a judge should avoid any 
sort of prejudice, stereotype and gender discrimination (ibid:122). Equality entails that 
judges recognise values deriving from diversity and be open to cultural differences 
(ibid:123). Any manifestation of bias or prejudice through words or actions should be 
avoided in and out of the courtroom by judges and parties in the process (ibid:124-127). 
It is very hard to gain a correct impression of the prejudices or stereotypes of Albanian 
judges because no studies or surveys have been made so far (ABA/CEELI 2008). My 
interviews and observations suggest that ‘equality’ is an area in which Albanian judges 
perform comparatively better. There are many cultural and historical factors that lay out a 
solid foundation for Albanian judges to be moderate on issues of race, religion, cultural 
diversity and gender. Albania takes pride in its reputation for religious harmony (Clayer 
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2010). Since 1912, ethnicity and religion503 have neither been a barrier to judges’ careers 
nor a reason for judges to discriminate. In certain periods of history, justice was governed 
by people with a minority religious background such as Orthodox Christianity, despite the 
dominant religion in Albania being Islam (Elezi 1999). In addition, in 1996 Albania ratified 
the European Convention on Human Rights (ABA/CEELI 2004:13). 
However, during the communist period, there were some stereotypes and prejudices 
mainly grounded on ideological concerns (Gjoliku 2009). Judges for instance were more 
positive toward individuals who had participated as partisans in the Second World War 
(ibid:241). Litigants with a family background of wartime political opposition to 
communists, such as membership of the ‘Balli Kombetar’ or ‘Legaliteti’, were often 
discriminated against (ibid:249). Although informal, ‘Krahinizem’ (regionalism) was also a 
cause for favours and prejudice during communism.504 Judges of the High Court were also 
engaged actively in religious discrimination either by way of court decisions or propaganda 
(ibid:216). 
The current Albanian Constitution contains a series of articles stipulating against 
discrimination on the grounds of race, religion, ethnicity, language, political, religious or 
philosophical beliefs, education, parentage, as well as economic and social status.505 
Albania also has the institution of Ombudsman, called the People’s Advocate, who has a 
significant role in protecting individual rights against unlawful or improper actions from 
public administration including violation of human rights as a result of administration of the 
judiciary (ABA/CEELI 2006:24). 
In 2008 a new law on protecting gender equality was enacted.506 As late as 2010, in 
accordance with all European Convections, a special law against discrimination was 
approved by the Albanian Parliament.507 There also exists the Ombudsman-like post of 
Commissioner for Protection from Discrimination.508 In 2010, there were only six cases 
brought before the Commission and none of them was connected to any sort of 
discrimination in the judiciary or during the court process.509 
There are no statistics regarding the religious and ethnic composition of judges during the 
transition to democracy (ABA/CEELI 2001:8). It is reported, however, that in the late 1990s 
in the South, the majority of judges in the first court of Saranda were ethnic Greeks. The 
                                                          
503 According to the 1939 census, there are three main religions recognised in Albania: Islam (70%), 
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509 Keta, E. (2010) ‘“Discrimination” Fails: 10 million leke for 6 claims’ (Deshton ‘Discriminimi’: 10 
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community there claimed that this was unfair and disproportionate for Albanians (ibid:8). 
At that time, one member judge of the High Court, out of 17 in total, was ethnic Greek 
(ibid:8). 
While ethnic Greeks were well represented in several courts, less privileged classes of 
society such as the Roma community, were not (ibid:8). My interviews suggest that in the 
early period of democracy there were prejudices among the community of lawyers against 
politicised judges. In the period 1990-98 expressions such as ‘judge of democracy’, 
‘communist judge’ or ‘six-months judge’ were often used as stereotypes for unprofessional 
and politicised judges.510 Although not frequent, these stereotypes are still part of the 
rhetoric of the community of lawyers.511 
Ethnic background and religious affiliation are not criteria used to assess students who 
apply to the School of Magistrates (ABA/CEELI 2004:11). It is difficult, however, to tell 
whether there is discrimination in the appointment of judges on the grounds of ethnic or 
religious beliefs as there are no statistics prepared by the Ministry of Justice that include 
these variables for assessment (ABA/CEELI 2006:19). That said, there is a persistent concern 
among lawyers as to why the Roma community is not integrated in the judicial structure 
(ABA/CEELI 2008:17). 
To date, discrimination on religious grounds is almost absent but there may be rare 
occasions where parties may be discriminated against for their appearance, religious 
clothing or symbols – such as a long beard, headscarf or visible cross. Such prejudices may 
be more evident in the courts of the North and South where religious division is more 
sensitive.512 Similarly, ‘former communist judges’ and ‘judges of transition’ are regarded as 
thinking about religion in a more stereotypical way than ‘Magistrates’, who tend to be 
more ‘open minded’.513 According to one of my interviewees, discrimination on religious 
grounds is more evident among prosecutors than judges.514 
There is little evidence regarding discrimination on the basis of ethnicity, as was confirmed 
by my interviewees. But, a few interviewed judges noted that some rural judges regard 
other ethnicities, such as Greeks in the South or Montenegrins in the North, as in some way 
superior.515 Several interviewees highlighted that there are sporadic problems with racial 
discrimination in both rural and urban courts. This is often the case with litigants from the 
Roma community. Whereas there is no clear evidence of discrimination in criminal cases, 
signs of prejudice against the Roma community are more common in civil cases. 
Interviewed judges said that the most evident cases are those concerning property 
rights.516 
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A few interviewees noted that younger judges in general are more tolerant and less 
prejudiced whereas, in contrast, older judges are more conservative.517 One of the main 
factors for this diversity of perception is that ‘Magistrates’ are better trained in national 
law and international conventions against discrimination. According to ABA/CEELI 
(2008:23), ‘Judges, to varying degrees, are familiar with the European Convention on 
Human Rights and other international law norms. The younger generation of judges, in 
particular, who are graduates of the MS [School of Magistrates], are familiar with the 
Convention, whereas more senior judges are generally less so.’ 
My interviews suggest that gender discrimination in the Albanian judiciary is rare. At least 
40% of judges are women, and 90% of people working in judicial administration are also 
women, as are 80% of applicants to the SOM.518 There has been a steady increase in the 
numbers of women in appeal courts and the High Court. Over the period 2006-08, in appeal 
courts the proportion increased from 32.3% to 33.3% and in the High Court from 26.7% to 
35.3%.519 Currently, the Chief Judge of the High Court and the General Prosecutor are both 
women. In 2010 there were courts occupied by female judges alone, such as the first 
instance court of Kruje.520 So gender discrimination overall is not an issue. 
Although gender discrimination is very rare, some judges admit that there is a kind of 
discrimination on social status.521 Discrimination on social status is more obvious in rural 
courts522 and in the first instance courts as the number of cases presented there is 
comparably higher than in other instances of the courts. In addition, in the first instance, 
parties meet face to face with judges whereas in other upper courts they are generally 
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Competence and Diligence 
 
While there have been significant improvements in the criteria for appointing judges, their 
level of professionalism remains a concern. In the period 1990-2001 there were three main 
routes for the community of lawyers to join the judiciary.524 The first route to the judiciary 
was via a legal qualification either from the SOM or a postgraduate degree in law from 
overseas. The second route was for those candidates with considerable legal experience 
with courts or judicial policies either working as lecturers at public law schools or as legal 
experts in public institutions. The third route was for candidates who had some 
professional connections with the judiciary, such as former judges, advocates or public 
notaries. 
Candidates for appeal courts and serious crime courts, in addition to the above criteria, 
were required to ‘have worked for at least five years as judges in first instance courts and 
to have demonstrated “high ethical, moral and professional standards in the exercise of 
their duties”’ (ABA/CEELI 2004:3). For the High Court, requirements were very broad: either 
the candidates be judges with ten years’ work experience or ‘known professional lawyers’ 
practising law for at least 15 years.525 Similarly for the Constitutional Court, the only 
professional requirement for candidates was to be ‘lawyers with high qualifications and 
with work experience not less than 15 years in the profession’ (Albanian Constitution 
art.125). 
Those who graduated from the SOM followed an intensive three year professional course, 
with the first year being very theoretical, the second more practical where students 
practise in the courts, and the third where students practise as real judges or prosecutors 
supervised by professional judges.526 By contrast, for ‘non-Magistrate judges’, the only 
qualification required to become a judge was the possession of a law degree (ABA/CEELI 
2008:13). In 2001, only judges with less than five years’ experience were required to follow 
the legal training organised by the School of Magistrates (ABA/CEELI 2001:3). 
The poor standard of law schools was a great concern and according to periodic reports, 
teaching materials and methods, infrastructure and teaching strategies were outdated 
(ABA/CEELI 2004:6). Albanian legal training was focused more on theoretical rather than 
practical aspects, such as legal reasoning, methods of legal research, legal writing and 
argumentation (ibid:6). 
In 2005 there were some significant improvements in terms of judicial professionalism.527 
The SOM for the first time planned a three-year Continuing Legal Education (CLE) 
programme (ABA/CEELI 2006:1). All judges since then have been required to participate in 
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the CLE. Training is organised and managed by the School and judges are required to attend 
the CLE for a minimum of 20 days per year or 60 days every five years.528 Furthermore, in 
2005, as part of the EU requirement to improve education standards and harmonise them 
with the EU, Albania signed the Bologna Declaration. Accordingly, the University of Tirana, 
Faculty of Law, restructured the degree process whereby a legal degree was earned after 
the completion of four years plus an additional year of a postgraduate degree (ABA/CEELI 
2008:12). 
The Bologna process brought several implications to Law School programmes, as new and 
unfamiliar courses were included and new modules were added.529 Academic staff were 
not trained and teaching materials in the Albanian language were absent.530 In a situation 
of rapid change of both the political and legal system, modern literature was scarce, and 
therefore foreign scholarly materials from the West were poorly translated and included in 
the curriculum without any clear teaching strategy (ABA/CEELI 2008:12). The opening of a 
few private law schools in 2003 increased competition, and as a result the full time staff of 
public schools moved or taught in both interchangeably.531 
In 2007, teaching methods in both public and the few good private law schools 
improved.532 The number of modules taught in both increased, including a wide range of 
subjects in response to societal development such as human rights, environmental law, 
cybercrime, legal writing and reasoning, legal ethics, legal sociology, gender equality and 
the law.533 Yet there were still concerns about the lack of academic staff and poor 
infrastructure (ABA/CEELI 2008:13). More interactive and practical forms of teaching were 
implemented such as moot courts and discussions on hypothetical cases (ibid:12). The 
impact of the SOM in terms of training was highly appreciated by the community of judges 






                                                          
528 Attendance at the CLE is recorded and is part of judges’ evaluation (ABA/CEELI 2006:9). The 
School of Magistrates also publishes a quarterly academic law journal, Jeta Juridike (Legal Life) 
(ABA/CEELI 2008:14). 
529 Interview with urban advocate no.1, 2010. 
530 Interview with urban advocate no.5, 2010. 
531 Interview with urban judge no.2, 2010. 
532 Interview with urban advocate no.6, 2010. 
533 Interview with urban advocate no.1, 2010. 





Interviewed judges noted that they were satisfied with the SOM but they also highlight that 
the academic structure of this school needs further improvement.535 A few interviewed 
judges and advocates noted that its curriculum is not very different from that of the public 
law schools.536 Similar core modules taught in the law schools are rehearsed in a more 
comprehensive way at the SOM.537 Teaching materials and lecturers too are almost the 
same in terms of quality.538 Most texts on core modules such as Penal Codes and their 
commentaries are based on former communist literature or are poor translations of foreign 
texts from the early 1990s.539 
My interviews suggest that recruitment to the SOM is also a problem. Law students 
recruited are not among the most excellent students in the country.540 The best lawyers 
usually follow postgraduate courses overseas and go on to practise law in the private 
sector.541 As one advocate put it, ‘those who apply at the SOM are the best of the worst’.542 
There is no procedure that screens law students who apply for the SOM. The examination 
process for candidates to the SOM was viewed by many of my interviewees as not very 
efficient. In the first couple of years, the entrance examination looked at various 
characteristics of the candidates such as charisma, professional knowledge and 
appearance.543 
There were two forms of exam – oral and written.544 The exam process was closely 
supervised by international observers. After five or six years, however, the quality of the 
examination process declined because the number and the role of international observers 
decreased. On rare occasions candidates even offered bribes to get accepted.545 According 
                                                          
535 Interview with urban court judge no.5, 2010. 
536 Interview with urban advocate no.1, 2010. 
537 Interview with urban advocate no.1, 2010. 
538 Interview with urban advocate no.5, 2010. 
539 Interview with urban prosecutor no.5, 2010. 
540 Interview with urban advocate no.1, 2010. 
541 Interview with urban judge no.5, 2010. 
542 ‘...another problem is the School of Magistrates (SOM)…  what this School is able to attract in 
terms of lawyers. In fact, SOM is presumed to attract the best lawyers in the country, but there are 
many cases, and I know specific names, who have been recruited but have not been the 
best….because the best lawyers go for post-graduation overseas. …. so effectively, despite some 
exceptions, those who apply to the SOM are the best of the worst or the best of those who have not 
been able to succeed in finding a scholarship to study overseas...’ Interview with urban advocate 
no.1, 2010. 
543 Interview with urban judge no.9, 2010. 
544 Interview with urban judge no.7, 2010. 
545 Interview with rural advocate no.1, 2010. 
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to an interviewed international observer, there is ‘talk of candidates who offered to pay up 
to 30,000 euros to get accepted in the SOM’.546 This is confirmed even by international 
reports.547 
Other interviewees suggested higher figures. This was also confirmed by the European 
Council experts in their 2010 report which highlighted that ‘several sources insist that facts 
of corruption happen in the phase of the appointment of the judges (or the admission of 
future judges at the SOM), where bribes are asked from the candidates. Once appointed, 
the magistrates ask bribes themselves, partly as a “return on investment”.’548 So this 
finding implies that judicial corruption finds roots at the education phase of judges. 
In addition, there were no entrance criteria regarding candidates’ ability to speak foreign 
languages and this was having a negative impact on future judges’ access to both 
international law literature and courts’ decisions. This issue was debated by the Executive 
Committee of the SOM but no suitable criteria were implemented because many full-time 
academics working in this school had very limited knowledge of foreign languages.549 
It was as late as 2011 that English was included as a core requirement for candidates, but 
still recognition by the certified body is vague.550 It was not by chance that international 
reports noted that a lack of knowledge of foreign languages was one of the main obstacles 
for judges in accessing cases of the European Court of Human Rights (ECHR) in 2004 
because they were in English and French (ABA/CEELI 2004:13). Even today, judges find it 







                                                          
546 Interview with international observer no.3, 2010. 
547 See Global Integrity Report (2010) ‘Global Integrity Report: Albania 2010’, Washington DC, USA; 
available at http://www.globalintegrity.org/report/Albania/2010/notebook [accessed January 25, 
2012]. 
548 See the Expert Report prepared by Francis Desterbeck and Thierry Loquet for the European 
Commission, titled ‘Rule of Law Mission: The Fight Against Corruption’, June 7-11, 2010 
(unpublished). This report is mentioned in several Albanian media. For instance see Neza, A. (2011) 
‘Why so much fear from the lifting of immunity’ (Pse gjithe kjo frike nga heqia e imunitetit), 
Panorama Gazette, September 22. 
549 Interview with the urban advocate no.5, 2010. 
550 See Zhilla, F. (2011) ‘The judicial reform should start from the School of Magistrates’ (Reforma ne 
gjyqesor duhet te filloj nga Magjistratura), Mapo Gazette, October 4.  




In general the community of judges is satisfied with the CLE. The training programmes are 
updated and contextualised,552 and judges are asked to review and propose ideas to the 
SOM (ABA/CEELI 2008:16) which are then reviewed by the School. Judges’ suggestions are 
included in the final plan which is subsequently scheduled and circulated to all judges for 
information and judges are free to select those training sessions they want to follow 
(ibid:16). The curriculum includes a variety of subjects and topics.553 
The CLE is composed of both local and international experts554 suggested either by the 
SOM, judges or legal professions (ibid:16). However, several interviewed judges and 
prosecutors noted that ‘they were not happy with the quality of some international 
trainers’.555 Their concern was that international trainers ‘do not contextualise their 
lectures in terms of the demands of the community of judges and prosecutors’.556 A few 
interviewees commented that international experts were sometimes ‘rather young and 
lacked work experience and often had difficulty in understanding the socio-legal 
complexities of Albanian society’.557 
Whereas judges have benefited from the CLE training, other equally important actors in the 
judicial process such as advocates, bailiffs and judicial legal assistants are not included in 
this training programme (ABA/CEELI 2008:14). My interviews suggest that ‘Magistrates’ are 
better educated on international conventions and refer more to decisions of the ECHR,558 
                                                          
552 Interview with urban judge no.7, 2010. 
553 Interview with urban judge no.9, 2010. 
554 The CLE has been continuously supported by OSCE, USAID and the Council of Europe on key areas 
such as the European Convention of Human Rights, Teaching Methodology and Judicial Ethics. For 
more see ABA/CEELI 2008:17. 
555 Interview with urban prosecutor no.4, 2010. 
556 Interview with urban judge no.6, 2010; urban prosecutor no.4, 2010; rural advocate no.1, 2010 
557 ‘This is a problem with the international assistance given to the judiciary these days. These 
missions overstep their role and function (assistance) and become lawmaker missions... they 
determine our legal needs, deal with the formatting of the laws and lead the process of law-making 
from beginning to end. What is the problem? The problem is that we are conformists in the sense 
that it is enough for us to have a good rapport with internationals and so we accept everything they 
serve us. So we have missions from the EU and USA which are often contradictory, maybe because 
of the disorganisation… foreign experts are rather young and lack work experience and often have 
difficulty in understanding the socio-legal complexities of Albanian society... in this context the 
questions raised are whether these experts are able to produce, suggest, and assist with laws which 
are beneficial to our country. And I see a drawback here. In principle they have a useful role, 
because we are a new democracy without experience and need international assistance... even with 
such poor expertise we can learn something….however, they rush too much in the law-making 
process, and they are sometimes tied to the politics of the day.  In my experience, I feel really sorry 
to see how foreign experts start to behave as Albanians after spending some time here.’ Interview 
with urban prosecutor no.4, 2010. 
558 Interview with urban judge no.9, 2010. 
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whereas older judges have problems in utilising both because they are not schooled in 
modern legal analytical methods and have poor knowledge of foreign languages.559 In 
general the CLE appears to be progressing well and its positive influence on the 
professionalism of judges was shown in the latest ABA/CEELI reports (2006 and 2008), 





Several interviewed advocates thought that the professional standards of many judges 
were below average. One interviewee considered that at least 60% of judges were 
substandard.560 In contrast, almost all interviewed judges, both urban and local, including a 
few advocates, noted that the professional performance of advocates was worst. One high 
court judge regarded lack of professionalism as the main problem of judicial corruption 
today.561 
In terms of prosecution, those prosecutors working in the General Prosecutor’s Office 
(GPO) are more professional than first instance and appeal court prosecutors. A reason for 
this, according to one interviewee, is that they have better access to CLE.562 Both the GPO 
and the SOM are located in the capital city, Tirana. 
Magistrates v. Non-Magistrates: My interviewees highlighted that among the categories of 
judge, ‘six-months judges’ and ‘judges of transition’ have a better legal qualification. The 
category of ‘Magistrates’ was perceived to be more professional.563 The majority of 
interviewees noted that the main difference in terms of competence and due diligence 
among the categories of judge is that ‘Magistrates’ ‘are more rigorous with procedures and 
better reasoned in their court decisions’, whereas, by contrast, the two categories 
                                                          
559 See also ABA/CEELI 2004:13 and 2008:23. 
560 Interview with urban advocate no.2, 2010. 
561 ‘...I would highlight lack of professionalism as the main factor of judicial corruption.  Of course 
another serious problem is bribes which again are associated with the lack of professionalism. In 
fact, I put lack of professionalism first because I note that where there are improvements in the 
court system generally you see that there are courts’ decisions with, for example, poor reasoning... 
you say how is it possible that they are at that substandard level?  Obviously this is not a general 
phenomenon (poorly reasoned decisions), because you also see very well argued decisions, there 
are very good judges but there are very poor judges too. Therefore I would highlight lack of 
professionalism as a primary factor impeding the progress of the judiciary. And of course, corruption 
is related to this (professionalism).  In addition, political influence is another factor and this also is 
related to professionalism. Non-professional judges are often those who allow politicians to 
influence them...’Interview with urban judge no.5, 2010. 
562 Interview with local observer no.1, 2010. 
563 Interview with urban advocate no.1, 2010. 
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mentioned above ‘do not always follow all procedural steps or respect ethical 
requirements during the process’.564 
As a result, a few interviewed advocates claimed that in general, courts’ decisions issued by 
‘non-Magistrates’ are characterised by ‘poor reasoning, do not refer to the proper law and 
are very ambiguous’.565 On the other hand, my data reveal that even among ‘Magistrates’ 
the standard of professionalism varies. Although there is no statistical evidence as yet, one 
of the interviewed judges said that, ‘of around 150 “Magistrates” the standard of 
competency is relatively good but around 30 of them can be considered as being very 
professional’.566 
My interviewed judges and judicial inspectors also suggested that although ‘Magistrates’ 
are generally more skilled in argument than ‘non-Magistrates’ this does not mean that their 
decisions are necessarily correct, rather ‘it can be said that they use more sophisticated 
and technical language’.567 ‘Magistrates’ have a better command of Western European 
languages such as English, French and Italian, whereas many ‘non-Magistrates’ ‘have little 
knowledge of Italian but a strong command of Russian’.568 
First instance v. Other instances: My interviews suggest that judges of the first instance 
courts especially in the rural courts perform better professionally.569 In the urban courts, 
such as both the first instance and Appeal court of Tirana, the situation is of greatest 
concern. There the perception is of both professional and very unprofessional judges.570 In 
general, the level of professionalism in the appeal courts is perceived by the community of 
lawyers as poor. This is especially evident in urban appeal courts because ‘the promotion of 
judges in these courts in 2009-11 was not transparent and based on merit’.571 In rural 
appeal courts the quality is slightly better and the trend is positive, especially in the 
North.572 
The majority of interviewees noted that judges of the Constitutional Court, before the new 
entrants in 2010-11, were perceived as better professionally than judges of other courts. 
                                                          
564 Interview with urban advocate no.2 and no.8, 2010. 
565 Interview with urban advocate no.2, 2010. 
566 Interview with rural judge no.7, 2010. 
567 Interview with inspector of HCJ no.2, 2010. 
568 Interview with inspector of HCJ no.2, 2010. 
569 ‘... the professional level of judges generally leaves much to be desired. Over 60% are below the 
average of lawyers in Albania. “Magistrates”, who are more in the first instance courts, have higher 
professional standards compared with “Non-Magistrate” judges...’Interview with urban advocate 
no.2, 2010. 
 
570 Interview with rural judge no.4; urban judge no.7, 2010. 
571 Interview with rural judge no.2, 2010. 
572 Interview with rural prosecutor no.1, 2010. 
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Judges of the High Court were highlighted as being substandard,573 and as one local 
observer put it, ‘the High Court has always been perceived by the public as the court of 
anonymous judges’.574 Another rural court judge of first instance pointed out that ‘where 
judges of first instance want to find a precedent for poor decisions they refer to decisions 
of the High Court’. Two reasons for the better performance of the Constitutional Court are 
attributed to the infrastructure and to the professional level of judges’ assistants.575 
Judges of both serious crime courts (i.e. first instance and appeal) are among the most 
professional and this was highlighted in most of my interviews, but even here my 
interviews suggest that ‘the most qualified judges are to be found in the first instance 
where the number of Magistrates is higher’.576 When asked about the professional 
standards of judges, one former constitutional court judge told me that ‘I am very happy 
with the first instance courts, not as much with appeal courts and less with the High 
Court.’577  
Criminal v. Civil cases: Judges perform better in criminal cases because according to 
interviewed judges and prosecutors ‘the nature of these cases tends to be simpler in 
procedural terms compared to civil ones’.578 Another supporting argument noted by 
interviewees was that ‘whereas in civil law there was an interruption of legal development 
during communism, in stark contrast, although highly politicised, the legal tradition on 
criminal law persisted’.579 However, the differences in judges’ due diligence between civil 
and criminal cases are not actually that significant. Issues of poor reasoning and 
shortcomings in the courts’ procedures have been found even at criminal cases, especially 
in the appeal courts.580 
 
 
                                                          
573 Interview with urban judge no.5, 2010. 
574 Interview with local observer no.1, 2010. 
575 Interview with rural judge no.7, 2010. 
576 ‘The Courts of Serious Crimes (first instance and appeal) are better because of their specifics 
(dealing with serious organised crime groups) and because judges who are selected to work there 
are carefully scrutinised. In addition, judges of these courts have some privileges and are paid better 
in comparison with their colleagues. The most qualified judges are to be found in the first instance 
courts where the number of Magistrates is higher. Apparently some of the judges in the first 
instance courts are very serious, have thought very carefully about their future career, and therefore 
give very courageous decisions. However, a good part of their decisions are overruled at a higher 
level...’ Interview with investigative journalist no.2, 2010. 
 
577 Interview with rural judge no.7, 2010. 
578 Interview with urban advocate no.1, 2010. 
579 Interview with academic no.1, 2010. 
580 See OSCE (2007) ‘Analysis of Criminal Appellate Proceedings in Albania’, p.12. 
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Factors Impairing Professionalism 
 
Some of the concerns raised by interviewed judges regarding professionalism were related 
to the level of skills, unfamiliarity with both international conventions and international 
courts’ decisions, and inconsistency in the legal tradition of the rule of law in Albania.581 
Inadequate methodological training was also an issue.582 Interviewed judges thought that 
more training in legal writing and reasoning is needed. Teaching at the law schools and 
training at the SOM were insufficient.583 
The lack of a traditional legal school is another problem.584 The rapid change to laws and 
legal approaches during transition has made it very difficult to have a uniform and solid 
legal system. Academics have changed, as have teaching methods and the structure of 
courses.585 In addition, both traditional and current academic research on the Albanian 
legal system has been lacking.586 The mushrooming of private law schools recently, without 
their being certified or duly credited by the Ministry of Education and Science, is also of 
growing concern (ABA/CEELI 2008:13). 
All these factors have impacted legal education and teaching policies in law.587 There is also 
an increasing concern among the international community about the competence and due 
diligence standards of Albanian judges (Miklau 2009:46). That said, there have been a few 
attempts by Albanian governments to increase the professional level of judges. The 
opening of specialised courts such as serious crime courts and the division of courts in civil, 
penal, commercial, administrative and family issues have increased the professionalism and 
efficiency of judges.588 These findings suggest that judges working on those courts where 
corruption is widespread (i.e. appeal courts and the High Court) not only lack integrity but 
also professionalism. 
To summarise, judicial corruption is widespread in Albania at all levels of court but more 
evident in appeal courts and the High Court. My data show that judges of appeal courts and 
especially of the High Court suffer more from the lack of integrity and professionalism than 
the lower level court judges. Among judges, prosecutors and advocates, the latter were 
considered to suffer the greatest lack of integrity. The ‘six-months judges’ were comparably 
viewed by interviewees as having less integrity and as being less professional, followed by 
(in rising order of integrity) ‘post-communist judges’, ‘judges of transition’ and 
‘Magistrates’. 
                                                          
581 Interview with urban judge no.2, 2010. 
582 See also IDRA (2010) ‘Corruption in Albania Perception and Experience: Judges Survey 2010’. 
583 Interview with urban judge no.9, 2010. 
584 Interview with urban judge no.6, 2010. 
585 Interview with urban advocate no.1; urban advocate no.5, 2010. 
586 Interview with rural judge no.7, 2010. 
587 Interview with urban judge no.2, 2010. 
588 Interview with the former Minister of Justice Enkelejd Alibeaj, 2010. 
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In rural courts, family ties and personal relations with judges were evident patterns of 
informal access to judges. In contrast, in urban courts, friendship ties, political influence or 
other commercial tactics such as bribes or exchange of favours were more common. It also 
appears that blood feud and the reputation of family name plays a positive role in 
restraining judges from corruption. There is also a notable tendency for patterns of judicial 
corruption in rural courts to mimic those in urban areas. Judicial corruption is more 
common in the main urban courts where the level of ‘business disputes’ is higher. My 
interviews suggest that corruption is more widespread in civil and administrative cases that 
deal with property rights. 
And finally, this chapter shows that individual factors also play a significant role in judicial 
corruption while the dynamic is slightly different between rural and urban courts. I also 
evidenced that judges have developed their subculture. In addition to two patterns 
highlighted in Chapter 4 – ‘covering up of colleagues’ mistakes’ and ‘silent agreement’ with 
powerful elites – in this chapter three other patterns were made evident: (a) the ‘favour 
within the limits of the law’, (b) two common ‘excuses’ for why the public has a bad 
perception of judges (i.e. the losing litigant and unprofessional advocates), and (c) the 





THE INTERPLAY BETWEEN ORGANISED CRIME 




In Chapters 4 and 5 I showed the degree of judicial corruption in Albania and analysed 
some of its patterns. The focus was on the judiciary and its interplay with external factors 
(political and social) and internal factors (personal and structural). In this chapter I look at 
the role of organised crime. There is a growing literature which emphasises a strong 
relationship between organised crime and judicial corruption (Van Dijk 2007; Buscaglia and 
Van Dijk 2003; Della Porta 2001; Ruggiero 2000; Della Porta and Vannucci 1999).589 In 
addition, organised crime is not only a factor of corruption in post-communist societies but 
has also become a concern in EU states in recent years.590 In this context, limiting the 
analysis of external factors to only socio-political actors would not be helpful in answering 
my research questions. Taking these elements into account, this empirical chapter is 
devoted to organised crime and its relationship with both judicial corruption and the 
political elite. 
This chapter offers a comprehensive analysis of organised crime and its consequences for 
judicial corruption in the transition period of 1989-2011. As in previous empirical chapters, 
in addition to interviews, I have used different sources and here I also review the memories 
of some active participants during the transition period. The most relevant recollections 
referenced are those of Alexander Moisiu (former president of Albania 2002-07); Prec Zogaj 
(a political activist and writer since 1990) and Mero Baze (a journalist since 1990). 
This chapter starts with a short background and definition of organised crime. I show how it 
is perceived by different categories of my respondents. In this section I also highlight that 
there are two forms of organised crime which use different mechanisms to undermine the 
judiciary. I then turn to the dynamics of organised crime and its patterns. I have divided this 
part into two large sections based on developments in organised crime during 1990-2011. 
In the first section I describe the patterns of organised crime during the early phase of 
transition (1990-98). I elucidate three main socio-political factors that gave rise to the rapid 
                                                          
589 See also Center for the Study of Democracy (2010) ‘Examining the Links between Organised 
Crime and Corruption’, European Commission; available at http://ec.europa.eu/home-
affairs/doc_centre/crime/docs/study_on_links_between_organised_crime_and_corruption_en.pdf 
[accessed February 20, 2012]. 
590 See European Commission (2012) ‘Special Eurobarometer 374: Corruption Report’, TNS Opinion & 
Social at the request of Directorate-General Home Affairs, February, p.8; available at 
http://ec.europa.eu/public_opinion/archives/ebs/ebs_374_en.pdf [accessed February 20, 2012]. 
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development of organised crime during this period. In the second section I discuss the 
‘sophistication’ phase (2001-11). In the next section I focus more on my data and analyse 
patterns of influence, the mechanisms and correlation between organised crime and 
judicial corruption to date. Finally I show the mechanism of judicial corruption in a criminal 
case and explain the role of key actors (state or judicial police, advocates, prosecutors, and 





Amid the wave of political changes in Eastern Europe in the late 1990s, Albania was the last 
country in communist Europe to break from the old regime and shift to Western 
democracy (Tarifa 1995; Biberaj 1998). Transition was complex and proved difficult for 
Albanian society. New legal and political concepts were not easy for the political elite to 
grasp (Austin and Ellison 2009). Rapid changes in constitutional rights and the 
decentralisation of institutional power created a chaotic social and political environment. In 
such a confused situation the formation of the political elite was a simple transformation of 
the existing elite (i.e. politburo members and the communist intellectual class) into new 
political structures (Vickers and Pettifer 1997). It was like communism playing to 
democratic rules. In practice the same networks and patterns of institutional control 
remained (Baze 2008). 
Criminals, once frustrated by the harsh policies of the communist regime, could now 
prosper in a transitional Albania where state institutions were very weak (Cilluffo and 
Salmoiraghi 1999). The political elite and local criminals saw the political chaos as an 
opportune moment for exploitation and quick enrichment (Vickers and Pettifer 2007). As 
the market economy developed, many former public properties begin to privatise. At the 
period (i.e. 1990-1999) a series of wars in the Former Republic of Yugoslavia (FRY) was 
taking place. The need for arms and comodity was emerging. In the North Albania shared 
border with the FRY.The political elite employed local criminals who gradually became 
organised to run its affairs. This is how the links between the political elite and organised 
crime started. Since then, although the political and economic context has varied over the 
years the judiciary was one of the most significant institutions to have given comfort to this 
relationship during the transition of 1990-2011.591 
                                                          
591 ‘...so today we have two main political parties (Democratic Party and Socialist Party) which in fact 
are two big oligarchies….they have been ripping off the resources of the country for the last 20 
years… they have their own media…if you notice, when they get into power they use similar tools to 
keep the judiciary in control. First, they corrupt the elections and send signals to the judiciary to 
frighten the judges, second, they abuse the system with the psychology of submission of the 
judiciary to politics which seems to be something related to our political culture, third, both powers 
(executive and legislative) exert direct and indirect pressure on the judiciary and fourth, the judiciary 
itself is corrupted. So the judiciary is like a plant grown in a corrupt environment….judges too are 
compromised by the Mafia even without the involvement of politics.... and the fact that these 
judges are corrupt, captured also by organised crime and corrupt politicians, means that even the 
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As mentioned above, the patterns of interplay between organised crime and the political 
elite have changed, influenced by different social and political contexts. But, as my research 
shows, judicial corruption seems to have remained constant in its encouragement of this 
rapport. In this chapter, I will focus on the dynamic between organised crime and judicial 
corruption. Explaining this relationship will assist in the distillation of the theories offered 
in the next chapter and their contribution in explaining the causes and factors of judicial 
corruption in Albania. 
 
 
Definition of Albanian Organised Crime 
 
My interviews suggest that there is uncertainty over what constitutes Mafia and what 
constitutes organised crime in Albanian society. The definition of Albanian organised crime 
(AOC)592 as shown in Chapters 1 and 2 is also confused in the literature where even 
contemporary researchers of organised crime in post-communist Europe see parallels 
between AOC and the Italian Mafia (Stojarová 2007; Transcrime 2004; Holmes 2009). 
It should be noted that the academic debate over the definition of organised crime is not 
exhausted (Levi 1998). Mainly influenced by American scholars, its definition has gone 
through different historical stages based on the contextual structures of organised crime in 
the US. Varese (2010) summarises the conceptual evolution of American organised crime in 
the last 100 years and states that there have been at least five main progressive structural 
stages: (1) Specialisation593 (mid 1850s), (2) Hierarchy594 (1950), (3) La Cosa Nostra/Italian-
                                                                                                                                                                    
judiciary is part of this abuse of power by the state— the corruption...’ Interview with academic no. 
3, 2010. 
 
592 I use AOC in those sections where I compare it with other OC groups active in the Western 
Balkans and the EU such as the Italian Mafia. In those sections where I focus on Albania I only use 
the term OC which refers to native organised crime groups. It is important to remember that there 
are also other non-indigenous yet very powerful types of OC that exploit Albanian territory, such as 
the Italian Mafia, Colombian Mafia, Balkan Mafia and Russian organised crime groups. For more see 
Zhilla, F. (2012) ‘Fatal Attraction: Foreign Criminal Networks in Albania’, Jane’s Intelligence Review, 
March, pp.44-48. 
593 Organised crime was perceived as a specialised entity which had ‘its own language; it has its own 
laws; its own history; its tradition and custom; its own method and techniques; its highly specialised 
machinery for attacks upon persons and property; its own highly specialised modes of defence’ 
(Varese 2010:3). 
594 Influenced by Donald Cressey (1967), one distinguishing element of organised crime was its 
hierarchical structure (Varese 2010:4). 
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American Mafia595 (1963-69), (4) Enterprise596 (1975-80), and (5) Networks and harm597 
(1990-2000) (Varese 2010:3-8). 
The majority of my interviewed prosecutors suggested that the structure of AOC falls into 
the category of ‘Networks’. A few prosecutors reported that ‘AOC groups operate in small 
numbers, rely on family and friendship ties and do not have a typical hierarchical 
structure’.598 As we will see in the following sections, only during 1997’s civil unrest, when 
state power weakened significantly, did ‘several organised crime groups consolidate 
around hierarchical structures’.599 Some of the most typical organised crime groups 
pertaining to these categories were ‘Banda e Lushnjes’ (1997-2006),600 ‘Banda e Mandeles’ 
(1995-99),601 ‘Banda e Tropojes’ (1997-2001)602 and a few organised crime groups 
operating in Vlora (Hoxha 2008:63-141). 
                                                          
595 This term had a political connotation where Italian gangsters were seen united for one criminal 
cause, La Cosa Nostra. They were considered by American authorities as a ‘sinister organisation 
known as Mafia’. Later on the definition of La Cosa Nostra was depoliticised in academic circles and 
was equated with the crime syndicate (Varese 2010:5). 
596 While ethnic ties and conspiracy were considered significant features of organised crime, another 
definition which seems more market oriented becomes familiar – the ‘enterprise’. Organised crime 
groups are seen as purely illegal ‘large enterprises that exercise control over illegal markets’. The 
cooperation between organised crime groups is as among ‘illegal entrepreneurs (often aided by 
corrupt police officers)… [they] remain independent illegal operators, [and do not] join a single (a 
few) structured, hierarchical organisations’ (Varese 2010:6). 
597 ‘Network’ is a self-organising structure that is driven by the emergent behaviour of its parts’ 
(Carlo Morseli quoted by Varese 2010:8). According to Varese (2010:8) this definition can be 
applicable to ‘organisational systems ranging from simple co-offending to monopolising markets and 
territories, from one-time partnerships to membership in quasi-structured organisations, from ties 
based on family, to those based on friendship, background affinities, resource sharing and so on’. 
598 Interview with urban prosecutor no.3, 2010. 
599 ‘...within that climate of corruption, organised crime developed without rules. Why? The collapse 
of the state weakened the pressure of law enforcement agencies and thus organised crime groups 
mushroomed all over the country……the 1997 period was the worst because they were armed, and 
formed their zones of influence…several organised crime groups consolidated around hierarchical 
structures..we had hierarchical groups such as “Gangs of Zani”, “Gangs of Lushnja” or  “Gangs of 
Gaxhai”. They were more or less the classical forms of organised crime at the time...’Interview with 
urban prosecutor no.5, 2010. 
600 This was a very structured organised group mainly based on family and friendship ties. There is no 
exact number of its membership. The head of the group Alfred Shkurti, alias Aldo Bare, was a former 
police officer in the early 1990s. The group’s structure was hierarchical: at the top was the leader; he 
had an advisor whom they called ‘professor’; then there was someone taking care of the investment 
of criminal proceedings, and someone for committing the killings called the ‘killer’ (personal 
interview with urban prosecutor no.6, 2010; Hoxha 2008:110-122; Arsovska and Basha 2011:41). 
601 This organised crime group operated in the Midlands city of Elbasan, was composed of 40 
members, all of whom were gypsies. The structure of the group was hierarchical, with the leader 
being Eduart Peqini, alias ‘Mandela’; then a rank below were Peqini’s four brothers, followed by 
their relatives and trusted friendship connections (Hoxha 2008:81). 
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In 1997-2001, AOC groups were also acting as Mafia groups as they were controlling the 
distribution of property rights and offering protection to domestic businesses and 
politicians.603 My interviews suggest that the influence of organised crime on judicial 
corruption has been more evident during periods where state institutions have been 
weak604 – something also emphasised in the literature (Van Dijk 2007). 
Most of my interviewees note that from 2000 onward, ‘AOC gradually shifted from 
hierarchical to a “Network’ structure”’.605 The majority confirmed that most of the AOC 
groups presently operating in Albania have ‘a simple structure, generally loyal to one 
leader, though on occasion, other members of the group take the leader’s 
responsibilities’.606 They are ‘not well organised, act randomly and often are chaotic’.607 
Typical ‘AOC membership varies from three to 15 people per group’.608 
A few prosecutors told me that the structure of AOC is moving from family ties to 
friendship relations, and as one urban prosecutor explained, ‘if we measure by percentage I 
think that those based on friendship connections are more’.609 In stark contrast, the 
journalists interviewed contended that ‘the majority of the groups today rely on family 
ties’.610 I would argue that both statements stand as based on the assessment of the 
typologies of ‘Banda e Lushnjes’, ‘Banda Tropojes’ and ‘Banda e Mandeles’, the 
composition of these groups was a mixture of family and friendship ties. So I would argue 
that the characteristic of AOC is that their membership is based in both family and 
friendship ties. 
My interviews also contradict some of the ‘myths’ about AOC developed in the literature 
which stress that AOC’s source of strength and relationship lies in its reliance on ‘strict 
codes of conduct’ (Xhudo 1996; Stojarová 2007) or a 15th century code known as ‘Kanun of 
Leke Dukagjini’ (Holmes 2009:275). As one urban prosecutor told me, ‘this is not true. … 
taking into account the young age of AOC’s membership (generally 25-40 years) they know 
little or nothing about Kanun’.611 My data also suggest that the only elements that keep 
                                                                                                                                                                    
602 ‘Banda e Tropojes’ operated in the North. It was based on close family ties and close relatives. 
Many of this group’s recruits were state police – its leader Fatmir Haklaj was chief of Tropoja city’s 
state police (Hoxha 2008:64-68). 
603 Interview with urban prosecutor no.4, 2010. 
604 ‘...the influence of organised crime on the judiciary was more open and more straightforward 
during 1997-98. It was characteristic of that period that a criminal would put a gun on the table of 
the judge’s office and say, “here is the money and here is the gun, pick and choose”...’ Interview 
with urban prosecutor no.2, 2010. 
605 Interview with urban prosecutor no.5, 2010. 
606 Interview with urban prosecutor no.4, 2010. 
607 Interview with urban prosecutor no.6, 2010. 
608 Interview with urban prosecutor no.1, 2010. 
609 Interview with urban prosecutor no.3, 2010. 
610 Interview with investigative journalist no.2, 2010. 
611 ‘They do not have written honour codes, they simply follow the Albanian mentality…they feel 
that their family is threatened and then themselves….. taking into account the young age of AOC’s 
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Albanian criminals together are ‘“trust” among each other and “fear” of consequences for 
their family members or relatives’.612 
Another element which is not mentioned in the literature so far is the ‘positive’ role of 
blood feud in terms of organised crime. So organised crime ‘will not attempt to hire 
individuals from those families which are under the regime of blood feud because then this 
will put the criminal group automatically in a turf with all the family members under the 
blood feud’.613 However, there is a tendency of families in blood feud ‘these days to hire 
professional killers to do the killing and this is in violation of the Kanun which says that the 
killer should not hide but inform the family of the victim that he commited the crime…. this 
new trend has made the authors of blood feud killing very difficult to be traced today’.614 
Turning to the definition, most of the journalists and advocates interviewed applied the 
term ‘Mafia’ to those criminal groups that are entrenched in the political elite and 
legitimate powerful businesses. For the majority of interviewees the distinct element of the 
Albanian Mafia is not what the literature suggests, such as the provision of criminal 
protection or control of property rights, but, ‘rather, close ties with the legislature, 
executive, judiciary and business’.615 But those ties do not distinguish them as Mafia but 
‘their criminal activities blended with legal business outsourced by corrupt politicians such 
as exploitation of mines or the scrap business’.616 
This perception of Albanian Mafia among this category of interviewees,617 and society at 
large, is influenced by the Italian media and cinema (Hoxha 2008:198). Popular perceptions 
                                                                                                                                                                    
membership (generally 25-40 years) they know little or nothing about Kanun, so they do not use 
such terms. They use banal expressions like,  “we will kill your parents,  destroy the family” and so 
forth.  This is not Kanun.  They do not know about it. They do not even know the rules of “Besa”...’ 
Interview with urban prosecutor no.3, 2010. 
612 Interview with rural prosecutor no.4, 2010. 
613 ‘...organised crime will not attempt to hire individuals from those families which are under the 
threat of blood feud because, then, this would put the criminal group automatically in the same 
position as all the family members under the blood feud…vengeance is based on individual reports, 
not in relation to the group as a whole...’Interview with rural prosecutor no.3, 2010.  However, one 
investigative journalist pointed out  that: ‘...there are organised crime groups which were formed  
because one member of the family entered into a blood feud, and, to protect themselves they 
started to organise, steal and kidnap...this is how they secured their living...  gradually these groups 
moved to more serious crimes such as human and drug trafficking...’Interview with investigative 
journalist no.2, 2010. 
614 Interview with rural advocate no.2, 2010. 
615 ‘...for me, the difference between organised crime and the Mafia is that in Mafia groups there 
are powerful people coming from politics, and here I mean people coming from parliament, the 
judiciary and particularly from the executive. So people who have close ties with the legislature, 
executive, judiciary and business...join criminal organisations while still keeping their public 
functions…. this is the Mafia…. ‘ Interview with urban advocate no.4, 2010. 
616 Hoxhaj, E. (2012) ‘The stealing of scrap, the new “drug” of Albanian mafia’ (Vjedhja e skrapit, 
droga e re e mafies shqiptare), Shqiptare Gazette, April 30. 
617 Interview with urban advocate no.4, 2010. 
152 
of the Mafia are similar to patterns of the notorious Sicilian Mafia ‘Cosa Nostra’. According 
to most journalists and advocates interviewed, Albania has two forms of organised crime: 
(1) organised crime groups and (2) the ‘Mafia-like groups’. In general, the journalists and 
advocates thought of the Mafia as the highest level of organised crime. A few of them 
highlighted that what we frequently think of as organised crime groups in Albania are, in 
fact, those who appear violent in the public eye, but in reality the Mafia-like groups are 
those integrated in the economy and politics – they are hidden behind legal business and 
have strong links with political elites. And as one advocate put it, ‘They never go to court or 
prison’. According to most of my interviewees the Mafia-like organised crime is a real 
threat to society, because ‘they can influence the law-making and undermine 
democracy’.618 
Interviewed prosecutors and judges, those dealing specifically with serious organised 
crime, had a clearer perception of AOC groups. For them, AOC displays similar patterns to 
the Italian Mafia groups but it is not the same. From the criminological perspective, they 
categorised them in old and new forms. At least one of the interviewed judges noted that 
‘at the moment [2010] there are two typical typologies of organised crime groups in 
Albania’.619  
The first one is a leftover of 1997’s criminal groups, such as ‘Banda e Lushnjes’, which were 
dismantled in 2001 because of the strong intervention of the state. Some members of this 
group went to prison and some of them emigrated to the EU where they continued their 
criminal activities. After a while in the EU, some of them began to invest their illicit profits 
back home and to revitalise their old links to the country. The second typology includes 
those groups that emerged after 2001 who use special methods of cooperation and whose 
criminal activity is specific. Their main criminal activities are women trafficking and the 
smuggling of narcotics and arms.620 Some judges and prosecutors assumed that there are 
powerful criminal rings which have close links with high profile politicians and which run 
consolidated businesses, but they also highlighted that ‘there is lack of clear evidence of 
this and that everything is based on rumour and assumption’.621 
The perception among Albanian people in general is similar to that of my interviewed 
journalists and advocates (Hoxha 2008:198). However, the perception among all categories 
(prosecutors, judges, journalists, advocates) is consistent in that there are two types of 
organised crime group in Albania and that the ‘Mafia-like’ groups are the most 
sophisticated form of organised crime. This perception, in fact, does not contradict the 
                                                          
618 ‘They can influence the law-making and undermine democracy. The Mafia today does not kill 
anyone. Why not, when they killed before? It’s because the Mafia is becoming rich, not through 
murdering people anymore, but through the preparation of legislation. Through laws, the Mafia is 
getting rich in a “legitimate” way, and it makes millions. For me the Mafia is inside the state.  Who 
makes the laws? It is the parliament. Since this parliament contains criminals they vote for laws and 
elect the government, the General Prosecutor and judges of the High Court and Constitutional 
Court. So the state is finished.’ Interview with urban advocate no.3, 2010. 
619 Interview with urban judge no.4,2010. 
620 Interview with urban prosecutor no.3, 2010. 
621 Interview with urban prosecutor no.4, 2010. 
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modern definition of the Mafia. According to Varese (2010:17), ‘a Mafia group is a type of 
OCG [organised crime group] that attempts to control the supply of protection… and the 
scope of a Mafia group is much wider than that of an OCG, since it aspires to protect any 
transaction…in a given domain’. However, my data suggest that even the first form of 
organised crime exhibited mafia-style patterns during the local elections in 2011 when local 
organised crime groups provided informal protection of the ballots and influenced the 
distribution of voting rights for the political parties that hired them (Zhilla 2011). 
My interviews suggest that AOC groups are different from the Italian Mafia. According to 
Albanian experts and many of my interviewed prosecutors and judges, ‘AOC may have 
nuances of Italian Mafia families such as reliance on family ties or customary norms and be 
violent but they are different from the Italian Mafia family structures’622 (Hoxha 2008:197). 
According to interviewees, there ‘have never been traditional classical Italian Mafia-like 
families rooted in Albania’.623 
For the above reasons, in this chapter, I will use another definition for AOC and avoid the 
term Mafia, as the typology of AOC does not quite fit with the typologies of classical Mafia 
groups such as the Sicilian Mafia, Cosa Nostra, the Hong Kong Triads, the Russian Mafia and 
the Japanese Jakuza. The AOC groups do not share ‘similar rituals and rules…of a collective 
entity of which they are a part’, as the above-mentioned Mafia groups do (Varese 2010:17). 
One of the main reasons is that the Italian Mafia’s complex codes and rituals have ‘so far 
not proved to be either exportable or credible beyond the boundaries of its original 
communities’ (Paoli 2003:12). 
Having described my interviewees’ perceptions of the definition of AOC, I now turn to the 
categories of organised crime in Albania. As my research shows, they use different patterns 
to influence the judiciary and for this reason it is important to elucidate the distinctions 
between different structures of AOC. 
 
 
Contextual Categorisation of Organised Crime Groups 
 
During 1990-96, in the early period of post-communist transition, organised crime 
developed very quickly. Gradually, two forms of organised crime emerged. The first had a 
low profile and this category always remained in the realm of criminal activity and low level 
of criminal culture and never moved up in the hierarchy of society. I will define this form as 
                                                          
622 Interview with urban prosecutor no.3, 2010. 
623 ‘It is a little difficult to give an absolute definition of Albanian organised crime because the 
structure of organised crime groups changes from year to year.  This means that here we do not 
have and, in fact, never have had traditional classical Italian Mafia-like families rooted in Albania. 
The structure and functioning of Albanian organised groups is totally different...’  Interview with 
urban prosecutor no.1, 2010. 
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Low Profile Organised Crime (LPOC). This is, in effect, what the majority of my interviewees 
define as organised crime. The LPOC groups resemble more the Italian Camorra624 of the 
late 1990s or are similar to Varese’s definition of the ‘Networks and harm’ mentioned 
above whereby they are often focused on only one or two criminal activities. They act quite 
independently from the executive, legislature and judiciary in the sense that ‘their 
interaction with politicians and judges only begins when they are arrested and detained by 
law enforcement agencies where they want to facilitate their criminal activities’.625 
Therefore LPOC does not rely much on political support for its criminal plans and activity 
(Saviano 2007). 
So, the LPOC does not have a hierarchical structure, operates in small groups and is very 
flexible.626 Its links with the judiciary and political elite are sporadic and not permanent.627 
The most obvious connection between organised crime and the political elite occurs during 
general elections when this category of organised crime becomes very active in ‘protecting 
the ballots and collecting votes for the candidate of the political party they support in their 
local domain’.628 In exchange for this ‘service’, LPOC only resorts to local governors or 
Members of Parliament for access to courts where the mechanism of bribery has not 
worked. My interviewees suggest that because judicial corruption is systemic, the LPOC’s 
need for political support to influence the judiciary is minimised,629 something which has 
decreased the cost of the role of politics in the interplay between LPOC and judicial 
corruption. 
The second category of organised crime is more sophisticated and is integrated in business 
and politics.630 I will define it as High Profile Organised Crime (HPOC). This category is 
similar to that which the Albanian public and many of my interviewees perceive as Mafia. 
Similarly to Sicilian Mafia groups, HPOC is more ‘sophisticated and has close links with the 
political elite’631 (Paoli 2003). They resemble more Varese’s (2010) ‘Enterprise’ definition, 
as one of their prime interests is legal economic enrichment via violent patterns. So they 
                                                          
624 For the modern structure of the Italian Camorra see Saviano (2007:45). 
625 Interview with urban advocate no.3, 2010. 
626 Interview with urban prosecutor no.4, 2010. 
627 Interview with urban prosecutor no.1, 2010. 
628 ‘...political and local elections are one of the most visible indicators of the connection between 
organised crime and the political elite. Criminals are involved in protecting the ballots and collecting 
votes for the candidate of the political party they support in their local domain. In the 2009 political 
elections, the system changed (regional proportional), giving more power to the leader of the 
political party. However, even with the new election system, the impact was greater, because 
criminal groups actively engaged in raising funds and the collection of votes by the use of force. 
When they are collecting money for a political power, the leader of that party is forced to cooperate 
with organised crime on what the candidate puts in the election manifesto because organised crime 
groups will not finance someone who is not going to win. It is not guaranteed afterwards...’Interview  
with investigative journalist no.2,2010. 
629 Interview with urban advocate no.2, 2010. 
630 Interview with investigative journalist no.3, 2010. 
631 Interview with urban advocate no.4, 2010. 
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can use ‘violence and blackmail in addition to bribery to get access to public goods’632 
(Santino 2002). They have strong connections with senior judges. Sometimes it is difficult 
to ‘distinguish them from legal businessmen or elected politicians’.633 In contrast to LPOC, 
they ‘behave in public as law abiding citizens’.634 
My interviews highlight that LPOC is more exposed to law enforcement agencies and is 
engaged in conventional crimes, whereas HPOC, in addition to its criminal activities, is 
hidden behind political outfits and legal businesses.635 HPOC is often the link between LPOC 
and high profile politicians during both general and local elections.636 They have both the 
financial resources and the right connections, which enables them to produce politics and 
laws in their favour by way of influencing the election of targeted politicians in parliament 
and by having direct relations with high profile judges, prosecutors and state police637 
(Santino 2003:87). 
My data also suggest that the main distinguishing characteristics between the two forms 
are: 
First, continuity and reliance on the political elite. The LPOC generally act independently 
and the interplay with judicial corruption and political elite is seasonal (e.g. protection of 
ballot votes during general and local elections), whereas, HPOC’s connection with judges 
and politics is permanent. In this sense LPOC does not need to ‘hire’ any particular judge 
but simply uses bribery or blackmail when its members go to court. By contrast, HPOC has 
established contacts with high profile judges, prosecutors, state police and politicians who 
can exert their influence to solve HPOC’s disputes with state agencies or their adversaries. 
My interviewed advocates and investigative journalists pointed out that the influence of 
HPOC is on ‘the law and policy making and this requires it to invest in the election of 
politicians and promotion of judges, state police and prosecutors’.638 As mentioned earlier 
its main interest is business and it acts as a business venture, often relying on criminal 
methods (e.g. extortion, bribery, life threats or blackmail) in doing business639 (Santino 
2003:85). 
The second distinguishing feature between the two forms concerns the ratio between legal 
and illegal business. LPOC relies more on illegal business because, as one interviewed 
prosecutor put it, ‘they are not able to do legal business’.640 For HPOC groups, the size of 
                                                          
632 Interview with investigative journalist no.2, 2010. 
633 Interview with investigative journalist no.1, 2010. 
634 Interview with investigative journalist no.3, 2010. 
635 Interview with urban advocate no.3, 2010. 
636 Interview with investigative journalist no.3, 2010. 
637 Interview with investigative journalist no.2, 2010. 
638 Interview with urban advocate no.2, 2010. 
639 Interview with investigative journalist no.2, 2010. 
640 ‘...they are more engaged in criminal activities because they do not know how to do legal 
business. The most that they might do is open a coffee bar which they would mostly use as a 
meeting place. They cannot run a proper business and be successful. One of the characteristics of 
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their formal business can be larger than the size of informal activities. The blurring of 
activities makes HPOC more difficult to be investigated641 (Saviano 2007). 
Third, the relationship dynamic between the political elite and the judiciary is also 
different. While the heads and members of LPOC usually derive from former gangs and 
generally have not worked in public institutions, by contrast the heads or members of 
HPOC are generally individuals who were ‘formerly public officials holding various positions 
such as members of state police, the secret service, bodyguards of high profile politicians 
and customs officers’642 (Hoxha 2008:185). In the early period of transition, using their 
official power they were able to access formal and informal markets and establish contacts 
with corrupt judges, criminals and informal business. This helped them to accumulate 
considerable financial resources and sensitive information. Gradually some of them joined 
politics and business, or both, and a few of them became ‘members of the legislature or 
executive during 2000-10’.643 
It is difficult however, to draw a line between both forms as occasionally HPOC may act as 
LPOC or vice versa. During the transition period many groups upgraded from LPOC to 
HPOC; some of the LPOC were imprisoned in 2005; new LPOC emerged in 2005-11; some 
LPOC and HPOC may have withdrawn from illegal activities and converted to small or 
consolidated legal businesses.644 However, I will use these definitions throughout this 
chapter to distinguish and elucidate patterns of interplay between organised crime and 
judicial corruption. 
Having explained the distinguishing features of the different categories of organised crime 
group in Albania I will now turn to explain its dynamic during the last two decades. As 
explained above, I have divided the development of the interplay between organised crime 







                                                                                                                                                                    
Albanian organised crime is that they are not capable of carrying out a business which requires a 
daily routine, work which would require them to manage a business...’ Interview with urban 
prosecutor no.1, 2010. 
641 Interview with urban prosecutor no.3, 2010. 
642 Interview with investigative journalist no.2, 2010. 
643 Interview with investigative journalist no.2, 2010. 
644 Interview with urban prosecutor no.3, 2010. 
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Albanian local organised crime emerged during the country’s transition to democracy. 
There were many factors and historical moments which opened opportunities for 
organised crime to exploit the economy during 1990-93. The early 1990s was the period 
when illegal markets flourished all over the Western Balkans and when transnational 
organised crime began to emerge (Antonopoulos 2008). At this time, the role of the state in 
Albania was almost absent and this enabled local gangs to flourish. The structure of state 
police was in chaos and this generated fear and lack of confidence among law enforcement 
agencies (Vickers and Pettifer 1997:129). The economy disintegrated and unemployment 
soared. Robbery and rape were common in almost every Albanian city (ibid:128). 
The historical changes and wars commencing in the Western Balkans in that period also 
played a significant role in boosting political corruption and nurturing organised crime.645 
Albania’s transition to democracy occurred while the Former Republic of Yugoslavia (FRY) 
was at civil war and while Slobodan Milosevic initiated an ethnic cleansing of non-Serbs 
there. In 1992, the United Nations (UN) imposed sanctions on FRY, which resulted in 
increased opportunities for trans-border criminal activity in the Western Balkans (Krastev 
2002:46). 
Sharing a land border with FRY, Albania was a very opportune path for organised crime and 
the political elite to break the embargo and smuggle fuel and other commodities in high 
demand to FRY’s army (Glenny 2008:39). During 1993-94, the estimated profits from oil 
trafficking to FRY were US$1 million per day (ibid:44). The Albanian democratic state was in 
its infancy and its institutional structures very weak. There was little separation of powers 
and control of the political elite over the judiciary was evident (Zogaj 2009:44). 
A regionalism in organised crime began to take shape. In 1992, to circumvent international 
supervision, Albanian politicians employed local gangs to manage and control their criminal 
activities (Hoxha 2008:185). During the UN embargo, local gangs in northern Albania, on 
the border with Kosovo and Montenegro (then parts of FRY) became engaged in oil 
trafficking. In this period they were strongly attached to the Democratic Party (DP), then in 
power. As Neritan Ceka, leader of the Democratic Alliance, a party in opposition to the 
democrat-headed government at that time, declared: ‘the most worrying precedent now is 
the link between the government and the Mafia, particularly around Shkoder [a main city 
of northern Albania], which is breaking the UN sanctions against Yugoslavia’ (cited in 
Vickers and Pettifer 1997:249). 
                                                          
645 See United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime (2008) ‘Crime and its Impact on the Balkans and 
Affected Countries’, March. 
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In the South, other criminal activities emerged such as human and drug trafficking and the 
stealing of antiquities (Vickers and Pettifer 1997:134). It is believed that many of the 
organised crime groups in southern Albania had close links with socialists via members of 
the former communist secret service, then ‘Sigurimi’, who escaped to Greece while the old 
regime was toppling (ibid:134). 
This regionalism in organised crime was boosted during the 1997 civil unrest when the 
political elite attempted to divert public attention away from the real crisis by portraying 
the quasi civil war as a war between North and South. Many local organised crime groups 
were involved in this political scenario (Zogaj 2009:257). During this period, it was very 
difficult to distinguish between an armed local political supporter and a local organised 
criminal group. In summer 1997, the DP, via the secret service, then ‘SHIK’, supplied around 
4,000 firearms to its political supporters in the surrounding cities in the Midlands and 
North. A group of 200-300 loyalists from the North were guarding Sali Berisha, the then 
President, inside his compound (ibid:260). 
During 1990-95, organised crime was largely composed of criminals imprisoned during the 
communist period but released early as the communist regime collapsed in 1990 (Hoxha 
2008:184; Vickers and Pettifer 1997:129). An amnesty freed all those individuals sentenced 
for non-political crimes (e.g. robbery, theft, fraud) during the communist regime. In 1988, 
the ratio of those sentenced for political reasons to those imprisoned for non-political 
crimes was 1 to 54 (Bezhani 2003:51). 
The change of political system was another significant factor in the rapid development of 
judicial corruption and organised crime.646 The transition from a centralised to free market 
economy opened enormous opportunities for corrupt officials to undermine the 
privatisation process and capitalise formerly state-owned properties for private gain.647 
Privatisation was a target of organised crime as was the banking system too. Many loans 
were given and have still not been repaid to banks (Hoxha 2008:184). 
Control over foreign aid was another link between the political elite and organised crime. 
To smooth Albania’s transition to democracy, the international community offered a 
package of emergency aid worth $150 million in the early 1990s (Vickers and Pettifer 
1997:72). The Italian government was in charge of administering and transporting the aid 
to Albania (Tripodi 2002). Many local organised crime groups with strong ties to local 
politicians were involved in stealing this foreign aid and selling it on the black market 
(Vickers and Pettifer 1997:135). 
This corruption was revealed in 1990, and the socialist-led government was accused by the 
opposition of Mafia-type links with Italian leftists in exploiting the foreign aid and diverting 
it for illegal profit (Polovina 2003:78). This is the period when the patterns of political 
corruption of the Western political parties, particularly the Italian ones, were transfused 
into the Albanian political elite (Ruggiero 2000:116-117). 
                                                          
646 Interview with urban prosecutor no.4, 2010. 
647 Interview with urban advocate no.4, 2010. 
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Albania’s chaotic land reform, which persists to this day,648 was another determinant in the 
perpetration of corruption and organised crime in the judiciary. The majority of my 
interviews indicate that one of the main factors generating judicial corruption in Albania is 
‘cases related to property disputes’.649 A disrupted and inconsistent land reform has 
created an overlapping of ownerships over properties, which has inflicted a rough division 
in society and increased criminality (Bardhoshi 2011; Lemel 1998). It is estimated that in 20 
years of transition around 8,000 people have been killed over property issues.650 My 
interviews suggest that while other violent crimes have fallen significantly, ‘the scale of 
crimes related to property disputes remains high’.651 In September 2011, one judge of the 
first instance court of Vlora, Skerdilajd Konomi, was killed by a remote-controlled bomb 
placed under his car. Konomi’s family claims that the real motive behind his assassination is 
related to their property located in a strategic coastal area, which was recognised to them 
by a High Court decision in 2011.652 
In 1993-96 corruption in public administration, including the judiciary, became a serious 
problem.653 During this period, an informal relationship of control was established between 
the political elite and public employees. Nepotism was widespread among ministers. This 
pattern of appointments was transfused to almost all public institutions and the justice 
system (Vickers and Pettifer 1997:244-245). Senior officials would ‘turn a blind eye to the 
criminal activities of their subordinates unless they were exposed in public’.654 In turn, 
public officials were asked to support the governing political elite during elections.655 Public 
institutions became instruments in the hands of politicians for close interests. 
                                                          
648 See European Commission (2011) ‘Albania 2011 Progress Report’, Commission Staff Working 
Paper, October 12, p.19; available at 
https://mail.google.com/mail/?shva=1#inbox/133b6822496f76b0 [accessed December 6, 2011]. 
649 ‘Albania has a huge problem with the issue of property disputes, because they involve a lot of 
corruption.  I can say with full confidence that property cases are the most corrupt cases in the 
courts.  Bribes paid for these cases are really hard to bear for the claimants because the property 
trials can last for years and people have to continue to pay bribes the whole time... a large number 
of property issues in the capital city Tirana have been solved, while a great many are still blown 
away by the “Strong” people (criminals), and the VIP.  In these cases the trial is a lost cause, 
everyone knows that.’ Interview with investigative journalist no.1, 2010. 
650 Stefani Andrea (2010) ‘Properties blighting the transition’ (Pronat pergjakin tranzicionin), 
Shqiptare Gazette, October 29. 
651 Personal interview with urban prosecutor no.2, 2010. 
652 See the open letter by Konomi’s family made public in the media: Shqip Gazette (2011) ‘Skerdilajt 
Konomi’s family: This country is ruled by Mafia’ (Familja e Skerdilajt Konomit: Ne kete vend 
mbreteron mafia), November 23. 
653 Interview with rural advocate no.1, 2010. 
654 Interview with academic no.3, Tirana, 2010. 
655 ‘During elections in the early transition (1993-97) we were often asked by our chief of police, 
who himself received orders from high profile officials in the Ministry of Interior, to make sure that 
we all cast our votes for the party in power, and persuade people we knew to do the same. The chief 
of police would speak openly to us and say that we should do everything to secure the win...’ 
Interview with former state policeman no.1, 2011. Patterns of the politicisation of state police 
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This was the period when public employees in the criminal justice system exploited their 
position for criminal gain.656 Many key public officials in the fight against organised crime, 
such as state police, were also members of or cooperating with organised crime.657 They 
were involved in various crimes such as human trafficking and document forgery.658 There 
were occasions when even local chief state police were involved in racketeering. Today 
some of them are successful businessmen in the construction industry.659 
Having shown the socio-political factors that gave raise to organised crime during the 
transition, I now focus more on its interplay with judicial corruption. My data suggest that 
organised crime has used various patterns to influence the judiciary. 
The Center for the Study of Democracy (CSD) (2010:34), based on the work of Buscaglia and 
Van Dijk (2003), lists five ways in which organised crime often accesses public institutions 
including courts: ‘(1) sporadic, or low-level, bribery; (2) regular, meaning low-ranking 
officials on an organised crime payroll; (3) infiltration of managerial domains; (4) 
compromised heads of agencies; and (5) capture of state-policies’. 
However, the use of political channels to compromise the judiciary and the influence on 
law-making are missing from this list. My data suggest that these forms of influences have 
been the most evident tools used by organised crime and political elite to corrupt the 
judiciary. In the following sections I will show how all these mechanisms have been 




Judicial Corruption, the Political Elite and Organised Crime 
 
As mentioned in Chapter 4, political control over the judiciary increased and nomination of 
judges became highly politicised in 1992-96. Telephone justice was common.660 In this 
period the Albanian government initiated several legal reforms to purge the judiciary, 
prosecution and state police of former communist remnants.661 This was the phase when 
                                                                                                                                                                    
during elections (local and political) have remained the same. During an informal conversation with 
a high profile police officer in 2012, he said ‘I told my staff that they had to make the right choice 
when casting their vote (meaning they should vote for the democrats) if they wanted to keep their 
job…this is how it works here ….even socialists have done the same…this is the system whether you 
like it or not...’Interview with former state policeman  no.2, 2011.  
656 Interview with a former investigative state policeman, 2011. 
657 Interview with investigative journalist no.2, 2010. 
658 Interview with a former investigative state policeman, 2011. 
659 Interview with investigative journalist no.1, 2010; investigative state policeman, 2011. 
660 Interview with investigative journalist no.2, 2010. 
661 Interview with academic no.1, 2010. 
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the level of professionalism in the judiciary and prosecution dropped and its politicisation 
increased (Vickers and Pettifer 1997:246; Bezhani 2003:61-75). 
The judiciary was highly corrupt and criminals’ access to the courts was straightforward.662 
As Zogaj (2009:216) notes, for that period ‘our corrupted judges…complained all the time 
that they were not protected in the fight against criminals. In this way, they ensured an 
alibi [which allowed them] to play politics with the criminal justice policies. The politics of 
criminal justice is paid. Judges not only live but live very well, while criminals continue to 
kill…’ 
The judiciary was used as a weapon to weaken political adversaries.663 As a result, the 
former prime minister and then leader of the Socialist Party, Fatos Nano, together with the 
then vice minister of foreign affairs, Sokrat Plaka, were arrested and charged with 
corruption and abuse of foreign aid on July 30, 1993 (Polovina 2003:79; Vickers and Pettifer 
1997:240). The process was perceived by the public as highly politicised, and as Vickers and 
Pettifer (1997:253) put it: ‘the consideration of evidence [in Nano’s process] was of a 
diminishing importance in the judicial process, where the over-riding factor was that the 
government required the opposition leader to be convicted’. 
Although the legal system was different from the communist past, patterns of political 
control over the judiciary were the same (Vickers and Pettifer 1997:245). The Secret 
Service, then ‘SHIK’, was used randomly by the executive to blackmail judges, public 
officials and political adversaries.664 According to the Albanian media, in 1994 one of the 
judges, Arben Ristani, who acquitted two journalists known for opposing the executive, 
then governed by democrats, was later set up by SHIK and was arrested in 1994 to 
subsequently be released on bail. Strangely enough, in 2009, the same judge was selected 
and appointed by democrats headed by the same leader, Sali Berisha, as chairman of the 
Central Election Commission (i.e. the institution in charge of managing the elections and 
validating the results). Ristani was accused by the opposition of open bias toward 
democrats and of having direct influence on the politicisation of the administration of the 
2010 local elections.665 
In 1995 the Chief Judge of the Court of Cassation, Zef Brozi, was dismissed by President 
Berisha because Brozi denounced the failure of key institutions dealing with crime such as 
the Ministry of Internal affairs, the Albanian Prosecution Service, the Prosecution Office of 
Tirana, the First Instance Court and the Appeal Court, and accused them of participating in 
a ‘system of manipulating and falsifying evidences’ (Zogaj 2009:61-64). Judge Brozi also 
opposed many of the government’s policies regarding judicial dismissals, politicisation of 
the courts’ decisions, mishandling of human rights and the proposed procedures for 
approving the new constitution (Vickers and Pettifer 1997:271). The discharge of the Chief 
Justice was perceived by the international community as highly politicised, leading 
President Clinton to cancel the $3 million of US aid allocated for the training of judges, 
                                                          
662 Interview with rural judge no.2, 2010. 
663 Interview with rural prosecutor no.4, 2010. 
664 Interview with academic no.2, 2011. 
665 Tema Gazette (2011) ‘The secret past of Arben Ristani’ (E shkuara sekrete e Arben Ristanit), May 
11. 
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prosecutors and police (Tripodi 2002:92). In addition, almost all General Prosecutors from 
1992 to 2008 have been dismissed by the executive for political reasons and some of them 
have successfully won their cases in the Constitutional Court666 (Zogaj 2009:44; Moisiu 
2009:277). 
In 1997, a series of pyramid schemes mushroomed in most criminalised cities, such as Vlora 
and Tirana. This is the period when almost all the investments of Albanians, including 
judges, were criminalised. Around 500,000 to 600,000 people or around 25% of Albanian 
families invested their savings, mainly collected from the remittances of Albanian refugees 
working in Greece and Italy (Zogaj 2009:283). The amount estimated to have been invested 
in these schemes was around US$1-1.5 billion (Miletich 2000:72). The political elite and 
organised crime also invested in these ventures. Bosses of these schemes had strong ties 
with the government (Zogaj 2009:276).667 In March 1997 the main pyramid schemes 
collapsed, sending the country into chaos and a near civil war. Almost 2,000 people were 
killed and over 10,000 wounded (Jarvis 2000:1; Zogaj 2009:236; Hoxha 2008:133). 
During this time organised crime consolidated into hierarchical structures.668 In those cities 
where a criminal subculture was more developed, different organised crime groups 
infiltrated their people into all key local governmental institutions (Hoxha 2008:96). This 
gave them access to information and in time increased the opportunity to circumvent state 
control (Hoxha 2008:96). Many powerful organised crime groups were controlling the 
appointment of prosecutors, judges and high profile state police. By early January 1998, the 
chief of state police in the city of Gjirokastra was changed eight times, ‘which meant that 
the law was dictated by the regional mafia’ (Baze 2008:44). 
Parallel and informal structures of organised crime were competing with state institutions 
for control.669 In several cities, including the capital Tirana, powerful organised crime 
groups imitated state police and opened their own ‘police stations’.670 They used similar 
ranks to the state police and army and applied comparable hierarchical structures.671 
During this period organised crime had access to the judiciary without the help of 
politicians, and direct links between local criminal and corrupt judges were established.672 
                                                          
666 Interview with urban advocate no.5, 2010. 
667 ‘We often saw a pyramid schemes manager passing through our border to Macedonia. She 
travelled in a very luxurious car, a kind of limousine, escorted by professional security guards as if 
she was the President of Republic and we didn’t check her...her team were equipped with more 
modern security equipment than the state police...we were told by high profile politicians not to 
hassle her or her people.. we didn’t dare...but what also struck me at the time was that even at the 
neighbouring Macedonian border the police did the same...nobody checked her, she was 
untouchable...’ Interview with former state policeman no.1. 
668 Interview with urban prosecutor no.5, 2010. 
669 Interview with urban judge no.2, 2010. 
670 Interview with investigative journalist no.1, 2010. 
671 Interview with investigative journalist no.3, 2010. 
672 Interview with rural judge no.1, 2010. 
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The judiciary was ‘left unprotected and vulnerable to organised crime’.673 As mentioned in 
Chapter 4, several courts were burned and documents destroyed.674 Judges, especially in 
rural areas, were ‘threatened constantly by local organised crime’.675 In March 1997, one of 
the state police officers describing the situation of organised crime groups in the city of 
Lushnja noted that ‘they [criminals] challenge the state openly. … threaten state police and 
people working for the criminal justice sector’ (cited in Hoxha 2008:107). 
 
 
Sophistication Phase (2001-12) 
 
By 1999, the judiciary remained a weapon in the hands of politicians and continued to be 
exploited for political reasons and criminal ends.676 As mentioned earlier, immediately after 
1998 when socialists came to power they began to purge the judiciary of democrat 
‘loyalists’. All court cases involving former communist politburo members, including the 
wife of dictator Enver Hoxha and the last leader of the communist government Ramiz Alia, 
were closed and the majority of the presiding judges in these cases removed. Five high-
profile politicians, holding key positions during the democrats’ governance in 1997, were 
accused of genocide and crimes against humanity for the events of that year (Baze 2008). It 
appeared that socialists used the same patterns of blackmailing the opposition through the 
misuse of the prosecution office and the judiciary. They did not condemn any of the 
accused and the process was ‘allegedly “frozen” in the court by the socialists 
themselves’.677 
The nexus between the political elite and organised crime became gradually more 
sophisticated. In parliament in November 2004, Nikolle Lesi, a member of parliament and 
the head of one of the most influential newspapers Koha Jone during 1996-2004, read 
extracts from a transcript of an alleged tape recording made by an Albanian investigator of 
a secret meeting between the then Prime Minister, Fatos Nano and the Parliamentary Head 
of the Legal Commission, Fehmi Abdiu in December 1997. This affair became known as the 
‘Albanian Watergate’.678 According to that transcript, both Nano and Abdiu discussed the 
possibility of softening the criminal law on offences pertaining to arms and drug 
trafficking.679 
                                                          
673 Interview with urban judge no.7, 2010. 
674 Interview with urban judge no.8, 2010. 
675 Interview with rural judge no.7, 2010. 
676 Interview with academic no.3, 2010. 
677 Interview with urban advocate no.7, 2010. 
678 Personal interview with investigative journalist no.3, 2010. 
679 Korrieri Gazette (2004) ‘Nano in the trafficking of arms’ (Nano ne trafikun e armeve), November 
9. 
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Referring to the transcript, Nano promised to promote all key actors willing to participate 
in the scheme such as Abdiu and the then Minister of Justice, Thimio Kondi. It may be 
coincidence, but Abdiu was later promoted to Chief Judge of the Constitutional Court and 
Kondi to Chief Justice of the High Court. Both Nano and Abdiu denied the accusations. The 
then Prosecutor General, Theodhori Sollaku, who in 2011 was elected as a member of the 
National Assembly of the Socialist Party,680 considered the evidence seriously tampered 
with and not sufficient for further investigation of the Prime Minister.681 Nano asked 
parliament to lift the immunity of deputy Lesi and accused him of libel. However, his 
request was voted down by parliament.682 
The source of this information was Sokol Kociu, who at the time of the recording worked as 
chief of police in the district of Kucove and later on as a prosecutor at the Albanian 
Prosecution. In 2001 Kociu was accused and found guilty of drug trafficking and of being a 
member of an international organised crime group, commonly known in the media as the 
‘Cocaine Group’. Kociu denied the accusations and considered them politicised and linked 
to the recording.683 After ten years in prison he successfully sued the Albanian government 
in the European Court of Human Rights (ECHR) for compensation in 2010.684 
An interesting point to note is that at least one prosecutor I interviewed said that the 
‘recording was politically motivated and that this was a political scenario to weaken the 
General Prosecutor’s Office and the then Prime Minister Nano’.685 In stark contrast, at least 
one advocate and a journalist emphasised that ‘the recording was real but the transcript 
read by Lesi in parliament had been tampered with for political purposes’.686 However, 
according to one interviewed journalist, those parts of the discussion where Nano and 
Abdiu spoke about the amendment of the criminal law were true. Lenient legislation 
against arms and drug trafficking would pave the way for organised crime to prosper in the 
years to come.687 By 1997 AOC groups were involved in the Balkan route of such trafficking 
and many were gradually expanding their territory overseas, but their links with Albanian 
politicians remained (Ruggiero 2000:58-60). 
 
 
                                                          
680 Panorama Gazette (2011) ‘The Assembly of SP, the counting of votes closes’ (Asambleja e PS-s, 
perfundon numerimi i votave), November 9. 
681 Metropol Gazette (2005) ‘Sollaku, nothing true in the file of “Lesi”’ (Sollaku asgje e vertete ne 
dosjen ‘Lesi’), April 14. 
682 See US Department of State (2005) ‘Human Rights Report, Albania’, Bureau of Democracy, 
Human Rights, and Labor, February 24; available at 
http://www.state.gov/g/drl/rls/hrrpt/2004/41666.htm [accessed December 2, 2011]. 
683 Personal interview with urban advocate no.6, 2010. 
684 See Lala, K. (2010) ‘Sokol Kociu, my life in a cell with Dritan Dajti’ (Sokol Kociu, jeta ime ne qeli me 
Dritan Dajtin), Shqiptare Gazette, September 23. 
685 Interview with urban prosecutor no.5, 2011. 
686 Interview with investigative journalist no.1, 2011. 
687 Interview with urban advocate no.6, 2010. 
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Low Profile Organised Crime (LPOC) v. High Profile Organised Crime (HPOC) 
 
In the period 2004-11, the Albanian state became stronger and moved to restore order.688 
Important laws against organised crime and an international convention were ratified, and 
a special Serious Crime Court was established. Almost all those evidenced for local 
organised crime activities during 1997-98 were arrested and put behind bars.689 Bringing 
the country to order took a huge toll on the Albanian state police.690 Some 220 officers 
were killed and nearly as many wounded (Hoxha 2008:194). The political elite learned that 
leaving too much power to organised crime can be very dangerous and thus the 
arrangement between them and ‘off the bar’ organised crime became more 
sophisticated.691 
AOC gangs working overseas started to invest their illicit proceeds back home and instead 
of exploiting their country they gave a financial boost to the fragile Albanian economy.692 
The nature of organised crime changed and the patterns of criminality became more 
complex.693 Those groups which resisted after the events of 1997 entered into politics and 
grew strong.694 They have connections with local authorities, the executive, legislature and 
judiciary. As noted earlier, they are perceived by the public as Italian Mafia-like 
structures.695 
Classic patterns of organised crime such as violence and revenge were fading away.696 The 
relationship between organised crime with the political elite and its interconnections with 
the judiciary changed. With the consolidation of state structures, many politicians abused 
and manipulated LPOC for their own interests.697 One interviewed journalist recalled a 
criminal saying that ‘the first time when they [the political elite] should have punished me 
they released me, and the second time, when they should have released me they punished 
me. … for as long as there are only state police killed and not judges, there will be no justice 
in Albania’.698 
While LPOC was minimised, HPOC remained embedded in the system. Also, another 
phenomenon became evident. While many LPOC groups went behind bars due to the 
                                                          
688 Interview with urban judge no.4, 2010. 
689 Interview with rural prosecutor no.4, 2010. 
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692 Interview with investigative journalist no.1, 2010. 
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strong policies against organised crime, many also went overseas.699 LPOC was more active 
outside Albania, in the USA, Greece, Italy, Spain, and the UK,700 whereas within the country 
HPOC kept expanding and investing in lucrative legal investments and politics.701 That said, 
new LPOC did emerge (Hoxha 2008:194-196), and other unfamiliar forms of criminal 
activity began to appear such as bank robbery, credit card fraud, and cybercrime.702 
The HPOC groups have invested in media, education and football clubs.703 They are also 
involved in exploiting natural resources such as water, forests and minerals.704 Some have 
even invested in private police (i.e. security firms) as this gives them the opportunity to not 
only protect themselves but also monitor important private and public institutions, 
excluding courts. Almost all government institutions (including ministries) and private 
businesses which collect sensitive data such as banks and telecommunication companies 
have hired private police. These security firms give the HPOC groups access to modern 
weapons and sophisticated surveillance equipment which can easily be used for 
blackmailing (Turbiville 2006:569). 
My data suggest705 that yet another phenomenon is becoming problematic. In an open 
conflict of interest, some chiefs of state police stations have employed their own private 
security firms to guard ministries. In addition, they have close ties with the political elite. 
For instance, former high-ranking state police are attached to the political party which 
governed the country during their term and they too have their own private police 
companies. So the main political parties have made sophisticated links with HPOC through 
the use of private police firms. My interviewees706 indicated that some of these former 
police chiefs who own private security firms and are attached to political parties were 
heavily involved in the 2011 local elections and demonstrated Mafia-like patterns in 
protecting the ballots using their own people, many of whom had a criminal record (Zhilla 
2011). 
It is difficult for the public to view HPOC groups as organised crime entities as they run 
successful businesses and enjoy respectable social status.707 They maintain connections 
                                                          
699 Interview with urban prosecutor no.6, 2010. 
700 See EUROPOL (2011) ‘EU Organised Crime Threat Assessment (OCTA) 2011’, April 28; available at 
https://www.europol.europa.eu/sites/default/files/publications/octa_2011.pdf [accessed December 
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706 Interview with investigative journalist no.3, 2011. 
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with both the criminal world and politics.708 Some of them have become so independent 
and powerful that they engage in politics to be protected from both prosecution and 
political extortion. Local LPOC gangs and those overseas are more spontaneous and more 
exposed to local and international law enforcement agencies.709 Their connection to 
politics is seasonal and evident only during political or local elections.710 My interviews 
suggest that the agreement between LPOC and politics is grounded in short-term interest. 
Politicians do not want to risk their reputation through association with violent criminal 
activity.711 As a result, we saw a reduction in the violence of LPOC between 2008-10. 
As mentioned above, after 2005 there were some successful prosecutions of various 
organised crime groups. During this period the Albanian government made steady progress 
in the fight against organised crime, and this was one of the most highlighted positive 
aspects in the 2011 European Commission Report for this country.712 
However, my interviews with prosecutors demonstrate that since 2009, while there has 
been some success in combating LPOC little progress has been made in the fight against 
HPOC. Official reports show unrealistic figures. Referring to Albanian government 
statements, Arsovska and Basha (2011:41) note that ‘12 of the largest criminal clans in the 
country were investigated in 2005 and more than 150 members of the so-called “mafia 
families” were arrested. Between 2005 and 2006, around 150 criminal groups were 
dismantled in Albania and around 1,000 members of those criminal groups were arrested. 
Also 191 wanted criminals were extradited in that period.’ In addition, the Head of State 
Police, in the annual analysis of state police for 2009, showed that the number of organised 
criminals captured by police in that year was 142, with 64 for serious offences against 
persons and property, 31 for drug trafficking, 23 for illegal trafficking, and 24 for economic 
crimes.713 
                                                          
708 Interview with rural prosecutor no.4, 2010. 
709 Interview with urban prosecutor no.3, 2010. 
710 Interview with urban prosecutor no.2, 2010. 
711 ‘it is difficult to say if there is a permanent connection between small organised crime groups and 
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My findings suggest that the above figures are overstated. According to my data,714 for the 
period November 2006 to November 2011 there were only 24 organised groups715 
prosecuted by the Prosecution Office for Serious Crime. Charges have been dropped for at 
least 50% of them either in the First or Appeal Court of Serious Crimes or in the High Court. 
The trend of those organised crime groups for whom charges were dropped is declining: in 
2006 there were six groups, in 2007 only eight, in 2008 only five, in 2009 only one, in 2010 
only three, and as of November 2011 only one. This low rate was one of the main criticisms 
made by the General Prosecutor Ina Rama to the Prosecution Office for Serious Crime as 
recently as February 15, 2012.716 
As my data above show, there has been little progress in dealing with HPOC. Some 
interviewees suggested that there are two main reasons for this: first, the lack of 
professionalism among judges, prosecutors and state police; and second, the political elite 
wishes to divert public attention from HPOC. As an international observer put it, ‘what we 
see much more frequently is that there is a tendency to go after low level criminals in order 
to avoid really digging and finding out where the real problems are… there is a real 
tendency to avoid digging too deep’.717 
During 2011-12, there has been a trend for LPOC gangs to return to 1997 patterns of crime 
where LPOC became exposed in the public and attacked high-profile public officials.718 
Among the most serious were the assassination of Judge Konomi and the alleged murder of 
a secret service agent who was found in his burned-out car in summer 2011. As recently as 
December 9, 2011, a 400-gram bomb exploded in the house of the vice chairman of state 
police in charge of investigating serious crimes, Dorian Muca. It is believed that the attack 
was intended to kill Muca and his family because of his role in the fight against crime.719 
My interviews suggest that those judges, prosecutors and state police who were more 
exposed to crime during 1995-97 are more likely to have close ties with organised crime 
and become corrupt. Many of them were promoted in ‘courts of career’ or appeal 
courts.720 In Chapter 4 I grouped them in the category ‘judges of transition’. My data 
suggest that today, it is this category of judges to which both LPOC and HPOC find very easy 
to access and exploit. In late 2005, President Moisiu turned down one of the candidates, 
                                                          
714 Interview with urban prosecutor no.5, 2011. 
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Artan Gjermeni, proposed by the High Council of Justice (HCJ) to become a judge of the 
Serious Crime Court. According to Moisiu and the then Minister of Justice, Ilir Rusmaili, 
there were allegations that Gjermeni had close links with one of the most notorious 
organised crime groups in 1997, ‘Banda e Lushnjes’.721 
In 2006, the same judge was elected by the National Judicial Conference as a member of 
the HCJ. Ironically, while members of the executive, the democrats initially asked for a 
thorough investigation of this judge and then they suddenly changed their position and 
became silent (Moisiu 2009:257). On November 14, 2011, Gjermeni was promoted by the 
HCJ in the Appeal Court of Tirana.722 
 
 
Patterns of the Interplay Today 
 
In the preceding sections I described the connection between organised crime and judicial 
corruption with emphasis on the role of the political elite for the period 1989-2011. In this 
section I turn to my data and assess this relationship more closely and describe the 
patterns in more detail. In addition, regarding socio-political factors, my data suggest that 
the role of state police is also crucial in the interplay between judicial corruption and 
organised crime. 
As mentioned in this chapter’s introduction, one of the factors for the failure of law 
enforcement agencies to fight organised crime is the lack of professionalism and corruption 
of the state police.723 My interviews also suggest that the lack of cooperation between the 
judiciary, prosecution and state police is another significant cause. While there have been 
significant improvements in urban areas, the coordination between state police and 
prosecutors in rural areas remains problematic. Many investigations have failed due to 
leaks of information by state police to local organised crime groups in rural areas. 
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As one prosecutor put it, ‘at the local level, the state police is inefficient, non-existent and 
entirely infiltrated by crime’.724 The politicisation of state police is also of concern. The level 
of corruption in terms of fighting organised crime is more widespread in the state police. 
And, according to one of my interviewed international observers, this is because 
‘policemen are very close to lawyers, parties, suspects and witnesses’.725 At the local level 
many state policemen are appointed because of their links with the political elite.726 
The problem is that organised crime is not only focused in the capital city but is spread all 
over the country and is extensively engaged in trans-border criminal activities. Another 
problem revealed by my interviewees concerns the structure of the police investigating 
organised crime. The current model is ‘based on the Italian structure of policing – 
decentralised, not specialised in organised crime, and spread in different sectors such as 
judicial, state and customs. This form has proved to be highly ineffective in investigating 
and fighting organised crime.’727 
My interviews also suggest that the interplay between organised crime and judicial 
corruption is very complex. Whereas LPOC generally involves common patterns of 
corruption such as bribery or threats, HPOC, in addition, involves more sophisticated forms 
of luring judges such as lobbing for promotion, offering shares in business investments and 
easy access to high profile politicians.728 
The majority of my interviewees noted that the most blatant display of the relationship 
between organised crime and politicians is at elections, and this is becoming evident even 
in the judiciary. According to one interviewed international observer, ‘organised crime is 
probably centred around political parties and mostly the major political parties have their 
connections or are actually, I would say, so involved in organised crime that they are the 
major part of them. … elections in Albania have never been clean and of course criminal 
interests have been involved there’.729 
My findings are confirmed by the diplomatic community in Albania. In his confidential 
report on the 2009 general elections, revealed by WikiLeaks, the US ambassador in Tirana, 
John L. Withers II, noted that: 
‘Despite the relative calm on Election Day, it has very much come to our attention 
that there is a strong undercurrent of people tied to organized crime that 
participated and/or were involved in possibly manipulating the June 28 elections. 
The three major parties, the Democratic Party (DP), the Socialist Party (SP) and the 
Movement for Social Integration (LSI) all have MPs with links to organized crime. 
While Post cannot legally prove these links, the conventional wisdom, backed by 
                                                          
724 Interview with urban prosecutor no.4, 2010. 
725 Interview with international observer no.3, 2010. 
726 Interview with rural prosecutor no.4, 2010. 
727 Interview with rural prosecutor no.3, 2010. 
728 Interview with investigative journalist no.2, 2010. 
729 Interview with international observer no.3, 2010. 
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other reporting, is that the new parliament has quite a few drug traffickers and 
money launderers.’730 
Even in the 2011 local elections there were allegations that the opposition engaged some 
organised crime groups to protect votes in the ballot centres.731 As mentioned above, the 
elections not only link politicians with organised crime. The judiciary also plays a significant 
role. The Election College is an institution composed of eight appellate court judges 
formally approved by political parties and which acts as the final court regarding disputes 
over electoral administration.732 In this context, the political elite’s interest in controlling 
the judiciary is not only confined to the pure judicial role of the judiciary where judges can 
review laws brought by the legislature or adjudicate politicians for corruption. 
The judiciary can even ‘issue’ mandates in political and local elections. So there is a double 
interplay between the legislature, executive and judiciary and this makes the judiciary very 
exposed to the political elite and organised crime during elections.733 In this context a 
corrupt judiciary can on one hand ‘provide’ mandates for politicians on contested elections 
and on the other acquit those criminals that help politicians to win. 
In the 2001 general elections, the Constitutional Court allegedly favoured the SP with 40 
mandates out of 140 members of parliament in total (Baze 2008:247). In the 2011 local 
elections, the Election College issued a very controversial decision in favour of the 
executive’s representative for the Council of Tirana, Lulzim Basha. In 2011, the mandate of 
one of the member judges of the Election College was extended by the HCJ for two more 
years, although she had to retire, and this kind of ‘promotion’, according to the leader of 
the opposition, Edi Rama, was payback for her service to the executive during the 2011 
local elections.734 
In addition, in April 2011, Emilian Shullazi, formerly imprisoned for leading an international 
heroin-smuggling network passing through Albania to Europe, was accused by the SP of 
obstructing their local election campaign. But Shullazi was released by the court only 24 
hours later.735 On local election day, May 8, Shullazi was arrested near one of the election 
zones, Fark Commune, Tirana, with eleven other individuals travelling in a bulletproof car 
and wearing a bulletproof jacket. During the arrest, police agents found three guns, three 
                                                          
730 See US Embassy Albania, Confidential Report, reference 09TIRANA552, subject ‘Criminals Making 
the Laws in Albania’s Parliament’, dated Thursday August 13, 2009; available at 
http://wikileaks.org/cable/2009/08/09TIRANA552.html [accessed December 6, 2011]. 
731 Interview with investigative journalist no.2, 2010. 
732 See Office for Democratic Institutions and Human Rights, Election Observation Mission Report for 
the Local Elections May 8, 2011, p.21; available at http://www.osce.org/odihr/81649 [accessed 
December 6, 2011]. 
733 Interview with urban judge no.5, 2010. 
734 Balkanweb (2011) ‘Rama: Sashenka Jonuzi rewarded for two years of ripping off’ (Rama: 
Sashenka Jonuzi u shperblye me dy vjet rrjepje lekure), November 7; available at 
http://www.balkanweb.com/kryesore/1/rama-sashenka-jonuzi-u-shperblye-edhe-me-2-vjet-per-
rrjepje-lekure-73581.html [accessed November 16, 2011]. 
735 Shqip Gazette (2011) ‘Prevented the campaign of Socialist Party (SP), Shullazi is freed’ (Pengoi 
takimin e PS, lirohet Shullazi), April 26. 
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police radios, three knives and a considerable amount of cannabis sativa.736 The arrest was 
made just a few minutes before the closure of voting in Fark Commune. The Court of 
Appeal released Shullazi again, accepting his excuses that the ‘guns and bulletproof jacket 
were not his’.737 
The majority of interviewees pointed out that organised crime is now sophisticated in both 
the patterns of crime it engages in and its interplay with judicial corruption. As one 
advocate told me, ‘The Mafia does not make money through killings anymore, but they get 
rich by influencing law-making. … through laws they open legal ways to make criminal 
money. … those gangs that are charged these days in the courts are low level organised 
crime. … they cannot be called Mafiosi, they do not have the brains to be Mafiosi.’738 As 
recently as April 25, 2012 the chief police of the District of Diber, Shemsi Prenci declared in 
a press conference that he ‘was suspended by General Director of Police, Hysni Burgaj 
because [Prenci] was fighting the Mafia of the Chrome Mines which is linked with the 
powerful media groups, the intention of whom is to exploit the national wealth’.739 In 
addition, Prime Minister Berisha himself issued a very strong public statement that sparked 
controversy. In 2010, he declared that ‘crime has in its foundation 90% of politicians at all 
levels and who have served it for 15 years’.740 
A few interviewees highlighted that organised crime groups influence both the left and 
right wings on issues that interest them more such as property rights and shareholder 
rights.741 According to one interviewed urban advocate, the main laws that may have been 
influenced by organised crime are land law, tax law, company law, public procurement, and 
law on waste management.742 The interest in company law is closely related to the 
privatisation of public property inherited from the communist system in the early 1990s 
(Mema 1997). In the first phase of privatisation, former workers had the right to own 
shares in public companies thus becoming owners of these companies (Hashi and Xhillari 
                                                          
736 Tema Gazette (2011) ‘Emiliano Shullazi arrested with 11 others’ (Arrestohet Emiliano Shullazi me 
11 te tjere’, May 8. 
737 Panorama Gazette (2011) ‘Emiljano Shullazi in cuffs, captured with mask and a gun’ (Emiljano 
Shullazi ne pranga, kapet me maske dhe pistolete), November 9. 
738 Personal interview with urban advocate no.4, 2010. 
739 Shqiptarja.com Gazette (2012) ‘The chief of police Premci withdraws: Roots of the Mafia of 
Chrome are in Tirana’ (Jep doreheqjen, Prenci: Mafia e kromit i ka rrenjet ne Tirane’, April 25. 
740 Gillaj, B. (2010) ‘The crime: 90% of high profile politicians have links with crime’ (Krimi, 90 per 
qind e pushtetareve, ne bazat e krimit), Shqip Gazette, January 26. 
741 ‘...in my opinion, organised crime controls political wings, those who governed the country 
yesterday and those who are governing it today.  By “controlling” I do not mean that organised 
crime commands them, but that it influences them in areas that organised crime is concerned with 
such as property rights and shareholders’ rights. We are at a point where organised crime is part of 
the politics and influences both sides (socialists and democrats) to achieve its goals...’ Interview with 
urban advocate no.2, 2010. 
742 Interview with urban advocate no.2, 2010. 
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1999:104). Later the process became corrupt and relevant laws were tailored to give access 
to those with strong links with the political elite.743 
According to some interviewees, company law was amended to open loopholes for HPOC 
to avoid former employees and take these enterprises over.744 And the courts have been 
playing a significant role in this corrupt mechanism. The same pattern of ‘stealing’ the 
shares of legal owners is also applied to foreign shareholders owning shares in local and 
foreign companies investing in Albania.745 According to an international observer, ‘the 
court is used to cheat foreign companies out of their investments. … they do not allow, 
legally or illegally, foreign companies to exercise their shareholder rights. … there have 
been cases where they simply ignore foreign companies. It might have majority shares and 
they simply do what they want anyway. … the Albanian minority does what it wants to and 
the courts don’t enforce the rules.’746 
Even the 2008-09 changes to tax law, according to one of the urban advocates, were made 
to favour powerful businesses or help HPOC to launder the illicit money.747 These changes 
were in a form of fiscal amnesty and this mechanism was similarly applied even in 2011, 
just before the local elections.748 The law on public procurement had for many years been 
one of the main ways to exploit public goods. A few interviewees highlighted that even 
with the enactment of electronic procurement, the process is not working. More than 80% 
of tenders going through this system are dismissed for discrepancies in documentation.749 
As recently as February 2012, the Advocate of Procurement in its report to the 
Parliamentary Commission of the Economy declared that in 2011 around 491 companies 
claimed that procedures for online tenders were violated.750 The involvement of organised 
crime in public tenders is hidden from public and is very sophisticated. As one prosecutor 
put it: 
‘while organised crime groups do not control those firms that apply for a project, 
they do try to manage the tender’s commission which administrates the process 
                                                          
743 Nurellari, A. (2001) ‘The Corrupted Process of Privatization in Albania’, paper presented at the 
10th Anti-Corruption Conference, Prague, Czech Republic, October 7-11; available at 
http://www.10iacc.org/content.phtml?documents=300&art=48 [accessed February 21, 2012]. 
744 Interview with urban advocate no.2, 2010. 
745 ‘...one of the mechanisms is that they don’t allow foreign companies to exercise their shareholder 
rights legally or illegally. There have been cases where they have simply ignored the foreign 
companies. It might have majority shares but they simply do what they want anyway and the court  
… the Albanian minority does what it wants to do anyway and the courts don’t enforce the rules. I 
have also seen one case where the majority shareholder rights were taken away in a very 
questionable manner...’(Interview with international observer no.3, 2010). 
746 Interview with international observer no.3, 2010. 
747 Interview with urban advocate no.2, 2010. 
748 Cocoli, F. (2011) ‘Fiscal amnesty’ (Amnistia Fiskale), Panorama Gazette, March 20. 
749 Personal interview with urban advocate no.2, 2010. 
750 Hoxha, B. (2012) ‘The Advocate of Procurement shows the patterns of abuse with tenders’ 
(Avokati i Prokurimeve zbardh zinxhirin e abuzimeve me tenderat), Mapo Gazette, February 28. 
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and declares the winners. So they blackmail the tender’s commission and ask them 
to favour the business firm that has informally agreed with the organised crime 
group. In exchange, organised crime gets 20% or 30% of the project. Such groups 
do not participate directly in the tender as this exposes them to investigation.’751 
The influence of organised crime in law-making was also noted by diplomatic bodies. In the 
leaked 2009 US embassy cable, shown above, the US Ambassador titles his report ‘The 
Criminals Making the Laws in Albania’s Parliament’. 
He mentions several ‘noteworthy members of parliament with ties to organised crime’, 
such as Tom Doshi752 who is ‘known as the richest member of parliament (MP), with a 
declared fortune of more than $15 million and is also suspected of trafficking narcotics’; 
Lefter Koka753 who is ‘a member of perhaps the most notorious organized crime family in 
Albania, with ties to narcotics and human trafficking and other illicit activities’; Sokol 
Olldashi754 who is ‘suspected of smuggling goods and narcotics’; Lulzim Basha,755 who 
‘represent[ed] the DP [Democratic Party] in Elbasan, was involved in facilitating the release 
from prison of a notorious criminal in Elbasan in return for support from the criminal’s 
family. Relatives of the criminal promised to “organize” people in Elbasan to support Basha. 
The criminal was released on June 29, the day after the elections’; Paulin Sterkaj,756 who 
has ‘been accused by a former friend of murdering a politician in Shkoder a few years ago. 
Sterkaj claims to have business interests in oil, restaurants, and construction’; and Gramoz 
Ruci757 who has ‘long-standing ties to narcotics traffickers and organized crime’.758 
Another former member of parliament, Gazmend Mahmutaj, was arrested in 1998 by 
Italian police while he was travelling together with other members of parliament. 
Mahmutaj was the head of an AOC smuggling drugs in Milan.759 In as late as May 2012, the 
                                                          
751 Personal interview with urban prosecutor no.2, 2010. 
752 Former Member of Parliament for the Democrats and now for the Socialists. 
753 Lefter Koka is a Member of Parliament representing the Movement for Social Integration (LSI) 
which is currently in coalition government with the Democrats (as of February 2012). 
754 Sokol Olldashi is the current Minister of Public Works, Transport, and Telecommunication and a 
Member of Parliament representing the DP (as of February 2012). 
755 Lulzim Basha was a minister in key ministries during the Democrats’ rule (2005-10) and as of 2012 
is the Mayor of Tirana. 
756 Paulin Sterkaj has moved several times from one parliamentary group to another. In the 2009 
elections he was the Democratic Party candidate but after a few years he switched to the Socialist 
Party’s parliamentary group. 
757 Gramoz Ruci worked for the communist government in the past and is one of the most influential 
remnants of the communist party in the Socialist Party today. 
758 See US Embassy Albania, Confidential Report, reference 09TIRANA552, subject ‘Criminals Making 
the Laws in the Albanian’s Parliament, dated August, 13, 2009; available at 
http://wikileaks.org/cable/2009/08/09TIRANA552.html [accessed December 6, 2011]. 
759 Hasani, H. (2012) ‘The file of Kajolli: transcribed the telephone calls of drug trafficking of Gaz 
Mahmutajn, the close friend of politicians’ (Dosja e Kajollit: Zbardhen telefonatat e droges per Gaz 
Mahmutajn, mikun e politikaneve’, Mapo Gazette, May 24.  
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Italian authorities issued an arrest warrant for one of the councillors of the District of Fier, 
Fatmir Kajolli, a known businessman, a high profile member of the Republican Party (in the 
recent government coalition), who is accused of running a criminal organisation in Italy 
during 1998-2001 and charged by the Italian courts in 2000-01.760 
It is difficult to realise how the above politicians, alleged to have close ties with organised 
crime, have consolidated their support in their political parties. This raises serious doubts 
as to the true function of political parties in Albania. Even after this US embassy cable was 
revealed in the media, in late August 2011, some of the these politicians mentioned in the 
cables were among the most voted individuals in their parties’ elections for the new 
parties’ executive committees in autumn 2011. Only a week before the Albanian press 
published the cables in late August 2011, Basha and Olldashi had the largest majorities of 
the Executive Committee of the DP, where Basha was first with 116 votes followed by 
Olldashi with 104.761 
In December 2011, Ruci held one of the strongest majorities in the General Assembly of the 
SP and he was the only name proposed by the socialists’ leader, Edi Rama, to hold the post 
of Head of the General Assembly of the party.762 This may be a typical indicator of how 
individuals with strong ties to organised crime access political parties and influence directly 
the law-making and indirectly the justice system in Albania. 
Some interviewees told me that organised crime groups have helped judges to be 
appointed or promoted in key courts. They also influence the decision that cases pertaining 
to organised crime be given to certain corrupt judges.763 One interviewed urban advocate 
pointed out that ‘I know cases in the court of Tirana that have been allocated to particular 
judges for criminal reasons, not in the family section, nor in the administrative section, but 
in the civil section.’764 Some of my interviewees noted that HPOC is frequently involved in 
                                                          
760 Mapo Gazette (2012) ‘The Italian file of the businessman Kajolli is opened; The court leaves him 
under house arrest’ (Zbardhet dosja italiane per biznesmenin Kajolli, gjykata e le ne arrest shtepie), 
May 24. 
761 Tema Gazette (2011) ‘Basha and Olldashi, new leaders of DP?’ (Basha dhe Olldashi, drejtuesit e 
rinj te PDs?), August 23. 
762 Panorama Gazette (2011) ‘The Assembly, the Presidency of Socialist Party elected’ (Asambleja, 
zgjidhet Kryesia e Partise Socialiste), December 2. 
763 Interview with investigative journalist no.2, 2010. 
764 ‘In most cases the judiciary is influenced by bribes. Given the economic power and the muscle of 
the “Strong” men, organised crime, together with politicians, or even on their own, have been able 
to influence the judiciary for their own interests. There are cases where certain judges were 
appointed to the top of the judicial hierarchy, even at the High Court ... There are rumours that 
organised crime even influenced the appointments that occurred in the High Court in 2010. There 
are certain individuals, and I am not mentioning any names, who are traditionally known to have 
strong links with earlier organised crime groups “Skafistet” since 1997, and who were appointed as 
judges in high profile courts. They still work in these courts today and have a huge influence in the 
decision-making of these courts.  I'm sure that organised crime has influenced the appointment of 
judges in almost all levels of courts. I know cases in the court of Tirana...there have been cases 
allocated to particular judges for criminal reasons, not in the family section, or in the administrative 
section, but in the civil section...’ Interview with urban advocate no.2, 2010. 
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civil cases. In criminal cases, generally ‘organised crime tends to take care of matters 
before the cases get to court’.765 
My data indicate that organised crime is ‘currently investing in law students to later 
infiltrate them in the legal system as future prosecutors or judges’.766 There are rumours 
that the School of Magistrates is under constant pressure by high profile politicians, 
businessmen and organised crime. One local observer noted that ‘there are individuals out 
there that are ready to pay even 200,000 euros to get their people accepted in the SOM’.767 
Several interviewees pointed out that, in general, Serious Crime Courts have become more 
efficient in dealing with LPOC but that the problem persists with consolidated HPOC.768 The 
latter groups are entrenched in business and difficult to investigate. Many of the 
interviewees indicated that this form of organised crime is ‘very powerful, with strong 
connections in both political camps and at all levels of court’.769 
It is important to remember that international reports still portray AOC as very violent.770 
And while this may have been true before 2005,771 my data suggest that from 2005 to 2010 
the violence decreased but that in 2011 the trend has changed again. Both interviewed 
advocates and prosecutors noted that organised crime has ‘minimised its aggressive 
patterns of influence on judges such as verbal and physical threats’.772 Widespread 
corruption in the judiciary has facilitated the direct access of organised crime to judges and 
political support is not as important as it was before 2005. As one prosecutor put it, ‘things 
have changed, we are not in the period of 1997-98 where criminals could enter judges’ 
offices and place a gun and a sum of money on the table and ask judges to make their 
choice’.773 
                                                          
765 Interview with international observer no.3, 2010. 
766 Interview with investigative journalist no.2, 2010. 
767 Interview with local observer no.4, 2011. 
768 Interview with investigative journalist no.2; international observer no.2; urban prosecutor no.4, 
2010. 
769 Interview with investigative journalist no.3, 2011. 
770 See EUROPOL (2011) ‘EU Organised Crime Threat Assessment (OCTA) 2011’, April 28, p.29; 
available at https://www.europol.europa.eu/sites/default/files/publications/octa_2011.pdf 
[accessed December 6, 2011]. 
771 In 2005 EUROPOL noted that Albanian-speaking organised crime groups are ‘renowned for being 
violent…against law enforcement agencies and judicial officials’. See Council of Europe (2005) ‘2005 
EU Organized Crime Report’, EUROPOL, The Hague, October 25, p.27; available at 
https://www.europol.europa.eu/sites/default/files/publications/eu_organisedcrimereport2005.pdf 
[accessed December 6, 2011]. 
772 Interview with urban judge no.2, 2010. 
773 Interview with urban prosecutor no.2, 2010. 
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The majority of interviewees highlighted that while organised crime groups attempt to 
corrupt all levels of court, they tend to target the Appeal and the High Court.774 According 
to advocates, organised crime tends to intervene in these levels of court because especially 
the High Court has the final say. In a 2011 case, involving an international drugs dealer 
known also as a businessman, Armand Andoni alias Arjan Selimi, the High Court returned 
both decisions of the First and the Appeal court of Serious Crime which sentenced Selimi to 
16 years’ imprisonment on the grounds of irregular admission of evidence.775 Selimi was 
subsequently killed near his home while under house arrest on the night before his second 
round of appearance in the First Court of Serious Crime on September 27, 2011.776 
Another question I wanted to explore was whether organised crime groups helped judges 
to launder their proceeds of crime. The literature suggests that money laundering is one of 
the criminal activities that link corrupt officials with organised crime in Albania but there is 
no data on whether this is the case with judges (Fink and Baumeister et al. 2004). In stark 
contrast with my previous assumptions, money laundering does not appear to be a criminal 
activity that links corrupt judges with organised crime. My data show that judges use a 
similar mechanism with corrupt politicians or criminal groups to launder their proceeds of 
crime, but they do not use organised crime.777 
The interviewed investigative journalists suggested that corrupt politicians do not use LPOC 
to launder their proceeds of crime but HPOC.778 As mentioned, they usually hide illicit 
proceeds behind legitimate businesses or put them on behalf of trusted individuals. There 
is an ‘increasing trend for corrupt politicians to invest their money in offshore accounts in 
countries such as Cyprus, Gibraltar and the Isle of Man’.779 
Corrupt judges too are applying more sophisticated techniques of money laundering. 
Increasingly, they are not using the financial system to deposit their licit and illicit 
income.780 Some urban prosecutors highlighted that, as with corrupt politicians, ‘corrupt 
                                                          
774‘One of our colleagues in one of the NCJ meetings 6-7 years ago said that politicians and criminals 
did not need us judges of the first instance courts, because their cases are appealed and go to the 
High Court. ‘ Interview with urban judge no.1, 2010. 
775 Samarxhiu, Th. (2011) ‘The High Court: Mistakes that released Arjan Selimi’ (Gjykata e Larte: 
Gabimet qe leruan Arjan Selimi), Shqiptare Gazette, September 30. 
776 Sokolaj, T. and Bajrami A. (2011) ‘Today the Court Case, Arjan Selimi executed with five bullets’ 
(Sot eshte gjyqi, ekzekutohet me pese plumba Arjan Selimi), Panorama Gazette, September 27. 
777 Interview with urban prosecutor no.6, 2010. 
778 ‘...certainly, in the context of the intensification and dynamic of sophisticated organised crime 
groups, I would not rule out the fact that numerous politicians would alter, or transfer their illicit 
incomes.  Of course they do not do it on their own; they launder dirty money through businesses, 
through sophisticated organised crime groups who at first glance may seem legitimate, but who are 
basically criminal organisations, because their activity is not based on having great success in the 
market but rather on their questionable networks, criminal patterns, and their questionable source 
of money. This is something that I can confirm from my work experiences investigating crime and 
corruption...’ Interview with urban prosecutor no.2, 2010. 
779 Interview with urban prosecutor no.2, 2010. 
780 Interview with urban prosecutor no.2, 2010. 
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judges integrate their illicit profits in businesses managed by their close relatives or friends, 
where in reality, they are businesses owned by judges’.781 Several judges ‘own private 
businesses such as insurance or travel companies’.782 
A new pattern of disguising proceeds of crime is becoming problematic. Corrupt judges and 
public officials hide the true origin of their income in the form of long term interest-free 
loans or gifts given by their family members or third parties.783 One of the problems is the 
lack of law in filling this loophole and it seems that the political elite is reluctant to move 
amid warnings from experts.784 
Interviewed prosecutors and investigative journalists pointed out that the most preferable 
business for organised crime to hide the proceeds of crime is in the construction industry. 
In 2010 there were around 4,000 apartments for sale in Tirana and the prices were either 
steady or rising while the purchasing power was decreasing. My data suggest that this is 
because the main source of money is not coming from the sale of apartments but from 
money laundering.785 According to one investigative journalist, ‘in a pilot investigation 
made by [my] newspaper at a recent construction site on the outskirts of Tirana, [we] 
found that around 80% of investments were by criminal groups’.786 
Having explored the dynamic between organised crime and judicial corruption at the macro 
level, I will now demonstrate how this works at the micro level and highlight the role and 






                                                          
781 This was confirmed even at a recent declaration of the Head of the High Inspectorate of 
Declaration and Audit of Assets (HIDAA); Mapo Gazette (2011) ‘Head of the HIDAA: Corrupted 
officials hide their properties behind the names of their relatives’ (Kreu i ILDKP, zyrtaret e korruptuar 
fshehin pasurine ne emer te te afermeve), December 12. 
782 Interview with urban prosecutor no.2, 2010. 
783 Mejdini, F. (2012) ‘Public officials and judges, lofty free interest loans’ (Zyrtaret dhe gjyqtaret, 
borxhe te majme pa interes), Shqip Gazette, February 13. 
784 See the opinion of Adriatik Llalla, Head of the High Inspectorate of Declaration and Audit of 
Assets, January 16, 2012; available at http://www.hidaa.gov.al/16-janar-2012/ [accessed February 
21, 2012]. 
785 Interview with investigative journalist no.2, 2010. 
786 Interview with investigative journalists no.2 and no.3, 2010. 
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The Mechanism of Judicial Corruption in Criminal 
Cases 
 
To understand the outcome of the influence of organised crime in a court decision I asked 
interviewees about the mechanism. There are four actors who play a significant role in a 
criminal court case. First, either state police or the judicial police who are in charge of 
collecting evidence at the crime scene. Second, the prosecutor who manages the pre-trial 
phase (i.e. investigation, gathering of evidence, questioning of witnesses, proposal of 
security measures) and who plays an active role during the trial (i.e. defending of the case, 
asking for the charge). Third, the advocate who defends the offender and represents him in 
all phases of the trial (i.e. pre-trial, during the trial, and after). Fourth, the judge, whose role 
becomes very important during the trial; but he can also seek other evidence; asks for 
experts; and foremost gives the decision. 
My interviews suggest that organised crime tries to penetrate each stage of the trial and 
seeks opportunities to find the weakest link in the chain of procedures of a criminal case 
tried in the court or one of the above actors who is willing to accept a bribe.787 In an 
environment where judicial corruption is systemic it is not difficult to find the gap. 
A few interviewees admitted that bribery has proven a successful pattern compared to 
other more violent mechanisms,788 and therefore we see a tendency for organised crime 
groups to not ask the political elite for support but access judges directly in most cases. In 
this context widespread corruption in the judicial system has strengthened the nexus 
between organised crime and judicial corruption.789 
My data show that there are two ways in which organised crime accesses judges and 
prosecutors: first, via third parties (e.g. friends/relatives of the judge or the prosecutor), 
and second, via the advocate. My interviewed advocates explained that ‘the advocate 
organises the whole strategy of how to corrupt the prosecutor and the judge, and how to 
neutralise the witnesses’.790 Often, they also link the relatives of the offender with the 
judge or prosecutor and negotiate the amount of the bribe.791 
In the following sections, I explain the role of each of the actors in a corrupt criminal court 
case. 
 
                                                          
787 Interview with rural prosecutor no.3, 2010. 
788 ‘Today we do not see criminals attempting to influence the judiciary via violence, blackmail or 
pressure; they use money.  Criminal justice entails many actors, stages and procedures…we have 
judicial police, prosecutors, and three tiers of the court system… so it is easy to exploit a flaw in the 
system…. ‘ Interview with urban prosecutor no.1, 2010. 
789 Interview with urban prosecutor no.4, 2010. 
790 Interview with urban advocate no.3, 2010. 
791 Interview with urban judge no.2, 2010. 
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Judicial or State Police 
 
Organised crime can try to obstruct the process right from the investigation phase, which is 
mostly related to the collection of evidence. Here the role of judicial or state police is 
crucial. In the Albanian judicial system both judicial and state police have the right to 
collect evidence at the crime scene. 
My interviews suggest that organised crime tries to manipulate the investigation process 
through corrupting the police and asking them to either hide or tamper with crucial 
evidence. Some interviewees said ‘there is a market price for hiding or destroying 
evidence’.792 
In addition, as mentioned above, corrupt police often inform or leak the information to 
organised crime. However, my interviewees implied that in serious crime cases state police 
and especially judicial police ‘act more professionally because of a more rigorous role of 





My interviewees noted that there are two types of corrupt advocate: those with 
experience; and those who have strong contacts with corrupt prosecutors and judges, 
commonly known as ‘Sekser’. While experienced advocates try to avoid bribes where 
necessary, the ‘Sekser’ do not. 
The latter know the character of most of the judges and prosecutors and also have precise 
information on which accept bribes and which do not.794 It is no accident that the ‘Sekser’ 
are often the most ‘successful’ advocates. There are occasions where close family members 
of the offender are guided by the prosecutor of the case on which advocates to pick, and 
the suggested advocates are often those who have proved to be loyal to corrupt judges and 
prosecutors.795 
                                                          
792 ‘ ...there is a market price for hiding or destroying evidence....prices of tampering with evidence 
are widespread among the public. I have heard that to hide a bullet may go from two thousand up to 
ninety thousand Euros.  And this is not only happening in criminal justice, it is in every sector of life. 
We know how much a doctor charges for surgery in a public hospital, although surgery legally is free.  
Likewise prices to circumvent prosecution in a criminal case and to win the case in the court are 
known. In the community of organised crime groups or gangs especially, the information is more 
precise.  This is the situation unfortunately.’ Interview with academic no.3, 2010. 
793 Interview with prosecutor no.3, 2010. 
794 Interview with urban advocate no.3, 2010. 
795 Interview with investigative journalist no.3, 2010. 
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The majority of my interviewees suggested that there are four characteristic mechanisms 
used by advocates to undermine a criminal case. 
First, advocates tend to delay the decision by not being present during the trial. The 
subsequent postponement of the case at every stage of the trial is becoming highly 
problematic. A few interviewees noted that when advocates do this too often in a case, this 
is an indicator that they are trying to bribe or persuade the witness or are negotiating with 
either the judge or prosecutor for the bribe.796 
Second, another common mechanism is where advocates try to neutralise the witnesses, 
and in criminal cases often the witness withdraws or changes his story before the court 
from the original statement because of the pressure or money offered by the offender. 
According to the majority of my interviewed prosecutors, this has led to witnesses’ 
declarations being considered as unreliable proof. This is where advocates exploit most, 
because tampering with or destroying evidence is more difficult.797 
Friends or family of the offender become very active in the process of neutralising the 
witness either by blackmailing or paying them. Third, advocates also try to persuade or lure 
experts.798 In both civil and criminal cases in Albania, often the expert interview or 
expertise is very persuasive to judges.799 
My interviewees suggested that contacts with judges or prosecutors are direct, face to 
face, or via trusted third parties. Contact via mobile phone is avoided due to possible 
phone tapping. Meetings are organised in particular coffee shops or restaurants either in 
the town or the outskirts of the city. Judges usually prefer to send others to collect the 
money, or ask that the bribe be transferred to a special bank account. There are occasions 






The role of a corrupt prosecutor is more evident in the pre-trial process (i.e. investigation 
phase) where he has the power to either close the investigation or send it to the court.801 
From there on, the power shifts more to the judge and the advocate.802 
                                                          
796 Interview with urban prosecutor no.2, 2010. 
797 Interview with urban prosecutor no.3, 2010. 
798 Interview with urban advocate no.2, 2010. 
799 Interview with urban advocate no.2, 2010. 
800 Interview with investigative journalist no.1, 2010. 
801 Interview with urban prosecutor no.1, 2010. 
802 Interview with urban advocate no.5, 2010. 
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Patterns of behaviour displayed by a corrupt prosecutor include: (1) the collection of non-
relevant evidence; (2) avoidance of interviewing crucial witnesses, or the asking of very 
general and non-specific questions; (3) circumvention or hiding of the most important 
evidence for the process;803 (4) asking the court for lenient security measures (e.g. instead 
of imprisonment the prosecutor asks for a house arrest); (5) passivity during the trial to 
allow evidence to be easily attacked by the advocate; (6) a failure to react when realising 
that the witness is somehow giving a different story from that of the original statement 
during the investigation process;804 and finally, (7) the request of a lenient sentence for the 
offender, as in Albania it has become a custom for judges not to give a harsher sentence 
than that requested by the prosecutor.805 
In addition, in 2012 the Constitutional Court decided that in cases of the summary 
procedure ‘Gjykimi i Shkurtuar’,806 the court cannot change the legal qualification of the 
offence and ask for a different one based on the same facts if the offender has agreed to 
plead guilty for the offence asked by the prosecutor; and second, the court cannot give a 
different sentence from that required by the prosecutor. This decision contradicts two 
previous decisions of the Constitutional Court in 1999 and 2003 in which it argued that the 
court can ask for a different offence from that required by the prosecution if it believes so 
based on similar facts.807 It should not be confused however with the security measures 
whereby in which it is the law that stipulates that a judge can not apply harsher measures 





The role of a corrupt judge becomes significant during the trial. First, a corrupt judge will 
wilfully violate the procedure knowing that this will make the Appeal court return the 
case.809 Second, the judge will make several minor procedural mistakes knowing that these 
will be regarded in the Appeal or the High Court as mistakes resulting from the judge’s 
negligence. 
                                                          
803 Interview with urban prosecutor no.2, 2010. 
804 Interview with urban prosecutor no.1, 2010. 
805 Interview with urban advocate no.1; urban judge no.3, 2010. 
806 A summary procedure is new form of procedure applied in criminal cases to simplify the 
procedures of the courts. In these cases the offender agrees to an early guilty plea without having 
the hearing in the trial and this entails a reduction of up to one third of the sentence in case of 
conviction. See Ashworth and Zedner (2008). See also the decision of the European Court of Human 
Rights on the case of Scoppola v. Italy, September 17, 2009.  
807 See the Decision no.4, of the Constitutional Court dated February 10, 2012.  
808 See Penal Procedural Code art.244 point 3.  
809 Interview with urban prosecutor no.1, 2010. 
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This ‘negligent’ behaviour will encourage the judges of the Appeal or High Court (if the case 
is to be sent to appeal) to believe that the judge of first instance has undermined the 
procedures. In this context, it is highly likely that the Appeal or High Court will return the 
case to the first instance court for a thorough legal review or give an acquittal. In this 
regard, the most characteristic procedural problems are those related to late notifications, 
conflicts of interest (e.g. judges who decide for security reasons that the offender cannot 
take part in the trial), and the judge’s refusal of the defence’s request for the collection of 
certain evidence.810 
Third, the way a judge questions the offender is another sign of a corrupt judge. Thus, a 
corrupt judge will try to confuse the offender or the witnesses and make them provide 
contradictory statements.811 My interviews show that judges in criminal cases often 
become more active in the process than is required, and frequently take the role of 
prosecutor.812 Fourth, the judge shifts weight from crucial to less-relevant evidence. Fifth, a 
corrupt judge may on purpose refer to a different law, knowing that this will be a legal 
element for the Appeal or the High Court to turn the decision down.813 
To summarise, my interviews suggest that the interplay between organised crime and 
judicial corruption is complex. I have shown that there are two types of organised crime in 
Albania –LPOC and HPOC. The patterns of influence on the courts depend on the profile of 
organised crime groups. Both types of crime use political channels to access the judiciary. 
LPOC employs common methods of influence on judges such as bribery or threats and also 
connections with local politicians or corrupt police. 
In contrast, HPOC is far more complex and entrenched in business and politics. Such groups 
use more moderate forms of influence to control the judiciary such as promotion, business 
shares, or the influence of high profile politicians. In general they have direct access to high 
profile judges and strong ties with key players in the institutions dealing with the judiciary 
such as the HCJ. 
In addition, my data suggest that HPOC is also influencing particular laws such as Land Law, 
Tax Law, Company Law, Public Procurement Law and Waste-management Law. My data 
also show that courts of appeal and the High Court are more exposed to organised crime 
groups. Judges and prosecutors working in cities where criminal activity was endemic in 
1997 are more exposed to corruption and organised crime. 
In terms of cases, while property rights cases cannot be excluded, LPOC is more involved in 
criminal cases; and, HPOC’s influence is more on property rights, administrative, tax and 
company cases. Contrary to the literature, AOC does not base its relationship in Kanun but 
in family and friendship ties. It was also evidenced that blood feud plays a positive role in 
‘pulling’ organised crime from recruiting members from families under the blood feud 
regime. 
                                                          
810 Interview with urban advocate no.6, 2010. 
811 Interview with urban prosecutor no.2, 2010. 
812 Interview with urban advocate no.1, 2010. 
813 Interview with urban advocate no.6, 2010. 
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7  
EXPLAINING FACTORS OF JUDICIAL CORRUPTION 




This chapter explores explanations for judicial corruption in Albania. It argues that judicial 
corruption is one manifestation of the broader phenomenon of corruption there. It implies 
that roots of judicial corruption are grounded in the same socio-political terrain as other 
types of corruption. In this study, lack of democratic legitimation of judicial reforms and 
lack of trust in the courts are contextual conditions that explain why judicial corruption is 
accepted in Albanian society. Poor economic conditions and financial incentives of judges 
explain the changing dynamic of judicial corruption inside the court system and its interplay 
with organised crime in the period 1990-2012. The weakening of social control sheds light 
on the influence of social factors and context that led judges to corruption. Throughout, 
this research considers the role of organised crime. The thesis here attempts to provide an 
in-depth explanation of judicial corruption from a socio-legal perspective. It considers 
political, institutional, economic, historical and social factors. In short the study here seeks 
to explain what makes corruption work. 
This chapter is divided into three main parts. In the first, I address some general conditions 
at the macro level envisioned by democratic legitimation theory which explain why people 
have a negative perception of the role of courts and how this has influenced the tolerance 
of judicial corruption. Some of the conditions that are considered are lack of trust in the 
courts, a negative legacy of the communist period and poor standards of democratic 
participation in judicial reforms. 
In the second part, in the light of economic theories, the research moves from a general 
perspective to more specific conditions related to judges and corruption inside the court 
system. It explains the role of financial constraints on judges in judicial corruption. It 
considers the role of low wages, poor quality of bureaucracy and the cost of punishment as 
favourable conditions for judges to become involved in corruption. It also explains the 
influence of bribes in the competition between different levels of court and also in 
promotion of judges. Moreover, it highlights how the widespread use of bribes in the court 
system has affected the interplay between organised crime and judicial corruption. 
While in the first and the second part the study focuses more on institutional and 
organisation conditions of judicial corruption, the third part turns to the social context and 
its influence on the deviant behaviour of judges. In this context several key social 
conditions suggested by social control theories are shown. The focus is on the influence of 
the disruption of legal culture, judicial quest for a higher status in society, judicial 
subculture, and the role of customary norms. 
185 
The Theoretical Approach 
 
In this chapter the study turns to the theoretical framework and looks for competing or 
complementary explanations for the phenomenon in the light of research questions. As 
mentioned above, three theoretical approaches are drawn on to probe for answers which 
will help to generate original findings. Problems of democratic legitimation provide a set of 
conditions that explain why judicial reforms are not yielding results and why corruption is 
socially accepted in Albanian society. Lack of trust is one of the main conditions considered. 
In the context of this study, lack of trust involves both a culturally framed negative 
sentiment against the judiciary inherited from communism, and the consequence of the 
lack of democratic participation in the institutional reforms. This latter factor suggests that, 
if society is prevented from having equal and free participation in law-making, the law and 
courts may lose their legitimacy (Habermas 1998a). As a result people will attempt to 
circumvent and disobey laws and disrespect the judiciary. In this theoretical framework it is 
also suggested that anti-corruption policies are invalidated because media and civil society 
are also corrupted. These changing dynamics of the acceptance of judicial corruption 
during Albania’s transition to democracy explain why judicial reforms have not yielded 
results. The above factors provide a broad explanation of judicial corruption focusing more 
on issues outside the court system. 
This thesis then moves to particular aspects inside the court system which push judges to 
corruption. It is argued that this second set of conditions is influenced by a restricted 
economic growth and market development. Low wages and poor quality of bureaucracy 
are some of the most important conditions that give rise to corruption inside the court 
system. This suggests that limited financial conditions for judges have created competition 
among different levels of the courts to exploit the power of the judiciary for gain, where 
judges of the higher courts appear to be the most corrupted level. This fact is facilitated by 
extensive immunity of judges and the low cost of punishment for corruption. Free market 
policies seem also to have increased the demand on courts for protection of property 
rights, and this seems to have enhanced the interplay between judicial corruption and 
organised crime. Contrary to the literature, it appears that organised crime and corrupt 
judges mostly exchange favours rather than see each other as competitors (Gambetta 
1993; Varese 2010). 
After an overview of conditions outside and inside the court system, the study then turns 
to explain the influence of the social environment and the weakening of social control, as a 
third set of conditions, on judicial corruption. Rapid changes in the legal system and judicial 
structure, urbanisation and the introduction of free market policies are considered key 
factors in the disruption of social bonds, and, thus, the disorganising of society. In this 
context, opportunities for organised crime and corruption to penetrate public institutions 
and law-making have increased and thus corruption of the judiciary has become more 
likely.  
Another significant social condition relating to social control is the claim by judges for a 
higher social status in society. This is what Cohen (1955) labelled as ‘status deprivation’. 
Judges seeking higher status and integration, among other things, has pushed them to form 
a subculture that tolerates deviance. This has led to judicial corruption becoming more 
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sophisticated. The asymmetrical role of customary norms to judicial corruption is also 
suggested as a social factor. While the influence of some controversial customs is fading 
away (i.e. ‘Krahinizem’), surprisingly, the role of violent customs (i.e. blood feud) seems to 
have a continuing positive influence. In contrast, other non-violent customs (e.g. friendship 
ties) appear to have had a negative effect on judicial corruption. 
 
 
Democratic Legitimation of Law 
 
In this section the study begins to explain the general contextual conditions that have 
favoured judicial corruption to become engrained culturally in society and be accepted as a 
normal phenomenon even by judges.814 The analysis begins with the argument that the 
deficit of trust in the justice system has pushed people away from the judicial reforms. This 
has weakened social pressure to reform corrupt judges and politicians. Judicial corruption 
thus has flourished and society’s perception of the judiciary has become negative. This 
tension between society and the judiciary is not a phenomenon of democracy, but, as the 
study shows in this section, it stems from the communist past. What is also explained is 
that this negative legacy was reinforced during the transition. The democracy failed to be 
institutionalised. Lack of access to law-making, a weakened role of civil society and 
ineffective anti-corruption policies were some of the factors. What is particularly significant 
during the transition process was the adverse effect of the increase of judicial 
independence, which, paradoxically, simply boosted judicial corruption more. 
 
 
Deficit of Trust in the Justice System 
 
One of my research questions was, ‘Why are judicial reforms in Albania yielding so few 
results?’ To a large extent the answer appears to be the lack of legitimation of these 
reforms as envisioned by democratic legitimation theories. The lack of legitimacy is 
grounded in a failed system of democratic participation of people in institutional reforms. 
This is because of a systematic compromise of the election process by political parties 
throughout the transition.815 The ruling political class therefore is not effectively the one 
elected by the people. So society’s concerns about corruption generally and judicial 
corruption specifically, are not reflected in judicial reforms. In recent years, as mentioned 
                                                          
814 As per IDRA (2010), around ‘33.9% of the interviewed judges, [confirm that] corruption in the 
Albanian court system is a serious problem’. IDRA (2010) ‘Corruption in Albania, Perception and 
Experience’, p.26. 
815 See Gjipali, G. (2011) ‘Freedom House, Nation in Transit 2011 Report’, section on Albania, p.51; 
available at http://67.192.63.63/images/File/nit/2011/NIT-2011-Albania.pdf [accessed April 15, 
2012]. 
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in Chpater 4, international reports have used explicit terms such as ‘Albania lacks the 
culture of judicial independence’816  to show that judicial corruption is becoming a cultural 
phenomenon.817 The lack of trust is so deeply entrenched that it has penetrated not only 
society at large but also the community of judges. One of my interviewed judges recalled 
asking a member of the HCJ in 2011, whether there was any chance left to improve the 
situation in the judiciary, and the reply was ‘I am afraid…it is too late’.818 
Thus public trust in the justice system has been undermined. This deficit of trust has 
pushed people to be sceptical about the capacities of courts to deliver justice.819 As Krastev 
(2003:26) puts it, ‘in the Western Balkans there is a growing gap between the public and 
the political elite…[which is producing] growing mistrust in the democratic institutions’. 
The courts in Albania are perceived almost in the same light as other corrupt public 
institutions which serve the powerful elite rather than society in general.820 This cynical 
perception has resulted in a widespread mentality wherein the judicial system is seen as 
corrupt. Thus the most efficient form of accessing courts is ‘via informal mechanisms’ – 
bribes, exchange of favours, political influence, organised crime and through customary 
norms.821 
The accommodation of society with the culture of informality  has created a vicious circle 
of corruption where everyone feels neglected but also morally reluctant to change. As one 
intellectual noted, ‘we live with widespread collective guilt of feeding our self corruption 
and crime which grows every day, and which in a certain way is the real problem for the 
state builders, the law abiding and the judiciary; an atmosphere which corrupts the 
judiciary but where even the corrupt judiciary contributes to this heavy atmosphere’.822 
There are two main factors that have contributed to the deficit of trust in the justice 
system overall: first, the communist legacy and, second, the lack of democratic 
participation in law-making and judicial reforms.823 
                                                          
816 European Commission Analytical Report (2010) ‘Commission Opinion on Albania’s Application for 
Membership of European Union’, November 9, SEC1335, p.21. 
817 Some of the interviewed judges shared the some perception. As one judge pointed out ‘….one of 
the issues of judicial corruption is the inherited concept from the communist past of a controlled 
judiciary by the state which has continued even during these years of political transition…principles 
such as the separation of powers and especially judicial independence are not so clearly perceived 
by the community of judges….which means that probably even the judiciary finds it difficult to adopt 
the idea of judicial independence….or judges themselves have made no attempt to avoid references 
to other powers (executive and legislative)...’ (Interview with urban judge no.2, 2010). 
818 Interview with rural judge no.7, 2011. 
819 According to IDRA (2010), ‘trust toward the judicial system has declined from 2009,having 
increased steadily from 2005’. IDRA (2010) ‘Corruption in Albania, Perception and Experience’, p.23. 
820 Interview with investigative journalist no.2, 2010. 
821 Interview with urban advocate no.7, 2011. 
822 Interview with academic no.3, 2010. 
823‘...if we can quickly skim the post-communist period of Albania in the last twenty years, we see 
that immediately after 1991, up to 1997 there was a continuation of the communist legacy which 
was taken over by Sali Berisha, then the President and the Head of the Democratic Party, who 
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The Legacy Paradigm 
 
There is a general legacy of distrust in public institutions which may be rooted in the two 
longest conquests of Albania, namely those of the Byzantine Empire 395-1385 and 
Ottoman Empire 1385-1912 (Elezi 1999).During these historical periods local people were 
prevented from law-making and state-building (Anastasi 2007). Subsequent experience 
under the Soviet bloc continued this tradition. In this section, I focus on the communist 
legacy (1944-89). The communist legacy and its perceived continuation has impacted 
negatively on society’s expectations of an independent judiciary and has, I argue, 
weakened social pressure to eradicate judicial corruption. During the transition to 
democracy (1989-96), the ‘path’ to judicial independence followed steps similar to judicial 
politicisation under communism. This made society cynical about the democratic 
transformation of the courts. As one rural advocate explained, ‘people began to make fun 
of the politicised judges… they used to label them “judges of democracy”’.824 
Many patterns of judicial politicisation and education used in the early period of 
communism (i.e. 1950-65) were ‘simply transferred and applied by the post-communist 
political elite in the early phase of transition in 1992-98’.825 As with the former communist 
judges who were purged from the system in 1992-93 during the transition to democracy, 
judges educated in the West in the early 1930s during communism were either removed 
from the system or jailed for political reasons in 1945-48 (Pashko 1948:59). 
The new class of communist judges in the late 1950s were selected from the working class 
and from those families with strong links with the Communist Party (Konomi 1948:16).826 
The majority of assistant judges were also uneducated and a few judges asked the Ministry 
of Justice at that time for instructions on whether assistant judges could be allowed to sign 
with their fingerprints, as many were illiterate.827 It is important to remember that illiteracy 
                                                                                                                                                                    
continued to rule the country with the same communist patterns.  In the aftermath of 1997, we see 
the rise of the first oligarchs who were former drug traffickers and suspicious businessmen. They 
were involved in the privatisation of public properties. These individuals invested heavily in the 
construction industry and other profitable businesses. So these were people who accumulated a lot 
of wealth very quickly.  Gradually these powerful individuals founded their media, a kind of 
Berlusconi version of “media-politics”.  Then, after 2005, we see that these oligarchs, similar to 
Russian oligarchs, began to privatise strategic natural resources of the country, mines, rivers, seas, 
gas etc.  These people have become so powerful now that they not only control politicians but also 
influence the law making...’ (Interview with academic no. 3, 2010). 
824 ‘In 1993-97, the weakening of the role of the judiciary became evident.  The public perception 
was so negative that people started to make fun of the politicised judges… they used to label them 
“judges of democracy”...and this showed not only a lack of power of the state and law but also lack 
of respect of the citizen towards the state...the fear of the state during communism was replaced by 
anarchy during the early transition to democracy.  And this bad public perception fed judicial 
corruption further...it then become a vicious circle . A culture of violation of the law was created 
which is still continuing  today.’ Interview withrural advocate no.1, 2010. 
825 Interview with urban prosecutor no.4, 2010. 
826 Interview with urban judge no.10, 2010. 
827 Albanian National Archive, File no.1, 1947. 
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was widespread in Albania in 1945, but it had almost disappeared by the late 1980s. In 
1962 only 49 judges had a law degree, 21 had only finished high school, five had finished 
secondary school and one judge only had primary education.828 In 1950-65 a new wave of 
ideological and unprofessional judges entered the system.829 By that time all Western-
educated judges had been removed (Pashko 1948:59). In 1966 only 28.3% of the total 
number of judges had graduated from a law school.830 
Similarly, as I showed in Chapter 4, this pattern of politicisation of judicial nominations was 
mimicked by the post-communist elite in the years 1993-96.  In these years ‘many of the 
recruited judges were people with close connections to the government of the time’ and 
‘people … did not have even a law degree’831 (Vickers and Pettifer 1997: 246; Bezhani 
2003:61-75). Only a few post-communist judges remained in the system.832 According to 
one judge interviewed, it was not difficult to recognise some of the post-communist judges 
during the transition as some of them ‘had cut fingers because they had worked as 
carpenters before becoming judges’.833 
We see that in both periods political cleansing occurred in the early phases of transitions, 
i.e. Nazi-fascism to communism (1945-70) and communism to democracy (1992-2000). 
Several laws promulgated in the early phase of democracy were loaded with political terms 
mirroring the highly politicised laws of the communist periods. For instance, in the Albanian 
Penal Code of 1993, organised crime was defined as ‘formation of a criminal group with a 
fascist, communist, Enverist [i.e. Enver Hoxha the dictator of Albania during communism] 
totalitarian and terrorist character…’834 The inherited patterns of judicial politicisation 
influenced the negative perceptions of society toward the judiciary in the early phase of 
transition, 1990-96.835 As one academic put it, ‘the problem of the communist legacy in 
Albania is a real concern for the whole of society and not only for the judicial sector… we 
have a continued elite spread in all political parties who control the country with the same 
communist manners, and this for me is one the main causes of corruption today’.836 
As mentioned earlier, this cynical approach was further developed by the lack of 
democratic participation in law-making which permanently eroded the legitimacy of the 
judicial system over the last two decades. I now turn to explain this phenomenon in more 
depth. 
 
                                                          
828 Albanian National Archive, File no.24, 1963. 
829 Interview with urban judge no.10, 2010. 
830 Albanian National Archive, File no.3, 1966. 
831 Interview with rural advocate no.1, 2010. 
832 Interview with academic no.1, 2010. 
833 Interview with urban judge no.10, 2010. 
834 See Albanian Penal Code of 1993 article 57. 
835 Interview with urban prosecutor no.4, 2010. 
836 Interview with academic no.3, 2010. 
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Lack of Democratic Participation 
 
At the outset of this work I asked if the form of Albania’s new democracy played a part in 
judicial corruption and a lack or ineffectiveness of efforts at reforms. According to 
Habermas (1998a), low societal participation invalidates a regime and weakens society’s 
trust in state institutions. In these settings, the state may shift to a model of control via 
surveillance and policing, and a crisis of legitimation of public institutions may result. The 
credibility of judges may be eroded and the enforcement of law may come under question. 
The legitimisation is thus affected by a very negative opinion about the political class which 
‘follows the old schemes of corruption… it is very corrupt and with little desire to do 
something good for the country’.837 
Growing research shows that Albania is a disputed democracy. Political parties rarely agree 
on the result of polls and tend to accuse each other of stealing votes (Krastev 2003; Kajsiu, 
Bumci et al. 2003). Permanent political discontent between the two main political forces, 
the Democratic Party and the Socialist Party, has produced tension in society and 
undermined judicial reforms.838 This was a major consideration in the EU rejecting the 
candidate membership status of Albania in 2011.839 
So the ‘transition from the communist past to democracy proved to be harder and longer 
than expected’.840 Institution-building seems to have suffered during this period, as under 
communism, from political control. As mentioned earlier, the culture of judicial 
politicisation and unprofessionalism which was inherited from the communist past, was 
‘continued and even reinforced in the post-communist period’841 (Prato 2004:74). The 
                                                          
837 ‘….the inherited issues of the past are just a problem of judicial corruption, but they are a major 
problem to Albanian society as a whole…it is very complex.  We see a continuation of the former 
communist elite in the system. By “elite continuation” I do not mean the accusations made by 
political parties to each other or by the political party in power (Democratic Party) to judges of the 
High Court. These accusations are part of a continued political game of the same political elite, 
which has the same mentality of governance.  What do I mean by this?  There has been no honest 
approach to the lustration laws so far, a real catharsis….absolutely not…there are two main reasons 
for this approach, firstly, the continuation of the power of the same political communist elite and 
secondly, the weakened reaction of the politically prosecuted segments of society during 45 years of 
communism...the latter were not able to take over power during the transition to democracy. ...the 
current political elite follows the old schemes of corruption… it is very corrupt and with little desire 
to do something good for the country...’ Interview with academic no.3, 2010. 
838 See European Commission (2009) ‘Albania Progress Report 2009’, p.7; European Commission 
(2011) ‘Albania Progress Report 2011’, p.11; available at 
http://eeas.europa.eu/delegations/albania/eu_albania/progress_reports/index_en.htm 
[accessed March 27, 2012]. 
839 See European Commission Opinion on Albania’s Application for Membership of the European 
Union 2010, p.11; available at 
http://ec.europa.eu/enlargement/pdf/key_documents/2010/package/al_opinion_2010_en
.pdf [accessed March 28, 2012]. 
840 Interview with academic no.3, 2010. 
841 Interview with academic no.1, 2010. 
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judiciary had already, like many public institutions (i.e. state police, secret service), entered 
the era of democracy in 1990-93 with a huge deficit of trust (Kajsiu, Bumci et al. 2003). As 
Krastev (2003:20) argues, when ‘the post-communist type of farewell state replaces the 
communist type of welfare state, it naturally results in a legitimation crisis for the new 
democratic regimes’. 
A lack of democratic participation in law-making influences people’s perception of the 
validity of the law and its legitimacy. According to Habermas, valid law arises through a 
process of non-coercive discussion between parties. This makes law the legitimate power 
to be enforced. In the context of Habermasian democratic legitimisation of law, the 
institutionalisation of law enforcement only becomes legitimate if the law is a product of 
the democratic consent of all interested subjects. This is because, ‘judicial decision making 
is bound to law and legal statutes, the rationality of adjudication depend on the legitimacy 
of existing law’ (Habermas 1998a:238). And the legitimacy of law is guaranteed only by a 
‘discursive justification’ by an independent judiciary which needs to be ‘sterilised’ from 
political influence or the legislative role (Habermas 1998a:262). 
Albanian society, like all other countries in the post-communist Western Balkans, was 
trapped and caught by a chaotic situation (Krastev 2003).842 Habermas’ vision of the 
popular basis of valid law-making and popular sovereignty was not fulfilled in Albania. 
Access to political discourse is made only via political parties and this has limited society’s 
access to law-making and judicial reforms (Kajsiu 2010). Because ‘political parties do not 
only steal the votes but they also purchase them from constituents’.843 
As explained in Chapter 1, the role of political parties in post-communist societies is not 
similar to their counterparts in the West. Although their legal modelling is quite similar, 
they ‘still maintain an inherited communist culture of autocratic control over their 
subordinates, public policies and institutions’844 (Holmes 2006). 
Exclusive rapport with the law and judicial reforms gives political parties the power to 
exercise a ‘hegemonic’ political behaviour which consists of, first, domination over the 
public discourse by distracting public opinion on judicial reforms, and second, the 
exploitation of public resources and institutions, either via defective laws or by controlling 
the law enforcement agencies, including the courts (Karklins 2005). The ‘political control 
over public discourse and public goods’845 has influenced society’s attitude toward public 
institutions. People feel frustrated and, evidence suggests, few are motivated to change 
the situation.846 So people’s inertia and indifference towards crucial reforms for the 
enhancement of democracy such as judicial reforms has increased (Trimcev 2003). 
However, contrary to the Habermasian assumption, lack of democratic participation did 
not produce a model of a state that exerted its control via surveillance and police but 
                                                          
842 Interview with urban judge no.2, 2010. 
843 Interview with academic no.3, 2010. 
844 Interview with urban prosecutor no.2, 2010. 
845 Interview with urban advocate no.4, 2010. 
846 Interview with investigative journalist no.2, 2010. 
192 
rather through ‘clientelist’ networks.847 The central state had ‘mimicked the period of 
communism’.848 In Albania we see that the political elite exerts its control by nominating 
and promoting its own people in public institutions.849 There is no difference between the 
rural and urban areas.850 The powerful elite often ‘select people with strong family and 
friendship ties in the community and appoint them as their representatives’851 (Gërxhani 
and Schram 2008). 
The lack of democratic participation in law-making has also given a free hand to the 
executive to inflate anti-corruption reforms, often implemented under constant pressure 
from the international community.852 The post-communist elite plays with the fact that 
corruption is an indisputable phenomenon of societies in transition, and this narrative has 
often been used to justify the failure of the executive to fight judicial corruption and 
organised crime (Krastev 2003:21; Prato 2004:75).853 As a result, the influence of 
international pressure on anti-corruption reforms seems to have produced little effect.854 
Another factor why the influence of the international community seems weak is that, ‘first 
of all, internationals often rush to do legal reforms, and second after a while in Albania, 
they become familiar with the corrupt environment and also attach to politicians’.855 
Another important element of democratic participation, civil society, whose role is 
awareness-raising and state-monitoring, is also marginalised in this context.856 Many NGOs 
funded by the international community have failed to promote the role of an independent 
judiciary or denounce the risk of judicial corruption (Krastev 2003:14). One of the problems 
is that often the research and the main concerns of civil society regarding judicial 
corruption and the politicisation of courts do not get the public’s attention because either 
they are not made available or do not get the attention of the media857 which is also 
                                                          
847 Interview with investigative journalist no.3, 2010. 
848 Interview with urban advocate no.4, 2010. 
849 Interview with investigative journalist no.2, 2010. 
850 Interview with rural judge no.6, 2010. 
851 Interview with investigative journalist no.2, 2010. 
852 Interview with urban advocate no.1, 2010. 
853 According to IDRA (2010), ‘the awareness of the public toward anti-corruption initiatives is very 
low’ and ‘only 15.7% of the respondents were aware of at least one anti-corruption initiative in the 
country’. See IDRA (2010) ‘Corruption in Albania: Perception and Experience’, p.17. 
854 See European Commission (2011) ‘Albania Progress Report 2011’, p.13; available 
athttp://eeas.europa.eu/delegations/albania/eu_albania/progress_reports/index_en.htm 
[accessed May 7, 2012]. 
855 Interview with urban prosecutor no.4, 2010. 
856 See Fundación para las Relaciones Internacionales y el Diálogo Exterior (FRIDE) Report (2010) 
‘Democracy in Albania’, p.15; available at http://www.fride.org/publication/758/democracy-in-
albania [accessed May 6, 2012]. 
857 Interview with investigative journalist no.3, 2010. 
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controlled.858 My fieldwork revealed information about these studies and reports, which 
was made possible only by personal contact with NGOs. 
Furthermore, the most outspoken members of civil society tend to be hired by the political 
elite to manipulate public opinion and some of them have become members of political 
parties.859 The media, too, is not independent and is highly politicised 860 (Tare 2009). As 
one of my interviewees reported, ‘this is a regime which is not controlled by police or army 
but a regime which is controlled through media’.861 It is not by chance that the majority of 
the interviewed judges were afraid of the media which has, although not often, attacked 
them for political reasons.862 
A few journalists admitted that sometimes the media has been used to attack judges but 
they also pointed out that there have been occasions when certain segments of the media 
have protected them. As one interviewed journalist pointed out, ‘there have been times 
when I have sent information on the alleged corrupt behaviour of many judges to my 
newspaper and the editor has never published them, but I recall that once I sent something 
about one judge with whom the owner of the newspaper had had a problem before, and 
the news was published instantly – it was a good coincidence’.863 
In addition, the direct interplay of society with courts is also a condition of public mistrust 
in the courts. As I showed in Chapter 5, people are very influenced by improper behaviour 
of judges in and out the courtroom, the lack of solemnity in the process, ‘their expensive 
life style, lack of transparency in the court system, and lack of professionalism’.864 In a 
sense all these factors have enforced the idea in society that judicial reforms are not 
working. 
So the Habermasian ‘ideal speech’ as a condition for a functioning democracy is absent 
from Albanian life. Public participation is limited and law-making largely reflects the 
interests of political and business elites. A few interviewed judges and advocates pointed 
out that a lack of democratic participation allows the political elite and organised crime to 
design specific laws to blackmail political adversaries or judges and prosecutors dealing 
with high profile criminal cases and also exploit society. Some classic examples are the 
                                                          
858 Gjipali, G. (2011) ‘Freedom House, Nation in Transit 2011 Report’, section on Albania, pp.51-52; 
available at http://67.192.63.63/images/File/nit/2011/NIT-2011-Albania.pdf [accessed April 15, 
2012]. 
859 Two ministers – Majlinda Bregu (Minister of Integration and Spokesperson of the Executive) and 
Aldo Bumci (Minister of Tourism, Cultural Affairs, Youth and Sports) – and a few vice ministers such 
as Taulant Bimo. For more see the CVs of the underlined officials at the official website of the 
Council of Ministers; available at http://www.keshilliministrave.al/?fq=showcabzvm [accessed 
May 6, 2012]. 
860 See FRIDE Report (2010) ‘Democracy in Albania’, pp.16-17; available at 
http://www.fride.org/publication/758/democracy-in-albania [accessed May 6, 2012]. 
According to  
861 Interview with academic no.3, 2010. 
862 Interview with urban judge no.1, 2010 
863 Interview with journalist no.1, 2010. 
864 Interview with urban advocate no.1, 2010. 
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lustration laws (Austin and Ellison 2009; Bezhani 2003), Tax Law, Company Law and Land 
Law.865 I showed in Chapter 6 that the relationship between organised crime and judicial 
corruption not only relates to criminal cases but also to commercial matters. Social justice 
is also undermined, and ‘all those segments of society not loyal to political elites are 
alienated’.866 
In short, democracy is not institutionalised nor is judicial independence. A power 
distance867 between the elite and society is formed and this has obstructed access to 
judicial reforms and undermined the legitimacy of the courts. The power distance has 
increased the cost of accessing courts and this ‘has facilitated a powerful elite and 
organised crime to penetrate and influence the judiciary’868 (Trimcev 2003:56). 
 
 
Patterns of Judicial Corruption: Adverse Effect of Judicial Independence 
 
Lack of democratic participation in law-making has also influenced the dynamics of judicial 
corruption and sophisticated its interplay with organised crime and the political elite. In 
this context, we see that the changing dynamics of judicial corruption has followed three 
stages: first, ‘politicisation’ (1992-96), then ‘criminalisation’ (1997-2000), and finally 
‘market-oriented’ corruption (2001-11). In 1992-97 the judiciary was politicised and judicial 
independence obstructed. The majority of judges were selected and appointed via political 
channels. Judicial corruption was ‘more a consequence of political corruption’.869 But in the 
                                                          
865 Interview with urban advocate no.2, 2010. 
866 ‘Today in Albania the state is in the hands of let’s say the most economically powerful individuals 
of the country, which means that, in Albania, those who have more money are more likely to corrupt 
politics and seize the state, because they are able to buy it, not only buy it but also steal the vote 
….so all those segments of society not loyal to political elites are alienated and have no power to 
influence the law making...’ Interview with academic no.3, 2010. 
867 Some characteristics of ‘power distanced’ societies relevant to Albania are: the middle class is 
small; power is based on family or friends, charisma, and ability to use force; autocratic or oligarchic 
governments are based on cooptation; the powerful have privileges; and domestic political conflicts 
frequently lead to violence (Hofstede 2003:8). 
868 Interview with urban advocate no.4, 2010. 
869 ‘ In 1992-97 judges were hired based mainly on political criteria …and this structure of judges’ 
recruitment went back to the same mentality  of political control over the judiciary, the control of 
the  mono-party system—the “state-party” (communist system). So despite politicians proclaiming 
in public  that this was the end of  the “state-party” and that the time of the modern democratic 
state had come, in reality  the state was in the stronghold of the current political party in power 
(democratic party)... it  ruled over all public institutions including the independent institutions (the 
judiciary, the prosecution office etc.)… those people who were supportive  and had close  ties with 
the ruling political party were placed in key positions… so political sympathies  were the basis of 
public  institutions, including the judiciary and prosecution office.  What was the outcome?  This 
meant that public officials did not answer to the law but to the political party.  Providing favours to 
the political party in power gave judges sufficient protection against any danger that would come 
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upheaval of civil riots in 1997 where the state broke down and organised crime was 
strengthened, the judiciary became vulnerable to criminal groups. By 1998 the judiciary 
was not only corrupt but also criminalised.870 So by 2000, as I showed in Chapter 6, a critical 
mass of corrupt and criminalised judges was present in the judiciary. 
In 2001-11 the role of the state strengthened and the quality of the judiciary improved, but 
the dynamic of judicial corruption ‘became more sophisticated’871 and ‘market driven’. 
Political influence over the judiciary in 2005-11 was mainly focused on the appointment 
and promotion of judges of the Constitutional Court and High Court. According to the 
interviewed prosecutors and advocates this was because these courts were ‘the ones 
which the political elite and organised crime dealt with more often’.872 While the 
Constitutional Court can be a political obstacle for the executive as it can turn down 
important laws or cases on constitutional bases, the High Court can be a threat to the high 
profile politicians accused of corruption and crime. As shown in both Chapter 4 and 
Chapter 5, the High Court has the final say on both criminal and civil matters to which both 
the political elite and organised crime can be subject. In addition, in criminal cases, ‘the 
control of the executive over the justice system is also exerted via the state police’.873 
Many interviewed prosecutors pointed out that the nomination of state police is highly 
politicised and mentioned that this is one of the reasons why the latter are corrupt. In this 
context, after 2005 political intrusion into the judiciary became selective. 
The political interference was exercised at the externalities of the system, at both the 
entrance door to the judicial system (i.e. investigation processes via corrupt state police) 
and at the exit door (via corrupt high ). This ‘polarised’ political influence made the role of 
intermediary stages of the judicial control (i.e. first instance and appeal courts) irrelevant 
by thus weakening the due process.874 This explains why the majority of my interviewees 
pointed out that both state police and judges of the High Court were among those ‘most 
perceived as corrupted officials in the justice sector’.875 
In addition, in 2001-11 there has been some progress in both judicial reforms and the fight 
against organised crime.876 But while the quality of judicial independence has increased, 
                                                                                                                                                                    
due to violation of the law or corruption….so judicial corruption in that period was more a 
consequence of political corruption.’ Interview with urban prosecutor no. 4, 2010. 
870 Interview with urban judge no.7, 2010. 
871 Interview with investigative journalist no.2, 2010. 
872 Interview with urban judge no.1, 2010. 
873 Interview with urban prosecutor no.1, 2010. 
874 Interview with rural judge no.2, 2010. 
875 Interview with urban prosecutor no.4, 2010. 
876 See European Commission (2011) ‘Albania Progress Report 2011’, p.11 available at 
http://eeas.europa.eu/delegations/albania/eu_albania/progress_reports/index_en.htm 
[accessed May 7, 2012]. 
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judicial corruption unexpectedly has kept growing (Anderson and Gray 2007:333).877 I 
argue that one of the factors in this is that the increase in judicial independence has proved 
to have given more space and protection to corrupt judges within the system and 
decreased judicial accountability.878 As shown in Chapter 4, the control over important 
institutions within the judicial system such as the NJC and HCJ is ‘co-shared among the 
political elite and strong networks of corrupt judges within the system’.879 Judges have 
become more protected from political intrusion but also immune from prosecution for 
corruption. As the majority of my interviewed prosecutors noted, ‘one of the main 
obstacles to investigating judicial corruption is judicial immunity’.880 And as one high profile 
interviewed judge pointed out, ‘it is easy to get a judge in the system but it is very difficult 
to remove him afterwards because of the constitutional guarantees’.881  
All the prosecutors interviewed for this research confirmed that no judge to date has been 
imprisoned for corruption. My argument is that this odd relationship where the increase of 
judicial independence is associated with the increase of judicial corruption may also be a 
consequence of the lack of legitimacy of the judicial reforms. This lack of legitimacy has, as 
a result, not been reflected in the behaviour of judges, and also has failed to increase 
society’s trust in the courts. The political elite therefore, has been forced by the 
international community, rather than by the public, to reform the judiciary.882 And thus the 
process seems to have been artificial and inefficient. 
In addition, after 2005, the increase in the quality of judicial independence laws de jure 
pushed judges to refine their patterns of activity and ‘hide their corrupt actions behind 
legal entities’.883 Corrupt judges have developed strong networks with law offices or 
particular advocates/solicitors and ‘Sekser’ (middlemen) that are known to have close ties 
with organised crime and powerful politicians.884 In recent years, as mentioned earlier, we 
have also seen that many intellectuals and journalists act as agents of the political elite by 
                                                          
877 According to the Transformation Index BTI (2012), ‘The judiciary seems to be the weakest link in 
Albania’s fragile system of separation of powers’; available at http://www.bti-
project.org/country-reports/ese/alb/ [accessed March 28, 2012]. 
878 The Analytical Report of the European Commission Opinion on Albania’s Application for 
Membership of the European Union (2010:22) points out that ‘…if the immunity granted to a large 
group of public officials (MPs, ministers and judges) is meant to increase their independence, it has 
proven to be a serious obstacle to the investigation of corruption, which increases the risk for this 
phenomenon’. Available at 
http://ec.europa.eu/enlargement/pdf/key_documents/2010/package/al_rapport_2010_en
.pdf [accessed March 27, 2012]. 
879 Interview with urban judge no.2, 2010. 
880 Interview with urban prosecutor no.1, 2010. 
881 Interview with urban judge no.7,2010. 
882 Several laws are approved as part of the Stabilisation and Association Agreement with the EU but 
there are still important laws waiting in parliament for the consensus of political parties. See 
European Commission (2011) ‘Albania Progress Report 2011’, p.11; available at 
http://eeas.europa.eu/delegations/albania/eu_albania/progress_reports/index_en.htm 
[accessed March 27, 2012]. 
883 Interview with urban prosecutor no.1, 2010. 
884 Interview with international observer no.3, 2010. 
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protecting their interests in the public discourse. Santino (2003) calls them the ‘Mafia 
bourgeoisie’. Together with politicised intellectuals and journalists, corrupt judges and 
advocates/solicitors have formed a criminal amalgam which obstructs the access of society 
to law-making and justice. As one prosecutor put it: ‘it seems very strange, there is an 
extraordinary coordination between the political elite, intellectuals and media when the 
political elite wants to fight us’.885 
As a result, popular communicative power has weakened against the arbitrary 
administrative power of the state, the distance between society and the courts has 





This study now turns to explain some other conditions suggested by economic theories 
which give rise to actual dynamics of corruption inside the court system. In this section I 
consider how limited financial conditions have pushed judges to accept bribes to self-
support their weak economic status. Research in the field suggested two main general 
economic conditions: low wages and poor quality of bureaucracy. 
In addition, the role of the low cost of punishing judges for corruption and their immunity 
are also considered as significant factors that helped judges to not being accountable for 
their misdoings. This appears to have decreased the cost of punishment for judges to 
accept bribes. The study then goes on to explain the dynamics of bribes in court cases and 
the prevalence of corruption in the higher courts. This approach is helpful to understanding 
better the shift from ‘criminalisation’ to the ‘market-oriented’ phase of judicial corruption. 
Following up the ‘market-oriented’ dynamics developed earlier, I explain the reasons why 
judicial corruption does not compete with organised crime for the protection of property 
rights. This argument is helpful to understand the reasons why organised crime has 
apparently withdrawn from violent patterns of influencing the judiciary and why it has 
given more preference to the ‘clientelistic’ relationship with corrupt judges. 
One of the key research questions to answer in this section concerns the role of low wages 
as a significant factor in pushing judges toward corrupt practices. Other more specific 
research questions will also be considered, such as: what makes judges accept bribes? why 
is corruption more evident in criminal cases, and why is the level of bribe paid higher in civil 
cases? In addition, why are bribes paid in the High Court higher than those paid in both 
appeal and first instance courts, and how does this ‘market’ of bribes influence the cost of 
promotion to ‘career courts’ appeal and the High Court? And finally, why did the level of 
bribes increased after 2005? 
                                                          
885 Interview with urban prosecutor no.4, 2010. 
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The role of low wages, is, my research suggests, only a partial explanation for judicial 
corruption. 
‘Economic theories’ highlight that economic-political transformation from a centralised to 
an open market economy creates favourable opportunities for the political and business 
elite to exploit public goods in post-communist societies (Tanzi 2002). Control over law-
making and law enforcement give the political elite a monopoly in producing regulation, 
manipulating tax policies and controlling the disbursement of public funds (Holmes 2006). 
As mentioned earlier, several studies have shown that Albania, borrowing again Hofstede’s 
term (2003:5), is a ‘power distance’ society where ‘the less powerful members of 
institutions and organizations within [the] country expect[ed] and accept[ed] that power 
[was] distributed unequally’ (Prato 2004:73). 
The judiciary seems to have been ‘one of the main independent institutions affected by the 
reduction of budget’886 in the transition period and this has reduced significantly the 
efficiency of the judiciary (Kajsiu, Bumci et al. 2003).887 I showed in Chapter 4 that in the 
last decade the Albanian government allocated less than 1% of GDP to the judiciary. The 
consequences of budgets for judges’ financial status, improvement of the courts’ 
infrastructure and enlargement of the administrative staff are very frequent avenues for 






The majority of my interviewees noted that judges’ low wages is one of the main factors of 
judicial corruption.888 According to a Transparency International report of 2011, Albanian 
judges had the lowest salaries in the Western Balkans.889 Shapiro and Stiglitz (1984:437) 
argue that there is a positive correlation between wage levels and corruption. According to 
Yang and Ehrichs (2007), the lack of ‘adequate’890 salaries pushes judges to look for other 
financial alternatives to substantiate their financial needs. A high wage in a country where 
the unemployment rate is high increases the value of the job position and this increases 
                                                          
886 Interview with urban judge no.8, 2010. 
887 See also the European Assistant Mission to the Albanian Justice System (EURALIUS) (2006) 
‘Increase of Judicial Budget Aiming to Reduce Corruption Degree based on European Countries’ 
Experience’. The material was not published. 
888 My findings are in line with the findings of IDRA (2010) which show that ‘there is an increase of 
near 10 percentage points compared to 2008 of the percentage of judges who view salary increase 
as the best tool of improving their (judges) performance’. IDRA (2010) ‘Corruption in Albania 
Perception and Experience: Judges Survey 2010’. 
889 TI (2011) ‘EU Anti-Corruption Requirements: Measuring Progress in Albania, Kosovo, FYR 
Macedonia and Turkey’, p.6. 
890 Yang and Ehrichs (2007:49) define adequate salary as ‘a wage that ensures judges and 
prosecutors can support their families, remain loyal to their profession and, at least, have no 
economic “need” for resorting to corruption’. 
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the cost of accepting bribes because then the bureaucrat risks losing his job. Shapiro and 
Stiglitz (1984) highlight that the role of high wages becomes significant in countries where 
the value of bribes is high and chances of prosecution for corruption very low. I speak 
about the cost of prosecution below. 
However, while the inadequate wage strategy paradigm was supported by many of my 
respondents, I was surprised to learn that a number of the interviewed judges did not rank 
poor salary as the first factor in judicial corruption and pointed out lack of integrity as the 
major problem.891 As one judge declared, ‘the most important factor is integrity and the 
level of professionalism of judges because despite the economic conditions and expensive 
cost of living, a judge with integrity should not be compromised and corrupted’.892 
Linking causes of judicial corruption with poor salaries alone is also not supported by many 
authors (Yang and Ehrichs 2007:51; Voigt 2007:299). Van Rijckeghem and Weder (2002) 
argue that trying to increase the salaries of public employees above the level of bribes in 
order to minimise their incentives for taking bribes may have an adverse effect as this can 
increase the level of bribes. Tanzi (2002:34) points out that raising wages to compete with 
the level of bribes ‘can achieve part of the objective…as even at high wages some 
individuals may continue to engage in corrupt practices’. 
In addition, poor salary without taking into account other social benefits related to the 
social status of judges – such as good pension schemes, interest free loans, subsidised 
transport or financial schemes to support education of judges’ children – has not been 
proved to be sufficient to increase the value of the job position and keep judges from 
corruption (Van Rijckeghem and Weder 2002:60). The negative influence of poor social 
status on judicial corruption was confirmed by the majority of my interviewed judges in 
both urban and rural courts.893 Social status is discussed in greater depth below. 
It became evident that the influence of the poor salaries should be seen within the context 
of political and economic changes.894 Some interviewed judges suggested that the level of 
wages played a significant role in the early phase of transition (1990-93) where corruption 
was still in its infancy. The rise of wages in the first decade of democracy (1990-2000) 
helped judges to avoid small bribes but failed to restrain judges from large bribes. The 
reason, according to a judicial inspector, was that ‘with the increase of privatisation and 
rapid change of land law in 1992-97 the level of bribes offered to judges after 2000 was 
highly disproportionate with the level of their salaries’.895 
                                                          
891 IDRA (2010) finds that while 33% of surveyed judges mentioned the salary increase as a concern, 
at least 22% of them also pointed out the need for ‘better training on ethical behaviour’ and also 
‘competence and fairness’. See IDRA (2010) ‘Corruption in Albania Perception and Experience: 
Judges Survey 2010’. 
892  Interview with urban judge no.2, 2010, see also quote no.39, p.169 .Interviewed prosecutors also 
shared the same view. As one prosecutor noted ‘... I do not think that judicial corruption is only 
about poor salaries.. it is more about the widespread mentality of quick enrichment in a short time. 
However, low salaries, lack of professionalism and poor education of judges are also essential 
factors to be considered...’ Interview with urban prosecutor no.5, 2010. 
893 Interview with urban judge no.1, 2010. 
894 Interview with rural judge no.6, 2010. 
895 Interview with judicial inspector no.2, 2010. 
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The small increase in salaries merely changed patterns of judicial corruption and made 
them more ‘market-oriented’. As I showed in both Chapters 4 and 5, political influence and 
the influence of customary norms is gradually becoming more monetised in nature. Judges 
prefer financial means in exchange for their services.896 In the last decade judicial 
corruption has been more about judges’ personal greed to maximise their incomes illegally. 
So judges do not take bribes to subsidise their needs but they ‘take bribes to become 
rich’.897 And this is why some of my respondents considered lack of integrity as the main 
factor.898 The influence of the role of poor salary however, is another argument which 




Poor Quality of Bureaucracy 
 
Another factor suggested by interviewed judges was the impact of the poor quality of 
bureaucracy on judicial corruption (i.e. lack of meritocratic recruitment, unfair internal 
promotion, and non-competitive salaries)899 (Schneider and Enste 2000; Tanzi 2002:32; 
Rauch and Evans 2000:18). A lack of meritocratic recruitment undermines judges’ trust in 
the justice system; it discourages them and weakens their resistance to bribes. As one 
judge put it, ‘we see that corrupt judges are promoted and those with integrity alienated, 
and this has been one of the biggest dilemmas for the majority of judges and this 
disappointment has given a considerable boost to the phenomenon of corruption in the 
judiciary’.900 I have elaborated and explained the consequences of poor infrastructure and 
the harmful role of the corrupt scheme of promotion in Chapter 4. I showed how the HCJ 
has manipulated the ‘career courts’. I also highlighted that the perception of judges 
regarding the promotion schemes was very negative and some of them refer to it as 
‘putting a price on justice’.901 
However, the meritocratic recruitment of judges was problematic before 2000 because ‘the 
hired candidates were selected based on vague criteria (e.g. ten years’ work experience or 
high integrity), something that gave a free hand to the political elite to pick and choose 
often the most loyal candidates to political parties’.902 From 2000 onward the School of 
Magistrates (SOM) has managed the process of recruitment. As mentioned in Chapter 4, 
                                                          
896 Interview with investigative journalist no.1, 2010. 
897 Interview with urban advocate no.2, 2010. 
898 See also that in IDRA (2010), surveyed judges also rated other factors as important in increasing 
their performance such as training (20.4%) and improved facilities/equipment (15.8%). IDRA (2010) 
‘Corruption in Albania Perception and Experience: Judges Survey 2010’. 
899 Interview with rural judge no.10, 2010. 
900 Interview with urban judge no.2, 2010. 
901 Interview with rural judge no.2, 2010. 
902 Interview with urban advocate no.1, 2010. 
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90% of the recruited judges after 2000 have to graduate from the SOM. The majority of the 
interviewed judges noted that in the last decade, ‘the main problem in terms of the quality 
of bureaucracy has been the promotion of judges and not the recruitment’.903 In addition, 
the poor quality of bureaucracy has pushed judges to ‘find other ways to improve their 
economic status’.904 
After 2001, we saw a ‘clientelist’ rapport between corrupt judges, litigants and advocates 
being formed.905 Applying Green and Ward’s definition (2004:21) on ‘clientelism’, the judge 
(i.e. patron) exercises his power in favour of the law office/Sekser (i.e. client), who 
reciprocates by offering ‘personal gifts and guaranteeing loyalty’. As I showed in Chapters 4 
and 5, many judges in urban courts are linked with certain advocates in the role of 
middlemen ‘Sekser’ or law offices who ‘rent’ them for both their support in a court’s case 
and for access to other colleague judges in exchange for the payment.906 
There is a growing body of literature demonstrating that many public officials consider 
bribes as a rent for their services (Dabla-Norris and Wade 2002). This principal-agent 
relationship between judges and advocates (i.e. representatives of litigants) has influenced 
society’s perception of judicial decisions as a commodity, the judicial system as a ‘market’ 
and judges as suppliers of ‘justice’. And this has caused the ‘bribe’ or ‘gift’ given to judges 
to be seen as something normal. As one prosecutor put it, ‘it has become a cultural norm 
that the court’s decision has to be followed by a sort of reward or compensation provided 
by the winning party to the judge’.907 
Another aspect of ‘clientelism’ which is related to the ‘guaranteeing loyalty’ feature of 
judicial corruption is that corrupt judges are looking to hide their corrupt activities and are 
investing in intermediary mechanisms (i.e. law offices) which ‘act as their agents’.908 I argue 
that judges in urban areas are using law offices more often because the society there is 
more diverse and open, and the use of family ties is very difficult. So the ‘law office’ as a 
mechanism has been proved by corrupt judges in rural areas to have secured more secrecy 
and more loyalty.909 However, this additional investment has increased the cost of corrupt 
transactions (Rose-Ackerman 2010:219: Lambsdorff 2007:235). And this cost may be one of 
the reasons why the level of bribes has increased in the last decade in rural courts. 
                                                          
903 ‘…the main problem in terms of the quality of bureaucracy has been the promotion of judges and 
not the recruitment…thus establishing their career — a career which is not clearly defined in the law 
as there is no specific law or specific procedure explaining judicial careers ... ‘ Interview with rural 
judge no.1, 2010. 
904 ‘… one of the factors of judicial corruption is not only the poor salary but also other financial 
support that the state should provide to judges to improve their social status such as preferential 
mortgage loans or loans without interest. Judges should not feel inferior in the locality in which they 
work ... ‘ Interview with rural judge no.4, 2010. 
905 Interview with international observer no.3, 2010. 
906 Interview with academic no.1, 2010. 
907 Interview with urban prosecutor no.2, 2010. 
908 Interview with investigative journalist no.3, 2010. 
909 Interview with investigative journalist no.1, 2010. 
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My findings suggest that all the above factors – low wages, poor quality of bureaucracy and 
the ‘clientelist’ regime – have weakened the role of honest judges in the system and 
strengthened that of corrupt judges. A few advocates and judges noted that ‘honest judges 
rely only on their salary which is not sufficient to cover their basic needs’.910 The cost of 
living in rural courts is cheaper and this may be one of the reasons why many of the honest 
judges are in these courts. In striking contrast, corrupt judges seem to have abused the 
theory of poor salaries and used this claim as an excuse to the public to justify their 
demand for bribes. As a local observer told me, ‘it is not about the low wages because 
every judge before entering the system has agreed to earn as much… they cannot hide 
behind poor wages and accept bribes… yes, low wages influence but their role is not as 
important in causing judicial corruption as is often propagated by judges’.911 
Therefore, honest judges cannot advance in urban courts because the costs of living there 
are higher and, secondly, they do not have the financial power to ‘purchase’ their 
promotion as corrupt judges do.912 This has increased the number of corrupt judges in the 
system and institutionalised judicial corruption. As one judicial inspector noted, ‘the 
increase of salaries may help positive judges to detach from corruption and decrease the 
number of corrupt judges in the system’.913 
So honest judges are under constant pressure either to ‘conform to the system or 
withdraw’.914 According to Guerrero and Rodríguez-Oreggia (2008:359) the pressure of the 
institutional culture on the behaviour of the individual in relation to corruption is one of 
the factors that influence the individual’s choice to accept bribes. This means that if 
someone works in institutions where corruption is endemic, the individual is forced to 
become involved in corruption as otherwise he will not be able to ‘survive’. 
This phenomenon, according to Guerrero and Rodríguez-Oreggia (2008:359), produces a 
‘vicious circle’ of corruption that the individual lives in. An additional ingredient of the 
‘vicious circle’ is the low social cost of the bad reputation of a corrupt judge in public (Juin-
jen Chang and Chia-ying Liu 2007). I argued earlier that judicial corruption is ‘socially 
accepted as something normal in Albanian society’.915 According to Guerrero and 
Rodríguez-Oreggia (2008:363) in developing countries, where the social cost is not 
perceived as a collective harm by the public, the level of corruption in the system becomes 
paramount. 
In addition, ‘a corrupt judge sees an honest judge as a threat as the latter may make a 
difference in the public with his service and this may expose the former more in public and 
the corrupt judge may risk losing his job’.916 Also the ‘cost of service offered by honest 
                                                          
910 Interview with rural judge no.10. 
911 Interview with local observer no.1, 2010. 
912 Interview with investigative journalist no.2, 2010. 
913 Interview with HCJ inspector no.2, 2010. 
914 Interview with urban advocate no.7, 2011. 
915 Interview with urban prosecutor no.4, 2010. 
916 Interview with urban advocate no.7, 2011. 
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judges is less expensive than the one offered by corrupt ones’917 and this can significantly 
reduce the level of the bribes and, as a result, reduce the revenues of corrupt judges. The 
arguments cited above may explain why the majority of honest judges work mainly in the 
first instance courts in rural areas. 
 
 
Cost of Punishment 
 
Another factor of judicial corruption suggested by my findings is the low cost of 
punishment of judges for corruption. Economic theories argue that if the value of the bribe 
exceeds the expected cost of penalties of law enforcement, judicial corruption is more 
likely. In other words, judges will not only be pushed to accept informal payment to 
subsidise the deficit from poor wages but they will also consider the cost of prosecution for 
corruption, which is another risk of losing their job. Guerrero and Rodríguez-Oreggia 
(2008:359) argue that both the briber and the bribee base their decision on a calculated 
cost benefit of their actions. 
This is what Becker (1968:170) calls the cost of crime. So if the profit from the bribe is 
higher than the cost of being punished or caught by law enforcement agencies then a judge 
is more willing to accept bribes. In the Albanian context, the benefit of paying for a bribe is 
far higher than the cost of being prosecuted for judicial corruption, and in these 
circumstances the quality of enforcement, argue Becker and Stigler (1974:4), ‘would tend 
to decline as the gain to violators increases’. 
My data suggest that there are two factors which make the cost of convicting judicial 
corruption cheap. First, the general social perception that corruption is not punished and 
no members of the public are interested enough to chase it918 (Krastev 2003). This 
phenomenon is otherwise known as the culture of impunity.919 According to a 2011 report 
by Freedom House, ‘official immunity and a frequent lack of determination to see cases 
through to a verdict nourished the country’s already widespread culture of impunity’.920 
My interviewed academics noted that the law either is not enforced to high profile public 
officials or enforced to those targeted by the political elite. As one academic put it, ‘On one 
hand the law is enforced selectively and on the other public institutions shut their eyes 
against actions of those public officials who violate the law… and this selective 
enforcement of law has created the idea that the law has a secondary role in society and 
                                                          
917 Interview with rural judge no.10, 2010. 
918 Interview with academic no.3, 2010. 
919 Ekanem (2012:51) defines a culture of impunity as ‘a situation in which people in society have 
come to believe that they can do whatever they want with impunity, which means exemption from 
punishment, harm or recrimination’. 
920 See Gjipali, G. (2011) ‘Freedom House, Nation in Transit 2011 Report’, section on Albania, p.53; 
available at http://67.192.63.63/images/File/nit/2011/NIT-2011-Albania.pdf [accessed April 
15, 2012]. 
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that is an instrument in the hands of the powerful elite.’921 And this sceptical public 
perception has weakened the public pressure to corrupt judges922 (Prato 2004:75). 
The second factor is the cost of the immunity of judges. While the immunity granted to 
judges is intended to protect the judiciary from the intrusion of two other branches, in 
practice this has proved to have become a barrier to prosecutors investigating judges for 
corruption. According to one prosecutor, ‘when there are indications (indicia) that a judge 
is engaged in a corrupt activity they cannot start an investigation without asking the HCJ to 
lift the immunity of the suspected judge’. The interviewed prosecutors also claimed that 
‘this procedure exposes their investigation and makes it very difficult for them to collect 
evidence’.923 Another legal barrier is ‘article 289 of the Procedural Penal Code which 
requires prosecutors to seek authorisation before using special measures to collect 
evidence [i.e. phone tapping, interception of communication, search and seizure in private 
or office]’.924 It should also be mentioned that there is a tendency for judges and 
prosecutors protect each other,925 something indicated in Chapter 5. I elaborate more on 
this aspect in the section on ‘social control conditions’ below. 
That no judges have been condemned for corruption speaks volumes about the low cost of 
the conviction of judicial corruption in Albania. The majority of interviewed judges 
disagreed with the claims of the interviewed prosecutors and mentioned that immunity per 
se is not in fact the real problem but pointed to the lack of judges’ integrity, 
professionalism and poor economic conditions. However, the international community 
holds the same position as my interviewed prosecutors.926 
I now turn to the other specific research questions which help to understand the dynamic 






                                                          
921 Interview with academic no.3, 2010. 
922 Interview with local observer no.1, 2010. 
923 Interview with urban prosecutor no.2, 2010. 
924 Interview with urban prosecutor no.2, 2010 
925 Interview with rural judge no.10, 2010. 
926 According to the European Commission, ‘One of the main factors obstructing investigations into 
possible cases of corruption in the judiciary is the full immunity enjoyed by judges. It will be 
necessary to limit or abolish the immunity of judges, which requires changes to the constitution.’ 
See European Commission (2011) ‘Albania Progress Report 2011’, p.11, Enlargement Strategy and 
Main Challenges 2011-12, Brussels, October 12; available at 
http://ec.europa.eu/enlargement/pdf/key_documents/2011/package/al_rapport_2011_en
.pdf [accessed April 15, 2012]. 
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Presence of Bribes in Court Cases 
 
In this section I explain why judicial corruption is more evident in criminal cases and why 
the level of bribes is higher in civil cases. A few interviewed advocates noted that ‘there is a 
price list in the black market for both civil and criminal cases’.927 In a civil case the price of 
the bribe is negotiated based on the value of the court’s case by both judge and litigants 
(i.e. represented by their advocate).928 In criminal cases ‘the situation is simpler because of 
the criminal procedure, and because there is a detailed price list in the black market known 
in the community of lawyers’.929 For instance, ‘there is a price for tampering with evidence, 
for discounting a year from the imprisonment, or for changing the decision from custody in 
prison to house arrest’.930 The majority of interviewees suggested that ‘corruption is more 
evident in criminal cases but the level of bribes is higher in civil cases’.931 There are three 
explanations implied by my findings. 
First, corruption in criminal cases is easy to measure and more predictable (e.g. a large 
discounted imprisonment rate from 25 years to 15 years or an acquittal for a corrupt 
politician whose evidence for imprisoning is clear).932 Second, in contrast with criminal 
cases, the procedure of civil cases is more complex, the timing of the final verdict is 
lengthier (it may take up to seven years if the case goes to the High Court) and the 
outcome is uncertain.933 Taking into account the commercial nature of many of the civil 
cases, all these factors increase the cost of accessing the court as the value of both 
favourable decisions and the time of the court’s process become very precious, therefore 
judges not only ‘sell their support but also the time to speed up the process’934 (Lui 1985; 
Leff 1964). 
Third, while courts remain the main setting for resolving civil cases, in criminal cases, 
people, especially in rural areas, resort to customary norms to solve their disputes. Apart 
from the blood feuds, some of my interviewed judges in the North mentioned that ‘there 
are non-violent customary norms preferred by people in the hinterland because of their 
advantages compared with institutional ones’.935 So the outcome of the process can be 
                                                          
927 Interview with urban advocate no.3, 2010. 
928 Interview with urban advocate no.3, 2010. 
929 Interview with urban advocate no.3, 2010. 
930 Interview with urban advocate no.6, 2010. 
931 Interview with rural judge no.10, 2010. 
932 Interview with urban advocate no.3, 2010. 
933 Former Minister of Justice, Enkelejd Alibeaj said that in the inspection conducted by the Ministry 
of Justice 2008, they found out that there were occasions when it took the Appeal Court up to eight 
months to publish the court decision. 
934 Interview with urban advocate no.2, 2010. 
935 ‘...there are non-violent customary norms preferred by people in the hinterland because of their 
advantages compared with institutional ones...mostly they are applied in cases of property issues 
and cases of honour related to divorce cases .. but in general they have been more on property 
disputes…in the hinterland there were no documents related to land ownership ...this is how 
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more predictable, these customary norms are less costly (i.e. no legal and court fees), 
efficient (very short time-scale) and enforceable (accepted and recognised in society) 
(Cooter and Rubinfeld 1989).936 
Interviewed judges in rural courts highlighted that, with the increased modernisation of the 
rural areas and rapid mobility, the role of customary norms is weakening and forms of 
judicial corruption are becoming more commercialised. And this is the reason why patterns 
of judicial corruption are mimicking those of urban areas. As one rural judge put it, 
‘patterns of judicial corruption are moving from those based on customary norms to 
bribery… it is about money… it is going there’.937 This suggests that the weakening of the 
customary norms may also increase the level of bribes in rural courts in the near future. In 
the early period of transition (1990-97) people ‘used family ties more frequently to 
influence judges and the appearance of bribes in rural courts was rare’.938 
 
 
Prevalence of Corruption in the Higher Courts 
 
Now I turn to explain why the level of bribes is higher in the appeal courts and the High 
Court and how this has influenced the level of payments offered to be promoted in these 
courts. Chapter 4 demonstrated that some of the symptoms of judicial corruption in 
Albania are lack of transparency, vague laws and uncertainty about the legal doctrine. It 
should also be mentioned that the alternative dispute resolution is inefficient at best (Kallfa 
and Sulstarova 2011). Buscaglia and Dakolias (1999) argue that all these factors increase 
the concentration of power in the hands of judges and give them a monopoly over court 
services. This has returned the judiciary to what Shleiffer and Vishney (1993:606) call a 
‘joint monopolist agency’ model. Shleiffer and Vishney (1993:606) argue that the ‘joint 
monopolist agency’ is where the output depends on the service of different departments 
within the public agency or different agencies that are involved in the output of one public 
service.939 
                                                                                                                                                                    
ownership of the land was determined here before, no  written document existed, this was the 
culture,...just saying this is my land and this is yours, and everybody knew..so, if they had a dispute 
they asked the committee of elders to solve it...’ Interview with urban judge no.5, 2010. 
936 To illustrate, if someone accuses a neighbour of having robbed his household without any clear 
evidence, the dispute will be resolved if the accused finds twelve reputable local individuals called 
‘Betar’ selected by both parties plus the priest (or for Muslims, 24 people) who will testify (give an 
oath) that the accused didn’t commit the crime. 
937 Interview with rural judge no.1, 2010. 
938 Interview with rural advocate no.2, 2010. 
939 Shleiffer and Vishney (1993:605) offer the example of a builder who needs different permits from 
the police, fire and water authorities. They argue that in these circumstances the competition 
between several departments within the agency for the bribe can influence the market price of the 
bribes within that agency. 
207 
In the context of my study, different departments within the agency represent all levels of 
courts and the output is the court decision. The cost of the output will depend on whether 
the case will be appealed and if it has been successful in Appeal or the High Court. While 
each of the instances of the courts acts as an independent department within the agency, 
there is competition between all courts’ levels that somehow influences the bribe’s level at 
the first instance courts and appeal courts. Interviewed advocates noted that judges of the 
first instance courts ask for ‘smaller payments than those of appeal courts and judges of 
the High Court’.940 The former bear the risk that the decision may be returned down or 
acquitted by the High Court. The cost of a returned case to either the judge of the first 
instance court or the appeal courts is also higher than that of the High Court because ‘the 
ratio of returned cases from appeal or the High Court to lower courts is one of the 
indicators of professionalism which is taken into account by the HCJ in the promotion of 
judges’.941 The higher the number of returned cases, the lower the score of professionalism 
of the judges. 
In addition, judges of the High Court are immune from inspections by both the HCJ and the 
MOJ. So the cost of potential prosecution for corruption to a judge of the High Court is 
almost zero942 while reward from the bribes is very high. The Shleiffer and Vishney (1993) 
model suggests that the increase of returned cases by appeal courts and the High Court to 
the first instance courts in the last decade is related more to competition for bribes rather 
than for legal reasons. As I showed in Chapter 4, several judges of first instance courts 
highlighted that they were overwhelmed with ‘the increasing number of returned cases 
from appeal courts and the High Court and by poor reasoning or contradictory arguments 
[i.e. different rationale for similar cases] provided by these courts’.943 
The high revenue generated by the collection of bribes with minimal costs for being 
prosecuted for corruption seems to have increased the demand of judges to be promoted 
to appeal courts, and the High Court. This explains why the value of bribes paid by judges 
to be promoted to appeal courts is at least two times higher than the payment offered to 
be promoted to ‘career courts’.944 The amount to be appointed to the High Court is at least 
five times higher than that offered to be promoted in ‘career courts’, and two times higher 
than that offered to be promoted in appeal courts.945 This mechanism of collecting bribes 
(i.e. appeal of cases by the higher courts to lower courts for profit and not for legitimate 
reasons) is another explanation in addition to that made earlier in the ‘democratic 
legitimation of law’ section for why the majority of my interviewees rated judges of appeal 
                                                          
940 Interview with urban advocate no.7, 2011. 
941 Interview with urban advocate no.7, 2011. 
942 Interview with rural judge no.2, 2010. 
943 Interview with rural judge no.2, 2010. According to interviewed urban advocate no.2, the number 
of unified decisions (i.e. which are intended to unify the legal practice) issued by the High Court has 
decreased in the last two years which shows ‘the lack of will by the High Court to avoid contradictory 
legal interpretations’. 
944 Interview with international observer no.2, 2010. 
945 My interviewees provided more or less the same figures to those of Global Integrity Report 
(2010) ‘Global Integrity Report: Albania, 2010’, Washington DC; available at 
http://www.globalintegrity.org/report/Albania/2010/ [accessed July 11, 2011]. 
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Competition between Judicial Corruption and Organised Crime 
 
The majority of interviewed prosecutors and advocates suggested that the low cost of 
prosecution and widespread use of bribes in the judiciary explains ‘the decrease in the 
violent patterns of interplay between organised crime and judicial corruption after 
2005’.946 It may also explain why judicial corruption moved from ‘criminalisation’ to 
‘market-oriented’ corruption. The theory of ‘property-rights of mafia emergence’ argues 
that Mafia-like organised crime (i.e. offering protection of property rights) can emerge in 
transitional countries that follow a rapid political-economical transition from one governing 
system to another, where the distribution of property rights increases because of 
privatisation, and as a result demand for protection rises. In a situation where laws are 
ambiguous and enforcement of the law is weak, people look for informal ways to enforce 
their rights which gives rise to mafias (Varese 2012). 
The majority of my interviewed prosecutors dealing with serious organised crime 
confirmed that ‘during 1996-99 when the state almost collapsed, the protection of 
property rights was dominated by local organised crime groups which monopolised this 
service by extending their direct influence to courts and state police’.947 But as the state 
strengthened after 2000, the rapport changed and the market of supply and protection of 
property rights became more competitive. Other public actors (corrupt state police, judges, 
prosecutors, bailiffs) and private actors (private police and private bailiffs) entered the 
market. The demand for protection by organised crime decreased.948 
A few interviewed prosecutors and advocates dealing with organised crime noted four 
factors that may have diminished the role of organised crime in supplying and offering 
protection in the last decade: first, other criminal activities (such as drug trafficking) have 
become more cost beneficial than the business of protection;949 second, people are more 
willing to pay bribes to a corrupt official than to organised crime because the former is not 
violent and is easier to denounce for corruption, as a last resort, if he does not keep his 
promise.950 
                                                          
946 Interview with urban advocate no.4, 2010. 
947 Interview with prosecutor no.4, 2010. 
948 Interview with investigative journalist no.2, 2010. 
949 Interview with urban prosecutor no.3, 2010. 
950 In 2012 one citizen accused a high profile police officer in Tirana after being disappointed that the 
corrupt police officer asked him for more money to close the investigation than they formerly 
agreed. Panorama Gazette (2012) ‘Corruption, closed files with money, the chief of police in 
handcuffs’ (Korrupsioni, mbyllte dosjet me para, shefi i policise ne pranga), April 17. 
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Third, customary norms such as vengeance and blood feuds are ‘still influential in rural 
areas, and informal protection offered by organised crime which is often violent can 
produce victims’.951 According to Becker (1968) the cost of crimes bearing victims are 
generally more expensive because family members of the victims will follow up with 
revenge on organised crime.  This will increase the cost of protection for organised crime 
when violent crimes such as vengeance and blood feud occur. Fourth, many high-profile 
organised crime groups are entering legal businesses and they too prefer public institutions 
de jure to resolve their disputes with other legal businesses.952 
Organised crime’s move away from the supply of protection after 2001 has increased the 
demand for corrupt judges and this has raised the price of bribes in the judiciary. It can be 
said that in a society that is organised through ‘clientelist’ networks, the increase of judicial 
independence of a corrupt judiciary increases the bargaining power of the latter in the 
market of protection and supply of property rights. 
However, the situation is not the same in rural areas where customary norms are still 
strong and big families continue to exert control in their own territories. Although in 
decline as a phenomenon, ‘there are still big families in rural areas who offer protection to 
businesses in their community to keep their reputation high and generate income’.953 
Other interviewed advocates and prosecutors in rural areas pointed out that the situation 
is improving.954 
I also argue that the ‘monopolistic’ behaviour of the judiciary increases the cost of 
accessing courts and this raises the opportunity for the powerful elite and organised crime, 
which have the financial means, to influence the judiciary and distort its role in delivering 
justice to society. So while a corrupt judiciary can minimise organised crime’s role in 
offering supply and protection of property rights in societies where corruption is rampant, 
it does also increase the chances of organised crime accessing courts and forming 
‘clientelist’ networks with corrupt judges.955 
Contrary to Gambetta (1993) who sees organised crime as a competitor of the judiciary 
(true during the civil unrest in Albania), in societies where corruption is endemic, my 
findings suggest that this relationship can change with the strengthening of the state, and 
corruption can serve as a link between corrupt judges and organised crime.956 The former 
offers bribes and protection, and the latter offers access to both the court system and its 
services. On the other hand, HPOC offers access to judges for promotion via its links with 
the political elite and high profile judges, and the latter, in return, favour HPOC when the 
case comes into their court. The ‘clientelist’ framework also explains how the networks of 
the ‘Mafia bourgeoisie’ are established. 
                                                          
951 Interview with rural advocate no.2, 2010. 
952 Interview with urban advocate no.3, 2010. 
953 Interview with rural prosecutor no.3, 2010 
954 Interview with rural prosecutor no.4, 2010. 
955 Interview with urban advocate no.2, 2010. 
956 See also Weng, P. (2012) ‘Mafia Emergence and Transplantation: a Modified Framework for 
Understanding the Economic Theory of the Mafia’, unpublished. 
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Social Control Conditions 
 
Social control theories suggest another set of conditions which help to understand the 
roots of judicial corruption from a different prospect. In the context of this study, the role 
of successive changes of the court structure is considered as another legacy condition that 
has diminished the society’s trust in the courts. The poor social status of judges is also 
argued to be a particular social condition for corruption. Claims for a better social status in 
society have pushed judges to succumb in their subculture and to justify their corrupt 
behaviour. The asymmetrical role of customary norms to judicial corruption is also noted 
and explained. 
Social control theories argue that causes of delinquency are strongly influenced by social 
factors rather than by institutional ones. Society is seen as a system of shared values 
embraced by its individuals bonded together and integrated into the same social system 
which Durkheim (1964:73) called solidarity or ‘collective consciousness’. The disruption of 
the social bonds between members of the society and their community (i.e. solidarity) has 
disorganised society and as a result ‘anomie’ (i.e. lawlessness) has been created. Durkheim 
(1964) argues that one of the main factors in the anomie is the transition of society from 
‘mechanical’ (pre-industrial) societies to industrial ‘organic’ societies. 
In similar theoretical settings, Sutherland (1934) suggests that contemporary factors such 
as rapid transformation of law, free market policies, urbanisation, and individualism may 
disrupt social control and weaken social institutions such as family, friendship, church and 
neighbourhood. Individuals will then be thrown into informal forms of relationship and this 
will erode the role of government institutions. A tension between social institution and 
formal institution may be formed and institutions disorganised. Sutherland (1934) 
considers institutional disorganisation as one of the main causes of delinquency and argues 
that ‘such disorganization fosters the cultural traditions and cultural conflicts that support 
such activities’ (Jensen 2003:2). 
 
 
Disruption of Legal Culture and Control 
 
This study argues that institutional disorganisation has happened consistently throughout 
the modern history of Albania (i.e. 1912-2011). Several political and economical factors 
have played a significant role in constructing an uncertain environment where the 
weakening of social institutions (customary norms) has increased and where, on the other 
hand, the building of solid, credible and functional Western-like institutions (formal 
institutions) based on the rule of law seems to have struggled957 (Anastasi 2007). The 
parallel existence of two weak institutions – social and official – has created normlessness 
or anomie of both modern law and customary norms. Judges are persuaded by ‘bribes, 
                                                          
957 Interview with academic no.1, 2010. 
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social pressure or powerful elites rather than by the law in their decision-making’.958 In 
short, both social and official institutions are not taken seriously by people and this has 
opened gaps for corruption. There have been several factors that have undermined the 
legal culture and influenced society’s negative perception of the role of courts. 
Successive changes of a governing system in short periods of time could be one of the main 
conditions.959 The years 1912-39 could be called a period of swift change of governance 
and court structures. While the governing system changed five times, the court 
organisation changed at least seven times in only 27 years – 1912, 1913, 1914, 1921, 1923, 
1925, and 1929 (Nova 1982). Albania was governed by an emergent government 
(Government of Vlora) (1912-14); a foreign monarch under international protectorate 
(1914-21); a parliamentary monarchy with a collegial body playing the role of King (1921-
24); a parliamentary republic (1924-28); and a parliamentary monarchy (1928-39) (Anastasi 
2007). The change of both court structures and laws from the Ottoman law to European 
civil law countries’ model created uncertainty among the community of judges and society 
at large which were familiar with the Ottoman law (Elezi 1999: Nova 1982:70).960 
The confusion of judicial models was another distinctive factor during the period 1912-39. 
In 1919, the executive was not clear what law to follow (Ottoman or modern),961 and what 
court tariffs to apply962 in opening the new courts. The discordance of the governing 
system between that applied by the book and that applied in reality was also very 
problematic. From 1924 to 1928 the governing structure was a monarchy de jure but in 
practice it worked as a parliamentary republic (Anastasi 2007:67; Brozi 2007:344). This 
created a conflict among the political elite on how participation in law-making should work, 
something that undermined the democratisation of the institutions. 
The overlapping of legal systems is another influential factor to be considered. It became a 
concern in 1912-29. While at the central level the governing structure was similar to 
European civil law countries, at the local level the administrative law was still Ottoman 
(Anastasi 2007:43). In the late 1920s the Penal Code (1928) was copied from Italy and the 
Civil Code (1929) adopted partly from German and Austrian models (Nova 1982:76-83).963 
The procedural law (i.e. civil and penal) however, was still based on Ottoman law. So this 
contradictory legal system, where people in local areas were following a different law from 
that at the central level, confused society more and weakened its relationship with the 
courts. 
Uncertainty over what legal school and legal terminology to apply were other potential 
factors that harmed legal tradition. Many judges had problems with the new terminology 
as many were educated in a different system from that which they were working with (in 
                                                          
958 Interview with investigative journalist no.2, 2010. 
959 Interview with urban judge no.2, 2010. 
960 Albanian National Archive, File no.I-76, 1923. 
961 Albanian National Archive, File no.I-8, 1919. 
962 Albanian National Archive, File no.II-1, 1919. 
963 Several laws, such as the Penal Code, Procedural Code and Inheritance Law, were copied from 
Italian legislation and were prepared by an Italian expert called Giulio Mezinger di Presenthal who 
was hired by the Albanian government from 1925. Albanian National Archive, File no.I-117, 1925. 
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1912-20 most of them were educated in the Ottoman law schools and were practising civil 
law model courts – some of them had problems with the Albanian language) (Elezi 
1999:33).964 While after 1925 the situation improved, because many students went to 
Western schools, there were still problems with the legal interpretation because legal 
terminology was still Ottoman law. In the period 1928-39 judges who did not know the 
Ottoman language were not able to work.965 The situation became baffling in 1938 because 
neither the judges nor the people were familiar with the new ‘modern’ laws966 and people 
were incriminated for issues that had not been considered crimes before. This may have 
been another factor that influenced people’s negative perception of the courts and laws.967 
Inconsistent application of the ‘modern’ court system throughout the country was another 
factor that contributed negatively to the enhancement of legal tradition and society’s 
perception of the courts. There were areas such as the hinterland in the North (including 
the cities of Puke, Malsi e Madhe, Dukagjin and Kosovo) that had a different court system 
(i.e. Commission of Xhibal) from the rest of the country and that applied the ‘Kanun’ (Elezi 
1999:22). This created a clash of jurisdiction in the North between the ‘modern’ judicial 
system applied in the cities and the Commission of Xhibal working in the hinterland. Often, 
highlanders committing crimes in the city would not accept being tried in the ‘modern’ 
courts.968 
The Kanun was only codified in 1933 and for the period 1912-33 the Commission of Xhibal 
(founded in 1858) often abused applying the norms and their interpretation because the 
Kanun was not written anywhere until 1933 but transmitted orally to the people (Durham 
1994). Another concern was that cases going through the Commission of Xhibal limited the 
right to appeal because the decisions of the Commission of Xhibal were not appealed in the 
‘modern’ courts.969 Judges of the ‘modern’ courts had little knowledge of the Kanun and 
those of the Commission of Xhibal knew little about ‘modern’ law.970 Judges were unhappy 
and confused in 1928 when the Albanian King Zog reinforced the jurisdiction of the 
Commission of Xhibal and recognised that all conflicts related to inheritance in the 
hinterlands of the Northern district (i.e. Shkoder, Diber and Kosovo) should be resolved 
under the Kanun of Leke Dukagjini and Kanun of Skanderbeg (Nova 1982:83). 
So the successive change of the court system and laws described above allowed judges to 
abuse and manipulate, with the confusion of the terminology and laws.971 Thus judicial 
corruption flourished in the court system and legal tradition seems to have been marked by 
                                                          
964 Albanian National Archive, File no.II-56, 1921. 
965 Albanian National Archive, File no.II-600, 1937. 
966 See official letter no.3543, October 13, 1939 at Albanian National Archive, File no.II-435, 1930. 
967 Albanian National Archive, File no.II-634, 1938. 
968 See official letter no.117, dated May 12, 1920 written to the Ministry of Justice by the Court of 
Appeal of Shkoder. Albanian National Archive, File no.II-23, 1920.  
969 Albanian National Archive, File no.II-355, 1928. 
970 Albanian National Archive, File no.II-510, 1933. 
971 See Inspection Act of the Court of Kavaje in 1919 at Albanian National Archive, File 155. 
213 
a negative perception by society.972 I explain below that similar consequences of the 
change of the courts’ structure and laws continued even during communism and the 
transition to democracy. 
We see similarities between the symptoms of judicial corruption today and those 
evidenced in 1912-39, such as poor reasoning,973 breach of due process,974 nepotism,975 
lack of professionalism,976 poor infrastructure,977 and, lack of courts in the hinterland.978 It 
is interesting to note that in one Inspection Act of the courts in 1938, among some of the 
problems found in the court system, the most distinguishing one was the adaptation of 
judges to the culture of allowing cases to be postponed for long periods. The judicial 
inspector of that time labelled it as a ‘gangrene of our court system’.979 This pattern 
continues to be a concern even today. In 2011 around 50% of the civil cases tried in the 
biggest court of the country, the First Instance Court of Tirana, were postponed.980 
As mentioned earlier, the change of court structure and its implications for the legal 
tradition continued even during the communist period.981 From 1944 to 1989 the 
architecture of the courts changed several times (1945, 1946, 1951 and 1968) and the law 
applied was transplanted from overseas – the Communist Soviet Law (1946-60).982 The 
institution of the advocacy was abrogated in 1961 because it was considered a mechanism 
of the Western ideology of the rule of law (Nova 1982:132). Again the change of the court 
system generated many problems. One of the characteristic consequences of the rapid 
change in 1946-61 was the judges’ poor knowledge of law and their ‘lack of understanding 
of the institutions of civil law’.983 Western educated judges familiar with the ‘old’ system 
                                                          
972 See the inspection act of the court of Peshkopi in 1935 at Albanian National Archive, File no.II-
568. 
973 See documents of the Court of Lushnje, December 5, 1919, at Albanian National Archive, File 
no.1-20, 1919. 
974 See the Inspection Act of the Court of Elbasan in 1921 at Albanian National Archive, File no.I-40, 
1921. 
975 See the Inspection Act of the Court of Gjirokastra in 1930 at Albanian National Archive, File no.II-
442, 1930. 
976 See Inspection Acts no.5 and 6, of the Court of Vlora, September 15, 1926, at Albanian National 
Archive, File no.II-263, 1926. 
977 See the concerns of the Court of Korca in 1924 at Albanian National Archive, File no.II-164, 1924. 
978 See the requests of both the provinces of Mat and Gjakove (Kosovo) in 1924 at Albanian National 
Archive, File no.II-220, 1924. 
979 See Inspection Act no.83/VII, December 7, 1938, p.1, Albanian National Archive, File no.II-634, 
1938. 
980 See Lombard, P. and Stienstra, D. (2011) ‘The Use of Courtrooms at the Tirana and Durres District 
Courts’, USAID Albania, Final Study Report, p.11. 
981 It should be remembered that Albania was invaded by Nazi fascists during 1939-44 but apart 
from a few changes to civil and criminal procedures, the same court system remained. The only new 
court opened was a Military Court controlled by the high ranking officers of the Italian army and Nazi 
Germans in 1944 (Nova 1982:89). 
982 Albanian National Archive, File no.18, 1952. 
983 Albanian National Archive, File no.22, 1963. 
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claimed in 1948 that they ‘did not know how to deal and how to act with the [communist] 
laws’ (Pashko 1948:61). 
Even during the transition to democracy, most of the interviewed judges for this study 
suggested that legal inconsistency and the change of court structure affected the quality of 
the judiciary and produced similar outcomes of judicial corruption with those of the past.984 
As mentioned in Chapter 4, for the period 1990-98, Albania was governed by a presidential 
republic system and applied a three-tier court system: (1) first instance, (2) appeal courts 
and (3) the Court of Cassation (similar to the French model). 
During this period there was a series of successive changes of law that affected the 
organisational structure of the judiciary: the Law on Main Constitutional Provisions 1991 
(establishes the separation of power, immunity of judges, HCJ, Constitution Court); Law on 
Organisation of Justice 1997 (details the organisation of courts in the three-tier system, 
stipulates the role of judges and prosecutors in the court process, and also introduces the 
accountability of judges and prosecutors); Albanian Constitution of 1998 (constitutes the 
separation of powers, immunity of judges and other aspects of the due process); Law on 
Judicial Power 1998 (prosecution office is separated from the courts, becomes 
independent, and removed from the umbrella of the HCJ) (Pregja 2008).985 
The 1998 Law,986 which was amended five times until the current Law on Judicial Power 
2008,987 has also changed the model and the composition of the courts. The model of the 
High Court and the Constitutional Court were adopted from countries which had a different 
governing system (Federative) from Albania (Unitarian). The Court of Cassation changed to 
the High Court, imitating somewhat the US model of the Supreme Court. The model of the 
Constitutional Court was copied from the German model (Toro 2001). 
The adopted contradictory judicial models have further ‘confused judges about what legal 
doctrine to follow and this has opened up gaps for abuse and misinterpretation of the 
law’.988 The majority of the interviewed judges pointed out that contradictory 
interpretation of law by the High Court is one of the sources of judicial corruption because 
‘judges of the first instance or appeal court are not certain what decision of the High Court 
to take as a reference’989 and this gives judges a level playing field to abuse. 
                                                          
984 Interview with urban judge no.2, 2010. 
985 Interview with rural judge no.10, 2010. 
986 Some administrative aspects of the court organisation were also made so the assistant judges 
were also removed from the system, the chief secretary who was the same rank as the Chancellor of 
the Court was introduced. The opening of special courts was also introduced for the first time which 
allowed the opening of Serious Crimes Courts in 2004 and of the Administrative Court which is still in 
process. The 1998 Law has been amended at least five times (1999, 2000, 2001, 2003 and 2008) 
(Pregja 2008:63-78) 
987 The 1998 Law was amended in 1999, 2000, 2001, 2003 and 2008 (Pregja 2008:68). 
988 Interview with urban advocate no.3, 2010. 
989 Interview with rural judge no.2, 2010. 
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Mixing different European civil law countries in preparing Albanian laws has influenced 
their quality. As an example, the Penal Code was amended at least 19 times990 between 
1990 and 2009, while the Tax Law was changed 65 times in the period 1990-2011. Some 
interviewees claimed that defective laws give a wide discretion to corrupt judges to 
speculate and abuse legal terms. As one advocate put it, ‘flawed laws have always been a 
weapon of corrupt judges, because laws are badly formulated, poorly translated from 
Western models, and they lack contextualisation with the Albanian reality’.991 
The mixture of the different legal cultures has weakened the quality of law and this has also 
been an avenue for judicial corruption.992 While there are no records showing from which 
models the Albanian Codes were copied, the majority of my interviewees suggested that 
the Criminal Code is a mixed adaptation of French and Italian models whereas the 
Procedural Criminal Code was mostly borrowed from the Italian experience. 
The Civil Code is copied from the French and Romanian models. And the Administrative, 
Labour, and Commercial codes are adopted from a cocktail of Swiss, German and 
Portuguese versions.993 The mixture of different legal experiences confuses judges because 
they ‘find it difficult to understand the purposes of certain procedural devices’994 such as 
the ‘summary trials’995 (i.e. if the accused admits the offence before the trial, a third of his 
sentence will be redeemed) which are still questioned in the literature for their 
implications on the due process and criminal justice policies generally (Ashworth and 
Zedner 2007; Newburn 1995). Some of the adopted laws are ‘even outdated in their home 
countries’.996 
To sum up this argument, my data collected for the period 1912-2011 suggest that 
successive changes of governing system, court structure and rapid amendment of laws has 
undermined legal tradition, has negatively influenced society’s perception of the courts and 
this has created favourable conditions for corrupt judges to exploit the justice system. As 
one judge put it, ‘one of the main reasons for judicial corruption is the lack of a cohesive 
legal system and a disrupted legal tradition. It has always been attempted in our legal 
                                                          
990 Interview with academic no.1, 2010. 
991 Interview with urban advocate no.1, 2010. 
992 Interview with urban advocate no.6, 2010. 
993 Interview with urban judge no.2, 2010. 
994 Interview with urban advocate no.3, 2010. 
995 ‘…we find  it difficult to understand the purposes of certain procedural devices such as the 
“summary trials”... these  trials are a special kind of judgment which is aimed to be beneficial to the 
criminal justice system, and indirectly beneficial to the defendant…but truly, based on my extensive 
experience as an advocate working with criminal cases, judges do take bribes on these cases… 
because accepting the “summary trial” for  an offence which is  punishable by 9 years in prison will 
automatically deduct 6 years…it’s a very high margin of discount on the penalty…and both judges 
and parties play with it…it is a mechanism which is increasing the level of corruption in the 
judiciary...’ Interview with urban advocate no.3, 2010. 
996 Interview with urban advocate no.3, 2010. 
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tradition to import laws from other legal and cultural realities of European models but the 
process has been artificial.’997 
 
 
Judicial Quest for Status 
 
Another factor suggested by my data was the impact of low social status of judges on 
judicial corruption. Initially I thought that in societies derived from a communist system 
and where the class difference was not of great concern, the disparity of social status 
would not have been a major factor in corruption. However, as I show below, in post-
communist societies where the role of customary norms is still powerful (i.e. kin 
societies),998 low social status999 plays a significant role in weakening or strengthening the 
self-control of a judge against corruption. 
Reckless (1967) argues that individuals are influenced by internal and external factors 
known as ‘social pressure’ – such as lack of opportunity, poor living conditions, low social 
status, aggression or hostility – which ‘pushes’ or ‘pulls’ someone to contain or surrender 
to the criminal environment (Jones 2006:288). The majority of the interviewed judges 
claimed that they had a poor social status in society. They also pointed out that ‘a fair social 
status would be a moral barrier for judges to not socialise with the litigants or third parties 
and avoid ex parte meetings, as this would undermine their prestige in society’.1000 A few 
interviewees speculated that the political elite wishes to keep the profile of judges low as 
this helps the political elite control and manipulate judges easily.1001 This may be another 
explanation as to why the executive resists increasing the budgets of courts, something 
that would help improve the status of judges. 
                                                          
997 Interview with urban judge no.1, 2010. 
998 According to Wolf (1966:7) ‘kin societies’ are those in which family plays a multi-task role such as 
the ‘usual functions of economic provisioning, socialization, the exchange of sexual services, the 
bestowal of affect…in small units of output and in quick succession, with a relatively low cost and 
overhead’. Wolf (1966:2) conducted his fieldwork in countries with similar cultural characteristics to 
Albania such as Latin America and European Mediterranean. 
999 Social status is defined as ‘the relative rank that an individual holds, with attendant rights, duties, 
and lifestyle, in a social hierarchy based upon honour or prestige’. For more see Encyclopædia 
Britannica Online, Academic Edition, 2012; available at 
http://www.britannica.com/EBchecked/topic/551450/social-status [accessed April 24, 2012]. 
1000 Interview with urban judge no.7, 2010. 
1001 ‘… the political elite want to keep the profile of judges low, and this is key for the reputation of 
the judiciary before the public… they (political elite) do not make an effort to protect the judiciary 
but instead work to denigrate it. And this has a very negative impact on the community of judges 
generally and especially honest ones... a respectable social status of judges in public is very 
significant…it is important for judges and the public to see how the state respects the 
judiciary…’Interview with urban judge no.5, 2010. 
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As I showed in Chapter 4, judges dealing with cases of serious organised crime groups felt 
unprotected1002 and criminals, even in the courtroom, often threatened them.1003 So my 
data suggest that judges seek alternative ways such as bribes or support from the powerful 
elite, family or friends to maintain their high social status and this makes them socially 
dependent.1004 One of the judges revealed that once, when the media speculated that ‘he 
was threatened by criminals, the whole family was organised back home in around ten cars 
[40km away from the court] and came immediately to offer him protection’.1005  This judge 
made clear that it was his family that reacted immediately, and not the state. 
Social status was a concern even among the community of lawyers. Many interviewed 
judges and advocates in both urban and rural courts were not happy that the majority of 
judges were coming from the hinterland and not from urban areas. According to them this 
fact weakens the reputation of the judiciary in public as people will ‘perceive the judiciary 
as an institution represented by individuals who are using the institution as a form of 
integration with the hierarchy of society rather than as an institution that delivers 
justice’.1006 As shown in Chapter 5, some judges and advocates noted that judges coming 
from the hinterland were more vulnerable to social pressure because they would use their 
decision-making to satisfy both the powerful elite and organised crime, in exchange for the 
latter’s support to improve judges’ status in society.1007 
So the ‘integration’ paradigm could be another factor which facilitates the formation of 
‘clientelist’ networks between corrupt judges and organised crime. ‘Clientelism’ is not only 
based on the commercial benefit but also on other non-monetary favour exchanges such as 
access to the political elite (Della Porta and Mèny 1997). In addition, the ‘integration’ 
argument provides another explanation for the formation of the ‘Mafia bourgeoisie’ where 
to integrate with the superstructure one needs to use contaminated ‘clientelist’ networks 
and cede from ethics. 
Another concern revealed in my data was the social disparity among the community of 
lawyers. This is something that ‘affects the behaviour of judges in and out of the courtroom 
and this may push judges to underestimate the reasoning of colleagues, the arguments of 
the prosecutor and the defence of an advocate, and this may make judges biased’.1008 I 
discovered a tension between the prosecutor and judges which lay in the assumption that 
                                                          
1002 Interview with urban judge no.4, 2010. 
1003 In April 2012 one of the most notorious criminals, Dritan Dajti, accused of killing four agents of 
the special forces, threatened judges of the first instance of the Serious Crime Court during the trial. 
See Panorama Gazette (2012) ‘Dritan Dajti threatens and insults judges of Serious Crime Court’ 
(Dritan Dajti kercenon e shan Krimet e Renda), April 3. 
1004 Interview with rural judge no.3, 2010. 
1005 Interview with urban judge no.5,2010. 
1006 Interview with rural advocate no.2, 2010. 
1007 Interview with rural advocate no.1, 2010. 
1008 Interview with urban advocate no.1, 2010. 
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‘judges pretended to have a higher social status than the prosecutors in the justice 
system’.1009 
According to a few of the judges and prosecutors this class differentiation ‘stems from the 
School of Magistrates where students with high grades are selected to become judges and 
those with poorer grades to become prosecutors’.1010 In addition, in urban courts both 
judges and prosecutors felt they had a higher social status in society compared with 
advocates, for exactly the same reason (i.e. differences in professionalism). Interviewed 
advocates noted that they ‘did not feel they were being respected enough by judges and 
were often despised by them’.1011 I visited some of the coffee shops frequented by judges 
and advocates in both rural and urban areas and realised that judges were always sitting 
together, in luxury coffee shops, which were not exposed to the public and not attended by 
advocates. 
In contrast, advocates frequented cheaper coffee shops and often sat with litigants. The 
reasons given by the interviewed judges for this distinction were, first, to avoid socialising 
with advocates and litigants in the public as this would have been against the ethics and, 
second, to maintain a high prestige in front of common people.1012 Another aspect of social 
status was the difference between urban and rural judges. Rural judges felt like second-
class citizens compared with their counterparts in urban courts. As one rural judge told me, 
‘when we sit with our colleagues from urban courts we have to lie sometimes about our 
incomes and show that our economic status is as good as theirs which in fact it’s not’.1013 
According to my observations, many ‘Magistrate’ judges were sceptical prima facie of the 
decisions of the ‘Non-Magistrate’ judges because the former thought that they were more 
qualified.1014 
Social status was also one of the factors as to why judges discriminated against litigants 
from the Roma community.1015 We saw in Chapter 5 that there is no judge in the Albanian 
judicial system representing this community. While the social status of judges was a 
concern in the general community of lawyers, this was more evident in rural courts. As I 
showed in Chapter 5, non-local judges coming from the hinterland were perceived as ‘being 
more vulnerable to corruption because of their lack of knowledge of the community’.1016 
                                                          
1009 ‘…I do not believe that judges avoid socialising with advocates and prosecutors in public because 
they are afraid of being misunderstood by society…in reality judges pretend to have a higher social 
status than the prosecutors in the justice system...they use advocates and prosecutors rather than 
treating them in a friendly way...’ Interview with rural prosecutor no.3, 2010. 
 
1010 Interview with rural judge no.10, 2010. 
1011 Interview with urban advocate no.7, 2011. 
1012 Interview with rural judge no.7, 2010. 
1013 Interview with rural judge no.5, 2010. 
1014 Interview with urban judge no.7, 2010. 
1015 Interview with rural judge no.10, 2010. 
1016 Interview with rural advocate no.2, 2010. 
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However, one positive aspect of social status which was evident in the rural courts, was 
that judges coming from respectable families (‘Dere e Madhe’) were more likely to refrain 
from accepting bribes in order to protect the good name of their family in the community. 
As one judge said, ‘If I accept a bribe I have something to lose which is the good name of 
my family and this is a very important factor that keeps me away from both bribes and 
socialising with people with bad reputation in the community.’1017 One of my more 




Judicial Subculture and Deviant Elements 
 
The subculture of judges provides another perspective in understanding the changing 
dynamic of judicial corruption from ‘criminalisation’ to ‘market-oriented’. Merton (1968) 
argues that subculture is a consequence of anomie where individuals who lack institutional 
means to integrate into society follow deviant forms. Cohen (1955) explains the rise of 
subculture as a cultural solution of disfavoured categories of society to problems created 
by social structure where values of the powerful class shape the society (Downes and Rock 
2007:126). Therefore, vulnerable groups form their own subculture and develop deviant 
patterns, which are legitimate to their subculture but are not accepted by the dominant 
culture (Jones 2006:180). As I mentioned earlier, the increased independence from politics 
has given more space to judges and we see that after 2001 corrupt judges ‘drift’ between 
law-abidance and corruption (Matza 1964). To justify their deviant acts and content 
themselves that what they are doing is not wrong, corrupt judges have formed what Sykes 
and Matza (1957:664) call ‘techniques of neutralisation’. 
In this respect I argue that corrupt judges have developed their own subculture, to justify 
their corrupt activities, improve their status quo or advance upward in the hierarchy of 
society (mostly judges of the first instance rural courts). 
My data suggest five patterns of judges’ subculture: 
First, almost all my interviewed judges provided similar reasons for why society has a bad 
perception of judges. As shown in Chapter 5, the most common reasons given were: (a) the 
nature of the court process ‘may influence people’s perception because in a civil case there 
will always be one losing party and often the latter thinks that they lost because the judge 
was bribed by the winning party’;1018 (b) the judges’ reputation is undermined by ‘those 
unprofessional advocates who manipulate litigants and ask them for money supposedly on 
behalf of the judges’.1019 According to most of the interviewed judges this is not true, 
because ‘the advocates take this money for themselves and never tell the judges or give it 
                                                          
1017 Interview with rural judge no.2, 2010. 
1018 Interview with urban judge no.9, 2010. 
1019 Interview with urban judge no.2, 2010. 
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to them’.1020 This negative attitude of advocates makes parties believe that the judges are 
corrupt. 
Interviewed advocates admitted that there are ‘occasions when advocates play this 
“bluffing” trick’ but they disagreed with the opinion of the interviewed judges that this is a 
phenomenon.1021 This manoeuvre of the advocates, ‘can work only on simple cases where 
advocates predict that they will win… so on these occasions advocates ask for higher fees 
from litigants than usual, claiming that a good part of it will go to the judge. In complex 
cases however, this trick cannot work because it is very difficult for the advocate to predict 
the outcome of the case.’1022 
Second, there is a tendency for judges to ‘legalise’ non-monetary bribes (such as cars, 
properties, vacations)1023 given in the form of ‘gifts’.1024 Chapter 5 revealed that most of the 
interviewed judges saw ‘baksheesh’ as something acceptable as (a) it is not illegal in 
principle because a public official can accept gifts with a value of less than 10,000 Albanian 
Lek (£70) and (b) accepting the gift is a sign of appreciation shown to litigants as the 
contrary would be insulting and in violation of the Albanian custom. 
It seems that ‘appreciation’ is not only an element of public official subculture in 
transitional societies, as similar justification (i.e. appreciation) is highlighted by Newburn’s 
study into corrupt police in the United Kingdom, United States and Australia (1999:10). This 
argument may explain why the High Inspectorate of Declaration and Audit of Assets 
(HIDAA) expressed concerns as recently as February 2012 about the increasing trend of 
judges declaring considerable amounts of money justified as gifts, free interest long-term 
loans and sponsorships.1025 
In addition, judges also are often ‘rewarded’ by litigants because they have decided fairly. I 
discerned that these patterns of subculture were mainly found among judges considered 
by the community of lawyers as ‘good’.1026 On these occasions the price of baksheesh is 
smaller compared to that paid to ‘bad’ judges (i.e. those who ask money in order to favour 
a party before the decision is made).1027 
                                                          
1020 Interview with urban judge 9, 2010. According to IDRA (2010), ‘48.4% of the judges declared that 
lawyers do approach them outside the court in order to influence decisions. This percentage is 11.2 
percentage points higher than in 2009.’ See IDRA (2010) ‘Corruption in Albania, Perception and 
Experience: Judges Survey 2010’. 
1021 Interview with urban advocate no.1, 2010. 
1022 Interview with urban advocate no.7, 2011. 
1023 As recently as 2012 the First Instance Court of Fier found two doctors not guilty for accepting a 
gift because this was not given in cash, although the prosecution claims to have provided clear 
evidence which showed that both doctors were recorded asking for and accepting cash from their 
client. See Hoxhaj, E. (2012) ‘Corruption: the clash between the prosecution and the court in Fier’ 
(Korrupsioni, perplasje prokurori-gjykate ne Fier), Shqip Gazette, March 12. 
1024 Interview with local observer no.1, 2010. 
1025 Mejdini, F. (2012) ‘Public officials and judges with expensive free interest loans’ (Zyrtaret dhe 
gjyqtaret, borxhe te majma pa interes), Shqip Gazette, February 13. 
1026 Interview urban advocate no.7, 2011. 
1027 Interview with urban advocate no.2, 2010. 
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Third, this is when a judge favours the accused by giving the lowest charge provided by the 
law for that offence (e.g. if the law stipulates a prison sentence of between 15 and 25 
years, the judge decides to charge the offender with the minimum, 15 years) and the judge 
gives this biased decision not on legal grounds but because he wants to do a favour. As 
mentioned in Chapter 5, this pattern is known in the community of judges as a ‘favour 
within the limits of the law’. This mechanism, which is often used when judges are accessed 
via friendship ties, was practised during the communist period and is applied even today. 
The majority of interviewed judges saw this widespread pattern as normal.1028 
Fourth, another evident common pattern is when judges hide their colleagues’ mistakes 
both from the public and from the law enforcement agencies.1029 This form of secrecy or 
protection helps them to strengthen their social bond and loyalty to each other and 
protects them from any possible charge of corruption. The secrecy and inertia of judges 
toward misbehaviour of their colleagues increases the number of incriminated judges in 
the system and this makes it very difficult for honest judges to blow the whistle as the 
latter may risk being alienated. This alliance extends even to prosecutors and this can be 
another barrier in addition to judges’ immunity to investigate judges for corruption. 
However, my data also show that solidarity within the large community of judges is only 
manifest on issues of impunity. In Chapter 4 I showed how different categories of judge – 
‘Non-Magistrates’ and ‘Magistrates’ – compete to control the distribution of promotion 
rights through controlling the HCJ and NJC. I also showed in that chapter how corrupt 
judges used the dissenting opinion mechanism to weaken the position of honest judges in 
the system. 
Fifth, there is a ‘silent agreement’ between judges and the powerful elite, especially with 
politicians. Corrupt judges ‘will be reluctant to condemn politicians, powerful 
representatives of the media or organised crime in exchange for not being attacked by 
them’.1030 This helps corrupt judges to protect their illegal patterns of enrichment. An 
invisible alliance between powerful segments of society, including judges, seems to have 
been formed where all parties are reluctant to fight each other on issues of corruption and 
anti-corruption rhetoric is used as a facade.1031 And this phenomenon has undermined 
judicial accountability. The ‘silent agreement’ points to another explanation of why the 
‘Mafia bourgeoisie’ is established. 
 
                                                          
1028 Interview with urban judge no.4, 2010. 
1029 Interview with rural judge no.10, 2010. 
1030 ‘For me, the judiciary has not been effective  in the fight against organised crime and corruption 
... in this context the state does not support the  judiciary in any way  ... a judge who works with high 
profile cases of serious organised crime travels with no car and no guards, there is no security for 
them…judges are left in the hands of criminals but also of the economic elite and the media…so 
judges have to protect themselves and therefore they will be reluctant to condemn politicians, 
powerful representatives of the media or organised crime, in exchange for not being attacked by 
them...it seems that there is an agreement between them...a silent agreement...’ Interview with 
urban advocate no.4, 2010. 
1031 Interview with academic no.2, 2010. 
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Rethinking the Role of Customary Norms 
 
Another important finding suggested by my data is the asymmetry of the role of customary 
norms in judicial corruption. In earlier chapters I showed that the role of friendship ties is 
becoming more important than the influence of political pressure. I have also highlighted 
that surprisingly, violent norms, such as blood feud, restrain judges from corruption and 
also ‘pull’ organised crime to recruit from families under the blood feud. Both corrupt 
judges and organised crime may enter into conflict with the family members of the victim 
of the blood feud. A non-violent custom such as the maintenance of the good reputation of 
‘the family name’ ‘Dere e Madhe’, appears also to have ‘pulled’ judges from accepting 
bribes. The reason mentioned was that this will harm the name of the judge’s family in the 
area. 
In Chapters 1 and 2, based on the literature, I suggested that regionalism or ‘Krahinizem’ 
(i.e. regionalism) can also play a role in judicial corruption, though many interviewed judges 
argue that this is ‘not very significant these days’.1032 Krahinizem still plays an important 
role during political elections. There is still a ‘political distinction between North and South 
[based on] networks of families and clans’ 1033 (Gërxhani and Schram 2008). 
 Politicisation of Krahinizem also played a critical part in the rise of armed conflict between 
criminals during the 1997 civil unrest, ‘where many organised crime groups were divided 
according to the regions – North and South’1034 (Zogaj 2009). But the role of Krahinizem 
‘does not seem so influential in judicial corruption in the last decade’.1035 In contrast, ‘the 
role of friendship networks is very powerful and even more significant than political 
influence’.1036 
Initially I assumed that political parties tend to use Krahinizem as a tool to generate votes 
(Saltmarshe 2000). In this respect the influence of Krahinizem would be echoed in judicial 
corruption in situations when judges are appointed or promoted by politicians based on 
their origin and not on their merits. And as a result this could produce regional solidarity 
where litigants, sharing the same origin as the judge, would ask the latter for favours, 
assuming that the judge indirectly profited from the litigant’s vote. Similarly, criminals and 
                                                          
1032 Interview with urban judge no.5, 2010. 
1033 Interview with international observer no.2, 2010. 
1034 Interview with urban prosecutor no.4. 2010. 
1035 Interview with urban judge no.5, 2010. 
1036 ‘….rather than politics or “Krahinizem”(regionalism)… friendship ties and private connections are 
more influential today for judges. For me, the role of friendship networks is very powerful and even 
more significant than political influence. Yes politics interferes in the judiciary but, in my opinion, the 
most influential actors today on judicial corruption are friends and family members. Even when 
politicians want to influence a judge sometimes they will use friendship ties……remember friendship 
can even convert to money, because you did me a favour I will buy you a car ...this is why friendship 
ties are becoming so important…’ Interview with urban prosecutor no.3, 2010. 
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politicians can use Krahinizem to influence judges. After data collections, I found out that 
this paradigm is only partly true, for several reasons. 
First, the structure of the selection of judges limits the role of Krahinizem as candidate 
judges are ‘filtered by the School of Magistrates which does not discriminate on the basis 
of origin’.1037 Krahinizem can, therefore, be employed only on the promotion of judges. The 
majority of my interviewees mentioned that this happens but not on a large scale. As one 
advocate put it, ‘Krahinizem has some sort of influence but it is not significant… for 
instance there were no judges from the North working in the Court of Appeal of Tirana 
before 2005, but during the last five years there have been only a few judges appointed 
from that region’.1038 
Second, the widespread nature of judicial corruption has increased the cost of the 
promotion and thus ‘bribes have become more preferable than Krahinizem’.1039 So 
politicians or members of the HCJ would support the candidate judge who offers more 
rather than the one with whom they share an origin. Krahinizem can become really 
significant if a consolidated majority (two-thirds) of the members of the HCJ come from the 
same region, but the majority of my interviewed judges showed that this is not the greatest 
concern with the HCJ today but lack of transparency and corruption there.1040 
However, Krahinizem plays a role when judges support each other to get elected in the HCJ 
or NJC, but even here, ‘it is not about the origin, it is about the friendship ties’.1041 Third,  
not all judges working in a court are local. Therefore, judges support their colleagues in the 
election process because they work together in the same court and not because they share 
the same origin.1042 And finally this third argument is another explanation why the role of 
friendship ties is becoming more significant in respect of judicial corruption compared to 
other customary norms.  
Having explained the main factors of judicial corruption in the context of organised crime in 
Albania I now turn to the conclusion of the thesis. This study concludes by bringing 
together its main research themes and findings. Implications for policy and 
recommendations for reform are also discussed, as are ways forward for further research.
                                                          
1037 Interview with rural judge no.10, 2010. 
1038 Interview with urban advocate no.2, 2010. 
1039 Interview with investigative journalist no.1, 2010. 
1040 Interview with urban advocate no.5, 2010 
1041 Interview with urban judge no.3, 2010. 
1042 Interview with urban judge no.3, 2010. 
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8  
TRADING JUSTICE: FROM POLITICISATION AND 
CRIMINALISATION TO MARKET ORIENTED 




What emerges in this study is a picture of the changing dynamics of judicial corruption in 
Albania: from politicisation to criminalisation through to a flourishing market based 
corruption. What appears is a judicial ‘entrepreneur’ who effectively ‘trades’ justice. One 
has to ask whether not only the dynamics have changed but whether corruption has 
decreased or increased. All evidence is that corruption is on the rise. This study also 
suggests that institutional social control in the courts is breaking down as a result of 
constant political and institutional changes. It shows a public unable or unwilling to resist 
corruption because of distrust, low democratic legitimation and the weakness of civil 
society. On the one hand then, we have a breakdown of social control on corruption. At the 
same time, incentives for the mobilization of corruption among judges are growing 
stronger. Thus the constraints on rising corruption are diminishing.   
The objective of the thesis was to analyse and explain the root causes of Albanian judicial 
corruption in the context of organised crime. I argue that one important condition which 
has allowed judicial corruption to flourish and interact with organised crime is a 
generalised lack of trust by society in the justice system. The culture of distrust, it is argued, 
is a product of successive disruptions of legal institutions and a lack of consolidated 
democratic culture throughout the modern history of Albania. Patterns of judicial 
corruption were reproduced during the transition to democracy mimicking the communist 
past thus diminishing the positive hopes of society for a better perspective of the justice 
system. So, judicial corruption today is perceived as something malign to the social 
organism, which recognises its existence and accepts its reality but is not able to apply a 
cure. 
The ‘immune system’ of society which is composed of institutions such as courts, 
prosecution, state police and others from civil society and the media which serve to protect 
people from crime and fight corruption,1043 is not working because corruption has 
penetrated the immune system and contaminated its employees. In this context, corrupt 
politicians, judges, advocates, prosecutors, journalists and intellectuals have formed a 
criminalised fusion, the ‘Mafia bourgeoisie’, which operates between individuals and the 
powerful elite and obstructs the healthy interaction of society with justice and law-making. 
                                                          
1043 According to IDRA’s 2010 survey, ‘Media is perceived by the general public as more corrupt than 
in 2009 and in 2005’ (p.10). 
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Social institutions too, such as church, family, friendship and neighbourhoods, have been 
eroded by rapid urbanisation and chaotic market-oriented policies. Society has become 
disorganised and social control weakened. Thus judicial corruption is embodied in the 
social fabric and society feels powerless to carve it out. People have lowered their 
expectations and minimised their hopes of having a fair and independent judiciary. Society 
has become cynical to both judicial reform and law, and views both with scepticism. A 
distance between society and courts has been formed. The culture of distrust has pushed 
people back to their traditional informal ways of dealing with courts such as bribes or 
customary norms. This situation has increased informality at the expense of formality. 
Informal mechanisms have become the practical ‘formal solutions’ while formal institutions 
are being used as ‘legal’ dressing to legitimate informal practices (Gërxhani 2004, 2003). 
Society, which seems to have become dependent on corruption, has accommodated itself 
to this informal environment. A collective guilt where everyone feels incriminated but 
unable to react has served as an informal general amnesty for a society which 
accommodates corrupt officials. This in turn has weakened the social cost of corruption for 
judges. The culture of informality has led corruption to flourish in the judicial system and 
has created opportunities for organised crime and the political elite to establish ‘clientelist’ 
relations with the courts. The cost of accessing the judiciary has increased and thus the 
judicial system seems to be benefiting only the powerful. This has seriously affected the 
institutionalisation of democracy, due process, and weakened accountability. The justice 
system is corrupt and judicial corruption has become institutionalised. 
This study shows that in post-communist societies the nature of judicial corruption and its 
interplay with organised crime is very complex. A variety of political, social and economic 
factors have been taken into account. In Albania intensive transformation has produced 
different state structures (monarchy, fascism, Nazism, communism, neo-liberal 
democracy). Due to a myriad of institutional experiences and a cocktail of legal doctrines 
and ideological backgrounds (e.g. judges educated in communist ideology end up judging in 
democratic courts), legal institutions seem to have failed to gain acceptance and to 
establish a democratic legal culture. 
I argued that the causes of judicial corruption should be traced from a continuing legacy of 
the communist justice system which persisted during the transition to democracy. This 
negative legacy combined with a defective democratic process of law-making, weakened 
the legitimacy of the judiciary in the public mind. It seriously undermined its capacity to 
deliver justice as well as protecting society from the administrative ruling of the state. 
The political elite has managed to control society via ‘clientelist’ networks and through 
limiting the budgets of independent institutions. The social status of judges in society is 
low. Poor wages and the quality of bureaucracy are some of the factors which contribute to 
this status. To improve their economic and social status judges look for informal 
mechanisms such as bribes and exchange of favours. This has allowed corruption to flourish 
in the judicial system and has created a competitive environment for bribes among levels 
of the courts. 
In a situation where the cost of prosecution for judges of the higher courts (appeal courts, 
High Court and Constitutional Court) is low, the demand for promotion in these courts has 
increased and the payment offered doubled. As a consequence, a class disparity between 
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judges is formed where the most corrupt are at the top of the judicial hierarchy and the 
less corrupted at the bottom. To improve their social status and strengthen their status quo 
judges have formed a ‘social group differentiated from the general public, whose behaviour 
is more significantly structured by informal norms than by formal rules’ (Herbert 1998:343). 
It seems that the subculture in this context is expressed internally in relation to each other 
(i.e. legalising ‘Rryshfet’; ‘favour within the limits of the law’; protecting each other against 
prosecution) and externally in relation to other powerful actors such as the political elite, 
outspoken members of civil society, journalists and high profile criminals (i.e. offering the 
latter favourable court decisions on criminal and civil matters). This corrupt behaviour of 
judges has made them unreliable to the public and increased the gap between them. 
Therefore judicial accountability and transparency toward the public are undermined. 
Lack of accountability has allowed judges to create their ‘clientelist’ networks with litigants 
and sophisticate their patterns with organised crime. In this setting the increase of the 
quality of judicial independence has only empowered more corrupt judges and has made 
them more independent from political influence but it has failed to reduce judicial 
corruption. Corruption in the courts has become an institutional culture where honest 
judges find it very difficult to resist as otherwise they risk being alienated and never being 
promoted. This has increased the number of corrupt judges in the system and given them 
more power to control key institutions for the judiciary, the HCJ and the NJC. 
This study also finds that one of the particularities of judicial corruption in Albania is its 
dynamic of interplay with organised crime. It can be said that similar patterns can be found 
in other countries in the Western Balkans. This thesis shows that the dynamic of judicial 
corruption in Albania is not constant but vibrant and very flexible. The interplay of judicial 
corruption with the political elite and organised crime takes shape influenced by various 
political and economic factors. In the early phase of transition to democracy (1990-96), 
where the change of laws, institutions and the circulation of the elite was chaotic, judicial 
corruption was more a consequence of political corruption. The judiciary seemed more an 
extension of the executive. This was associated with a capillary politicisation of the courts 
where the political elite exerted control in every aspect. The patterns of judicial corruption 
were very similar to the communist past. The executive controlled the nomination and 
promotion of judges via defective laws and the so-called lustration law policies. This was 
the politicisation phase of the judiciary. 
The dynamic changed dramatically during the political and financial collapse in 1997 when 
the state institutions broke down. Immediately local organised crime groups seized power, 
substituted the role of state institutions, offered protection and managed the supply of 
property rights. Mafia-like groups emerged. The role of the judiciary and state police was 
minimal and this helped organised crime to strengthen hierarchical structures and 
penetrate courts. Links between high profile judges and organised crime were established 
and this was particularly evident in rural areas. Society turned to violent customary norms 
to solve the disputes where vendettas and blood feuds were the most preferred forms. 
Criminalisation of the judicial system occurred. 
After 2001, when the state strengthened, the increased quality of judicial independence 
created an adverse effect on judicial corruption because by that time many judges in the 
system were already highly politicised and criminalised, and the raising of independence 
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decreased the cost of prosecution, and chances for judicial corruption improved. Another 
factor which helped judicial corruption to prosper after 2001 was rapid economic change 
followed by defective property rights laws. The number of commercial disputes increased 
and this raised the demand for courts. In the absence of effective alternative dispute 
resolutions, the judiciary took the monopoly over the supply of property rights. 
The bribe became the most popular means of accessing the courts and this affected the 
relationship between judicial corruption and organised crime, where violent forms 
diminished and exchange of favours were selected as more preferable forms of connection. 
Organised crime therefore seems to have established permanent ‘clientelist’ networks with 
corrupt judges as this appears to be more cost beneficial. High Profile Organised Crime, 
which is mostly focused on legal business and has its own access to the political elite, 
provides access and support to corrupt judges in exchange for favourable court decisions 
especially in civil cases. In such a situation, patterns of judicial corruption have become 
sophisticated. 
Gradually in the last decade judges have solidified their own social group and formed their 
subculture to be more protective. The subculture of judges supported by their immunity 
status has pushed the political elite to refine its patterns of judicial control. We see that 
after 2005, the executive influences the judiciary from those domains where it still has the 
power to select and nominate public officials. The executive selects and nominates state 
police, some key members of the HCJ such as the Minister of Justice, and often even the 
President of the Republic. It also influences the selection of judges of the High Court and 
the Constitutional Court. The interaction between the political elite and corrupt judges has 
gradually shifted to a ‘clientelist’ relationship and accountability has been undermined. This 
is the ‘market-oriented’ phase of judicial corruption where corruption is more driven by 
greed than by political influence.1044 
The changing dynamic of judicial corruption and the complexity of its interplay with 
organised crime has a significant implication for social justice in Albania and its accession to 
the EU. A corrupt judiciary with close links to the political elite and organised crime erodes 
the people’s trust in the institutionalisation of democracy. It undermines judicial reforms, 
weakens judicial professionalism and the capacity of the state to fight corruption and 
organised crime. A fragile judicial system increases the opportunity for foreign criminal 
networks to be transplanted into the country (Zhilla 2012). A corrupt judiciary hampers the 
ability of Albania to fulfil its political and economic commitments to the EU Treaty, the so-
                                                          
1044 ‘...even previously (1990-2001), although now (2010) it is more evident, corruption was seen as 
a quick mode of enrichment by judges...judicial corruption become something normal, people used 
to make fun of and tell anecdotes about corrupt judges... it was so open, everything was solved in 
the court if you could bribe the judge...and it continued this way. Today it has become a 
phenomenon, a tradition has been formed where justice is easy tradable, it has a price like goods 
sold in the market, and the political elite are not interested in making the judiciary accountable for 
corruption because they also are corrupt...so corruption is protected through corruption...’ 
Interview with urban prosecutor no.4, 2010.   
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called ‘Copenhagen criteria’, which are related to the consolidation of democracy and the 
rule of law.1045 
Given the implications for judicial corruption in the context of organised crime, this study 
suggests several recommendations that can strengthen the judiciary and its role in the fight 
against corruption and crime. First, the improvement of the quality of democracy is 
paramount; people should have effective institutional means and equal access to law-
making. Second, a set of effective judicial reforms should be tailored to increase the 
professionalism of judges, improve their ethical behaviour and the quality of bureaucracy. 
These reforms should aim to raise the cost of judicial corruption, eradicate corrupt judges 
and allow more space for professional judges in the judicial structure. Third, access to 
judicial reforms should be more transparent and the judiciary more accountable to the 
public. Immunity of the judges from prosecution of corruption should be removed and 
even judges of the higher courts should be subject to judicial inspection. 
Given that there is a paucity of research on the links of judicial corruption and organised 
crime in post-communist societies, this study brings some important contributions to the 
literature. 
Methodologically, this thesis is the only work, the author is aware of, that draws on legal 
history, criminology, jurisprudence and public law for the analysis of the links between 
judicial corruption and organised crime. It is also among the very few works that attempt to 
theorise empirically judicial corruption in post-communist societies. For the first time also 
this research applies the Bangalore Principles of Judicial Conduct (BPJC) to elucidate the 
landscape of judicial corruption. In contrast with other models which measure the 
performance of the judiciary based on institutional indicators, the BPJC draws attention to 
social and cultural aspects of judicial corruption. However, this study reinforces the 
concerns of previous authors on some limitations of the usage of a model for assessing 
courts (Larkins 1996; Hammergren 2007). In the context of my project, the BPJC assisted in 
the examination of the links between judicial corruption and organised crime. 
From a criminological perspective, while there are many studies on the subculture of police 
corruption, there is a gap in the literature on the studies of the subculture of judges. This 
research highlights that in post-communist societies, where society is polarised, the poor 
economic conditions of judges push them to look for informal ways to integrate and 
improve their social status in society, and a subculture of judges is formed. As another step 
to the study of judicial corruption in post-communist societies, this thesis leads to fuller 
comparative study of judicial subculture across different countries in Post-Soviet states. 
Another distinctive finding of the research is the role of rapid change of judicial structure as 
a cause of judicial corruption. While there are studies which point to the successive change 
of laws as potential factors (Buscaglia 2007; Mendelski 2012), there are no studies so far 
focusing on the implications of the disruption of court systems on judicial corruption. This 
theme also merits further research. 
This thesis argues that in post-communist societies, if the social status of judges is low, 
corrupt judges may develop their own subculture and this may create favourable avenues 
                                                          
1045 See European Commission Opinion on Albania’s Application for Membership of the European 
Union, November 9, 2010, p.11. 
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for corruption. A high level of judicial corruption favours corrupt judges more than honest 
ones and this produces a social disparity among different categories of judges inside the 
judiciary who struggle for power. This class division may create an internal conflict between 
judges and erode the efficiency of the judiciary.  
The increase of corruption in the judiciary weakens the ability of violent patterns of 
organised crime to influence the judiciary. This strengthens the role of bribes in corrupting 
judges. As a result, an ongoing ‘clientelist’ relationship between organised crime and 
corrupt judges is more likely. Sophisticated organised crime groups tend to establish 
permanent relations with judicial corruption whereas less developed organised crime 
prefer sporadic contacts. 
Contrary to the limited existing literature, customary norms such as ‘Krahinizem’ and 
‘Kanun’ do not play as significant a role in the corruption of modern urban courts as 
previously expected. However, Kanun does appear to operate in remote areas where the 
penetration of the modern state and its courts is physically absent. Clientelistic family 
relationships exert a kind of asymmetrical relationship with judicial corruption – sometimes 
they may promote particularism but family honour on the part of judges may also work to 
prevent it. Most importantly, the blood feud continues to play a major role in shaping the 
incentive of judges for corruption and obstructing the attempts of organised crime to 
recruit in the hinterland. 
In countries where judicial corruption is rampant and alternative dispute resolutions are 
weak, the increase of judicial independence gives rise to an unintended consequence. This 
is a form of ‘monopolistic’ behaviour on the part of the courts whereby they are effectively 
the sole generator of the protection of property rights. This produces high demand for 
courts’ services. As a result the cost of ‘accessing’ the courts through bribery increases. It 
opens opportunities for powerful elites and organised crime to gain by influencing the 
judiciary. It alleviates some corrupt judges and raises the cost of their promotion.  
In societies where there is successive disruption of the judicial system through political 
transition and lack of consolidated democratic legal culture, judicial corruption is more 
likely. 
This thesis concludes with the general argument that the nature of judicial corruption in 
post-communist societies is complex and its relationship with organised crime 
multifaceted. My research has demonstrated that social and cultural influences must be 
considered alongside other institutional and organisational factors in the explanation of 
Albanian judicial corruption. 
This study suggests the roots of judicial corruption derive from an inherited tradition of a 
weak judiciary lacking in popular legitimacy which has persisted throughout the modern 
period of the Albanian state. This deficit of trust was also reinforced during the transition 
from communism to democracy. The integrity of the judiciary was further undermined by 
chaotic market oriented polices and a high degree of judicial politicisation during this 
period. Albanian people, as a result, returned to customary ways of accessing courts.  This 
informal relationship of society with courts created opportunities for corruption and 
judicial corruption became institutionalised.  
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Judges relied on each other and formed their subculture for protection, and for quick 
integration in society.  A multilayer category of judges was established inside the court 
system in which most corrupt judges controlled the distribution of promotion rights in the 
lower courts.  The judiciary is  therefore struggling for independence not only externally 
from the political elite but also internally from a powerful network of corrupt judges. 
 The patterns of judicial corruption identified were sophisticated and the cost of accessing 
courts as a result has increased. A clientelist relationship between corrupt judges and the 
political elite including organised crime was formed.   This powerful alliance has limited the 
opportunities for society and increased the chances for elite and high profile organised 
crime groups to manipulate courts for their closed interests.  As a result the distance 
between society and the courts has increased and social pressure against corrupt judges 
has weakened. Judicial accountability has also been undermined. The rise of judicial 
independence in the last decade has not, therefore, yielded positive results, it has only 
served to strengthen the corrupt judge . 
Finally all these factors have encouraged widespread cynicism within Albania toward anti-
corruption policies. This is why society today is indifferent with regard to judicial reforms 
and views judicial corruption as an irreparable problem. In this context judicial corruption is 
not only institutionally entrenched in the justice system in Albania but also accepted as a 























Conceptualising the Model 
 
To understand the landscape of judicial corruption I will be employing a theoretical 
construction of a ‘standard model’ of judicial behaviour. This model will then be compared 
with judicial corruption in Albania and will help to elucidate its contours.  Before explaining 
my ‘standard model’ I will first define what the ‘standard model’ means.  I have borrowed 
Weber’s approach of ‘ideal-type’ as a methodological attempt to better expose the 
phenomenon.  Weber gives several reasons for the methodological role of the ‘ideal- 
type’.1046 He highlights that the ‘ideal-model’ is not a hypothesis but it helps to construct 
the hypothetical grounds for the research object. It is not descriptive in nature but it 
intends to enlighten the ambiguous part of what is described.  Weber defines the ‘ideal -
type’ as the ‘one sided accentuation of one or more points of view and by the synthesis of a 
great many diffuse, discrete, more or less present and occasionally absent concrete 
individual phenomena, which are arranged  accordingly to those one-sidedly emphasised 
viewpoints into a unified analytical construct. In its conceptual purity, this mental construct 
cannot be found empirically anyware in reality.’ (Weber 2007:211)   
 
He further explains that through the use of an ‘ideal-type’ the researcher will be able to 
find out to what extent this ideal- construct reflects or diverges from the construct. In my 
case, I am measuring the landscape of judicial corruption in Albania. This process is 
comparative in nature. It juxtaposes empirical data with the model.  It compares what is, to 
the ‘standard model’. This involves contrasting empirical findings from the interviews with 
the model in light of earlier claims from the literature review. Weber however, leaves it up 
to the discretion of the researcher to devise their own ideal-type making sure that certain 
‘ethical’ boundaries are kept and respected throughout the process of inquiry.  ‘The “ideal-
type” needs to be “objectively possible” and “adequate” from the nomological standpoint’ 
(Weber 2007:212).   
Weber argues that even in analysing history, the researcher must use only those concepts 
that are defined clearly in the form of the ‘ideal-type’ (Weber 2007: 213). The ideal-type 
                                                          
1046 Weber, M. (2007). 'Objectivity’ in  Social Science in Classical Sociological Theory. Craig Calhoun, 




may be an extraction from a variety of sociological events or epochs and this might raise a 
methodological claim in terms of contextual inconstancy between the ‘ideal-type’ and the 
context in study. It may appear methodologically incorrect to use a theoretical construct 
derived from a certain context to measure a different one.   
The challenge is to expose the differences between the ‘standard model’ and the context in 
study and from there to begin carving out socio-political factors (Weber 2007:215).  The 
use of this ‘standard model’ in our context serves to facilitate the construction of the 
judicial corruption landscape in Albania. To illustrate, the definition of the rule of law which 
has been explained in our first chapter, is an ideal set of standards that a democratic 
society should comply with. Different societies comply differently. Freedom House, based 
on these standards, measures and qualifies the progress of democracy in different 
countries by rating and marking them accordingly. For instance the Albanian judicial 
framework and independence for 2010 scored 4.25 on a scale of 1 to 7, with 1 representing 
the highest level of democratic progress and 7 the lowest.1047  
However, I need to draw a distinct line between the Freedom House’s methodological use 
of ‘ideal-type’ and my use of ‘standard-model’.  I do not intend at this stage to make value 
judgements on judicial integrity in Albania based on certain ideals and criteria. On the 
contrary, my approach is comparative in a logical way. I seek, as Weber puts it, to do a 
‘logically comparative analysis of reality by ideal types in the logical sense’ (Weber 2007: 
215). 
Now I turn to explain the selected ‘standard model’ which will guide this study. My model 
consists of key analytical components of appropriate judicial conduct. As a basis for forming 
this model, I build upon The Bangalore Principles of Judicial Conduct (BPJC).  
 
 
Contextualising the Model 
 
The applicable model in the context of Albania needs to reflect certain criteria. Before 
explaining them I need to specify some characteristics of the Albanian legal culture that will 
help to guide our inquiry for a suitable analytical model for the study.  As I mentioned 
earlier, the tradition of the Albanian judiciary is an amalgam of several legal systems such 
as Islamic Law, French civil law, a few totalitarian legal regimes (Fascism 1939-1941; Nazism 
1941-1944, Communism 1945-1989 and Democracy (1912-39;1989-2011) (see chp.7). 
Harmonisation of national laws with EU legislation as a precondition of EU membership is 
another factor that is pushing Albanian judges to contextualise the decisions of the 
European Court of Human Rights (ECHR) and also review all national laws according to EU 
principles before commencing full membership of the Union.  
                                                          
1047 See Freedom House 2010 Report ‘Nation in Transit’ available at 
http://www.freedomhouse.eu/images/Reports/NIT-2010-Albania-final.pdf [accessed August 10, 
2012]. 
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The Albanian legal culture, as mentioned above, is diverse and also contains traces from 
other legal systems such as Islamic law and socialist or communist legal systems.  Albanian 
courts are currently also applying patterns of common law legal reasoning such as 
precedent. Albanian customary norms such as the ‘Kanun of Lek Dukagjini’ are strong in the 
hinterland and mostly applicable in the North, and their influence on Albanian legal culture 
cannot be ignored.  In addition, legal culture is a broader term than the legal system. In this 
context, we cannot rely on a civil law influenced model of judicial conduct. The legal system 
can be only one of the many other significant factors that can cause judicial corruption. 
There are also other socio, economic and political factors which need to be explored. I can 
do that only by using a model that embodies all ingredients of the Albanian legal culture in 
order to help this research point to all possible facets of the judicial corruption in the 
context of OC.  
 Therefore, a standard model based only on one legal system may not be helpful to explain 
nuances that may derive from other systems not considered in the standard model. I need 
first, a model that sets its standards on a wide range of legal systems so as to make sure 
that all characteristics of the Albanian legal culture can be mirrored there. Judicial 
corruption is not only institutional but is also caused by social and cultural factors 
(Buscaglia 2007; Karklins 2007). The standard model should therefore, first, represent or be 
formed based on all conventional legal systems like common law, civil law and Islamic law. 
In addition, the standard model needs to be composed grounded on the opinions of a large 
community of judges. It is important that they come from different legal experiences, 
regions and systems, including especially those from post-communist societies in Eastern 
Europe.  
Second, the standard model should consider the views of experts and not simply rely on 
people’s perceptions as usually the latter can be misleading. Having an ideal model framed 
according to the judges’ perspective may be even closer to ideal judicial conduct. This 
approach is more likely to help this study to probe the causes of judicial corruption from 
the judges’ point of view which is usually missing in the literature or international reports 
on judicial corruption. In addition, taking a model based on the judge’s perspective can 
generate more objective findings and more clear grounds for the analysis of this project. In 
this research, judges are the same community sample, interviewed during the field work.  
 Third, the selected model should be reliable by being internationally acceptable or 
recognised by the community of judges. It also needs to have already been tested and 
applied worldwide. There are two factors stimulating this requirement, the first one being 
that we are living in a globalisation area where laws tend to globalise, and the second is 
that Albania is soon to join the EU, a region with a variety of legal systems. As mentioned, 
the process of harmonisation of laws with the EU is a condition put forth in the Stabilisation 
and Association Agreement with the EU which entered into force in 2009.   
 In now turn to explain why the BPJC is the most suitable analytical model employable for 
this research.   
Since its independence in 1912, Albania’s legal system has undergone a complex legal 
process, starting from transition from Ottoman Law to the new era of French civil law in 
1924-1939; forty years of communist governance 1940-1989 and returning to the actual 
civil law which more resembles a cocktail of civil law, prepared by pieces of law borrowed 
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from different European states (see chp.7). Therefore, our model, as analysed above, needs 
to consider elements that reflect dynamics from all these legal experiences. Such a 
document is the BPJC. This document emerged as a result of people’s concern about 
judicial corruption and the increased public mistrust in the judiciary worldwide. 
Under the auspices of the United Nations Centre for International Crime Prevention, a 
group composed of Chief Justices and senior justices, known as ‘The Judicial Integrity 
Group’, worked together on framing a set of principles in respect of judicial conduct during 
2000-2002 (Commentary 2007). This was the first time that the United Nation had asked 
judges to ‘put their house in order’ (Commentary2007: 9). In their first meeting they set out 
two basic concepts which served as the premise of the BPJC.  
First, they agreed on that the principle of accountability required a more active role on the 
part of national judges in strengthening judicial integrity by pushing forward judicial 
reforms within the judiciary’s competence. Second, they stressed that ‘a universally 
acceptable statement of judicial standards which, consistent with the principle of judicial 
independence’, would be applicable and enforced at the national level without the 
interference of the legislative and executive (ibid:10). 
During the transition Albanian laws were drafted with the help of different experts coming 
from several jurisdictions or copied from nearby countries such as Italy, Greece, Austria, 
Spain and France. As mentioned above, Albanian Criminal Codes are mostly based on the 
Italian experience, Civil Codes and the Family Code from the French and others, such as the 
Labour Code and Commercial Law from German and Austrian similar laws (see chapter 4 
and chapter 7). 
 Similarly the BPJC was drafted by a very diverse community of judges.  In preparing this set 
of principles, the Judicial Integrity Group had recourse to a variety of national, regional and 
international codes of judicial conduct.  The first draft was initially influenced by the 
common law approach (Commentary 2007:12). It was in the second meeting in 2001 that 
The Judicial Integrity Group decided that the draft should be checked and scrutinised by a 
broader range of judges, involving also those from civil law jurisdictions.  The second draft 
was circulated to many judges from different legal systems to gather their opinions and it 
was revised even by Eastern European judges, including senior judges from Kosovo as well 
(ibid:13) .  Albania had been governed for five centuries by the Sharia Law during the 
Ottoman presence between the 14th and 19th centuries (see chapter 7). Therefore a judicial 
code of conduct considering this aspect would be an additional socio-legal asset for 
Albania.  The BPJC has been reviewed by judges with an Islamic Law background. 
As mentioned, Albania signed the Stabilisation and Association Agreement with the EU 
which, among other requirements, obliges Albania to approximate and harmonise its laws 
with the EU.  The BPJC was assessed by representatives of the Consultative Council of 
European Judges who also represented their remarks in the second draft (Commentary 
2007:14). It should be noted that the BPJC raised several legal disagreements between 
common law and civil law judges and it is worth mentioning some key points here that are 
relevant for the legal context of Albania. Legal disputes consisted in the ordering of the 
principles (values); usage of technical wording; and disagreement on the nature of the 
political activities of judges. In terms of the preferential ranking of the values, common law 
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judges disagreed with the current order which ranked ‘propriety’ after ‘independence’, 
‘impartiality’, and ‘integrity’. 
 Disagreement on one piece of terminology, among others, was on the use of the word 
‘code’. Civil law judges claimed that the usage of ‘code’ as a term might be confusing, as in 
civil law jurisdiction the term ‘code’ constitutes a ‘complete and exhaustive’ legal 
instrument. A code of conduct is not a statutory law, therefore it would be inappropriate to 
use the term code for the BPJC. In addition, civil law judges expressed their concern with 
the text of the ‘Preamble’. According to the preamble the source of judicial power is 
derived from ‘the public acceptance of the moral authority and integrity of the judiciary’. 
Civil law judges argued that the source of judicial authority was the constitution.  
The political activity of judges was the most contested matter. Civil law judges supported 
the view that participation of judges in political activity should not be viewed as 
inappropriate. They based their argument on the fact that currently there is no 
internationally recognised consensus on whether judges should be allowed to participate in 
politics. There are countries that allow judges to engage in political activities 
(Commentary2007:16). This matter, according to the civil law judges, should be left to the 
discretion of each country to decide. The civil law judges thus opined that non-participation 
of judges in political activity should not be stipulated as a global principle (ibid.).  
Albania is a member of almost all the main international organisations such as the United 
Nations, World Bank, IMF, and NATO.  It was important that the model of judicial conduct 
retained a worldwide credibility. As such the BPJC has growing international recognition.  
The Special Rapporteur on the Independence of Judges and Lawyers presented the BPJC to 
the United Nations Commission on Human Rights in April 2003. At this meeting the 
Commission adopted resolution 2003/43 noting ‘the Bangalore Principles of Judicial 
Conduct (E/CN.4/2003/65, annex) adopted at the Round Table Meeting of Chief Justices 
held in The Hague on 25 and 26 November 2002 and bringing those principles to the 
attention of Member States, relevant United Nations organs and intergovernmental and 
non-governmental organizations for their consideration’.1048 
 In addition, renowned experts have required that the BPJC be extended even to law 
schools and professional associations. The United Nations Special Rapporteur on the 
Independence of Judges and Lawyers in 2004, Dr Leandro Despouy suggested that ‘the 
Bangalore Principles be made available, preferably in national languages, in all law faculties 
and professional associations of judges and lawyers’ (Commentary2007:17).   
 
It will be beyond the scope of this study, which is on the factors of judicial corruption  and 
its interplay with OC, to do an in-depth analysis of the BPJC , therefore, in the following  I 
will only sketch out each of these ‘values’ in order to set out a better idea before projecting 
them into my empirical data.  
                                                          
1048 For more see Resolution 2003/43 adopted by the UN Commission on Human Rights. Available at 
http://www.unhcr.org/refworld/publisher,UNCHR,,,43f313390,0.html [accessed August 15, 2012]. 
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Bangalore Principles of Judicial Conduct  
 
The model of the BPJC consists of six core values: independence, impartiality, integrity, 
propriety, equality, and competence and diligence.   Each of these values is followed by 
sub-points or conditions that are suggested for application of these principles/values.  It is 
important to note that while where lack of judicial independence is often cited as one of 
the most significant factors for judicial corruption , in the BPJC  the number of suggestions 
as to how this value may be applied was not the highest. There are other ‘values’ which 
apparently had not been so common much popular in the literature of judicial corruption 
which elaborated more suggestions than ‘independence’ from the BPJC for their 
applicability.  
There are only five suggestions made for ‘independence’ whereas in a stark contrast, there 
are sixteen suggestions provided for ‘propriety’. This disproportionate number of 
suggestions may be a significant indicator of the growing role and importance of judges’ 
appearance and trust in front of the public. On the other hand, this emphasises the 
importance and intention that was given to ‘propriety’ by the BPJC. It may be assumed that 
this tendency may also be derived from the constant influence in the last decade of several 
international reports on judicial corruption which have mainly been based on the people’s 
perception.   Whatever the reasons, the extensive number of applications given to 






Judicial independence is the hallmark of the BPJC.1049 Independence of judges here is 
perceived in very broad terms, from the individual and institutional perspective to social 
and political independence. Judicial independence according to the Bangalore Principles 
refers to ‘both a state of mind and a set of institutional and operational arrangements. The 
former is concerned with the judge’s independence in fact; the latter with defining the 
relationship between the judiciary and others...’(ibid:39). 
Judges should also be free from any social pressure in the course of their work, including 
interpersonal connections with colleagues and parties in the litigation (Application 2). 
Politically judges should avoid any inappropriate connection with other branches of the 
government, executive and legislative (Applications 1 and 3). As the Commentary points 
out ‘Judges should not beholden to the government of the day’ (ibid:40). Judges should 
also play an active role in maintaining the institutional and operational independence of 
the judiciary by being ‘vigilant.. to any attempts to undermine [their] institutional and 
                                                          
1049 According to the BPJC ‘judicial independence is a pre-requisite to the rule of law and a guarantee 
of a fair trial’. See Value 1 ‘Independence’ in the BPJC 2002:3. 
237 
operational independence ...’(ibid:52). They can even stimulate the public’s awareness of 
judicial independence by helping them ‘understand the fundamental importance’ of this 
principle (ibid).   
In a nutshell, ‘Independence’ according to the BPJC includes independence of personal 
views; society; executive and legislative; colleagues and court staff. Judges are also 
required to uphold institutional integrity and promote trust and high standards of the 
judiciary to the public. It should be noted that conceptually ‘independence’ may sometimes 
be confused with ‘impartiality’.  Being independent is to be impartial in certain court cases 
and both concepts may be blurred and confused at times (Stith and Root 2009). The BPJC 
are aware of this issue and carefully distinguish ‘independence’ from ‘impartiality’. In the 
Commentary (2007:40), ‘impartiality’ refers to ‘a state of mind or attitude of the tribunal in 
relation to the issues and the parties in a particular case. The word ‘impartial’ connotes 
absence of bias, actual or perceived.’ ‘Independence’ on the other hand, anchors in the 
‘traditional constitutional value of independence...it connotes not merely a state of mind or 
attitude in the actual exercise of judicial functions, but a status or relationship to others, 
particularly to the executive branch of government that rests on objective conditions or 
guarantees’(ibid).  It is not by chance that ‘Impartiality’ comes right after ‘Independence’ as 





Impartiality according to the BPJC is ‘essential to the proper discharge of the judicial office. 
It applies not only to the decision itself but also to the process by which the decision is 
made’.1050  Judges should be impartial in terms of their approach, and be rational but 
should also appear as such. The test of the impartial appearance of judges however is 
vague as explained in the Commentary.   
Accordingly ‘the perception of impartiality is measured by the standard of a reasonable 
observer’ (Commentary 2007:57). The BPJC defines a reasonable observer as ‘a reasonable, 
fair-minded and informed person’ who ‘might believe’ that the judge is unable to decide 
the matter impartially (ibid:68).  It should be highlighted here that although the term 
‘reasonable observer’ is used earlier in the Commentary (p.47), as it is in the BPJC’s first 
value, its definition however appears at suggestion 2.5 of the application of ‘Impartiality’.  
 As shown in the definition, it is very difficult to test the reasonableness of the observer 
because moral values such as ‘fair-minded’ and ‘believe’ are very individual and subjective. 
They may differ in different contexts and cultural aspects of the society in which a judge 
works. What is meant by a ‘fair-minded’ observer of a judge in the hinterlands, where the 
impact of customary norms is significant, may differ from someone who lives in urban 
areas, whose perception of modern laws is clearer (see chapter 4).  
                                                          
1050 See BPJC 2002, the value of ‘Impartiality’. 
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The BPJC renders five applications for impartiality. They can be clustered as objective and 
subjective factors.1051 The subjective parts of impartiality are very personal and mostly 
related to a judge’s commitment. Therefore, it is down to the judge to avoid favour, bias 
and prejudice when he thinks that these elements exist in the case before him (Application 
1).  It is also down to the judge to demonstrate his impartiality in and out of the court room 
(Application 2). Judges should try to minimise any situation that may ‘disqualify them from 
hearing cases’ (Application 3).  It will be considered improper and impartial if judge issues a 
comment before or during a case’s decision as this may influence the final verdict of the 
court (Application 4).  Objective factors are mostly procedural and refer primarily to 
situations where a conflict of interest may arise between the judge and litigated parties but 
also with the circumstantial factors of the case.   
Therefore, a judge should recuse from a case if he has an actual bias or prejudice or has 
prior personal knowledge of the evidence.  He should withdraw even if he has worked 
before as a lawyer with the case.  A judge should dismiss himself if he or a member of his 
family has an economic interest in the outcome of the case (Application 5).  In sum, 
impartiality would mean that judges, in the course of their work and court process, should 
avoid bias, favouring and prejudice to the parties in the process. In addition, they should 
avoid any case of conflict of interest and try not to influence the outcome of the case by 
expressing any comment while the case is still not decided. Further impartiality requires 





Integrity is the third value of the BPJC. As in the other principles mentioned above, 
‘Integrity’ is seen as ‘essential to the proper discharge of the judicial office’.  The 
conceptual framework of ‘integrity’ has been taken in a very broad sense without referring 
to any definition or particular example. The Commentary points out that ‘there are no 
degrees of integrity as so defined. Integrity is absolute. In the judiciary, integrity is more 
than a virtue; it is necessity’ (ibid:79). Being difficult to define ‘integrity’, the Bangalore 
Principles have applied a contextual test of this value based on the moral norms of the 
community in which it is applied. Accordingly, the ‘effect of conduct on the perception of 
the community depends considerably on community standards that may vary according to 
place and time’ (ibid). 
                                                          
1051 Quoting the European Court of Human Rights (ECHR) in their decision in Gregory v. United 
Kingdom, 1977, 25 EHRR 577, the Commentary (2007:57) points out that requirements of 
impartiality as explained by ECHR are twofold. ‘First, the tribunal must be subjectively impartial, i.e. 
no member of the tribunal should hold any personal prejudice or bias. Personal impartiality is to be 
presumed unless there is evidence to the contrary.  Secondly, the tribunal must also be impartial 
from an objective viewpoint, i.e. it must offer sufficient guarantees to exclude any legitimate doubt 
in this respect.’ (Commentary 2007: 57-58). 
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Even in this principle, the BPJC reinforces the importance of public perception of the 
integrity of judges. And this is reflected in two applications advised to be followed in 
preserving integrity in front of the public. In the first, ‘a judge shall ensure that his or her 
conduct is above reproach in the view of a reasonable observer’. In the Commentary, the 
standards of integrity are measured with that of the community. A judge’s behaviour in this 
respect should be at the highest level of community standards both in public and private 
life.  However, judges should not be influenced by standards of any segmented part of the 
society.   The border line to test judges’ attitudes  is not ‘whether an act is moral or 
immoral according to some religious or ethical beliefs, or whether it is acceptable or 
unacceptable by community standards (which could lead to arbitrary and capricious 
imposition of narrow morality), but how the act reflects upon the urban components of the 
judge’s ability to do the job for which he or she has been empowered (fairness, 
independence and respect for the public) and on the public perception of his or her fitness 
to do the job’(ibid: 81). 
In the second, ‘the behaviour and conduct of a judge must reaffirm the people's faith in the 
integrity of the judiciary. Justice must not merely be done but must also be seen to be 
done’.  The integrity of a judge is seen in both professional and personal aspects.  A judge is 
a member of a community and he needs to maintain his integrity to the highest standards 
even in his private life. Public trust in the courts may be influenced by the bad behaviour of 
judges in their private life.  ‘A judge must not only be a “good judge”, but must also be a 
“good person”...’ (ibid:83).  
 For the integrity of judge it will not suffice to just create a good impression and have a 
positive influence on the public perception. The judge ‘must not only be honest but also 
appear to be so’ (ibid). Judges not only need to decide the case honestly but they need also 
to behave in a good manner during the process so as to give the impression to the parties 
that they are honest and impartial (ibid). In sum, integrity is about reassuring the public 
that judges possess integrity. This should be made clear. Judges not only need to be just 
but they should also demonstrate their justice. It should be mentioned that the criteria and 
normative framework provided by the Bangalore Principles on integrity are not as 
elaborated as other values. This principle responds more to institutional integrity than to 











Propriety   
 
The BPJC considers ‘Propriety’ and its appearance as ‘essential to the performance of all of 
the activities of a judge’.1052  It seems like an axiom for the Bangalore Principles that justice 
needs not only to be given but also to be shown.  In fact ‘showing justice’ is even more 
important in the view of the Bangalore Principles.  ‘What matters more is not what a judge 
does  or does not do, but what others think the judge has done or might do’ 
(Commentary2007: 85).  As we will see in the following paragraphs, propriety not only 
includes issues of appearance but also elements of the personal integrity of judges. For this 
reason we will be tackling all the applications suggested for this principle.  
It is not by chance that the BPJC gives great importance to ‘Propriety’ of judicial conduct 
and its appearance in public.  The number of applications suggested by the BPJC for this 
‘value’ is higher compared with those suggested for others. For instance ‘Independence’ 
has 6; ‘Impartiality’, 5; ‘Integrity’, 2; ‘Propriety’,16; ‘Equality’, 5, and ‘Competence and Due 
Diligence’ have 7.  Suggestions for ‘Propriety’ begin with a ‘catch all’ requirement advising 
judges to ‘avoid impropriety and the appearance of impropriety in all of the judge’s activity’ 
(Application 1).  
Judges are citizens and they can exercise every right provided by the law such as joining 
associations or clubs irreconcilable with political activities (ibid: 95). They can also form or 
participate in associations that represent their interests (Application 13). But because they 
are public figures they should accept ‘certain restrictions’. And when exercising their rights 
they should conduct themselves in ways that ‘preserve the dignity of the judicial office and 
the impartiality and independence of the judiciary’ (Applications 2 and 6). A judge should 
be aware of his conduct in his professional activity with his colleagues and representatives 
of the legal profession and try to avoid any situation that may ‘reasonably give rise to the 
suspicion or appearance of favouritism or partiality’ (Application 3).   
Judges should avoid any act that may appear as giving rise to the appearance of a conflict 
of interest such as avoiding taking cases involving the members of their family or 
represented by them (Application 4) or letting them, close friends, court staff or their 
colleagues improperly influence their conduct and judgement (Applications 4, 14 and15). 
Nor should they allow them or others ‘to ask for, or accept, any gift, bequest, loan or 
favour in relation to anything done or to be done, or omitted to be done’ in reference to 
their work (Applications 14 and 15). It will not be considered as improper if judges accept 
gifts or other benefits if this is in accordance with the law; perceived as being proper; and 
without intentions to influence judges’ decisions (Application 16).  
Propriety of solemnity or its appearance is another important factor influencing public trust 
in the judiciary.  Therefore, judges should avoid any use of their residence or office by other 
members of the legal profession (Applications 5 and 9). Nor should they misuse their 
position or reputation for private interests. Judges should also not ‘convey the impression 
that anyone is in a special position improperly to influence judges in performance of 
                                                          
1052 See, BPJC 2002, the value of ‘Propriety’. 
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judicial duties’ (Application 9).  In addition, judges should avoid working with or engage in 
practising law in other institutions while holding their position as a judge (Application 12). 
However, it will not be considered as improper if judges are involved in academic activities 
or other public appearances providing that they preserve high standards of judicial conduct 
and integrity (Application 11).  
To sum up, ‘Propriety’ requires that judges appear and behave properly both in public and 
private life; avoid suspicious behaviour with all parties in the process; avoid cases where 
conflict of interest may arise; avoid use of their office by members of the legal profession; 
sustain neutrality individually or as part of any association or other situation that may 
involve the exercise of  rights to freedom of expression; be informed of his and his family 
members’ financial interests; avoid the influence of his staff, colleagues, family members 
and their friends; avoid exchange of favours; be confidential and protect personal data of 
litigating parties and avoid practising law elsewhere while being a judge. All this being said, 
judges’ propriety will not be affected if judges participate in associations which represent 





Justice is about a just decision providing that reference is made to the law alone and to the 
facts of the case.  Everyone is equal before the court and should be treated fairly.  Judges 
should avoid any objective or subjective ground that may give rise to discrimination or 
stereotyping (Commentary2007:121).  Every judge should be informed about national, 
regional and international legal documents on discrimination (ibid). The BPJC renders 
‘equality’ as its fifth principle but not as less important than the other values in terms of 
judicial conduct. Equality and fairness ‘have long been regarded as essential attributes of 
justice. Equality according to law is not only fundamental to justice, but is a feature of 
judicial performance strongly linked to judicial impartiality’ (ibid).  
Judges not only need to be familiar with issues of diversity and differences deriving from 
different cultural, political, religious and other similar ‘irrelevant grounds’ but should also 
take care to avoid ‘in the performance of judicial duties by words or conduct, manifest bias 
or prejudice towards any person or group on irrelevant grounds’ (Applications 1 and 2). 
Judges should have appropriate consideration and be aware to not discriminate on 
‘irrelevant grounds’ against any persons (i.e. parties, witnesses, lawyers, court staff, and 
judicial colleagues) in the course of his work (Applications 3 and 4). Nor should he allow or 
require lawyers before him in a court proceeding, by way of speaking or actions, to 
manifest ‘bias or prejudice based on irrelevant grounds, except such as are legally relevant 
to an issue in proceedings and may be the subject of legitimate advocacy’ (Application 5).  
In sum, ‘equality’ is a principle that requires judges to understand and be aware of diversity 
on ‘irrelevant grounds’. They should avoid manifesting bias and prejudice by words or 
actions. Judges should consider all parties in the process equal. They should also avoid 
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court staff influencing them to differentiate between parties. Nor should judges allow 
lawyers to demonstrate prejudice or dissemination in the court room. 
 
 
Competence and Diligence  
 
The BPJC renders ‘competence and diligence’ as ‘prerequisites to the due performance of 
judicial office’. A competent judge would mean someone possessing all the required legal 
knowledge and sufficient skills necessary for a sound legal review (Commentary 2007:129). 
A judge’s competence needs also to be shown and this requires that judges avoid being 
manipulated by alcohol, drugs or other substances with similar effects that may 
corroborate their competence or appearance of competence (ibid).  Lack of experience, an 
unstable temper or lack of self control may also be considered as incompetence on the part 
of the judges (ibid). 
Judicial diligence is not limited only to unpleasant situations where a judge should be sober 
or ‘decide impartially and act expeditiously’ but also requires that judges make every effort 
to maintain independence by upholding the law and protecting the judicial process from 
abuse.  The quality and performance of diligence may be weakened by lack of sufficient 
time to process the file, shortage of technical assistance and absence of social time (ibid). 
Judicial competence and diligence requires that judges give priority to their work over any 
other responsibility (Application 1).  Judges may be engaged in extra-legal activity to 
increase their income but this should not affect their main duty or function as a judge. 
Otherwise this may be called improper competence and diligence. ‘The judiciary is an 
institution of service to the community ....and not another segment of the competitive 
market economy’ (Commentary2007: 131). 
Part of judicial diligence is considered to be even the administrative competence of judges 
in managing office and court operations (Application 2). This includes ‘case management 
(including the prompt disposition of cases), recordkeeping, management of funds, and 
supervision of court staff’ (Commentary: 132). Judges should take care to protect court 
records and also be careful to avoid any informal payments made to the court’s staff for 
issues like ‘calling up of files, the issuing of summons, the service of summons, the issuing 
of a copy of the evidence, the obtaining of bail, the provision of a certified copy of a 
judgment, the expedition of cases, the delaying of cases, the fixing of convenient dates and 
the rediscovery of lost files’ (ibid:132-133). Competence needs to be up to date, and a 
professional judge should keep improving his skills through permanent training (Application 
3).   It is the duty of a competent and responsible judge to stay informed about the latest 
developments in national and international law and human rights norms (Application 4).  
Substantive indicators of judicial competence and diligence are punctuality, prompt 
delivery of decisions, order of the court process and decorum, and treatment of all parties 
with respect in the court room (Applications 5 and 6). ‘[What] is required is for a judge to 
take reasonable steps to achieve and maintain the level of order and decorum in court that 
is necessary to accomplish the business of the court in a manner that is both regular and 
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manifestly fair, while at the same time giving lawyers, litigants and the public assurance of 
that regularity and fairness’ (Commentary 2007:141). Judges should be careful to avoid 
engaging in any conduct which is not in compliance with the ‘diligent discharge of judicial 
duties’ (Application 7).  This includes fair distribution of work by presiding judges, 
withdrawal of cases only for valid reasons, taking appropriate actions in case of 
unprofessional behaviour by another colleague or lawyer and avoiding abuse of court staff 
and facilities (ibid:142).  
To sum up, ‘Competence’ and ‘Due Diligence’ means that judicial duty should be the 
judges’ utmost priority and all their professional activity should be focused on that. To be 
able to realise this task, judges should maintain and improve professional skills, be 
informed or updated about local and international laws as well as mechanisms for 
protecting human rights. Competence will also mean delivering decisions ‘efficiently, fairly 
and with reasonable promptness’. Part of professionalism is even preserving personal and 
institutional prestige. So judges should maintain order and decorum in the court room; 
respect and acquire respect from parties. Judges’ conduct should also be compatible with 
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Sample Structure  








Judges  21 11 10 34% 
Advocates 12 8 4 20% 
Prosecutors  13 7 6 21% 
Judicial Inspectors  3 - -   5% 
Journalists  3 - -   5% 
NGO/Academics/Politicians 7 - - 12% 
State Police  2 - - 3% 
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Organised Crime and Judicial Corruption: Democratic Transformation and Prospects for 




1- Judicial Reforms (all respondents) 
• What are some of the main judicial reforms enacted since 1989? 
• Probe who has supported and opposed them?  
• Probe what proposed judicial reforms have been defeated and what strategy was used 
in doing so? (Probe political elite, line item veto and check by court level or region.) 
• Probe what is the biggest problem that judicial reforms have experienced since 1989?  
 
2-Judicial Independence (all respondents) 
Administration 
• To what extent does judicial independence exist in Albania? (Probe by level of courts 
and region.)  
• Probe ways that how budget is used by administration in an effort to influence court 
staff and judges 
Budget  
• What is the budget allocation process? (Probe the agency responsible, how funds are 
spent, access, transparency, people in charge, where the investment goes most, 
criteria.) 
• Probe how much are the salaries of judges compared to similar level public officials? 
• Probe what is the estimate of average value of cases per year compared to the 
budged? (Probe by level of court and region in Euro.) 
Selection, Nomination of judges, Legal safeguards,  Promotion, Appointment, Education, 
Experience 
• What is the procedure of selection, nomination and promotion? 
• On what criteria do judges get promoted? (Probe reasons, indicators by level of court 
and experience.) 
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• Probe are the regional(Krahinizem) or political preferences of the judge candidate 
playing any role in the selection of judges? 
• What is the status of judges in society today? 
 
3- Judicial Corruption (All respondent—judges only the underlined) 
• Nature  and trend 
• We some times hear about judicial corruption.  What does this term mean to you? 
• Do you think there is judicial corruption today?  
• What are the most obvious judicial corruption acts? 
• Thinking back over the years 1980-2010, has judicial corruption increased or 
decreased?  
• Probe the intensity by case load, turning points, case importance i.e. political cases 
etc.)  
• Probe to what extent has the nature of judicial corruption changed since 1989 and then 
1980? (Probe factors of change.) 
 
Causes 
• We will talk in more details later but generally, to have an idea, what would you say are 
some of the main causes of judicial corruption in Albania?  
• Probe economical, (salary, short of budget, poor infrastructure (specify)  
• Probe legal culture, quality of law, (specify) 
• Probe disruption of judicial structures (specify implications) 
• What do you think caused the change of corruption since 1989 generally and judicial 
corruption more specifically? 
• Probe has democratic transition process in itself influenced the court progress? (Probe 
any casual link with judicial corruption and its dynamics in Albania.) 
 
Extent Today 
• Focusing on today how pervasive is judicial corruption? (Probe in what courts  is it 
more widespread, by case and region.) 





• In your opinion are courts difficult to be approached in terms of corruption and why? 
(Probe level, region, and work experience: Probe the most easy and difficult ones.) 
• Probe to what extent are judges accessible to contact litigating parties and those 
interested in the case?(Probe litigants, advocates, prosecutors, organised crime, 
politicians, law enforcement, business elite.) 
• Probe when, and in what part of the judicial process do actors mainly get involved to 
achieve corruption and why? [(Probe  through a scale politicians(local/central.), 
organised crime(local/central.), business elites(local/central.), media, powerful 
individuals, court staff, family, advocates, prosecutors, decision writing etc.)] 
• Probe who do judges say approaches those most in terms of corruption? [(i.e. litigants, 
advocates, politicians, organised crime, business, court staff.), (Probe frequency senior 
v. younger generation.), advocates (post communist v. new generation, politicians, 
organised crime, business elites (by case, court level, region.)  
• Why, in your opinion, usually people claim that advocates are the main intermediaries 
to judicial corruption? (Probe court level and region.) 
• What ADR is there in Albania today? (Probe mediation, arbitration private or public.)  
• Is it difficult to enforce an ADR decision and why? 
 
4-Organised crime, judicial corruption and political elite (all respondents-judges only 
underlined)  
• What indicators may point to the interplay among judicial corruption, organised crime 
and political elite? [(What, how, indicators, problems  (by case,  court level and region.) 
• Do you have any sense, according to your discussion with your colleagues about the 
structure and activity of organised crime? [(Probe their activity, recruiting process, 
membership (age, gender, relationship.), governing rules (code of honour, what 
customary norms.), frequency of power (cities, region, rural, urban.) 
• What are some of the ways of cooperation between judges and politicians in terms of 
judicial corruption? (Probe by case type, court level and region, patterns of meetings, 
causes.)Probe it said that usually judiciary is stereotyped by the politicians; what are 
some of the technique they use to achieve that and have they succeeded? (Probe by 
court level and region.) 
• Usually media claims that criminals are immune of prosecution because of judicial 
corruption; in your opinion what techniques does organised crime uses to neutralise 
judges and prosecutors? (Probe case type, court level and region.) 
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• Probe more specifically how do judges interplay with organised crime? (Probe by 
region and court level, senior and junior judges.) 
• Probe in a time scale what have, in your opinion, been the most frequent neutralising 
techniques used by organised crime since 1989? And 1980? (Probe case type, court 
level and region.) 
 
7-Role of Customary norms  
• What are some of the customary norms used to approach judges (litigants, 
prosecutors, colleague, advocates, OC) 
• Probe patterns of OC 
• Probe political elite 
• (Probe by variations, case type, court level and region.) 
 
8-Results and Obstacles to Reforms  
• What is the importance and role of judicial reforms in the development strategy of 
Albania? 
• Probe what are some of the links between judicial reform, private and social sector 
development?  
• Probe what is the likely result of judicial reforms in Albania? 
• Probe what are the main obstacles?  
• Probe who supports or opposes judicial reforms? (Probe by interest groups and 
potential risks.) 
• Media claims that the community of judges is not asked for several key judicial 













Interviewee: M…. K…….                         Date of Interview: 25/04/2010 
Gender: Female                                         Education. Post-communist judge 
Place: his/her office (First Instance court of Tirana)   Time of Interview: 10.30am 
 
Duration of Interview: 60min 
 
Was the venue suitable? 
• Yes  
Does anything need to be changed for future interviews? 
Be prepared for delays  
 
How easy was it to establish rapport?  
• Easy: In general, she was open but tried to escape from the questions regarding the 
causes of corruption in the courts.  
 
Were there any problems and how can this be improved for next time? 
• Be aware for the time as they can give you only 30minutes. 
 
Did the interview schedule work well? Does it need to be altered or improved? 
• In general it worked well but I tried to avoid questions on the links of organized 
crime and political elite with the courts. She was not quite sure on the influencing 
patterns of organized crime. It should be mentioned though that she was dealing 
with civil and administrative cases and not with criminal cases.  
What were the main themes which arose in the interview? 
• Defective laws, the role of executive, the latter is obstructing the role of courts by 
not enforcing administrative decisions decided by the courts.  
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• To her this patterns was to circumvent the judiciary role or lack of judicial 
independence. The executive did not recognize the decision of courts or ignore it at 
best.  
 
Did any issues arise which need to be added to the interview schedule for next time? 
• Many defective laws after 2005  
• Executive ‘ignores’ court decisions   
• The evaluation system of judges  
 
Is the interviewee willing to be contacted again?  
Yes and she offered her help to find for me another judge for interview.  
 
A possible quote from participant: 
“Gjyqtari e fillon karrieren si gjeneral dhe e mbyll si tetar” 
“Here in Albania we judges start our career with the enthusiasm of an army general and 
















Notes during the Interview 
  
A eshte gjyqsori i panvarur: (Judicial Independence) 
Ligjerisht po por jo praktikisht sepse me vendimet e gjykatave merret kushdo. Sapo nje 
vendim gjykate ne ceshtje sensitive del ne publik kushdo e ndjen vete gjykates per ta 
goditur. Pra gjyqsori eshte bere ne nje pre shume te lehte per tu anatemuar ne publik.  
Sidomos kur institucionet publike preken nga nje vendim gjykate. 
Administrimi gjyqsorit: (Administration) 
Shume te pakenaqur me buxhetin qe i jepet gjykatave. Ai eshte shume I paket ne raport me 
ate qe gjykatat prodhojne. Psh ligji per taksta qe lidhet me pullen ne lidhje me gjykatat. Ligji 
me perparshem ka qene qe 1% e vleres se ceshtjes i takonte gjykates tani ky ligje eshte 
shfuqizuar dhe kjo ka bere qe packa qe gjykata punon kjo nuk demonstrohet ne te ardhura.  
Tani Ministri Financave ka vene nje cmim pulle shume minimal. Keshtu duke qene se 
gjykata merr 5% nga te ardhurat qe i jep shtetit kjo ka bere qe te ardhurat qe nxjerr te jene 
shume me te pakta. Ligjet ne pergjithesi jane shume difektoze. Ligjet organike e kane 
vendosur gjyqtarin ne nje pozicion shume te veshtire pasi gjyqtari mund te penalizohet per 
cdo gje.  
Rekrutimi i Gjyqtareve (Nomination) 
Rekrutimi nuk bazohet ne meritokraci, aftesi profesionale apo eksperience. Gjyqtaret sot 
promovohen ne baze te njohjeve politike ose nese nje i aferm i tyre ka lidhje me politiken. 
Krahinizmi nuk duket se luan ndonje rol ne zgjedhjen e gjyqtarev. Mosha e emerimit te 
gjyqtareve duhet te jete me e larte sec eshte tani pasi kjo ndikon ne gjykimin e tyre. Kjo 
gjyqtare thote se me perpara ka dhene vendime edhe me 25 vjet heqje lirie por qe sot 
mbase nuk do ti jepte. Dhe kjo si rezultat i moshes.  
Sistemi vleresimi te gjyqtarit.(Evaluation process) 
Eshte bere nje draft por eshte shume difektoz. Kjo nuk eshte ne vende as si Italia. Eshte ne 
Gjermani por ne nuk jemi sistem gjerman. Ne i ngjajme me shume atij Italianit. Ne Greqi po 
duan ta heqin.  
Inspektimi (Inspection) 
Inspektoret jane gjyqtare por te cilet jane bere te tille vetem per te ardhur ne Tirane. Ajo 
qe te cudit eshte se ata inspektore aktiv ne goditjen e gjyqtareve (gjueti e shtrigave) jane 
shperblyer me poste te larta ne gjykata apeli. Por kjo nuk duket se eshte etike pra nje 
inspektor qe ka goditur gjyqtaret nuk mund te jete gjykates i Apelit apo gjykates se larte 







Te pa kenaqur. Sot qe po merrej intervista kompiuteri ne zyren e gjyqtares nuk punonte. 
Gjyqtaret detyrohen ti kryejne seancat e gjykimit ne zyrat e tyre pasi kompiuteri ne sallat e 
gjyqit nuk punon dhe kjo detyron sekretaret te mbajne shenime me dore te cilat shpesh 
jane fare te pakptueshme. Sekretaret ne pergjithesi i mbajne shenimet me kompiuter por 
kjo sipas kerkeses se gjyqtarit. Ka gjyqtare qe preferojne qe ato te mbahen me dore pasi 
keshtu jane me te sigurta per tu fallsifikuar.  
Siguria fizike (Physical security) 
Nga ana tjeter infrastruktura le shume per te deshirura si ne ceshtjen e solemnitetit por 
edhe ne sigurine e gjyqtarit. Ne gjykaten e Tiranes ka nje aparat kontrolli dhe polica 
sigurimi por kushdo kalon dhe nuk kontrollohet. Me e keqja eshte se aparati sinjalizon per 
metale dhe polici roje e sheh kete gje dhe nuk reagon.  
Dynamics of Judicial independence  
Kryegjtari dhe kryeprokurori ishin anetar te pleniumit. Per cdo vendim gjykate qofte edhe 
banal ata merrnin opinioni e organizates baze te partise ne lidhje me te pandheurit. Kjo 
edhe ne raste martesash.  Aktualisht gjyqsori eshte shume me i panvarur dhe nuk ka ndikim 
politik. ‘Ketu ne fakt gjyqtarja eshte pak konfuze sepse ne te gjitha ato qe thote per 
emerimin tregon se ka ndikim politika por si duket ajo ketu ka parasysh ndikime te 
drejtperdrejta, pra nje telefonoate apo nje mesazh nga eprori per nje ceshtje te caktuar’.  
Gjyqtarja shprehet se per sa ka ajo ne profesion qe prej 1988 ajo nuk ka pasur asnje rast te 
ndonje nderhyrje direkte politike pas 1990. Ajo qe goditet eshte vendimi i gjykates.  
Transparenca (Transparency) 
Transparenca ne gjykaten e Tiranes eshte e plote. Cdo vendim i zbardhur pas 15 ditesh per 
ceshtjesh penale dhe 10 ditesh per civile (koha per ankimim) cohet per tu botuar online nga 
gjyqtari. Nese ajo nuk ndodh ky nuk eshte faji i gjyqtareve. Por gjykata te tjera nuk e kane 
kete lloj transparence dhe ketu kemi parasysh infrastrukturen elektronike. Skandaloze 
eshte qe dhe Gjykata e Apelit te Tiranes nuk e ka kete infrastrukture. Ne lidhje me 
mbrojtjen e te dhenave ne ato raste kur cmohet se ceshtja eshte sensitive seanca kryehte 
me dyer te mbyllura.Ka nje problem me gazetaret te cilet edhe per masa sigurie (gje e cila 
nuk tregon se dikush eshte i fajshem) bejne publikimin ne media duke cenuar imazhin e 
individit. Kjo sidomos me te miturit.  
Korrupsioni (Corruption) 
Ka nje perceptim te gabuatr per korrupsionin ne gjyqsor i cili shume shpesh vjen si rezultat i 
avokatit. Ky i fundit luan rolin e sekserit dhe kur humb ceshtjen ia ve fajin gjyqtarit duke 
thene se do duhej ti jepnim leke. Nese parashikon se e fiton ceshtjen i kerkon para klientit 
duke i thene se i ka dhene gjyqtarit. Por ne te vertete gjyqtari nuk di asgje. Nga ana tjeter 
percepsioni eshte i gabuar edhe ne rastin e vendimit te drejte. Palet edhe nese vendimi 
eshte i drejte e paragjykojne. Shoqeria shqiptare vuan shume nga paragjykimet. “Gjyqsori 
eshte jetim”..Nese egzekutivi ka nje kryeminister qe e mbron dhe paralemntaret kane 
foltoret per tu mbrojtur gjyqtaret nuk kane. Cdo mos menazhim nga ana e qeverise i 
adresohet pa te drejte gjyqsorit. Ndikim i politikes eshte me i ndjeshem ne gjykatat e larta.  
Psh rasti i Kristaq Trajes ish gjyqtar i Strasburgut qe u refuzua nga Parlamenti tregon 
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kontrollin politik te gjykatave te larta. Mjafton te shohesh kush eshte anetar i gjykates se 
larte per ta kutpuar kete gje. Korrupsioni ne gjyqsor ka kapur kulmin ne vitet 1997-1998. Ka 
pasur nje renie me pas por ka filluar te rritet. Rreth viteve 1997-1998 kemi pasur djegje te 
dosjeve ne gjykata si e Shkodres psh qe eshte djegur dy here. Ndersa e Tiranes eshte 
permbytur. Kjo ka bere qe shume dosje te vjetra te kene humbur. Nje tjeter indikator 
tregues qe gjyqsori nuk eshte i panvarur eshte dhe Udhezimi i Keshillit te Ministrave per 
cregjistrimin e prones?????? I cili eshte shfuqizuar nga Gj. Kushtetuese si jo kushtetues. Por 
ky vendim hyn ne fuqi vetem pasi botohet ne fletoren zyrtare dhe duke qene se nuk eshte 
botuar vazhdon qe Udhezimi i KM te jete ne fuqi. (Paradoks).Ligji per legalizimet shume i 
gabuar. Nga nje ane iu jepet pushtet ne menyre te paligjshme Kryeregjistruesit te cfuqizoje 
vendimet e gjykatave me udhezimin no. 1 te KM dhe nga ana tjeter behen legalizime vetem 
me firmen e atij qe ka zene pronen dhe kufitareve. Pra nje VKM del mbi ligjin dhe nje 
institucion shteteror mbi gjykatat.  
Shkaktaret per korrupsionin (Causes of Corruption) 
Kushtet politike; Kushtet ekonomike—jo dhe aq. Rrogat e gjyqtareve jane me te lartat 
krahasuar me punonjesit e tjere te administrates civile. Ne pergjithesi per kete gje ankohen 
gjyqtaret e rinj te cilet duan te kapin standartet ekonomike shume shpejt; Edukimi nuk 
perben ndonje problem madhor sepse shkolla e magjistratures po nxjerr studente te mire. 
Problem qendron tek mesusesit qe japin mesim aty; Pronat nje problem madhor per 
korrupsion; Kultura juridike, kemi kulture juridike por kemi shume ligje kontradiktore 
(paradoks) 
Teknikat neutralizuese (corruption techniques in general) 
Perfaqesuesit e institucioneve te shtetit dhe avokati I shtetit pengojne punen e gjykates. Si? 
Kerkojne shtyrje seancash pa fund 
“Avokati i shtetit e koncepton veten si nje shkop ne rroten e gjykatesit”  
Nje rast specifik eshte kur avokati i shtetit kerkon qe vendimi qe sipas ligjit lidhet me 
ceshtje mbi 20milion leke kerkon te jepet nga 3 gjyqtare. Kjo nuk eshte funksionale pasi 
eshte shume e veshtire te besh 3 gjyqtare pasi jane shume shume te ngarkuar. Kjo eshte te 
paragjykosh gjyqtaret sidomos gjyqtaren relatuese. 
Por avokati i shtetit edhe pse e di kete gje e ben per te justifikuar veten e tij.  
Pengesa ne reforma (Obstacles to judicial reforms) 
Jane politike dhe ekonomike 
Kemi shume reforma sepse kjo vjen edhe si rezultat i punes jo te mire te te huajve. “Na 
perdorin te huajt si kavie”. Te huajt nuk e njohin fare kontekstin shqiptar por vijne dhe 
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